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Abstract 
 This thesis investigates the role of institutional logics, as hidden drivers of firm 
behaviour, in shaping firm practices and decisions on corporate governance configurations and 
engagement in corporate social responsibility. It adopts a quantitative approach to identify and 
assess the embeddedness of family and market (non-family) logics in firm decision making, 
incorporating several behavioural dimensions in terms of real firm practices that are empirically 
proven to differ between family and non-family firms. The thesis builds on the socioemotional 
wealth preservation perspective regarding displaying family or non-family firm-like behaviour, 
and develops a new, institutional-based classification of firms, comprising family logic-driven 
and market logic-driven firms that draw from the notion of firm logic orientation – a latent 
explanatory, institutional factor.  
This institutional-based approach suggests a distinct view of the familiness and non-
familiness, or marketness, of firms irrespective of ownership status (family or not). Particularly, 
this thesis emphasises that it is not family ownership status (or not), but the firm practices and 
behaviour that characterise and define firms in terms of their distinctive culture and nature. 
Using US-based data of firms listed on the S&P 1500 index in the period of 2006–2016, it tests 
the main and moderation effects of firm logic orientation through the empirical windows of 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility.  
The analysis finds that family logic-driven firms differ from market logic-driven firms 
regarding the firm choice of internal corporate governance configurations and the magnitude of 
the established corporate governance determinant-configuration relationships. Specifically, 
relative to market logic-driven firms, family logic-driven firms appoint smaller and less 
independent boards and pay top managers lower total and equity-based compensation. 
Moreover, compared with the marketness logic orientation, the familiness of firms mitigates the 
effect of corporate governance determinants, including firm-specific, managerial and 
governance characteristics, on corporate governance configurations concerning the structure of 
the board of directors and the design of executive compensation.  
The findings also show that family logic-driven and market logic-driven firms vary in 
terms of the firm social performance of corporate social responsibility and the magnitude of the 
relationship between strategic conformity – a legitimacy-seeking activity – and corporate social 
responsibility performance. Particularly, relative to market logic-driven firms, family logic-
driven firms perform worse regarding firm engagement in corporate social responsibility. 
However, relative to the marketness logic orientation, the familiness of firms amplifies the 
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social gains derived from firm legitimacy in relation to improving the perception of firms’ 
corporate social responsibility. This mitigates the otherwise negative impact of familiness logic 
orientation on corporate social responsibility performance.  
The findings indicate that, driving firm behaviour, the familiness logic orientation of 
firms presents a distinct, family-oriented business form that, apart from family ownership status 
(or not), differentiates firms from the standard, shareholder-oriented view of firms – so-called 
marketness logic orientation – in terms of firm practices and decisions. This implies that the 
latent institutional factor of firm logic orientation matters at least as much as the facet of 
ownership status for firm practices and behaviour. This thesis is one of the first to quantitatively 
measure the embeddedness of institutional logics – an intangible construct – in firm decision 
making based on the level of observed firm practices as a tangible manifestation of namely 
family and market logics, and to empirically examine the influence of family and market logics 
on firm practices and behaviour in the contexts of corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility. 
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1 Introduction 
The scholars have extensively investigated and attempted to explain the differences in the 
practices and decisions of firms, emphasising a certain concept of distinction among firms. To 
examine firms and – by extension – understand their practices and behaviour, it is reasonable to 
attempt to group them into distinguishable groupings and classifications. To this end, firms are 
usually grouped on the basis of ownership criteria. In the family business literature, firms are 
commonly and traditionally viewed in terms of their family ownership status and, as such, they 
are classified into genuine family firms if they are owned or managed by a family. By default, 
all firms that do not fall into this category are considered as non-family firms. Building on this 
simple dichotomy, family and non-family firms have been widely analysed in regard to firm 
practices and decisioins, with the result that this extensive literature provides ample empirical 
evidence of a behavioural discrepancy. However, this difference in firm behaviour deriving 
from the ownership status (family or not) of firms is fundamentally ignored in the literature. 
 A large majority of family-oriented studies is almost exclusively ownership-based, which 
relies on the ownership criteria to compare family firms with their counterparts. In doing so; 
however, the traditional ownership-based classification of firms falls short of incorporating the 
actual firm practices and behaviour. In this thesis, I posit that, contrary to the predominant 
ownership-based classification of firms, the behaviour of non-family-owned or managed firms 
can potentially be more similar to that of firms that are traditionally included in the family 
category. Or it may well be that the behaviour of firms, which are considered to be similar 
because of family ownership, can be substantially different when looking at firm practices and 
decisions. Thus, ignoring the behavioural perspective in favour of the ownership criteria 
represents a crucial misunderstanding and limitation in the family business literature. 
Emphasising firm behaviour, in this thesis, I mainly direct attention to the notion of 
institutional logics (ILs) as covert drivers of firm behaviour (Friedland and Alford, 1991). To 
explain the diversity of firms and how they react differently to the institutional environment in 
which firms exist and operate, the concept of ILs has come into play proxying for firm 
behaviour. Here, the isomorphism of firms, a key assumption of institutional theory on firms 
being uniform or similar (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott and Meyer, 1983; Scott, 1987; 
DiMaggio, 1988), becomes less of a major focal point at the field, societal and global levels. 
Instead, the focus shifts to the influence of ILs on firms and members at the firm, industry, 
market and other levels.  
Providing the guidance and prescriptions of appropriate behaviour and means to achieve 
it, ILs latently embed in firm decision making (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Greenwood et al., 
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2011). As such, they portray the culture and nature of firms in running the business that firm 
behaviour best demonstrates (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Danisman 
et al., 2006; Greenwood et al., 2011). According to Danisman et al. (2006), firms may embed 
one main culture or nature that reflects an overriding logic at the firm level concerning firm 
decision making. Thus, firm practices and decisions are tangible manifestation of such 
embedded logics (Greenwood et al., 2010), prompting the discrepancy in firm behaviour. 
Therefore, as a latent institutional factor, ILs trigger areas of further investigation regarding 
their role in shaping firm practices and decisions. However, previous studies have largely 
neglected the role of ILs that implicitly drive firm behaviour. As such, the primary purpose of 
this thesis is expanding the knowledge and understanding of the ILs perspective.  
According to Thornton (2004), firms exist and operate in a society that represents a multi-
order institutional system comprising multiple, main institutions or societal sectors, both market 
and nonmarket. Each of these is associated with a core, unique logic; IL, that addresses the 
values, assumptions and norms of the corresponding institution and guides social actions. 
Accordingly, firms confront a complex institutional context, encountering multiple and different 
institutional demands and pressures imposed by a plurality of logics (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
That is, ILs coexist and interplay, and at the same time, contradict one another. Therefore, as 
Greenwood et al. (2011) assert, although ILs can interrelate, they often come into conflict as 
their guidance is contradictory and incompatible in terms of the symbols and material practices 
comprising each institution’s ongoing principles.  
A growing interest in ILs is justified by the institutional complexity that firms confront 
due to the prevalence of multiple, typically competing logics and the adoption of different 
response strategies (Reay and Hinings, 2009; Pache and Santos, 2013). For instance, addressing 
the contradictory demands and pressures that firms experience, Greenwood et al. (2010) point  
to the inconsistency of family and market logics relating to firm decision on downsizing, where 
family logic promotes providing job security more effectively relative to market logic. Further, 
Miller et al. (2011) highlight the difference between the norms and prescriptions that family and 
market logics impose in terms of the strategic priorities of lone founder and family-owned or 
managed firms, thereby explaining firm performance. Likewise, Mair et al. (2015) stress distinct 
firm types in relation the setup of governance structures of hybrid firms, identifying the 
embeddedness of commercial and social welfare logics in firm decision making and firm 
response strategy to them. Still, there is relatively little empirical research on the role of ILs in 
driving firm behaviour.  
Stressing firm behaviour, in this thesis, I addresses the gap in the literature by first 
suggesting the application of the ILs perspective to the concept of distinction among firms, 
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rethinking of family and non-family firms in terms of firm behaviour apart from ownership 
status (family or not). In other words, I propose that the embeddedness of ILs in firm decision 
making plays an implicit role in shaping firm practices and decisions, ultimately determining the 
firm type in terms of whether or not a firm is family-oriented. Thereby, I emphasise that it is not 
family ownership status (or not), but the firm practices and behaviour that characterise and 
define firms in terms of their distinctive culture and nature. Particularly, in this thesis, I identify 
and classify family and non-family firms differently relative to the ownership-based studies, 
emphasising the display of family and non-family firm-like behaviours irrespective of family 
ownership status (or not).  
Accordingly, stressing the most prevalent ILs, I emphasise both family and market (non-
family) logics. Drawing on the family business literature, particularly the concept of 
‘institutional overlap’, I address the intersection between families and their businesses 
(Lansberg, 1983). In this way, I pose a family-oriented business system that is opposing or 
inconsistent with the typical shareholder-oriented business setting, emphasising the 
contradiction or incompatibility of family and market logics. Thus, in this thesis, I primarily 
depict the family logic in the sense of a family-oriented attitude and preference that 
fundamentally portrays an overlay between the family and business systems, presenting a 
distinct business setting. In contrast, drawing on the firm theory and market discipline 
perspectives and given the threat of the takeover market as a primary control mechanism 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the market logic underlies a shareholder-oriented business setting 
in terms of prioritising the key economic business objective of profitability and shareholders’ 
wealth maximisation in an archetypal business system.  
Stemming from the family business literature, in this thesis, I primarily draw on the 
perspective of socioemotional wealth (SEW) to underlie the difference among and classification 
of firms. The scholars have found that SEW is the most prominent aspect of family-oriented 
identity and the most important differentiator of family firms, where it represents a latent 
explanatory factor of their distinct behaviour (Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014). SEW is 
founded on behavioural agency theory, introducing the affective endowments of key firm actors 
– owners and managers – related to the non-economic benefits, such as authority, reputation, 
social ties and job security, derived from the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 
2012). It presents a primary reference point of family firms around which their problems, issues 
and opportunities are framed, irrespective of the economic logic of running the business in 
terms of the primary objective of profitability and shareholders’ wealth maximisation. In other 
words, relative to non-family firms, family firms carry out practices and decisions that 
essentially help maintain or extend SEW regardless of their financial returns, avoiding the 
potential loss of SEW.  
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Therefore, among the differentiation aspects, the SEW preservation increasingly presents 
a key distinguishing factor that explains the difference in strategic choices and managerial 
decisions between family and non-family firms (Berrone et al., 2012). In other words, as a key 
characterisation of family firms, the priority of SEW preservation captures the uniqueness of 
family behaviour in contrast to non-family firm behaviour, primarily exhibiting a family-
oriented attitude and preference. More importantly, SEW is not supposed to be limited to family 
businesses, and as such, family ownership or membership is not a condition (Berrone et al., 
2010; Miller and Le Breton‐Miller, 2014). Thus, stemming from the family business literature, 
in this thesis, I adopt the popular SEW model to frame firm behaviour in terms of depicting and 
differentiation between family and non-family behaviours, and in turn, identify and classify 
firms.  
Drawing on the idea of conforming firms that prioritise a single, dominant logic to direct 
firm behaviour (Mair et al., 2015), at one extreme, in this thesis, I introduce and define family 
logic-driven firms (FLDFs) as those embedding a family logic in terms of the priority of the 
preservation of SEW attached to the firm as a family-oriented attitude and preference. At the 
other extreme, I depict market logic–driven firms (MLDFs) simply the opposite, embedding a 
market logic in terms of the priority of profitability and maximisation of shareholders’ wealth, 
which is a primary economic business objective. Emphasising firm behaviour, in this thesis, I 
portray FLDFs and MLDFs as behaving like family and non-family firms, respectively, in terms 
of their motives, objectives and essence. In particular, FLDFs (MLDFs) are driven by the same 
family (market) logic of family-owned or managed (non-family) firms. This primarily 
emphasises the notion of SEW, where the SEW preservation is a vital non-economic reference 
point of firm practices and decisions; that is, SEW is a priority that distinguishes between 
FLDFs and MLDFs in terms of their practices and behaviour.  
Therefore, stressing the perspectives of ILs and SEW, I mainly expect commonalities and 
similarities between FLDFs (MLDFs) and family (non-family) firms. In essence, irrespective of 
ownership status (family or not), FLDFs and MLDFs exhibit family and non-family firm-like 
behaviours as a manifestation of family and market logics embedded in firm decision making, 
respectively. Further, building on the fact that ILs can coexist and interplay, as in dissenting 
firms that resist the identification with a single, dominant logic (Reay and Hinings, 2009; 
Greenwood et al., 2010; Mair et al., 2015), in this thesis, I allow firms to embed both family and 
market logics in a hybrid form of firms that exhibit an overlap of family and non-family firm-
like behaviours.  
Moreover, emphasising the embeddedness of family and market logics, I posit that such 
institutional-based distinction among firms is conceptually superior for characterising and 
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defining firms to the traditional split of family and non-family firms that emphasises the 
ownership criteria. Particularly, it incorporates firm behaviour regarding actual firm practices 
and decisions apart from ownership status (family or not). In other words, I emphasise the idea 
that family firms can behave like non-family firms and vice versa, where basically it is the firm 
behaviour that is important rather than the facet of ownership status. 
Thereby, emphasising the embeddedness of ILs, in this thesis, I mainly suggest a distinct, 
institutional-based classification of firms into FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs. Specifically, I 
introduce the notion of ‘firm logic orientation’ that depicts and defines the firm type in terms of 
the so-called logic-based group of firms, illustrating the embeddedness of family and market 
logics by which a firm is driven. Therefore, to describe the logic orientation of firms, I put 
forward the constructs of ‘familiness’ and ‘non-familiness’ to identify and classify firms. These 
constructs highlight the dominant logic embedded in firm decision making and driving firm 
behaviour accordingly irrespective of family ownership status (or not). For precision, simplicity 
and clarity, in this thesis, I refer to non-familiness as ‘marketness’, addressing the contrast and 
opposition of family and market logics (Miller et al., 2011). Accordingly, the discussion builds 
on the rapidly growing ILs perspective to highlight the distinction among firms, suggesting a 
distinct view of the familiness and marketness of firms.  
Regarding the core of this thesis, it raises an important claim that real firm practices and 
decisions tangibly manifest the embeddedness of ILs in firm decision making that portrays the 
firm culture and nature, thereby characterising and defining the firm type in terms of firm 
behaviour. Advancing the understanding and conceptualisation of firm type and the 
classification of firms, it primarily depicts the familiness of firms in terms of a family-oriented 
flavour and essence – the concern for SEW preservation – whereas the marketness of firms 
presents the opposite – the priority of profitability and shareholders’ wealth maximisation. To 
date, no study has directly defined and measured ILs, where most work on ILs is qualitative1 – 
interview or survey based; this draws attention to a research opportunity.  
Therefore, addressing such gap, in this thesis, I develop a quantitative measurement of the 
intangible construct of ILs concerning the embeddedness of family and market logics to 
determine the logic orientation of firms in relation to firm behaviour. As such, building on the 
perspective of SEW preservation, I differentiate between and classify FLDFs and MLDFs based 
on real firm practices and decisions in terms of the level of several behavioural dimensions, 
including corporate diversification, earnings management, tax aggressiveness and research and 
development (R&D) investment. In the family business literature, family and non-family firms 
are extensively analysed and empirically proved to vary in terms of these behavioural 
 
1 See for example, Mair et al. (2015). 
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dimensions, increasingly justifying the distinct behaviour of family firms from the SEW 
preservation perspective.  
In this thesis, I address another gap in the literature by directing attention to empirically 
examining the influence of ILs on firm practices and decisions, emphasising the role of ILs in 
driving firm behaviour. So far, research has not focussed sufficiently on the association between 
ILs and corporate governance (CG), highlighting an area of investigation given the evidenced 
discrepancies in CG, for instance, the difference in the board of directors’ structure between 
family and non-family firms. CG introduces the means of control in terms of internal CG 
configurations, including the board of directors as the core of CG and executive compensation, 
to manage the potential agency problems between owners and managers. It emphasises a central 
objective of maximising the wealth of shareholders, as the dominant stakeholder group, by 
increasing firm’s financial returns. Given the various CG configurations, CG practices exhibit a 
remarkable discrepancy among firms in terms of the setup of firm governance.  
While economic hypotheses largely explain the implementation of CG in relation to the 
structure of the board of directors and executive compensation plan, there remains an 
unexplained idiosyncratic component. Thus, the CG configurations adopted in firms where 
ownership status (family or not) is emphasised fall short of adequately explaining the 
uniqueness of firm governance practices. While the extant literature has highlighted the 
perspective of ILs in identifying and differentiating among firms regarding the setup of 
governance structures (e.g. the qualitative analysis of Mair et al. (2015)), less attention has been 
paid to empirically investigating and addressing how different CG configurations are. Thus, in 
this thesis, I address this lack of understanding and examine whether and how firm logic 
orientation affects firm behaviour, focussing first on firm governance. Specifically, drawing on 
the perspective of ILs, I emphasise the association between firm logic orientation and CG.  
Stemming from the SEW preservation perspective, the premises lie in the unique, 
influential identity of FLDFs, which encompasses firm priorities and interests in terms of what a 
firm is and what it wishes to become. Stemming from institutional theory, firm identity serves 
as a sensemaking tool for the distinct firm behaviour (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006; Glynn, 2008; 
Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014). In accordance with this, SEW represents the leading aspect of 
family-oriented identity (Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014), providing a demonstration of 
the characterisation and distinction of the identity of FLDFs. According to Greenwood et al. 
(2011), a stronger firm identity implies more conditions versus, and as such, resistance to 
external demands and pressures. Therefore, building on the concern for SEW preservation, 
FLDFs derive CG discretion from such an identity, which yields to CG deviance (Aguilera et 
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al., 2018), in alignment with SEW-related interests and goals given the non-economic utilities of 
key firm actors linked to the firm.  
This mainly sheds light on distinct, idiosyncratic governance practices of FLDFs relative 
to the dominant shareholder-oriented governance system, which is, drawing on the firm theory 
and market discipline perspectives, presumably more likely conformed in MLDFs, given its 
overarching objective in relation to shareholders’ wealth maximisation. Stressing the lens of ILs 
to investigate firm practices and decisions, the first empirical chapter – Chapter 3 – uses CG as 
the focal empirical window to examine whether and how the logic orientation of firms 
influences the firm choice of internal CG configurations in terms of the structure of the board of 
directors and executive compensation plan. Emphasising the implicit role of ILs as covert 
drivers of firm behaviour, it particularly raises a research question of whether ILs shape the 
setup of firm governance. 
Going a step further, the second empirical chapter – Chapter 4 – investigates whether and 
how firm logic orientation affects the relationship between CG determinants and configurations, 
addressing a more subtle and in-depth manifestation of firm character – the logic orientation of 
firms – in firm behaviour. Stressing the role of ILs in shaping firm practices and decisions, its 
underlying research question specifically is, do ILs condition the impact of CG drivers 
concerning the setup of firm governance? This mainly extends the initial argument on the 
difference in the choices of internal CG configurations between FLDFs and MLDFs. 
Particularly, I emphasise the moderating role of firm logic orientation regarding the effect of 
well-known CG determinants, including firm-specific, managerial and governance 
characteristics, on CG configurations in terms of the board of directors structure and the design 
of executive compensation.  
Emphasising the perspective of SEW preservation, the key premises underlying the 
moderating role of firm logic orientation lie in the application of an organismal filter. According 
to Greenwood et al. (2011), external pressures and demands do not affect all firms equally; 
however, they pass through organisational filters enacted by the characteristics of firms 
themselves, namely firm identity. Firm identity determines the interests and priorities, and as 
such, responses of firms to external demands and pressures, which shape the practices and 
decisions that firms undertake, making sense of firm behaviour (Scott and Lane, 2000; Albert 
and Whetten, 2004).  
Accordingly, building on the priority of SEW preservation, the identity of FLDFs serves 
as an organisational filter of the CG pressures and demands imposed by the dominant 
shareholder-oriented governance practices, where SEW poses the most prominent feature of 
family-oriented identity (Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014). Applying the organisational 
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filter of firm identity between CG determinants and configurations, FLDFs respond differently 
to CG determinants concerning CG configurations relative to MLDFs, mainly aligning CG 
practices with SEW-related interests and concerns irrespective of the prevailing governance 
system, in line with the CG deviance perspective (Aguilera et al., 2018).  
Further, stemming from the ILs perspective, firms confront institutional complexity, 
given the multiple, typically contradictory logics, to which they respond differently in the way 
that best fits them, namely firm response strategy (Greenwood et al., 2011). The response 
strategy of decoupling basically implies that firms implement practices that are best aligned 
with firm interests and goals, mainly separating between the operational and normative 
structures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Tilcsik, 2010; Bromley 
and Powell, 2012). Emphasising the SEW preservation perspective, FLDFs undertake practices 
that most likely conform to their SEW-related interests and goals in the name of protecting the 
affective endowments of key firm actors, including authority and control, reputation and 
prestige, job security and protection and social ties, attached to the firm.  
Therefore, adopting decoupling response strategy, FLDFs create a distinction or 
separation between the implemented and standard or prevailing systems regarding CG, where 
they decouple CG configurations from their determinants. That is, responding distinctly to CG 
determinants concerning CG configurations, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs do not undertake the 
predominant governance practices at their operational level; instead, according to Mair et al. 
(2015), they obey the minimum standards for legitimacy-seeking purposes. As such, FLDFs 
implement CG practices that align with their priorities, interests and concerns relating to the 
preservation of SEW that collectively demonstrate their distinct, potent identity.  
Moreover, stressing the SEW preservation perspective, the non-economic utilities derived 
from the firm self-motivate FLDF managers to willingly serve as self-monitored stewards of the 
business. Given the dual threat that they cope with in terms of bearing both financial and SEW-
related risks and the interdependence of firm’s financial standing and SEW (Berrone et al., 
2012; Miller and Le Breton‐Miller, 2014), the managers of FLDFs possess a substantial 
incentive to protect the firm financially, and in turn, maintain their both financial wealth and 
SEW closely attached to the firm. Therefore, they actively act efficiently and not 
opportunistically, given the competitiveness of managerial labour market and the threat of 
takeover market. This hinders the potential opportunistic behaviour of FLDF managers as the 
loss aversion of current non-economic benefits linked to the firm outweighs the pursuit of future 
gains.  
Accordingly, the self-incentivisation of FLDF managers prompts their stewardship and, 
according to van Aaken et al. (2017), self-governance. This underlies the substitution effect of 
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SEW for the respective controlling roles of the board of directors and executive compensation 
(Williamson, 1983). Specifically, the importance of the board of directors and executive 
compensation as internal CG configurations, regarding their roles of monitoring and advising, as 
well as managerial motivation and the alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests, 
respectively, is limited in FLDFs where the preservation of SEW is a priority. 
I extend the empirical investigation of the influence of ILs on firm practices and decisions 
through another important empirical window, that of corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR 
stresses the wider social good in terms of the socially responsible practices of firms that 
consider the interests, demands and concerns of various groups of stakeholders, both internal 
and external, as the recipients of firm practices and decisions (Peterson, 2004). Despite 
shareholders presenting the dominant stakeholder emphasised by firm management, firms have 
many other relationships with a variety of stakeholders, including consumers, suppliers, 
employees, government bodies and environmental supporters, who purse different, non-
financial goals, preferences and interests. This highlights the significance of evaluating how 
firms perform regarding the social and environmental consequences of their practices and 
decisions, where doing good leads basically to doing better (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Sen 
and Bhattacharya, 2001; Nelson, 2004; Borghesi et al., 2014). 
In spite of the prominence and influence of CSR, firms normally exhibit a difference in 
firm social performance, where some firms engage less in socially responsible practices 
compared with their counterparts given the common, underlying difference of ownership status 
(family or not) (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2016; Zientara, 2017). While 
the extant literature has addressed the effect of ILs on strategic and economic behaviours, 
research attention to the association between ILs and CSR is lacking. This highlights an area of 
examination given the proven differences in CSR, for instance, the difference in socially 
responsible practices between family and non-family firms.  
In this thesis, I address this lack of understanding and examine whether and how the logic 
orientation of firms influences firm behaviour, emphasising firm social performance as a second 
consideration. Particularly, building on the ILs perspective, I stress the association between firm 
logic orientation and CSR. Accordingly, the third empirical chapter – Chapter 5 –  uses CSR as 
an empirical window to examine whether and how the logic orientation of firms affects CSR 
performance in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR, namely the evaluation of how 
firms perform on environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance benchmarks that 
incorporate the social and environmental effects of firm practices and decisions. Emphasising 
the role of ILs in shaping firm practices and decisions, it specifically raises a research question 
of whether ILs drive firm engagement in CSR.  
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The central premises underlying the difference in CSR performance between FLDFs and 
MLDFs lie in the dark side of SEW (Kellermanns et al., 2012). Stressing the underlying family-
oriented facet that underlies the difference between and classification of FLDFs and MLDFs, 
the priority of SEW preservation presents a family-oriented attitude and preference as opposed 
to the priority of profitability and shareholders’ wealth maximisation. Given the 
multidimensional character of SEW, the scholars note that SEW dimensions can be both 
positively and negatively valanced as they associate with pleasant and unpleasant emotions and 
outcomes regarding firm stakeholders. Therefore, the stressed SEW dimensions are namely 
contradictory from the perspective of CSR. Such an ambivalent nature of SEW implies its 
detrimental effects on firm stakeholders in relation to responding to stakeholders’ demands and 
interests differently in a self-serving manner (Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012; 
Cruz et al., 2014; Zientara, 2017).  
This basically addresses the self-serving behaviour of FLDFs that fulfils narrowly defined 
firm’s self-interests related to SEW (Cruz et al., 2014), which results in their discriminatory 
behaviour towards firm stakeholders in terms of treating internal and external stakeholders 
unequally and unfairly. In other words, relative to MLDFs, FLDFs carry out social practices and 
decisions that align with the concern for preserving the SEW of firm’s key actors irrespective of 
the detriments and disadvantages for firm stakeholders. This weakens the proactive stakeholder 
engagement of FLDFs and challenges their stakeholder management of FLDFs (Berrone et al., 
2012; Cennamo et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014), undermining the CSR performance of FLDFs. 
Specifically, stemming from the perspective of SEW preservation, compared with MLDFs, 
FLDFs selectively and instrumentally implement socially responsible practices, adopting an 
instrumental (selective) rather than a strategic (normative) approach to CSR (Zientara, 2017).  
Moreover, in line with the response strategy of selective coupling perspective (Pache and 
Santos, 2013), FLDFs consider the interests and demands of firm stakeholders by selectively 
undertaking purposeful CSR initiatives and activities that primarily obtain (mitigate) gains 
(losses) of SEW. That is, given the negative valance of the SEW dimensions associated with 
discriminatory behaviour towards firm stakeholders, stakeholders’ concerns and interests are 
disregarded whenever SEW is exposed to risk (Cruz et al., 2014), purposefully implementing 
selected social practices and decisions that best fit the firm at the cost of some firm 
stakeholders. Therefore, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs view CSR as a marketing or public relations 
instrument, instead of a core business strategy, to fulfil SEW-related interests and concerns. As 
such, encountering the shadow of SEW’s dark side, FLDFs perform differently from MLDFs 
concerning CSR, namely suggesting a negative effect of the familiness of firms on CSR 
performance.    
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The third empirical chapter also investigates the relationship between strategic 
conformity, as a legitimacy-seeking activity, and CSR. It further examines whether and how the 
logic orientation of firms affects such relationship as a more subtle and in-depth articulation of 
firm character – firm logic orientation – in firm practices and decisions, highlighting the 
moderating role of firm logic orientation. Stressing the firm legitimacy perspective, its 
fundamental research question particularly is, does legitimacy seeking contribute to CSR 
performance? In addition, emphasising the implicit role of ILs in driving firm behaviour, it 
raises another research question of whether ILs condition the impact of firm legitimacy 
regarding CSR performance.  
Mainly, in this thesis, I direct attention to the interplay of firm logic orientation, firm 
legitimacy and CSR. Stemming from the discrepancy in CSR performance between FLDFs and 
MLDFs, I shed light on the role of firm legitimacy as an input of firm social performance. 
Particularly, stressing the firm isomorphism perspective, I emphasise the strategic conformity of 
firms (Deephouse, 1999; Deephouse and Carter, 2005), as an explanatory factor of CSR 
performance. In essence, apart from the understanding of CSR as a strategy for achieving firm 
legitimacy, I address CSR from a distinct perspective – not simply as a legitimacy-seeking 
activity.  
Specifically, I depict CSR as a kind of firm output related to firm social performance that 
follows social practices and decisions, which ultimately affect society and environment, given 
the ESG performance benchmarks. Irrespective of the underlying purpose behind firm 
engagement in CSR, here, the measure of CSR subjectively addresses and evaluates the way 
firms perform on a number of ESG categories that highlight the ESG strengths and concerns 
that the firm possesses and encounters, respectively. Accordingly, stressing the perspective of 
firm legitimacy, I emphasise the effect of strategic conformity on CSR performance.  
Both CSR and firm legitimacy stress firm stakeholders as the recipients and social 
evaluators of firm practices and decisions, respectively. Firm legitimation is a social judgment 
that infers the social validation of firms conferred by firm stakeholders, who evaluate firm 
practices and behaviour. It conveys firm approval and acceptance regarding the appropriateness 
and properness of firm practices and behaviour, which protect the conduct of firms from being 
mistrusted in accordance with the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995). Thus, firm legitimacy predictably results in valued socially 
constructed outcomes, including favourable firm reputation and the support of stakeholders 
(Rao, 1994; Choi and Shepherd, 2005; Bitektine, 2011), which help firms overcome obstacles 
and difficulties by creating positive image, facilitating access to fundamental business 
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resources, both financial and human capital, and granting a long-term relationship with firm 
stakeholders that ultimately improve the firm competitiveness and survival. 
Emphasising CSR performance, such predictable significant consequences of firm 
legitimacy indicate an upward implication for firms’ CSR concerning the evaluation of how 
firms perform in terms of the social and environmental effects of their practices and decisions. 
In other words, emphasising the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders, firm 
legitimacy prompts the social gains of firms in terms of improving the perception of firms’ 
CSR. Specifically, building on the assumption of institutional theory that isomorphism 
generates and improves firm legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983), seeking legitimacy through the adoption of isomorphic practices to those of industry 
peers, namely strategic conformity, has an incremental advantage for CSR performance. 
Drawing on the aforesaid difference in CSR performance between FLDFs and MLDFs, 
they thereby differ in firm legitimacy in relation to firm acceptance and approval regarding the 
appropriateness and properness of social practices and decisions. Stemming from the SEW 
preservation perspective, FLDFs confront the shadow of SEW’s dark side involving self-serving 
and discriminatory behaviours that generate poor publicity, negative image and bad reputation 
for FLDFs concerning firm engagement in CSR, imposing their imprudence, guiltiness and 
suspiciousness in the eyes of firm stakeholders.  
Accordingly, stressing the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders, the firm 
legitimacy of FLDFs, in comparison with MLDFs, is lacking given their self-serving behaviour 
that SEW drives, as well as the resulting discriminatory behaviour towards firm stakeholders 
(Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014), in terms of the 
discrimination between internal and external stakeholders, and the unequal and unfair treatment 
of internal stakeholders themselves related to responding to the interests and demands of firm 
stakeholders distinctly. Therefore, emphasising the discrepancy in firm legitimation between 
FLDFs and MLDFs, the social gains of firms derived from firm legitimacy differ according to 
the logic orientation of firms, implying that seeking legitimacy through adopting isomorphic 
strategies has a substantial incremental value for the CSR performance of FLDFs relative to 
MLDFs. 
The purpose of the above studies is to advance the knowledge of ILs, specifically family 
and market logics, and expand the understanding of the difference in CG and CSR among firms. 
Particularly, the overriding objective of this thesis is to provide empirical evidence of whether 
and how family and market logics affect the firm practices and decisions on CG and CSR. To 
conduct these studies, I use samples of firms listed on the S&P 1500 index, United States of 
America (US), in the period of 2006–2016. Mandatory data are retrieved from various 
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databases, including Compustat, Institutional Shareholder Services, Execucomp, Thomson 
Reuters, Centre for Research in Security Prices and MSCI. Using the empirical windows of CG 
and CSR, the findings of these studies provide empirical evidence supporting the notion of ILs 
as being hidden drivers of firm behaviour relating to the firm culture and nature of running a 
business. The importance of these studies lies in suggesting a distinct view of the familiness and 
marketness of firms, identifying and classifying firms based on the embeddedness of family and 
market logics, which tangibly manifests in actual firm practices and decisions, beyond 
ownership status (family or not).  
In these studies, I mainly show how family and market logics play a latent role in 
influencing firm behaviour, and as such, differentiating among firms, emphasising the CG and 
CSR contexts. This implies the importance of the latent institutional factor – firm logic 
orientation – to better understand firms and by extension firm practices and decisions, at least as 
much as the facet of ownership status. Looking beyond firm strategies, I specifically shed light 
on a covert logic-based root; that is, the culture and nature of firms, underlying how firms 
internally configure businesses in terms of firm practices and decisions, relating to firm 
governance and engagement in CSR, to deliver their strategies and goals. Given the studies in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I provide unique, empirical evidence of the association between firm logic 
orientation – familiness and marketness – and firm behaviour regarding CG configurations, 
namely the board of directors structure and the design of executive compensation, and CSR 
performance. 
Given the studies of this thesis, I contribute to the ILs, CG, CSR, family business and 
firm legitimacy literature in different ways. First, I emphasise, define and operationalise family 
and market logics. Second, I develop and validate a new quantitative measurement of the 
embeddedness of family and market logics, and I establish an institutional-based classification 
of firms, identifying and grouping them as FLDFs, hybrid firms or MLDFs beyond the 
traditional understanding of the types of firms. Third, I introduce the concept of firm logic 
orientation, particularly the constructs of familiness and marketness, to define and depict the 
embeddedness of family and market logics by which a firm is driven. Thus, I mainly develop an 
index of the logic orientation of firms based on real firm practices and behaviour. Fourth, 
relative to the extant ownership-based studies, I use a different approach to view and determine 
the familiness and marketness of firms, applying the perspective of ILs to identify and classify 
firms in terms of depicting and differentiating between family and non-family firm-like 
behaviours irrespective of family ownership status (or not). 
Fifth, from an empirical perspective, I report a difference between FLDFs and MLDFs 
regarding the firm choice of internal CG configurations, highlighting the effect of firm logic 
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orientation on firm governance. Sixth, I address a contrast between FLDFs and MLDFs 
concerning the magnitude of CG determinant-configuration relationships, pointing out the 
influence of firm logic orientation on the CG of firms. Seventh, I highlight a difference between 
FLDFs and MLDFs regarding CSR performance, addressing the effect of firm logic orientation 
on firm engagement in CSR. Eighth, emphasising the isomorphism attempts of firms, I shed 
light on the social gains of firms obtained from firm legitimation, and further, I address a 
contrast between FLDFs and MLDFs concerning the magnitude of strategic conformity-CSR 
relationship, highlighting the effect of the logic orientation of firms on CSR performance.  
Ninth, I empirically approve and expand the understanding of the implicit role of ILs – 
family and market logics – as covert drivers of firm behaviour in terms of affecting the setup of 
firm governance, differentiating the firm choice of internal CG configurations and the effect of 
established CG determinants on CG configurations among the logic-based groups of firms. 
Tenth, I empirically show and advance the understanding of the hidden role of ILs –family and 
market logics – as latent drivers of firm behaviour in terms of influencing CSR performance, 
differentiating firm engagement in socially responsible practices and the effect of firm 
legitimacy on the perception of CSR among the logic-based groups of firms. Moreover, in 
applying the ILs perspective to the contexts of CG and CSR, I thereby provide scholars, 
policymakers and regulators with a distinct explanation for and advance their understanding of 
the discrepancies in CG and CSR among firms, helping them better develop future CG and CSR 
research, policies and regulations. Finally, emphasising a different view of the familiness and 
marketness of firms to explain the difference in CG among firms, I consider an array of CG 
variables of the board and executive compensation and several structural constructs of CG 
determinants. 
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides a theoretical background and a 
review of the literature discussing the perspectives of ILs and SEW. It then discusses the 
difference between family and non-family firms in terms of CG and CSR. Chapter 3 presents 
the first empirical chapter, introducing the quantitative measurement of the embeddedness of 
ILs – family and market logics – and the firm logic orientation index. Moreover, it develops the 
institutional-based classification of firms and studies the association between ILs and CG in 
terms of the firm choice of internal CG configurations. Chapter 4 represents the second 
empirical chapter, investigating the moderating role of ILs in configuring CG. It emphasises a 
more subtle and in-depth manifestation of firm logic orientation in firm practices and decisions 
in terms of the relationship between established CG determinants and configurations. Chapter 5 
presents the third empirical chapter, studying the association between ILs and CSR in terms of 
firm engagement in socially responsible practices. Further, it investigates the association 
between firm legitimacy and CSR, and tests the moderating role of ILs regarding the 
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relationship between strategic conformity and CSR as a more perceptive and in-depth 
articulation of firm logic orientation in firm behaviour, addressing an interplay of firm logic 
orientation, legitimacy seeking and CSR. Chapter 6 provides a conclusion, including the 
background of the thesis, a summary of the main findings and the implications of the studies 
conducted. 
1.1 An Overview of First Empirical Chapter 
The first empirical chapter establishes an institutional-based classification of firms – 
FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs, emphasising the embeddedness of family and market logics 
in firm decision making as a distinct manner from the traditional ownership criteria. To 
accomplish this, a quantitative measurement of the embeddedness of family and market logics is 
developed, considering several behavioural dimensions that present empirically proven areas of 
difference between family and non-family firms in terms of firm practices and decisions, in the 
name of preserving the SEW of key firm actors. Stemming from the intangible construct of ILs, 
the latent institutional factor of firm logic orientation is presented and emphasised to identify 
and classify firms, and as such, explain firm behaviour, introducing the constructs of familiness 
and non-familiness, or marketness. It mainly depicts and defines the firm type in terms of the 
logic-based group in relation to the embeddedness of family and market logics by which a firm 
is driven, presenting a different approach to view and determine family-oriented or not firms, 
that is, the familiness and marketness of firms, relative to the conventional ownership criteria. 
Further, the chapter stresses the influence of ILs – hidden drivers of firm behaviour – 
through the empirical window of CG, investigating the firm choice of internal CG 
configurations, given the logic orientation of firms – familiness and marketness. Emphasising 
whether and how firm logic orientation affects CG configurations, the main hypotheses focus on 
testing the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs in terms of the structure of the board of 
directors and executive compensation plan. Specifically, the hypotheses predict that FLDFs will 
appoint smaller and less independent boards relative to MLDFs. Similarly, they expect that 
FLDFs will pay lower total, equity-based compensation and bonus and higher salary and cash 
compensation compared with MLDFs.  
A sample is used of 6286 firm-year observations from 987 firms and a sample of 6236 
firm-year observations from 971 firms in the period of 2006–2016 for the board of directors and 
executive compensation analyses, respectively. Generally, the study finds that firm logic 
orientation explains an extra amount of variation in the firm choice of internal CG 
configurations. Overall, consistent with the hypotheses, it reports a discrepancy between FLDFs 
and MLDFs in the board structure concerning board size and independence. It also finds that 
FLDFs and MLDFs differ in terms of the executive compensation plan, supporting the 
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hypotheses. Irrespective of family ownership status (or not), it provides empirical evidence of 
the association between the logic orientation of firms and CG, where the familiness and 
marketness of firms distinctly affect the firm choice of CG configurations. However, while they 
differ in terms of some characteristics due to an effect of ILs, firms in a context like S&P 1500 
can still have elements of similarity according to the competitiveness of market environment 
and industry regulations.  
1.2 An Overview of Second Empirical Chapter 
The second empirical chapter takes a further step of stressing the influence of ILs 
concerning the relationship between CG determinants and configurations as a more perceptive 
and in-depth articulation of firm type – firm logic orientation – in firm practices and decisions. 
Emphasising whether and how the logic orientation of firms influences the effect of established 
CG determinants on CG configurations, the main hypothesis focusses on testing the positive CG 
determinant-configuration relationships among the logic-based groups of firms. Particularly, the 
hypothesis predicts that such a positive relationship will be mitigated in FLDFs relative to 
MLFDs. 
The same samples are used as in the previous chapter. Emphasising the relationship 
between CG determinants and configurations, the study finds that the firm logic orientations of 
familiness and marketness have different effects. Overall, considering several constructs of and 
proxies for CG determinants, it reports that the positive effect of CG determinants on board size, 
board independence and executive compensation measures is a function of or conditional by the 
firm logic orientation, consistent with the hypothesis. The study applies an interaction empirical 
setting to provide empirical evidence that, irrespective of ownership status (family or not), the 
logic orientation of firms moderates the effect of CG determinants, including firm-specific, 
managerial and governance characteristics, on the structure of the board of directors and 
executive compensation design, highlighting the moderating role of firm logic orientation.  
1.3 An Overview of Third Empirical Chapter 
The third empirical chapter extends the examination of the effect of ILs through the 
empirical window of CSR, investigating firm social performance among the logic-based groups 
of firms. Emphasising whether and how the logic orientation of firms influences CSR initiatives 
and activities, the main hypotheses focus on testing the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs 
regarding CSR performance in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR. The hypotheses 
suggest a worse performance of FLDFs compared with MLDFs. In addition, stressing the role 
of firm legitimacy as an input of firm social performance, they propose a positive relationship 
between strategic conformity – a legitimacy-seeking activity – and CSR in terms of improving 
the perception of the CSR of firms. Further, emphasising whether and how the logic orientation 
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of firms affects the relationship between strategic conformity and CSR, the hypotheses focus on 
testing the positive strategic conformity-CSR relationship as a more subtle and in-depth 
manifestation of firm character – firm logic orientation – in firm behaviour, expecting an 
amplified relationship in FLDFs relative to MLDFs. 
A sample of 3984 firm-year observations from 784 firms in the period of 2006–2013 is 
used. Generally, the study finds that the firm logic orientation explains an amount of variation in 
CSR performance in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR. Overall, supporting the 
hypotheses, it finds a difference between FLDFs and MLDFs regarding socially responsible 
practices, emphasising the evaluation of how firms perform on the ESG performance 
benchmarks. Regardless of family ownership status (or not), it provides empirical evidence of 
the association between firm logic orientation and CSR. 
In addition, it reports a significant positive effect of strategic conformity on CSR 
performance, consistent with the hypotheses. Stressing the interplay of firm logic orientation, 
legitimacy seeking and CSR, it also finds that the firm logic orientations of familiness and 
marketness have different effects on such a relationship. Generally, it reports that the positive 
strategic conformity-CSR relationship is a function of or conditional by the firm logic 
orientation, supporting the hypotheses. The study applies an interaction empirical setting to 
provide empirical evidence that, apart from ownership status (family or not), the firm logic 
orientation moderates the effect of firm legitimacy on the perception of firms’ CSR, addressing 
the moderating role of firm logic orientation.
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2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Introduction  
Firms exist and operate in a specific context and they have been subject to academic 
research and studies focused on their regulatory and institutional environment. Based on the 
classification of firms emphasising their ownership status (family or not), the extant research 
has highlighted how family firms exhibit distinct strategic choices and managerial decisions 
relative to non-family firms regarding firm practices and behaviour. This has prompted a wealth 
of research on key firm aspects and explanatory factors of differences in firm behaviour. This 
chapter looks at the theoretical background underpinning research on family firms and proceeds 
as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the institutional research in relation to the institutional theory 
and firm isomorphism perspectives. Section 2.3 discusses the perspective of ILs. Section 2.4 
reviews the family business literature regarding the SEW perspective. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 
review the academic studies of CG and CSR, respectively. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes the 
chapter. 
2.2 Institutionalisation  
Firms are part of a bigger framework that determines their dimension and shape. They 
exist and operate within an institutional environment that affects them in various ways. 
Filatotchev and Nakajima (2010) assert that organisational behaviour and features are 
interdependent with the institutional environment. According to He et al. (2007), such an 
environment comprises a variety of main institutions that determine firms’ actions, influencing 
the outcomes and effectiveness of firms in turn. Accordingly, firms cannot be isolated from 
these institutions. In other words, neglecting the presence and power of the institutional 
environment would mean ignoring significant ‘causal factors’ that shape firm practices and 
decisions (Scott, 1987). Understanding the concept of the institutional environment and the role 
of the institutions involved necessitates paying attention to the fundamentals of institutional 
theory. The traditional perspective of institutional theory assumes the prevalence of isomorphic 
firms that eventually look and perform similarly, a key assumption of institutional theory that 
raises many questions and arguments. 
2.2.1 Institutional Theory  
The institutional environment is characterised by the expansion of rules and requirements 
with which firms are supposed to comply to obtain support and achieve legitimacy conferred by 
the institutional environment’s referents (Scott and Meyer, 1983). Scott (1987) notes that these 
environments and the ways in which they are characterised have become increasingly 
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significant in the literature due to their influence on firm behaviour. Symbolism has emerged as 
a particular area of interest given the fact that every social system is associated with an 
institutional environment that dictates the common social reality maintained within that system. 
This is manifested inside firms as social systems.  
Institutional theory has played a crucial role in addressing the link between firms and the 
institutional environment in which they exist and operate. In doing so, earlier theorists shed light 
on the definition of institutionalisation. Selznick (1957) describes institutionalisation as an 
adaptive process that occurs to firms over time, where firm practices and structures are 
influenced and shaped in reaction to the external environment. Additionally, Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) state that institutionalisation occurs when shared and repeated actions are 
assigned similar meanings that create ‘social order’ over time.  
In comparison, another version of institutional theory states that institutionalised beliefs 
ultimately determine a firm’s structure, its formation and evolution, which aligns to shared 
belief system or the theory of ‘rational myths’ outlined by Meyer and Rowan (1977). This 
approach focuses more on a belief system that originates from multiple forces, applying 
meaning to social functions and objectives through objective interpretations that outline the 
correct framework within which goals are achieved in a ‘rule-like’ way. Therefore, the various 
processes, systems, structures, practices and functions within a firm can be attributed to the 
nature and features of its institutional environment. According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
these features represent the intangible, related to culture and nature, yet solid institutional 
framework upon which the firm operates and behaves. The knowledge acquired by the 
institutions at large is thus filtered down to firms that are inferior to the greater institutions that 
enforce the rules and norms created in accordance with national or global regulations (Zucker, 
1987). 
2.2.2 Institutional Rules & Firm Isomorphism 
The institutions of the institutional environment impose the ‘rules of the game’, including 
both formal and informal rules and norms that shape and constrain firm behaviour, practices and 
relationships (North, 1990). Meyer and Rowan (1977) note that the strategies, procedures, 
programs and policies of firms are manifestation of powerful and impactful rules that function 
as rationalised myths. From an institutional theory perspective, a firm’s ability to survive is 
determined not only by its management and performance of daily operations but also by other 
elements. In running the firm business, firms must be able to access the mandatory resources 
they require while also being perceived as legitimate by institutions’ referents.  
In the context of institutional theory, firm legitimacy is primarily achieved through 
isomorphism via adopting the institutional rules and norms as taken-for-granted standards and 
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prescriptions (Scott and Meyer, 1983; Suchman, 1995; Deephouse, 1999). As Hirsch (1975) 
points out, this is dependent on the firm capacity and willingness to adopt such rules and 
managers’ ability to conform to them. Meyer and Rowan (1977) assert that firm isomorphism or 
compliance with the institutional environment results in dependence on externally fixed 
institutions, diminishing the turbulence and maintaining the stability of firms.  
Therefore, firms tend to comply with the institutional rules and norms due to the firm 
opportunity to obtain legitimacy, gain support, enhance stability, cross borders and access 
important resources. Institutional rules and norms incorporate the proper principles of 
organising and the standards of evaluation (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988). Thus, conformity to 
such principles and standards increases the chances and capabilities of firms for competitiveness 
and survival (Joel and Oliver, 1991). Additionally, Berger and Luckmann (1967) suggest that 
firm isomorphism can occur as a result of firms’ roles as mirrors of the social world in which 
they operate; whatever the nature of the social world, it will be the nature of firms. Therefore, 
firms not only interact with the institutional environment as an external factor but also embody 
the nature and features of the environment within firm practices and decisions. 
Research has been conducted on the different processes that create isomorphic firms, 
including the widely recognised model of firm isomorphism, which incorporates coercive, 
mimetic and normative processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In this perspective, the 
institutionalisation of firms refers to the processes and means that cause a firm to amend or 
adjust its structure to become isomorphic or comply with the institutional environment (Scott, 
1987). According to Zucker (1987), the sources of institutionalisation are classified into three 
types. First, an external source of institutional elements regrading structures, actions and 
practices is imposed on firms by the wider institutional environment (coercive). Second, other 
firms, competitors, develop administrative and technological innovations that may become 
institutional elements (mimetic). Third, an internal firm structure that is characterised by 
repetitive tasks, creating routines that eventually represent taken-for-granted institutional 
elements (normative). Based on their individual interests and ways to share their institutional 
elements, institutions differ in their approach to institutionalisation.  
2.2.3 Myth of Isomorphic Firms  
While it has been suggested that firm conformity to institutional rules and norms takes 
place as a result of coercive, mimetic and normative processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), 
this overlooks the issues of change and diversity within firms (Scott, 1987). It is believed that 
isomorphic firms demonstrate similar performance based on their presumably uniform, 
institutionally driven firm practices, actions and structures. However, whether or not isomorphic 
firms and performance practically exist is a viable question. Powell (1991) notes that the 
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reasoning for the evolution of institutional norms and rules is scarcely addressed in institutional 
theory, despite the fact that such norms can only change as a result of existing diversity. 
Moreover, as Hinings and Greenwood (1988) and Powell (1991) suggest, adherence to 
institutional norms and rules reduces the diversity of firms operating within a given field while 
also greatly restricting the ways in which firms are able to operate. Scott (1987) and DiMaggio 
(1988) also note that this minimises the significance of active agency and the financial 
performance of firms. 
Although firms seek legitimacy and access to the business resources required for their 
competitiveness and survival, they are actually unlikely to be similar and restricted concerning 
firm practices and decisions. The way in which individual firms define effectiveness and 
efficiency also varies based on the field to which they belong. Therefore, performance standards 
and evaluations are institutionalised according to firms’ specific areas of business (Hinings and 
Greenwood, 1988). In other words, acceptable performance is a relative notion (Kondra and 
Hinings, 1998). From the perspective of diversity and agency, performance is defined 
differently among firms and thus cannot be isomorphic. Firm performance represents the 
ultimate result of a chain of decisions made within firms in which different key firm actors play 
a role and make idiosyncratic choices. As such, practices, decisions, and in turn, performance 
and evaluation vary among firms.  
The basis of this argument is contrary to the main assumption of isomorphism promoted 
by the traditional institutional theory. According to institutional theory, as firm performance is 
constrained by institutional norms and standards, firms become increasingly similar (Kondra 
and Hinings, 1998). However, as Kondra and Hinings (1998) point out, to prevent firms from 
freezing in time, they must be allowed to change and diversify, which institutional theory tends 
to overlook. Therefore, as Oliver (1992) and Greenwood and Hinings (1996) suggest, 
institutional theory must be expanded to incorporate these points. The paradigm must 
furthermore demonstrate greater flexibility to provide reasons for the evolution of institutional 
norms and the diversity of firms. 
2.3 Institutional Logics 
Given the discrepancies among firms regarding practices and behaviour, firms make 
strategic choices and managerial decisions in accordance with their interests, preferences, 
guidelines and goals. As a function of the presence and power of the institutional environment 
in which they exist and operate, firms’ commitment or adherence and response to institutional 
norms and rules are unlikely to look alike. Because of the different, key institutions within the 
institutional environment, the responses of firms to their contexts are not likely to be isomorphic 
or uniform (Greenwood et al., 2010).  
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Here is where Friedland and Alford (1991) introduce the concept of ILs to further 
develop this viewpoint. In the perspective of ILs, firms exist and operate in a society that 
consists of multiple societal sectors or institutions. Each institution has a core logic that defines 
its belief system and provides the guidance of firm actions in terms of prescribing acceptable 
behaviour and the means to achieve it – material practices and symbols (Thornton, 2004). This 
drives firm decision making and shapes firm behaviour as a result (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; 
Greenwood et al., 2011). Therefore, drawing on the ILs perspective, in this thesis, I emphasise 
that ILs as latent drivers of firm behaviour contribute to distinct firm practices and decisions, 
prompting an area for investigation.  
Therefore, in contrast to the key assumption of institutional theory on isomorphism, it is 
contended that that firms vary in terms of their motives, objectives and essence related to the 
ILs embedded in firm decision making and covertly driving firm behaviour, thereby shaping 
firm practices an decisions. Specifically, stemming from the perspective of ILs, firms act 
distinctly by evaluating their choices, making beneficial decisions and effectively employing 
their own resources, capabilities and competences in alignment with their interests, preferences 
and goals. That is, they do so in the way that best fits and makes them comparatively and 
competitively different, highlighting the distinct culture and nature of firms (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Danisman et al., 2006).  
Considering the different kinds and extents of pressures and demands exerted by 
institutions in terms of the institutional norms and rules that firms confront, namely ILs, in this 
thesis, I stress that firm diversity and variation are attributed to the right of decision making held 
by and the idiosyncratic strategic choices of key firm actors. Therefore, given the implicit role 
of ILs, the ILs embedded in firm decision making are essential to determining firm practices and 
behaviour, which ultimately influence firm performance and drive the differences among firms.   
2.3.1 Diversity of Firms 
During the 1980s, the emphasis on society-based isomorphism was replaced with a 
greater focus on firm-level isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This research has 
contributed significantly to furthering empirical exploration, defining isomorphism as a 
phenomenon derived from coercive, normative and mimetic sources. Mimetic isomorphism has 
been highlighted as the primary perspective of cognition’s influence, with emphasis placed on 
irrational, mindless behaviour in response to cultural rationalisation (Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008). The concept of ‘new institutionalism’ has emerged as a result, in which firm structure 
stems from the process of challenging rationality. During this time, firm performance has been 
explained less in terms of efficiency and more in terms of legitimacy (Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983). Thereby, a new school of thought has emerged in institutional research that asserts that 
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institutional meaning and attributes are the result of ILs (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton 
and Ocasio, 1999).  
Comparing the new school of thought to the previous approach (e.g., Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991), controversy is seen in the 
ways that firm practices and processes are driven by cognitive structures and cultural norms. 
The main difference is comprised of isomorphism becoming less of a major focal point on the 
field, societal and global levels. Instead, focus shifts to the influence of ILs on firms and 
members at the firm, industry, market and other levels. The concept of ILs has been used to 
explain the diversity of firms and how they react differently to the institutional norms and rules 
of the institutional environment (Friedland and Alford, 1991).  
As Thornton (2004) assert, society comprises multiple institutional orders or institutions; 
each has a central logic composed of both material practices and symbols that embrace its 
ongoing principles that are available to individuals and firms to elaborate. As Thornton and 
Ocasio (2008) note, ILs provide a link between institutions and social actions. According to 
Thornton (2004), the main institutional orders of society are the market, family, professions, 
corporations, religions and the state as non-market institutions. 
Friedland and Alford (1991) introduce the notion of ILs to refer to the conflicting belief 
systems and actions demonstrated in contemporary Western institutions. ILs represent a new 
approach to institutional analysis, where the focus is no longer on isomorphism, whether in the 
world system, through society, or on the firm level. Instead, the ILs perspective directs attention 
to the effect of different logics implicitly embedded in firm decision making on individuals and 
firms in a larger variety of contexts (Thornton, 2004). The scholar asserts that ILs shape 
rational, mindful behaviour as opposed to the irrational, mindless behaviour that the assumption 
of isomorphism promotes.  
According to Thornton (2004) and Greenwood et al. (2010), ILs mainly provide the 
‘master principles of society’, and as such, ‘guide social action’. In other words, they present 
taken-for-granted resilient, social prescriptions that help make sense of firm practices and 
behaviour. Specifically, ILs put forward the ‘assumptions and values, usually implicit, about 
how to interpret organisational reality, what constitutes appropriate behaviour, and how to 
succeed’ (Thornton, 2004, p.70). Accordingly, they characterise unquestioned, readily accepted 
social norms and standards that shape the meaning individuals and firms apply to the world, 
forming a basis for their social actions and behaviour as taken-for-granted prescriptions.  
Greenwood et al. (2010) discuss various researchers’ definitions of ILs, including the 
definition of ILs as ‘symbolic systems, ways of ordering reality…thereby rendering experience 
of time and space meaningful’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p.243); as ‘the formal and informal 
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rules of action, interaction, and interpretation that guide and constrain decision makers’ 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p.804); and as ‘the axial principles of organisation and action 
based on cultural discourses and material practices prevalent in different institutional or societal 
sectors’ (Thornton, 2004, p.2). Therefore, ILs become the basis of strategic choices and 
managerial decisions, and as such, firm practices adopted within firms as well as the forces that 
validate them. As Greenwood et al. (2010, p.521) assert, ‘organisational forms and managerial 
practices are manifestation of, and legitimated by, ILs.’ Accordingly, the exploration of the 
association between ILs and firms concerning firm practices and decisions is of high importance 
for determining why and the ways in which firms demonstrate the same or different firm 
behaviour (Greenwood et al., 2010).  
According to Greenwood et al. (2010, p.522), ‘logics underpin the appropriateness of 
organisational practices in given settings and at particular historical moments.’ Further, 
Washington (2004) and Reay and Hinings (2005) confirm that firms tend to be characterised by 
facing numerous ILs that frequently oppose one another and that are also dependent on specific 
points in time and environmental contexts. Friedland and Alford (1991) also assert that firms 
adopt the norms and prescriptions outlined by logics in a manner suiting their own interests, 
needs and purposes regarding their practices and decisions. Similarly, Thornton and Ocasio 
(2008, p.101) note that ‘these practices and symbols are available to individuals, groups, and 
firms to further elaborate, manipulate, and use to their own advantage.’ Relatedly, Greenwood 
et al. (2010) state that negative outcomes likely arise if firms do not adopt the practices 
prescribed and accepted by the relevant logics. For instance, a decline in share price has been 
identified as a consequence of a firm practice justified in a way that was not widely accepted 
(Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
2.3.2 Institutional Complexity 
Because ILs refer to a set of belief systems, values, symbols and associated practices, 
Reay and Hinings (2009) state that ILs represent ‘the content and meaning of institutions.’ A 
variety of institutions comprise the context in which firms exist and operate (Thornton, 2004). 
Each of these institutions imposes its pressures and demands in terms of the resilient 
prescriptions and guidance that present its ongoing principles, which collectively define the 
underlying logic. This causes firms to encounter a complex institutional context where 
institutions exert contradictory prescriptions and pressures: ILs (Reay and Hinings, 2009). 
Thornton (2004) asserts that institutions follow a hierarchical order that runs from the market to 
the firm at the lower end of the scale, followed by the industry or field, and then family, religion 
and the state. Thornton’s (2004) work is the most extensive representation of the ‘nested 
hierarchy’ and it sheds light on the numerous societal sectors or institutional orders, with each 
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having a central logic manifested in the values, symbols and material practices elaborated by 
key firm actors.  
Accordingly, ranging from market to non-market logics, the multiple ILs imposed by 
institutions create the ‘arenas of contradiction’ that firms confront and manage (Pache and 
Santos, 2013). Therefore, as Danisman et al. (2006) point out, firms may embed one main 
culture or nature that reflects a ‘dominant’ logic at the firm level, though a ‘subdominant’ logic 
may also exist within specific departments or occupations or as an alternative culture within the 
firm. According to Hinings (2012, p.99), recent studies have suggested that ‘organisations can 
hold two or more logics at same time and find ways to ensure that they do not compete with 
each other or come into conflict.’ However, although there is general acceptance that multiple 
ILs can coexist and compete, ‘there is a fairly strong sense that one logic will be dominant over 
another,’ which primarily drives firm behaviour covertly (Hinings, 2012, p.98). 
ILs help interpret organisational reality and identify what constitutes appropriate 
behaviour and how to attain it successfully (Thornton, 2004). Firms thus adhere to the 
prescriptions and guidance that ILs provide to act confidently and consequently achieve 
legitimacy, support and ensure their competitiveness and survival. However, scholars such as 
Friedland and Alford (1991) and Kraatz and Block (2008) have asserted that firms tend to 
operate within an institutional environment that is characterised by the existence of numerous 
contradictory ILs. Regarding the presence and power of different institutions, the multiple logics 
can be but are not always compatible. When incompatible or perceived as such, this creates a 
conflict and issues for firms embedding the prescriptions and guidance of such logics, indicating 
the rise of institutional complexity (Thornton, 2002; Reay and Hinings, 2009).  
Thornton (2004) points out that the multiple coexisting logics bring ‘rivalry to the force’ 
and generate conflicting determinants of firm legitimacy and support. Therefore, the way in 
which this scenario can exist alongside a stable workplace environment for firms remains to be 
questioned. As such, in this thesis, I emphasise investigating the ways in which ILs are 
embedded in firm decision making, managed and dealt with in relation to firm practices and 
decisions. Drawing on the institutional complexity perspective, the contradictory pressures and 
demands imposed by ILs create difficulty in predicting and understanding firm behaviour, 
triggering an interest in examining the role of ILs. Therefore, in this thesis, I primarily stress 
further investigation of the way that firms embed and react to ILs concerning firm practices and 
behaviour. As Greenwood et al. (2011) assert, firms do not always commit to ILs that interact 
harmoniously with one another. Accordingly, the challenges that firms confront become 
exaggerated as incompatibility increases between the logics to which firms are exposed.  
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The literature began to change significantly in approach during the early 1990s when the 
concept of ILs garnered attention, specifically in terms of the argument that logics tangibly 
manifest within firms in the form of practices and decisions. Thornton (2004) notes that society 
is made up of multiple interdependent yet also conflicting logics comprising the core of the 
main market and non-market institutions. Therefore, firms confront institutional complexity as it 
arises from the contradictory pressures and demands that ILs impose. However, Greenwood et 
al. (2011) assert that firms experience institutional complexity to varying extents and kinds 
based on their characteristics and positions within the field to which they belong.  
Specifically, some ILs may influence firms more/less significantly than others due to firm 
attributes, such as firm identity, governance, ownership and structure, which serve as 
‘organisational filters’, filtering the pressures and demands imposed by multiple, typically 
competing, logics that firms encounter. In other words, given the institutional complexity, 
Greenwood et al. (2011) point to that external pressures and demands do not affect all firms 
equally; however, they pass through organisational filters enacted by the characteristics of firms 
themselves. Therefore, firms commit to, prioritise and embed logics in firm decision making 
differently, contributing to the distinct practices and behaviour of firms. That is, stemming from 
the process of filtering the pressures and demands that firms confront, such organisational filters 
justify how and why firms behave differently. 
As Greenwood et al. (2011) state, the number of logics to which a firm is exposed, and 
the degree of their incompatibility play a role in determining the extent of the institutional 
complexity encountered. It is thus plausible to state that firm compliance with or commitment to 
ILs and response to institutional complexity are likely to vary due to firms experiencing 
institutional complexity differently. Greenwood et al. (2010) also assert that the way in which 
firms respond and commit to ILs is determined by how receptive and sensitive they are to such 
logics. Given that firms operate within a pluralistic institutional environment where they 
experience institutional complexity differently, each firm demonstrates its idiosyncratic choice 
concerning firm adherence and commitment to ILs, which implies a range of organisational 
responses (Greenwood et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2013).  
While the ILs of society’s core institutions constrain both the means and ends of 
behaviour (Friedland and Alford, 1991), Thornton and Ocasio (2008, p.101) note that ‘they also 
provide sources and opportunity of agency and change.’ Primarily, the contradictions inherent in 
different ILs may create great room for choice and various opportunities for firms to make 
various decisions that are unlikely to be uniform among firms. Accordingly, the commitment 
and adherence of firms to receptive institutional demands and pressures regarding the 
prescriptions and guidance that ILs provide essentially influence their decision making related 
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to firm practices and behaviour. Building on the perspective of ILs, the strategic choices and 
managerial decisions made within firms drive firm behaviour differently, affecting firms’ 
performance outcomes. Highlighting the impact of ILs on firm culture and nature, the ILs 
perspective primarily emphasises that it is within the dominant logics that firm practices, 
interests and value systems are found (Thornton, 2002; Thornton, 2004; Greenwood et al., 
2011).  
Friedland and Alford (1991) and Thornton and Ocasio (1999) suggest that it is the 
interaction between institutional structure and individual agency that leads to results being 
achieved, consequences being realised and decisions being made. The prevailing ILs would 
support and limit participants’ ability to fulfil their own interests, climb hierarchies, obtain 
authority and enjoy both financial and non-financial benefits. Seo and Creed (2002) and 
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) name this theory ‘embedded agency.’ When analysing social 
action and structure, Friedland and Alford (1991) note that the embedded agency perspective 
assumes societal institutions, firms and individual actors have a certain degree of freedom or 
free will. Accordingly, firm compliance with or commitment and response to ILs vary among 
firms. Thus, the scholars suggest that there is a need to identify all ILs that firms embed in their 
decision making so that a better understanding can be achieved of how firms differ in 
complying with and responding to such logics in relation to firm practices and behaviour. This 
would help provide further insight into the ways in which firms, ILs and institutions are 
interrelated (Greenwood et al., 2010). 
2.3.3 Firm Response Strategies  
The existence of multiple central institutions, each with its own core logic, increases the 
complexity of the institutional context where firms exist and operate. However, given the 
multiplicity and incompatibility of ILs, firms experience such complexity in different extents and 
kinds. Accordingly, this results in a distinct commitment and response of firms to ILs. 
Specifically, based on firm interests, preferences and goals, key firm actors opt how to prioritise, 
manage and respond to the institutional demands and pressures imposed by ILs regarding their 
prescriptions and guidance of actions. Therefore, how they adhere and respond to such logics 
represents a pivotal factor that explains subsequent firm practices and behaviour.  
In their study of competing ILs and firm responses, Pache and Santos (2013) posit that 
firms make the strategic choice of their response strategy to deal with the various demands and 
pressures of multiple, contradictory logics. Inside firms, a certain response strategy is thus 
adopted and reveals a specific commitment to ILs. The scholars also summarise the strategies that 
firms adopt in response to ILs: decoupling, compromising and selective coupling. These response 
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strategies demonstrate that firm responses are essentially made in alignment with firms’ needs to 
obtain greater legitimacy and support from the different institutions’ referents.   
Bromley and Powell (2012) explain that the term decoupling has historically represented 
the ways in which firms keep their operational structures independent of their prescriptive and 
normative structures. By decoupling, firms pretend to confirm to the meaning and prescriptions 
defined by certain logics, whereas they do not actually implement and embed them at their 
operational level. Thus, as Tilcsik (2010) states, firms tend to take steps to create a distinction or 
separation between the way in which they behave and the way in which they openly support 
specific prescriptions. By adopting decoupling response strategy, it is anticipated that firms will 
carry out practices that comply with the logic that most likely helps the firm meet its interests, 
goals and preferences. In essence, by decoupling, firms tend to deviate or depart from the 
expectations and demands imposed by a prevailing logic if they are incompatible with firm 
interests, priorities and goals. However, to be adopted, the response strategy of decoupling 
requires the consensus and defence of firms’ key actors, as firms could be penalised by the 
respective institutional referents if detected.  
In the case of firms dealing with conflicting logics, Oliver (1991) and Kraatz and Block 
(2008) suggest that compromising can be an effective alternative response strategy. It can also be 
useful for firms to take steps to address and minimise the pressures that arise from such 
contradictions among logics. Oliver (1991) explains that the response strategy of compromising 
entails efforts made by firms to adjust the standards, policies and guidelines prescribed by ILs to 
create a new logic or approach that contains elements desired by both the external institutional 
environment and internal members or objectives. This can be achieved in various ways, including 
compliance with basic criteria, the creation of a new approach that partially supports all 
requirements but not a single requirement fully or the negotiation of a new agreement with 
institutional referents. As such, relative to the decoupling response strategy, the compromising 
response strategy is considered costly in terms of time and effort.  
Alternatively, Pache and Santos (2013) state that it is uncommon for firms to decouple 
their formal and operational structures. The scholars assert that compromising is also 
uncommon. Instead, their findings show that most firms attempt to selectively couple specific 
elements of each logic and fulfil the associated demands and pressures. According to Pache and 
Santos (2013, p.994), the response strategy of selective coupling specifically represents 
‘purposeful enactment of selected practices among a pool of competing alternatives.’ Similarly, 
Greenwood et al. (2011) and Tracey et al. (2011) suggest that firms adopt strategies that work 
by combining or balancing and enacting elements of different, typically competing, logics in 
response to the raised institutional complexity, which challenges the work of earlier institutional 
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scholars on decoupling and compromising. The act of selective coupling entails firms’ decisions 
on implementing certain practices prescribed and underlined by different ILs rather than 
supporting a single logic or adjusting the prescriptions and guidelines of multiple logics.  
Furthermore, Oliver (1991) claims that selective coupling response strategy may be more 
effective than compromising and other response strategies adopted by firms. Battilana and 
Dorado (2010) explain that this is due to the ability of selective coupling as a response strategy 
to mitigate the need of firms to negotiate or create new practices that partially fulfil conflicting 
demands and pressures without fully appeasing the corresponding institutional referents. 
Because the response strategy of selective coupling can be achieved without involving 
employees and managers in bargaining or creating new processes, it may be more cost effective 
than a compromising response strategy. Therefore, the response strategy of selective coupling 
can be considered a more feasible option for firms with less financial room to play with (Pache 
and Santos, 2013). Firms are thus able to avoid the expenses and challenges associated with 
compromising or decoupling while still addressing the conflict between different ILs.  
2.4 Socioemotional Wealth 
A growing stream of family business literature has established that relative to non-family 
firms, family firms represent a distinct business setting that differs in significant aspects 
regarding strategic choices and managerial decisions. According to Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011a, 
p.655), ‘family embeddedness gives these firms their distinctive flavour as reflected in several 
dimensions.’ Justifying the different nature of family firms, attention has increasingly been 
directed to the non-economic utilities derived by family shareholders and/or managers from the 
firm as a key distinguishing factor. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) label such non-economic utilities 
‘SEW,’ developing the increasingly popular concept of SEW that characterises family firms as 
opposed to non-family firms.  
Building on the foundations of family business research, the scholars (e.g., Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a) have 
suggested the notion of SEW as a latent explanatory construct of empirical studies, a concept 
originating from behavioural agency theory to explain the discrepancy between family and non-
family firms concerning their practices and decisions. In the SEW perspective, ‘family firms are 
typically motivated by and committed to the preservation of their SEW, referring to non-
financial aspects or affective endowments of family owners’ (Berrone et al., 2012, p.259). This 
sheds light on a family-oriented attitude and preference in terms of the priority of SEW 
preservation that uniquely characterises family firms relative to their counterparts.  
Family shareholders and managers closely identify themselves with and emotionally 
attach to the firm, implying the non-economic benefits or what they refer to as SEW tightly 
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linked to the firm. Therefore, apart from the financial wealth and benefits, it is crucial for family 
members to preserve or extend the different dimensions of SEW derived from the firm, 
including authority, control and power, job security and protection, identification in terms of 
prestige, image and reputation, as well as social ties and business networks. Therefore, they 
strive to maintain control, power and authority over the firm, keep a positive image, favourable 
reputation and prestige, ensure job security and protection, uphold social ties and business 
relationships, as well as sustain the family legacy for future generations and retain family 
values, nepotism and altruism that permit the financial and non-financial wealth of family 
members (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a).  
Accordingly, concerning making strategic choices and managerial decisions, family firms 
are primarily concerned about preserving the SEW of family members, where they avoid 
undertaking firm practices and decisions that threaten SEW. Thus, as mentioned above, the 
SEW preservation indicates an essential differentiation point between family and non-family 
firms, capturing the family-oriented attitude and preference. Specifically, Berrone et al. (2012, 
p.258) assert that ‘SEW is the most important differentiator of the family firm as a unique entity 
and, as such, helps explain why family firms behave distinctively’, addressing the uniqueness of 
family firm behaviour. This highlights the role of the affective endowments derived from the 
firm in moulding firm practices and behaviour, and as such, differentiating between family and 
non-family firms.  
To study firms’ risk-taking decisions, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) apply a behavioural 
agency model to the case of SEW in studying the firm behaviour of Spanish olive oil mills. 
According to this model, the strategic choices and managerial decisions of firms are viewed as a 
range of alternatives that vary in the potential gains or losses per a core reference point. Key 
firm actors weigh the perceived benefits and costs per such a reference point based on a 
‘subjective evaluation of what is important to their welfare, what is already accrued and what 
can be counted on’ (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a, p.658). Family firms primarily use SEW, 
regarding the non-economic benefits of family members, as a main reference point to frame 
firm opportunities, problems and issues and undertake firm practices and decisions accordingly. 
Therefore, based on the potential gains or losses of SEW, family firms make strategic choices 
and managerial decisions that ensure preserving the non-economic utilities attached to the firm.  
Family firms prefer to avoid the loss of SEW even if it entails bearing a higher business 
risk (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Thus, the preservation of SEW overlooks the financial 
contributions and consequences as long as the prospective firm practices and decisions expose 
SEW to risk, essentially deviating from the economic logic of running a business. According to 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011a, p.659), ‘the pursuit of non-financial utilities, […] family’s SEW, 
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can best capture the family firm’s uniqueness and thus serve as a unifying analytical perspective 
to explain differences in managerial choices.’  
Therefore, defining and depicting a family-oriented attitude and preference, in this thesis, 
I purport that SEW is a suitable and insightful basis to use in differentiating among and 
classifying firms. Given the difference between family and non-family firms in firm practices 
and decisions, the construct of SEW provides a vital foundation for detecting family – and by 
default non-family – firm-like behaviour among firms. SEW is the most prominent aspect of 
family-oriented identity, and as such, portrays a latent explanatory factor of the distinct 
behaviour of family firms in comparison with non-family firms (Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et 
al., 2014). A growing body of research has shown the major differences in the firm practices 
and decisions of family firms compared with their counterparts, implying a different approach to 
business (e.g., Chen et al., 2010; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 2010; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2011b; Martin et al., 2016). As Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011a, p. 658) state: 
The differences between family and non-family firms manifested in the research cannot 
be easily reconciled with an economically driven logic and may be better explained by a 
SEW preservation logic on the part of family members. 
Particularly, the preservation of SEW outweighs the pursuit of financial gains if 
undertaking certain firm practices and decisions exposes SEW to threat. This implies that the 
SEW preservation can be in contrast to the primary economic business objective of profitability 
and shareholders’ wealth maximisation – an economic logic of firm decision making.  
2.5 Corporate Governance 
2.5.1 Agency Theory 
The founders of firms possess full control and ownership of the firm, passing it down to 
future generations. Such system evolves with the growth of firms, separating ownership and 
management in large firms. This results in shifting the control from entrepreneurs to hired, 
professional managers as the ownership becomes dispersed among many shareholders – an 
atomistic ownership (Davis and Thompson, 1994). As Bricker and Chandar (2000) point out, it is 
proposed legally that the maximisation of returns for the benefit of shareholders, in relation to 
their financial wealth, is the core economic business objective of firm operations, which indicates 
legal support for the separation of ownership and management. When ownership and management 
are separated, an agency relationship emerges. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency 
relationship as a contractual relationship wherein an agent is granted a certain degree of decision-
making power and requested to carry out operations and activities on behalf of the owners or 
shareholders.  
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Fama (1980) explains that owners hire decision-making specialists and professional 
managers as agents who are required to make decisions that facilitate the greatest return for the 
best interests of shareholders. Therefore, the agency relationship is created when the 
accountability for decision making is delegated to one or more individuals by another, particularly 
in exchange for payment and privileges. Agents are hired on account of their qualifications and 
expertise in making sound judgements regarding the business and are assigned the role of making 
all key decisions for the firm. Otherwise, owners can run the risk of making ineffective strategic 
decisions if agents do not possess the knowledge and skills required to effectively manage and 
direct the firm in terms of its strategic directions, the use of firm resources and control.  
Emphasising the context of family businesses, the separation between ownership and 
management is less prominent in most family firms, compared with non-family firms, as the 
same individual(s) usually both own and manage the firm. According to Anderson and Reeb 
(2004), firm performance is stronger amongst family-owned firms that appoint a family member 
as the CEO rather than a non-relative. Redding (2002) states that the most probable reason for 
such higher performance is that these firms operate with the goal of maintaining the benefits, 
both financial and non-financial, of family members who usually concentrate their wealth in and 
closely identify themselves with a single family business.  
However, firms manged by family members are associated with two main agency-related 
issues that need to be addressed and overcome as the business expands (Lee and Yeh, 2004). 
The first issue is that family firms eventually need to hire outsiders who are not relatives to 
obtain the necessary managerial expertise, manpower or skills that the business requires to 
succeed as it grows, implying an agency relationship that gives rise to a potential agency 
conflict. The second issue is that a portion of family ownership may need to be sacrificed to 
acquire more capital to fulfil growth needs and requirements, raising issues related to the 
minority owners’ rights and how they can be best protected. 
The literature has presented numerous agency problems associated with businesses today. 
In most cases, these issues follow the separation of ownership and management (Peng, 2004). 
They specifically arise from the fact that first, shareholders often have little impact on the 
operations and activities of major public firms due to asymmetric information, and second, there 
is a lack of common objectives and interests between shareholders and agents, which suggests 
an opportunistic behaviour of managers. Managerial opportunism, therefore, implies the self-
interests and self-serving behaviour of managers that emerge from the separation of ownership 
and management when the interests of agents and shareholders, also referred to as principals, 
are not aligned (Hitt et al., 2007), creating a principal-agent conflict (Type I agency problem). 
The opportunistic behaviour of managers cannot typically be predicted, even by reputation; until 
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a manager behaves in an opportunistic way, it is not possible to determine the opportunism of 
the manager.  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory mainly applies the notion of 
contracts as symbols of the agency relationship itself, where agency theory emphasises the 
principal-agent conflict and the identification of specific contracts offering the greatest level of 
efficiency in the governance or control of agency relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency 
theory is primarily concerned with business, contractual relationships that reflect the 
fundamental nature of the principal-agent relationship, wherein the parties do not share the same 
level of risk aversion or the same objectives but are involved in collaboration.  
In other cases, agency problems arise from the presence of majority, controlling 
shareholders who can control firms’ decision making and objectives, and perhaps overlooking 
the interests of minority, non-controlling shareholders. This suggests the rise of a principal-
principal conflict (Type II agency problem). Exerting significant influence, power and control 
over the firm via ownership and/or voting rights, majority shareholders can pursue different 
goals, preferences, concerns and interests at the expense of minority shareholders. A principal-
principal conflict implies imposing costs on non-controlling shareholders that can take the form 
of sacrificing their overall returns to and expropriating their wealth by controlling shareholders. 
Therefore, addressing the two key, agency-related issues arising within business relationships 
represents the core of agency theory for which the protective CG configurations have come into 
play to govern or control firms. 
2.5.2 Corporate Governance Configurations 
From a firm perspective, CG refers to the control system by which firms are guided, 
directed and held responsible regarding their strategic directions and the use of business 
resources for the best interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Mair 
et al., 2015). Specifically, given the potential principal-agent and principal-principal conflicts, it 
addresses the means of control undertaken to manage the agency problems among firm 
stakeholders, including both minority and majority shareholders and managers, controlling and 
determining the firm direction and performance (Hitt et al., 2007). According to Mair et al. 
(2015, p.716), ‘organisational governance is concerned with strategic (providing direction) and 
controlling (monitoring and ensuring accountability) functions as well as managing 
relationships.’ Therefore, CG mainly comprises all practices adopted within firms to facilitate 
the usage of business resources, guide their strategic direction and mitigate agency problems 
between their stakeholders, maintaining firm efficiency, stability, competitiveness and survival 
(Daily et al., 2003). Desai et al. (2005) explain that the primary purpose of CG is to determine 
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the best methods to achieve effective strategic decision making, aiming the best interests of 
shareholders.  
Particularly, as Mair et al. (2015) assert, CG emphasises the overriding objective of 
maximising shareholders’ wealth, as the dominant stakeholder group, by increasing firms’ 
financial returns. According to Schwartz et al. (2005), CG represents and supports the values of 
firms by serving as a control system through which firms organise top managers and owners – 
controlling and non-controlling – in situations where there can be a conflict of interests, 
promoting the best benefit of shareholders. Therefore, CG supports and facilitates the 
conformity of shareholders’ and managers’ interests and the protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights. Filatotchev and Nakajima (2010) point to that the CG literature has mainly 
focused on the application of internal CG configurations – introduced to address the issues of 
managerial opportunism and the conflicts of interests – and their economic implications for firm 
performance. 
A lack of strong firm governance can result in significant agency problems, either between 
principals and agents or among principals themselves, which can be reduced when effective CG 
configurations are significantly invested in and put in place. While the issues associated with the 
protection of minority shareholders’ rights and the alignment of shareholders’ and managers’ 
interests can be experienced within each firm, each is unique in nature. Therefore, the CG 
configurations implemented by each firm to control such issues tend to vary greatly. The works 
of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) represent some of the most 
significant early publications on agency theory and CG configurations. They outline the two main 
CG configurations that can be adopted to mitigate agency problems: first, the use of outcome-
oriented contracts and, second, the leverage of information systems.  
Regarding the use of outcome-oriented contracts, the scholars assert that such contracts are 
effective mediators because they unite the objectives of owners and agents by incentivising 
common goals and minimising the conflict of interests. This can be achieved by granting 
managers an executive compensation that effectively motivates them to act in the best interests 
of shareholders, which reduces the risk of managers behaving in a self-serving manner – the 
managerial opportunism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In comparison, they note that information 
systems minimise the risk of managers’ opportunistic behaviour by ensuring that shareholders are 
aware of agents’ operations and activities. Therefore, agents recognise that they are unable to 
keep their behaviour and performance under the radar, and as such, they are less likely to engage 
in managerial opportunism. This has been discussed extensively in research, for instance, the way 
in which managers’ activities can be governed by the board of directors as an information system 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
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The CG literature has essentially separated CG configurations into internal and external 
categories (e.g., Walsh and Seward, 1990; Jensen, 1993). Other scholars, such as Tosi and Gomez-
Mejia (1994) and Zajac and Westphal (1994), have classified such configurations in terms of their 
purpose – whether they are designed for monitoring or aligning interests. Examples of internal 
and external CG configurations include the boards of directors and managerial remuneration, as 
well as shareholders’ majority shares and the threat of takeover market, respectively. Monitoring 
configurations include external blockholders and the boards of directors, while alignment 
configurations include incentive-based compensation emphasising the managerial ownership and 
performance-based incentives. 
2.5.2.1 The Board of Directors  
Jensen (1993) emphasises the role of the board of directors in ensuring that managerial 
behaviour and performance are effectively guided, directed, monitored, controlled and 
disciplined, with many other scholars highlighting the importance of the board as the core of 
CG. The board of directors is ‘a group of elected individuals whose primary responsibility is to 
act in the owners’ interests by formally monitoring and controlling corporation’s top-level 
executives’ (Hitt et al., 2007, p.313). In agency theory, the board acts as an internal control 
configuration that primarily serves the functions of monitoring and advising top managers, 
where the directors on the board are elected by firm shareholders to act on their behalf (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). Acting on behalf of shareholders, the board of directors is held accountable 
for the effective management of firm and serves as a representative and protector of the interests 
of shareholders, which can only be achieved through the implementation of effective firm 
governance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003)  
Therefore, the board of directors serves as a key mediator between managerial behaviour 
and performance and shareholders’ interests, providing the latter with the necessary information 
concerning the activities and operations of firms. Young (2000) asserts that the board of 
directors possesses the authority to ensure that the interests and rights of shareholders are upheld 
by the actions and operations of management and that managers are effectively incentivised and 
disciplined, mitigating the self-interests and self-serving behaviour of managers and avoid 
consequent scandals, such as that of WorldCom and Enron (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2004). 
However, as Aguilera (2005) notes, the board has been found to fall short of shareholders’ 
expectations in this regard, with managers often given excessive autonomy and discretion. 
Accordingly, various parties – including policymakers, regulators and shareholders – may 
demand that the board of directors becomes more effective and proactive in monitoring and 
directing the behaviour and performance of management. Along with monitoring and advising 
functions, the board is also a key source of business resources in terms of providing human 
capital in the form of social ties and business networks, as well as skills, expertise and 
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knowledge. The effectiveness of the board and, consequently, firm performance is believed to 
be influenced by the structure of the board of directors in terms of board size and independence 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Lefort and Urzua, 2008; Guo and 
Masulis, 2015; Liu et al., 2015).  
Various studies have addressed the relationship between board size and firm 
performance, but the findings have largely been controversial. Scholars such as Bushman et al. 
(2004) and Boo and Sharma (2008) find that larger boards are associated with inefficiency, 
ineffectiveness and communication issues; this mainly results from a potential free rider 
problem, which actualises lower ability to monitor and guide managerial behaviour and 
performance effectively. However, Kent and Stewart (2008) notes that it is not yet certain which 
factor influences the other.  
In contrast, Chiang and Chia (2005) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) assert that board size 
is positively related to firm performance. In accordance with this, Anderson et al. (2004) and 
Williams et al. (2005) state that board size is positively related to board monitoring 
effectiveness. Additionally, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) propose that firm performance and board 
size display an inverted U-shape relationship, wherein the firm benefits from greater knowledge, 
senses, minds and expertise when additional directors are added to the board. However, the 
scholars claim that, at a certain point, these benefits cannot outweigh the challenges associated 
with large boards in relation to the free-rider problem. 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) explain that the directors of the board are categorised as 
insiders, related outsiders, also known as affiliated directors, or outsiders. According to Zajac 
and Westphal (1996), inside directors or insiders are board members who have been appointed 
to a senior management position from within the firm and can provide insight into the 
operations, activities and performance of firms as a result. Related or affiliated outsiders are 
board members who are not part of the daily activities and operations of firms but are not 
entirely third-party entities either, because they are contracted by or otherwise associated with 
the firm. Outside directors or outsiders are board members who may have been appointed the 
role of board member before the present CEO was hired or who may be a senior manager of 
another firm and provide third-party guidance to the firm. Outsiders are assumed to be 
effectively objective and independent of the firm in terms of their emotional and financial 
attachments, which presumably enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of the board regarding 
its monitoring and advising functions (Davidson et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005; Koh et al., 
2007; Boo and Sharma, 2008).  
Westphal and Milton (2000) point to that many perceive the board where most members 
appointed are from within the firm, in senior management positions, to be less effective in terms 
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of monitoring, directing, controlling and disciplining management compared with the board 
with a smaller representation of internal senior managers. Similarly, Beasley (1996) asserts that 
the board must be independent if it is to effectively monitor, guide, control and discipline 
managerial behaviour and performance. Therefore, the board of directors is expected to be 
comprised primarily of outside directors, given the requirements derived from the enactment of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 relating to improving the internal CG configurations of US 
public firms (Valenti, 2008).  
However, Tosi et al. (2003) note that from the managerial entrenchment perspective, 
outsiders can be significantly influenced by the CEO of firms as a result of managerial power, 
control and seniority. As such, agency-related issues cannot be fully solved with a majority 
representation of outside directors alone. As Lorsch and Zelleke (2005) explain, the power and 
influence of CEO within the firm can be limited by ensuring that the CEO does not also serve as 
the board chair – CEO duality. Still, several issues can arise as a result of a high representation 
of outsiders on the board of directors.  
For instance, in line with the perspective of managerial entrenchment regarding 
information asymmetry, Roberts et al. (2005) assert that outside directors are unable to provide 
the same level of insight into and perception of the daily activities and operations of firms that 
CEOs and other inside directors can offer, limiting the efficiency of the board concerning its 
monitoring and advising roles. That is, if outsiders are able to maintain regular and effective 
monitoring, advising and communication with inside directors, this obstacle can be overcome 
with relative effectiveness. However, generally, when the majority of board directors comprises 
outsiders, this level of access, connection and understanding cannot be acquired. As a result of 
the inefficiency of the board relating to information asymmetry and depending on the costly 
financial control configurations that bind executive compensation and firm performance instead, 
monitoring and advising costs increase. 
2.5.2.2 Executive Compensation  
The economic basis of executive compensation stems from agency theory, maintaining 
that firms look for the most efficient, optimal, compensation contracts to attract, sustain and 
incentivise top managers (Conyon, 2006). Executive compensation is ‘a governance mechanism 
that seeks to align the interests of managers and owners through salaries, bonuses, and long-
term incentive compensation, such as stock awards and options’ (Hitt et al., 2007, p.317). 
Therefore, the plan or design of executive compensation seeks to mitigate potential managerial 
opportunism, motivate the effort of top executives and prompt the alignment of managers’ and 
shareholders’ interests.  
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The executive compensation plan takes the form of fixed pay and variable incentive pay 
that depends on the underlying purpose of incentive – whether to offer a bonus, an incentive of 
short-term focus; or an equity-based compensation, an incentive of long-term focus, to increase 
the accounting profit or maximise shareholders’ wealth by share price appreciation, respectively 
(Murphy, 1999; Chalmers et al., 2006). According to Mehran (1995), for firm value 
maximisation, what motivates managers is the form rather than level of executive compensation, 
given the different executive compensation components of fixed, secure and variable, risky pay. 
Therefore, executive compensation, in terms of total, salary, cash and incentive-based 
compensation, is to be properly and smartly designed, incentivising and appealing the current 
and prospective managers of the firm.  
In particular, McGuire and Matta (2003) assert that a greater association between the 
financial wealth of common shareholders and managers alleviates the risk of agency problems 
or assists the firm in addressing such problems as they arise, given the risk-averse nature and 
undiversified wealth of top managers. Hill and Stevens (2001) state that, for this reason, the 
long-term incentive-based compensation for top executives is received well by the stock market 
overall. In the United States in particular, executive compensation has increasingly focused on 
short- and long-term incentive-based compensation, such as bonus and equity-based 
compensation, respectively, linking managerial performance and pay. Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2003) note that because such incentive-based compensation is considered supportive of 
shareholders’ interests in terms of controlling and disciplining managerial behaviour and 
performance, executive compensation can minimise the pressure that shareholders place on the 
board concerning the structure of the board of directors, consistent with the substitution effect 
perspective (Williamson, 1983; Gnan et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, stemming from the managerial opportunism perspective, the scholars also 
suggest that shareholders tend to perceive the independent board with a high representation of 
outsiders as being better able to ensure that the executive compensation of senior managers is 
linked with firm performance, that is, coupling managerial performance and pay (Tosi Jr and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Miller et al., 2002; Martin et al., 2013). Commonly, the interests of 
managers and shareholders are aligned through the internal CG configuration of executive 
compensation, namely incentive-based compensation via managerial ownership and 
performance-based incentives. According to Conyon (2006, p. 26):  
By using stock options, restricted stock and long-term contracts, shareholders motivate 
the CEOs to maximise firm value. In other words, shareholders try to design optimal 
compensation packages to provide CEOs with incentives to align their mutual interests. 
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The alignment of shareholders’ and managers’ interests builds on the idea of executives 
being both effort- and risk-averse (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998). Tosi Jr and Gomez-Mejia 
(1989) note that it is challenging to closely monitor managers’ actions and operations since their 
opportunistic behaviour cannot be predicted. In this sense, as Eisenhardt (1989) notes, the 
potential principal-agent conflict can be mitigated through the use of incentive-based 
compensation, including bonus and equity-based compensation. Additionally, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Demsetz (1983) also assert that the degree of managerial ownership 
possessed by the CEO is an essential CG mechanism that can be used to align the interests of 
shareholders and managers, given the risk-aversion and undiversified wealth of top managers. 
Similarly, Devers et al. (2008) state that shareholders’ and CEOs’ respective levels of risk-
aversion are balanced through the incorporation of equity-based compensation, namely stock 
options or other long-term variable incentive pay, as part of managerial remuneration.  
Regarding executive compensation, Conyon (2006) points out that senior managers 
receive a base salary, stock options that give them the right to purchase shares in the future at a 
predetermined price, annual bonus tied to accounting-based performance measures and other 
compensation, such as retirement plans, non-cash privileges, non-equity incentives and 
restricted stock, which comprise the basic components of managerial remuneration. However,, 
there are some issues related to the plan of executive compensation regarding their short-term 
and long-term incentives that particularly cause the subject to be less straightforward.  
The first issue is that the senior executives of firms make non-routine and complicated 
strategic choices and managerial decisions based on the specific circumstance in question, with 
many factors, some of which are unpredictable and uncontrollable, are involved in the decision-
making process in each case. ’ Although, the managerial remuneration of top managers tends to 
be associated with the financial measures of firm performance that are simple to observe relative 
to the strategic choices and managerial decisions being made, resulting in an inappropriate 
judgement of the quality of managerial behaviour and performance (Hitt et al., 2007). The 
second issue is that the decisions made and strategic choices undertaken by senior managers 
tend to have a long-term impact on firm performance. Therefore, it is challenging to determine 
how the actions and operations of management impact firm performance in the immediate 
instance, and to evaluate managerial behaviour and performance accordingly.  
The third issue is that it is not only the actions and operations of top executives that 
influence firm performance. Therefore, given the surrounding business setting, it is challenging 
to measure and assess the effect of strategic choices and managerial decisions due to the 
influence of unpredictable legal, social, economic and other factors that can interfere and affect 
the quality of managerial behaviour and performance. Accordingly, as Bryan et al. (2000) 
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assert, the effectiveness of incentive-based compensation concerning short-term and long-term 
incentives can be questioned in terms of the actual motivation, control and discipline of top 
management.  
2.5.3 Corporate Governance of Family Firms 
Despite the role of laws and regulations in issuing the standards and guidelines 
concerning CG configurations, idiosyncratic factors of firms affect the setup of firm 
governance. Therefore, CG remains an important area that reveals differences between family 
and non-family firms, directing the attention of many scholars to identifying the underlying 
reasons. Around 33% of the S&P 500 index’s US firms have an ownership structure 
characterised by family members owning 18% of the outstanding shares (Hitt et al., 2007). The 
extant literature has largely shed light on firm governance as a key distinguishing aspect 
between family and non-family firms (e.g., McConaughy, 2000; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; 
Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007; Bettinelli, 2011).  
Among other factors, the concentrated ownership context, such as that in family 
businesses, suggests that the dominant or controlling shareholders represent an external CG 
mechanism that scholars primarily address as a substitute for the respective controlling roles of 
internal CG configurations, such as the board of directors and executive compensation. 
Resulting from the substantial incentive created by the large shareholdings, the dominant 
shareholders, namely family shareholders, play a direct and effective monitoring role in 
alleviating the potential managerial opportunism or the ‘vertical agency problem’ between 
shareholders and managers (Lefort and Urzua, 2008); that is a principal-agent conflict. 
However, at the same time, the dominant shareholders are believed to exert significant power, 
control and influence, relating to their large shareholdings, over firm practices and decisions in 
the name of fulfilling self-interests, goals and preferences, which can be at the expense of 
minority shareholders.  
As such, the presence of dominant shareholders tends to create other pervasive agency 
problem that emerges between controlling, majority shareholders and non-controlling, minority 
shareholders, presenting a ‘horizontal agency problem’ (Lefort and Urzua, 2008); that is a 
principal-principal conflict. The root of this problem is in the potential expropriation of financial 
wealth from minority shareholders, particularly in terms of making decisions and undertaking 
practices that are closely aligned with the preferences, objectives and interests of controlling 
shareholders at the cost of non-controlling shareholders. Therefore, a key complication of the 
concentrated ownership context of family firms is its impact on CG configurations relative to 
the dispersed ownership context of non-family firms due to its substitution and expropriation 
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effects. The type and severity of potential agency problems indicate that family firms vary from 
non-family firms regarding firm governance, presenting a distinct business setting.  
Relating to the monitoring role of dominant shareholders, the CG literature has addressed 
that the ownership concentration and both the representation of outsiders on the board and board 
size are negatively related (e.g., Bozec and Bozec, 2007; Misangyi and Acharya, 2014). In this 
relationship, the ownership concentration essentially substitutes the respective controlling role 
of the board relating to its monitoring and advising functions; this limits the necessity of large 
and independent boards. However, despite the substitution effect of the ownership concentration 
in the direct and close monitoring of managerial behaviour and performance, the dominant 
shareholders have a substantial incentive to keep weak internal controls that expediate wealth 
expropriation and fulfilment of self-interests (Bozec and Bozec, 2007).  
As CG aims to grant maximum returns on investments for the best interests of 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), the ownership concentration may contradict such an 
overriding objective in terms of its expropriation effect. Specifically, as controlling 
shareholders, family shareholders actively seek and enjoy the presence of directors who 
effectively promote or at least do not hinder attaining their preferences, goals and interests 
(Lefort and Urzua, 2008) irrespective of minority, non-family shareholders. Accordingly, 
compared with non-family firms, the boards of family firms lack independence and tend to be 
smaller to maintain effective control, power and communication.  
Also, building on the monitoring role of controlling shareholders, the ownership 
concentration presents a substitute for incentive-based compensation, including bonus and 
equity-based compensation, mitigating the need for coupling managerial pay and performance. 
According to Kraft and Niederprum (1999, p.20), ‘if concentrated ownership is equivalent to a 
high degree of corporate control, the probability is high that shirking will be detected.’ 
Therefore, emphasising the substitution effect of ownership concentration, they assert that the 
level of incentive-based compensation and pay-performance sensitivity are likely to be higher in 
a diversified ownership context of firms.  
In contrast, as family shareholders usually manage and control family firms whose shares 
they own, they exercise their discretion, authority and power to opportunistically determine their 
compensation, maintaining financial welfare, job security and protection. According to Cheung 
et al. (2005), instead of expropriating non-controlling, minority shareholders’ wealth through 
firm practices and decisions prompted by controlling, majority shareholders, family owners-
managers effectively set the form and level of their own managerial remuneration, perhaps in 
excess of the optimal executive compensation. 
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From the perspective of ownership concentration, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011a, p.654) 
assert that ‘concentrated family ownership presumably neutralised the moral hazard on the part 
of management that so concerned Berle and Means under atomistic ownership.’ Because family 
shareholders are cautious and self-incentivised enough to closely and effectively monitor top 
management to guard their usually undiversified investment, they note that family firms are less 
likely to choose and implement costly CG configurations relative to their counterparts. Thus, 
family firms are traditionally assumed to be ‘superior forms of governance’ (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  
However, stressing the principal-principal conflict, the CG literature questions this 
assumption and provides evidence that family ownership may enforce non-financial interests, 
preferences and goals in the name of preserving the non-economic utilities of family members 
derived from the firm; these are usually perceived by other, minority, shareholders as different 
from and contradictory to their financial interests and objectives. As such, building on the SEW 
perspective, the prioritisation of preserving the non-economic benefits gives rise to an agency 
problem between family and non-family shareholders. Such agency problem opposes the above 
assumption about family firms and shows them instead as having a ‘theoretically distinct form 
of governance’ (Schulze et al., 2001). Accordingly, the potential principal-principal conflict 
within family firms implies different CG configurations concerning the board of directors and 
executive compensation.  
In accordance with this, drawing on the perspective of SEW, family firms differ from 
non-family firms regarding their CG configurations intended to preserve SEW (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2011a), where, characterising family firms, SEW serves as a key distinguishing factor that 
explains the distinct behaviour of family firms in comparison with non-family firms (Berrone et 
al., 2012). Regarding the board of directors, large family ownership may entitle family 
shareholders to significant power and authority to appoint a board that actively supports and 
fulfils, or at least does not contradict, their interests, goals and preferences. In family firms, 
‘family principals are likely to see the board as a tool to reinforce their control and to pressure 
top executives to pursue the family’s objectives’ (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a, p.661).  
The findings of prior studies on family businesses have shown that the majority of board 
seats are held by family shareholders, their representatives or their appointees, reflecting 
significant control, both direct and indirect, over the firm, as well as maintaining prestige and 
image and job security and protection of family members (e.g., Mustakallio et al., 2002; 
Voordeckers et al., 2007). Relative to family and inside directors, the scholars find a low 
number of outsider directors who possibly have indirect connections with the family, indicating 
a lack of board independence in family firms.  
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Moreover, in the name of preserving the non-economic benefits attached to the firm, 
including authority, power and control, prestige and image and job security and protection, the 
boards of family firms are typically smaller compared with non-family firms. CEO-duality also 
tends to be very common on the boards of family firms, where the CEO is usually a family 
member, underlying the managerial entrenchment. The scholars note that the characteristics of 
family firms’ boards are consistent with the priority of SEW preservation, which justifies the 
difference in the structure of the board of directors between family and non-family firms.  
Regarding executive compensation, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) find that there is a 
negative relationship between family membership and CEO pay, where family CEOs receive 
lower executive compensation relative to non-family CEOs. These findings can be explained 
again from the perspective of SEW preservation in terms of deriving job security and protection 
that family members possess compared with non-family members in the firm. In the case of 
family CEOs, ‘disappointing results are attributed to uncontrollable factors rather than to the 
CEO’ (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a, p.663). Therefore, they receive lower pay compared with 
non-family CEOs as a trade-off between job security and protection and executive 
compensation, implying lower total compensation of family managers but higher base salary 
and cash compensation, perhaps in excess of the optimal executive compensation. However, as 
risk increases or family control decreases along with its protection, family CEOs expect to 
receive higher pay.  
Moreover, in relation to job security and protection, McConaughy (2000) asserts that 
family CEOs tend to bear less risk as they receive less incentive-based compensation, including 
bonus and equity-based compensation. That is, managerial performance is unlikely to be 
coupled with pay, suggesting less risky incentive pay, as well as higher fixed and cash pay as 
mentioned above. Unlike family executives, non-family executives bear the full risk of 
performance-based and long-term incentives. Accordingly, the priority of SEW preservation 
also triggers the difference in executive compensation between family and non-family firms and 
between family and non-family managers. 
2.6 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Shareholders comprise the dominant stakeholder group that firm management emphasises 
regarding strategic choices and managerial decisions in terms of the best benefit of shareholders. 
According to McWilliams and Siegel (2001), such emphasis arises from the firm theory 
perspective, which is based on the assumption that managers of publicly held firms act on behalf 
of shareholders aiming to maximise shareholders’ wealth, given the threat of takeover market as 
the primary control mechanism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, introducing stakeholder 
theory, Freeman (1984) notes that firms have many other relationships with a variety of 
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stakeholders, including the community, consumers, suppliers, employees, government bodies 
and environmental supporters.  
Compared with shareholders, these stakeholders are likely to pursue different, non-
financial goals, preferences and interests that managers are required to consider and serve as 
firm stakeholders both affect and are affected by firm practices and decisions. Given the 
multiple stakeholder groups, managers thus confront multiple pressures and demands, mainly to 
allocate managerial efforts and firm resources to CSR, holding firms accountable for the social 
and environmental impacts of firm practices and decisions. For instance, from a consumer 
perspective, there is growing evidence that consumers strongly appreciate socially responsible 
firms that devote their efforts and resources to CSR, prompting customer loyalty and attracting 
and sustaining socially conscious investors and other stakeholders. Thereby, doing good 
basically leads to doing better (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Nelson, 2004).  
Accordingly, as Borghesi et al. (2014) state, firms have increasingly directed their 
attention to the importance of CSR and to addressing the firm attempts concerning CSR 
initiatives and activities. CSR has become a priority of firms, triggering the ranking of firms 
based on their CSR performance (Porter and Kramer, 2006). Jo and Harjoto (2012) assert that 
CSR ensures the sustainability of firms in the eyes of firm stakeholders; this is done by 
undertaking sound business practices and decisions that uphold the accountability and 
transparency of the firm not only to shareholders but also to the society at large. Therefore, CSR 
is basically an influential managerial concept that addresses the role of firms in society, given 
the different stakeholders related to the firm, such as employees and customers. 
CSR has much in common with the stakeholder theory perspective as opposed to the 
perspective of firm theory, and stakeholder theory has become the dominant paradigm in CSR 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). According to Wood and Jones (1995), apart from the dominant 
stakeholder group of shareholders, firms have other, multiple stakeholders, both internal and 
external, who also influence and are influenced by firm practices and decisions. Accordingly, 
emphasising the CSR perspective, firms actively seek the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth 
while concurrently considering the interests, concerns and demands of all firm stakeholders 
(Peterson, 2004); that is for a wider social good. Therefore, building on stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, 1984), CSR is depicted as a manifestation of firm moral responsibility and 
commitment towards the whole society, where society members are the primary firm 
stakeholders. Friedman (1970, p.32) defines CSR as:  
To conduct the business in accordance with shareholders’ desires, which generally will 
be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of society, 
both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.  
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As such, the firm choice of how it operates within the social, ethical, legal and political 
standards of the context in which it exists and operates is a reflection of its CSR (Devinney et 
al., 2013). According to Borghesi et al. (2014), firm management engages in CSR for at least 
three reasons. First, there are altruistic, humanitarian and community-based motivations relating 
to firm moral responsibility, for instance, environment protection, charitable donations and 
employee welfare. Second, profitability-based motivation exists in terms of CSR’s consistency 
with and contribution to the financial interests and goals of firms.  
Third, firm managers experience self-motivation related to improving the personal and 
professional reputation attached to the firm. Jones (1995) asserts that the moral responsibility 
and commitment of firms towards the various firm stakeholders help firms establish an essential 
competitive advantage and enhance firm survival. Given the satisfaction and endorsement of 
multiple stakeholder groups, firms build lasting and productive relationships with firm 
stakeholders. This prompts the positive attention and good publicity of firms in relation to their 
favourable reputation and image arising from the firm engagement in socially responsible 
practices, which eventually contribute to the best interests of shareholders.  
Consistent with the firm theory perspective, firm engagement in CSR presents a form of 
investment that aims to maximise shareholders’ wealth while fulfilling the interests and 
objectives of non-financial stakeholders addressed by stakeholder theory. In particular, CSR 
primarily serves as a differentiation strategy, where firms attempt to accomplish and deliver the 
differentiation of products/services or processes that incorporate CSR-related attributes or 
manners, respectively. This prompts profit maximisation for the best benefit of shareholders in 
the sense that doing good, in terms of assessing the social and environmental consequences of 
firm practices and decisions, is good for the firm as a whole (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; 
Borghesi et al., 2014).  
Given firm’s good image, positive publicity and promising relationships with the various 
firm stakeholders, Yoon et al. (2006) assert that CSR plays a key role in burnishing the 
reputation of firms. In consistency , Khoury et al. (2013) point out that the social capital of firm 
in relation to CSR initiatives and activities conveys firm legitimacy regarding firm’s social 
validation in terms of firm stakeholders’ acceptance and approval concerning firm practices and 
behaviour. Therefore, firms mainly utilise CSR as a strategic means to achieve firm legitimacy 
of which stakeholders’ support and favourable firm reputation – a crucial intangible firm 
resource – are predictable valued socially constructed outcomes that improve firm 
competitiveness and survival in terms of acquiring access to business resources, both financial 
and human capital, that are mandatory for the business success (Rao, 1994; Choi and Shepherd, 
2005; Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Du and Vieira, 2012).  
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2.6.1 Corporate Social Responsibility of Family Firms 
Whether family firms are more socially responsible relative to non-family firms remains a 
controversial discussion. Cruz et al. (2014) explain the contradictory views of family firms’ 
social practices and performance on the basis of different reasons. First, most studies of the 
association between family ownership and CSR have stressed a single aspect of the socially 
responsible practices and decisions of firms, namely the environment, overlooking the diversity 
of firm stakeholders. In consistency, second, given SEW is the most salient, distinguishing 
factor in characterising family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2012), the 
studies have also emphasised a single SEW dimension of firm reputation, prestige and image 
with which key firm actors are closely identified. This implies incorporating an incomplete view 
of the CSR of family firms, as SEW has a multidimensional character.  
CSR is theoretically grounded in stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984); as such, the impact 
of SEW preservation on managing the various groups of firm stakeholders matters (Zientara, 
2017). Given the priority of protecting SEW, Cennamo et al. (2012) point out that family firms 
are more keen to engage in CSR, burnishing firm reputation and image in the eyes of firm 
stakeholders in the name of preserving and extending the non-economic utilities of firm’s key 
actors attached to the firm. However, according to Cruz et al. (2014), from the SEW 
preservation perspective, family firms can behave socially responsibly and irresponsibly 
simultaneously because of the multiple dimensions of SEW that challenge, and perhaps 
undermine, firm engagement in CSR.  
Particularly, stressing the social ties and business networks and reputation and image 
dimensions of SEW, family firms direct more attention to socially responsible practices and 
decisions that fulfil the demands and interests of external rather than internal stakeholders. 
Further, drawing on the authority, control and power dimension of SEW, family firms disregard 
the concerns and demands of internal stakeholders, namely employees, maintaining such non-
economic benefits in the hands of certain key firm actors, specifically top managers. Therefore, 
considering the various stakeholder groups, compared with non-family firms, family firms can 
be both good and bad at the same time in the name of preserving the affective endowments 
linked to the firm.  
Dyer and Whetten (2006) find no significant difference between family and non-family 
firms in CSR activities and initiatives; however, consistent with the discussion above on SEW, 
they discover that family firms are more proactive in decreasing the concerns of certain firm 
stakeholders, for instance, adopting environment-friendly strategies and thereby mitigating the 
negative environmental impacts of firm practices and decisions. Therefore, emphasising the 
CSR perspective, this indicates that family firms can act selectively in terms of treating firm 
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stakeholders distinctly. Moreover, despite the growing attention and pressure regarding firm 
social performance, Cruz et al. (2014) note that the national standards and industry conditions 
affect non-family firms rather than family firms concerning firm engagement in CSR; this 
suggests less socially responsible behaviour of family firms compared with non-family firms, 
given the concern for SEW preservation.   
Emphasising proactive stakeholder engagement, Kellermanns et al. (2012) note that 
family firms are strongly concerned with the preservation of SEW which addresses the interests 
and demands of certain firm stakeholders at the expense of others. Specifically, stressing the 
multidimensional character of SEW, the scholars explain that the SEW dimensions are double-
valanced as they can be positively and negatively valanced; they are associated with positive 
(pleasant) and negative (unpleasant) emotions and outcomes regarding firm stakeholders. 
Further, negatively valanced SEW dimensions result in a self-serving behaviour of family firms 
that weakens proactive stakeholder engagement and deteriorates stakeholder management.  
Given the multiple dimensions of SEW and their double-valanced nature, Kellermanns et 
al. (2012) shed light on the so-called ‘dark side’ of SEW that negatively affects firm 
stakeholders. Particularly, they assert that family firms are more responsive to the concerns, 
demands and interests of external stakeholders, namely suppliers, creditors and customers, 
concerning the environmental and social impacts of firm practices and decisions, irrespective of 
the detriments and disadvantages for internal stakeholders. This helps family firms maintain a 
positive image, good publicity and favourable reputation and thus retain and improve their 
social ties and business networks with external stakeholders, preserving two critical dimensions 
of SEW. However, as mentioned above, it indicates overlooking the demands and interests of 
internal stakeholders. 
Moreover, stressing the key SEW dimension of authority, power and control, family firms 
may abandon the interests, concerns and demands of internal stakeholders, specifically 
employees, regarding their involvement in decision making, appreciation of their potentials and 
their promotions, as they restrict such affective endowments to specific firm’s key actors. 
Together, this primarily displays unequal and unfair treatment of internal and external 
stakeholders, as well as discrimination among internal stakeholders themselves, imposing the 
self-serving and discriminatory behaviours of family firms, which thereby suggests their less 
socially responsible behaviour relative to non-family firms (Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns 
et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014; Zientara, 2017).  
Building on the work of Kellermanns et al. (2012), Zientara (2017) advances a discussion 
of the impact of SEW on how family firms perceive and engage in CSR, as SEW presents a key 
reference point for framing issues, opportunities and problems and making decisions in family 
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firms. In accordance with Kellermanns et al. (2012) concerning the dark side of SEW, Zientara 
(2017) asserts that SEW can have detrimental effects on firm stakeholders in relation to its 
ambivalent nature, emphasising the difference between the strategic (normative) and 
instrumental (selective) approaches to CSR in their underlying motives. Specifically, family 
firms are more likely to adopt an instrumental rather than strategic approach to CSR concerning 
CSR initiatives and activities in the name of preserving and expanding the non-economic 
utilities attached to the firm. This basically leads to different responses to the concerns and 
demands of the various groups of firm stakeholders, where family firms treat firm stakeholders 
differently.  
Therefore, the priority of SEW preservation triggers the self-serving behaviour of family 
firms in terms of their selective response to the demands and interests of certain firm 
stakeholders at the expense of others, implying an ambiguous nature of SEW which has adverse 
implications for firm engagement in CSR. Given the multidimensional character of SEW, 
Zientara (2017) points to the differentiation among firm stakeholders in terms of their unequal 
and unfair treatment, enforcing family firms’ discriminatory behaviour towards firm 
stakeholders. Such discrimination among firm stakeholders suggests a negative valance of SEW 
dimensions (Kellermanns et al., 2012), and in turn, contradictory social practices and decisions 
of family firms relating to SEW’s dark side, where they can act contradictorily from a CSR 
perspective.  
Adopting an instrumental approach to CSR, family firms use CSR as a marketing or 
public relations tool to serve SEW-related interests and goals. Whereas, emphasising the wider 
good for society at large (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Nelson, 2004; Peterson, 2004), non-
family firms view CSR as a core business strategy for the best interests of shareholders, 
implementing a strategic approach to CSR. Thus, given the SEW dimensions are contradictory 
from the perspective of CSR, family firms can act selectively and opportunistically, imposing 
less proactive stakeholder engagement and weak stakeholder management. This thereby 
challenges the implicit assumption of SEW as a prosocial and positive stimulus for socially 
responsible behaviour (Zientara, 2017).  
2.7 Conclusion 
Institutional scholars have shed light on the role of ILs in providing guidance and 
prescriptions of social actions, that is, the definition of acceptable behaviour and the means of 
attaining it. As an intangible construct, ILs implicitly drive firm behaviour in terms of shaping 
firm practices and decisions, where they latently embed in firm decision making, and as such, 
portray the culture and nature of firms in running the business (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Danisman et al., 2006). Thus, firm practices and decisions are tangible manifestation of ILs 
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(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2010). To date, no 
study has directly measured and empirically examined the effect of ILs, as hidden drivers of 
firm behaviour, on firm practices and decisions as most work on ILs has been qualitative – 
interview- or survey-based.  
This lack of attention has motivated the present research questions and studies, which aim 
to expand the knowledge and understanding of ILs and examine the influence of ILs, as hidden 
drivers of firm behaviour, specifically through the empirical windows of CG and CSR. 
Therefore, Chapter 3 presents the quantitative measurement of the embeddedness of ILs, namely 
family and market logics. In doing so, it develops the institutional-based classification of firms 
and introduces the concept of firm logic orientation, as opposed to ownership status (family or 
not), as well as the constructs of familiness and marketness. Focusing on the empirical window 
of firm governance, it then examines the association between ILs and CG concerning the firm 
choice of internal CG configurations.  
Chapter 4 investigates the moderating role of ILs in configuring CG, emphasising a more 
subtle and in-depth manifestation of ILs in firm practices and decisions in terms of the 
relationship between well-known CG determinants and configurations. Using another empirical 
window of firm social performance, Chapter 5 examines the association between ILs and CSR 
in terms of firm engagement in socially responsible practices. Stressing a more perceptive and 
in-depth articulation of ILs in firm behaviour, it further emphasises the interplay of ILs, 
legitimacy seeking and CSR, examining the moderating role of ILs regarding the association 
between firm legitimacy and CSR. 
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3 Do Institutional Logics Shape Corporate Governance? 
3.1 Introduction 
Firms are normally different business entities. Underlying such difference, certain criteria 
primarily address an element of similarity among firms upon which they are classified in 
specific categories, and in turn, distinguished. To examine firms and – by extension – 
understand their practices, choices and behaviour, it is reasonable to attempt to group them into 
distinguishable groupings and classifications. To this end, firms are usually grouped on the basis 
of ownership criteria, namely ownership status (family or not). Prior research has investigated 
the differences between family and non-family firms particularly regarding firm decision 
making and resulting business practices. In this vein, stemming from institutional theory, 
Friedland and Alford (1991) attempt to shed light on the notion of ILs, by introducing them as a 
proxy for firm behaviour as they may tacitly embed in firm decision making, and in turn, shape 
firm practices and decisions. Specifically, as Greenwood et al. (2011) propose, ILs provide 
guidance and taken-for-granted, resilient prescriptions that help make sense of the practices of 
societal actors, by defining and setting means of appropriate behaviour (Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008).  
Therefore, firm practices and decisions are basically tangible demonstration of embedded 
ILs (Greenwood et al., 2010), which trigger and explain the discrepancy in firm behaviour. As 
Thornton (2004) asserts, firms exist and operate in a society that is a multi-order institutional 
system. The system consists of multiple, main market and non-market institutions – or societal 
sectors – each of which is associated with a core, unique logic – IL. ILs act as means to address 
the values, assumptions and norms of the corresponding institution, and in turn, guide social 
actions. Firms encounter a complex institutional context, confronting multiple institutional 
demands and pressures imposed by a plurality of logics (Greenwood et al., 2011). That is, ILs 
coexist, interplay with one another and often conflict. Therefore, while they may interrelate, ILs 
often contradict one another due to incompatible guidance in terms of the symbols and material 
practices comprising the institution’s ongoing principles. A growing interest in ILs is justified 
by the institutional complexity that firms confront because of the prevalence of multiple, 
typically competing, logics and the adoption of different response strategies2. Still, there is 
relatively little empirical research on the role of ILs in driving firm behaviour. 
Miller et al. (2011) emphasise the difference between the norms and prescriptions that 
family and market logics impose for the strategic priorities of lone founder and family-owned or 
managed firms, which are used to justify firm performance. Similarly, addressing the 
 
2 See Reay and Hinings (2009) and Pache and Santos (2013). 
3 Do Institutional Logics Shape Corporate Governance? 
51 
 
contradictory demands and pressures that firms experience, Greenwood et al. (2010) highlight 
the discrepancy between family and market logics in relation to firm decision on downsizing. 
Further, Mair et al. (2015) highlight distinct firm types regarding the setup of governance 
structures of hybrid firms, identifying the embeddedness of commercial and social welfare 
logics in firm decision making and firm response strategy to them.  
While the extant literature has addressed the effect of ILs as latent drivers of firm 
behaviour on different firm aspects concerning economic and strategic behaviours, no attention 
has been paid to the influence of ILs on CG – the control system by which firms are guided, 
directed and held responsible (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). CG introduces the 
means of control in terms of internal CG configurations, including the board of directors as the 
core of CG and executive compensation, to handle the potential agency problems between 
owners and managers. It emphasises an overriding objective of maximising the wealth of 
shareholders – the dominant stakeholder group – by increasing firm’s financial returns. Given 
the various CG configurations, CG practices exhibit a remarkable discrepancy among firms in 
terms of the setup of firm governance. While economic hypotheses largely explain the 
implementation of CG in relation to the structure of the board of directors and executive 
compensation plan, there remains an unexplained idiosyncratic component. Accordingly, the 
CG configurations adopted in firms where ownership status (family or not) is emphasised fall 
short of adequately explaining the uniqueness of firm governance practices. 
For decades, the scholars have focussed on the connection between CG and firm 
performance. However, the existing literature has not directed attention to the implications of 
ILs for CG configurations. To address this gap, in this study, I extend the existing work, 
examining whether CG configurations vary according to the ILs embedded in the decision 
making of firms. In other words, I mainly emphasise the association between ILs and CG. 
Specifically, in this study, I aim to empirically investigate whether and how ILs shape the firm 
choice of internal CG configurations. The family business literature has widely highlighted the 
discrepancy in strategic behaviour among firms regarding CG, framed by family ownership 
status.  
Stemming from the perspective of ILs, in this study, I propose that ownership status 
(family or not) is an insufficient indicator to identify and classify firms as the ownership criteria 
disregard the importance of firm behaviour. Specifically, considering ownership status alone 
overlooks, as Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Danisman et al. (2006) explain, the culture and 
nature of firms of running the business relating to real firm practices and behaviour. Institutional 
research scholars portray ILs as latent drivers of firm behaviour and shapers of firm practices 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2010). Drawing on the ILs perspective, in 
3 Do Institutional Logics Shape Corporate Governance? 
52 
 
practice, family firms can behave like non-family firms and vice versa, embedding market and 
family logics, respectively, in firm decision making that firm practices and decisions best 
demonstrate.  
This primarily motivates the present study to rethink of family and non-family firms in 
terms of firm behaviour, incorporating the role of ILs concerning the concept of distinction 
among them beyond the traditional understanding and classification of firms. Further, it 
examines the effect of ILs – newly proposed lens – on firm behaviour through the empirical 
window of CG. Emphasising the firm type in terms of so-called the logic-based group, in this 
study, I primarily investigate the difference in the choice of CG configurations among firms, 
where I empirically examine the effect of ILs on known models of CG, considering an array of 
widespread CG variables. The purpose of this study is to advance the ILs perspective and to 
expand the understanding of the differences in CG among firms. 
While the extant research has extensively applied the ownership-based classification of 
family and non-family firms, in this study, I suggest a different manner to group firms reflecting 
the embeddedness of ILs irrespective of family ownership status (or not). Particularly, I design 
an institutional-based approach to directly identify and assess the embeddedness of family and 
market (non-family) logics by which a firm is driven and identify and classify firms 
accordingly. As the notion of ILs presents covert drivers of firm behaviour, the institutional-
based approach is designed to operationalise both family and market logics, applying a 
quantitative measurement to differentiate among firms. In doing this, different types of firms are 
presented based on the embeddedness of these logics – FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs. 
Drawing on the perspective of ILs, such an institutional-based classification of firms introduces 
the notion of ‘firm logic orientation’, namely the constructs of ‘familiness’ and ‘non-
familiness’, or so-called ‘marketness’, to define and depict the embeddedness of family and 
market logics by which a firm is driven.  
Unlike the traditional ownership-based classification of firms, the institutional-based 
classification emphasises firm behaviour in terms of actual firm practices and decisions. It 
primarily builds on  the perspective of SEW – the non-economic utilities of firm’s key actors 
derived from the firm – which is increasingly addressed in the family business literature as a key 
characterisation of family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a; Berrone et al., 2012; Miller and Le 
Breton‐Miller, 2014). Drawing on the strategic choices and managerial decisions of firms 
regarding a number of behavioural dimensions that are empirically proven to raise contrast 
between family and non-family firms in the name of SEW preservation, a typology of firms, the 
so-called logic orientation index, is developed to determine the logic orientation of firms in 
3 Do Institutional Logics Shape Corporate Governance? 
53 
 
terms of identifying the extent of their non-familiness, or marketness, which inversely indicates 
the familiness extent of firms.  
Stressing firm behaviour, in this study, I depict FLDFs and MLDFs as behaving like 
family and non-family firms, respectively, in terms of their motives, objectives and essence, 
building on the SEW preservation perspective. Specifically, I portray MLDFs as shareholder-
oriented firms that emphasise the primary economic business objective relating to the 
prioritisation of profitability and shareholders’ wealth maximisation, displaying an archetypal 
business setting. In contrast, FLDFs exhibit a family-oriented attitude and preference in terms of 
the priority of SEW preservation, where the family and business systems overlap in a different 
business setting.  
Therefore, drawing on the perspective of SEW preservation, FLDFs reveal a distinct firm 
identity, setting firm interests and priorities in terms of SEW-related concerns and goals as SEW 
represents the most predominant aspect of family-oriented identity (Glynn, 2008; Berrone et al., 
2012; Miller and Le Breton‐Miller, 2014). In other words, the prioritisation of protecting or 
extending the non-economic utilities of key firm actors linked to the firm reflects the 
characterisation and distinction of FLDFs’ identity. Such an identity of FLDFs thereby imposes 
conditions against, and in turn, resistance to external demands, standards and expectations 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014) in relation to CG. Specifically, 
according to Aguilera et al. (2018), the unique, influential identity of FLDFs underpins their CG 
discretion that results in the deviance or departure of firm governance practices from the 
dominant shareholder-oriented governance system in the name of preserving SEW, suggesting 
an effect of firm logic orientation on the firm choice of internal CG configurations.  
For the board of directors and executive compensation analyses, I use samples of 6286 
and 6236 firm-year observations for 987 and 971 firms, respectively, on the S&P 1500 index in 
the period of 2006–2016. Mandatory data are retrieved from the Compustat, Institutional 
Shareholder Services, Execucomp, Thomson Reuters and Centre for Research in Security Prices 
databases. Generally, the study shows that firm logic orientation explains an extra amount of 
variation in the firm choice of internal CG configurations. Overall, consistent with the 
hypotheses, it reports a discrepancy between FLDFs and MLDFs in the board structure 
regarding board size and independence. It also finds that FLDFs and MLDFs differ in terms of 
the plan of executive compensation, supporting the hypotheses.  
Specifically, the results suggest smaller and less independent boards of FLDFs compared 
with MLDFs. In addition, they suggest that, relative to MLDFs, FLDFs pay lower total and 
equity-based compensation. Irrespective of family ownership status (or not), the study provides 
empirical evidence of a significant association between the logic orientation of firms and CG, 
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where the familiness and marketness of firms distinctly affect the firm choice of internal CG 
configurations. However, while they differ in terms of some characteristics due to an effect of 
ILs, firms in a context like the S&P 1500 index can still have elements of similarity according to 
the competitiveness of the market environment and industry regulations.  
Stressing the important empirical window of CG, the findings provide empirical evidence 
supporting the notion of ILs as being latent drivers of firm behaviour related to the firm culture 
and nature of running the business. The importance of this study lies in suggesting a distinct 
view of the familiness and marketness of firms, identifying and classifying firms based on the 
embeddedness of family and market logics, which tangibly manifests in firm practices and 
decisions. In this study, I mainly show how family and market logics play an implicit role in 
affecting firm behaviour, and in turn, differentiating among firms, emphasising the CG context 
concerning the firm choice of internal CG configurations. Looking beyond firm strategies, I 
specifically shed light on the hidden logic-based root; that is, the culture and nature of firms, 
underlying how firms internally configure businesses regarding the setup of firm governance, in 
terms of the structure of the board of directors and executive compensation plan, to deliver their 
strategies and goals.  
Given this study, I contribute to the ILs, CG and family business literature in different 
ways. First, I emphasise, define and operationalise family and market logics. Second, I develop 
and validate a quantitative measurement of the embeddedness of family and market logics, and I 
present an institutional-based classification of firms, identifying and grouping them as FLDFs, 
hybrid firms or MLDFs beyond the traditional understanding of the types of firms. Third, I 
introduce the concept of firm logic orientation, particularly the constructs of familiness and 
marketness, to define and depict the embeddedness of family and market logics by which a firm 
is driven. Thus, I mainly develop an index of the logic orientation of firms based on real firm 
practices and behaviour. Fourth, relative to the extant ownership-based studies, I use a different 
approach to view and determine the familiness and marketness of firms, applying the 
perspective of ILs to identify and classify firms in terms of depicting and differentiating 
between family and non-family firm-like behaviours irrespective of family ownership status (or 
not).  
Fifth, from an empirical perspective, I report a difference between FLDFs and MLDFs 
regarding the firm choice of internal CG configurations, highlighting the influence of firm logic 
orientation on firm governance. Sixth, I empirically approve and advance the understanding of 
the implicit role of ILs – family and market logics – as covert drivers of firm behaviour in terms 
of affecting the setup of firm governance, differentiating the firm choice of internal CG 
configurations among the logic-based groups of firms. Moreover, in applying the ILs 
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perspective to the context of CG, I thus provide scholars, policymakers and regulators with a 
distinct explanation for and expand their understanding of the difference in CG among firms, 
helping them better develop future CG research, policies and regulations. Lastly, emphasising a 
different view of the familiness and marketness of firms to explain the discrepancy in CG 
among firms, I consider an array of CG variables of the board and executive compensation.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the literature review 
and hypothesis development. Descriptions of the data, sample and methodology design are 
presented in Section 3. Section 4 details the findings of the empirical tests of hypotheses, 
discusses the results of multivariate analysis and provides remarks on the robustness checks. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter.   
3.2 Literature Review & Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Institutional Logics: Family & Market 
Stemming from institutional theory, Friedland and Alford (1991) describe a shifting point 
of its key assumption on isomorphism among firms, providing the rapidly growing notion of ILs 
of which firm practices and behaviour are tangible manifestation (Greenwood et al., 2010). By 
providing the master principles of society, assumptions, norms, standards and values, ILs 
present taken-for-granted, resilient prescriptions that help make sense of societal actors’ 
practices and decisions (Thornton, 2004; Greenwood et al., 2010). In other words, at the societal 
level, ILs represent the rules of the game, forming the core of the key institutions comprising 
society (Friedland and Alford, 1991). At the firm level, ILs shape firm identities, choices and 
practices (Mair et al., 2015).  
Suggesting a nested hierarchy framework, Thornton (2004) portrays society as a multi-
order institutional system that encompasses multiple, main institutions or societal sectors, 
ranging from the market to the family via religion and the state. Each institution is associated 
with a central, distinctive logic providing both symbols and material practices that guide the 
social actions of social actors. Therefore, firms operate in a complex institutional context in 
which they confront multiple pressures imposed by a plurality of logics that define and set the 
means of appropriate behaviour (Greenwood et al., 2011). In this sense, ILs coexist, interplay 
with one another, and yet contradict each other. Accordingly, as Greenwood et al. (2011) assert, 
ILs can interact for influence on firm behaviour; however, they are often in conflict as their 
respective guidance and prescriptions comprising the corresponding institution’s ongoing 
principles are inconsistent.   
Research on ILs has focussed on the proposition that logics drive firm behaviour, 
establishing a link between ILs and several firm practices. Emphasising family and market 
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logics, prior studies have analysed their influence and the interplay between them concerning 
the economic and strategic behaviours of firms (e.g., Thornton, 2004; Greenwood et al., 2010; 
Miller et al., 2011). Investigating the lone founder and family-owned or managed firms’ 
strategic priorities, Miller et al. (2011) highlight the opposition of the norms and prescriptions 
imposed by family and market logics. They mainly argue that the strategic priorities of a 
business are influenced by the identity and role of key firm actors that explain firm 
performance. Emphasising family businesses, they claim that family owners and managers are 
influenced by and devoted to family stakeholders, embracing a family logic in terms of playing 
a nurturing role and adopting conservation and protection strategies. In contrast, lone founders 
embrace a market logic, encompassing a wider group of market-oriented stakeholders in terms 
of implementing growth strategies.  
Greenwood et al. (2010) address the firms’ experience of and response to multiple logics 
in terms of the strategies deployed in firms to cope with distinct demands and pressures. They 
stress the incompatibility of the prescriptions of family and market logics, analysing their 
distinctive implications on the firm practice of downsizing. On the one hand, describing market 
logic, they emphasise the market forces in terms of the performance criteria to compare the firm 
decision on downsizing between high- and low-performing firms. On the other hand, building 
on the importance of family businesses and relatively different behaviour of family firms, they 
discuss the family management status of family-owned firms, underlining the core of family 
logic regarding the firm practice of downsizing, where, compared with market logic, family 
logic promotes providing job security and protection more effectively. 
In a related work, stressing hybrid firms from an institutional perspective, Mair et al. 
(2015) shed light on their distinct types, emphasising commercial and social welfare logics. 
Examining the setup of their governance structures in a complex institutional context, the 
scholars identify two types of hybrids – conforming and dissenting – based on the response 
strategy adopted by firms to manage institutional complexity. Specifically, they assert that, in 
governing firms and achieving their strategic objectives, ‘conforming firms’ prioritise a single, 
dominant logic, adhering fully to its pressures and demands while complying with the minimum 
standards of the other logics for legitimacy-seeking purposes. In contrast, ‘dissenting firms’ 
manage to combine and balance demands and prescriptions of different logics by selective-
coupling or innovation mechanisms, operating under multiple, typically competing, logics. 
Thus, unlike conforming firms, they permit multiple logics to direct their practices and 
decisions, resisting the identification with a single logic. In accordance with this, Danisman et 
al. (2006) assert that firms embrace either one main culture or nature that relates to a single, 
dominant logic or alternative cultures that reflect coexisting, subdominant logics.  
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Building on the distinct types of firms regarding the embraced logics and the 
contradiction in terms of the opposition and incompatibility of family and market logics, in this 
study, I propose to portray firms as being driven by a single logic that dominantly embeds in 
and steers firm decision making, and as such, shapes firm practices and behaviour, reflecting the 
firm culture and nature. Stressing the most prevalent logics of family and market, I primarily 
suggest depicting family logic in the sense of a family-oriented attitude and preference that 
fundamentally overlaps the family and business systems, presenting a different business setting 
in terms of implementing nurture, conservation and protection strategies. In contrast, market 
logic underlies a shareholder-oriented business setting in terms of the priority of the key 
economic business objective of profitability and shareholders’ wealth maximisation in an 
archetypal business system, adopting market-oriented growth strategies and emphasising firm 
performance. In doing this, in this study, I suggest an institutional-based classification of firms 
into FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs, drawing on the notion of ILs. Specifically, I put forward 
the concept of ‘firm logic orientation’, presenting the firm type in terms of the logic-based 
group concerning the dominant logic embedded in firm decision making, thereby driving firm 
behaviour. To describe the logic orientation of firms, in this study, I propose the constructs of 
‘familiness’ and ‘non-familiness’, also referred to as ‘marketness’. Primarily, stemming from 
the perspective of ILs, it is argued that the traditional classification of firms emphasising 
ownership status (family or not) overlooks the importance of firm behaviour; this prompts the 
distinction among firms using a different manner from the ownership criteria. 
3.2.2 Socioemotional Wealth Preservation  
A large body of research has empirically shown that family firms are significantly 
different from their counterparts – non-family firms – over many strategic choices and 
managerial decisions. Greenwood et al. (2010) assert that family firms demonstrate a distinct 
approach to business. Given the distinct practices and behaviour that vary between family and 
non-family firms, increasing attention has been directed towards the notion of SEW in the 
recent family business literature (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a; 
Martin et al., 2016; Fitz‐Koch and Nordqvist, 2017). SEW primarily highlights a key feature of 
family firms that distinguishes them from other types of businesses, where it portrays the 
leading aspect of family-oriented identity and the most important differentiator of family firms 
(Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014). Particularly, the preservation of SEW is claimed to play 
a key role in justifying the distinctive behaviour of family firms relative to non-family firms, 
representing a latent explanatory factor of their practices and decisions. 
The popular model of SEW is constructed by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) and founded on 
behavioural agency theory to help explain the differences in firm practices and decisions 
between family and non-family firms. The sense underlying this theory is that family firms 
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make strategic choices and managerial decisions based on a reference point that is important for 
firm’s key actors – the dominant shareholders and decision makers. Accordingly, the strategic 
choices and managerial decisions are made bearing in mind mainly the preservation and/or 
extension of the SEW of key firm actors as a primary reference point around which the 
problems, issues and opportunities of family firms are framed. In family firms, preserving the 
SEW of family members – shareholders and/or managers – is fundamental. When SEW is 
threatened, family firms’ decisions are no longer driven by economic logic; instead, the priority 
of SEW preservation plays an essential role (Berrone et al., 2012).  
The generic concept of SEW refers to the affective endowments relating to the non-
economic utilities or benefits linked to the firm. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) and Berrone et al. 
(2012) explain that SEW captures the non-economic utilities or moral benefits derived from the 
firm in terms of the exercise of personal authority and power, enjoyment of influence and 
control over the business, possession of social ties and business networks, satisfaction of job 
security and protection and identification with the firm in terms of reputation, prestige and 
image. When making strategic choices and managerial decisions in family firms, the 
preservation of SEW serves as a vital criterion against which decisions’ outcomes are evaluated 
to mitigate the risk exposure of the non-economic utilities derived from the firm. Therefore, in 
most recent literature, SEW symbolises an important construct that best captures the uniqueness 
of family firms, effectively differentiating between family and non-family firms (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2011a; Berrone et al., 2012).  
Preserving SEW, family firms undertake strategic choices and managerial decisions that 
facilitate avoiding the potential loss of SEW, albeit at the expense of some firm stakeholders, 
where loss averseness to SEW outweighs risk averseness to financial objectives. In other words, 
family firms opt for SEW if reducing financial risk exposes the derived non-economic utilities 
of firm’s key actors to risk. Therefore, the SEW preservation largely reveals a primary basis for 
the distinct character and essence of family firms as reflected in many behavioural dimensions 
regarding firm practices and decisions. Specifically, the strategic choices of corporate 
diversification, earnings management, tax aggressiveness and R&D investment practices within 
family firms are interestingly argued to be driven by the fundamental role of SEW preservation. 
The extant family business literature provides empirical evidence that family firms behave 
distinctly regarding these behavioural dimensions compared with non-family firms (e.g., 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Jiraporn and DaDalt, 2009; Patel and Chrisman, 2012; Steijvers and 
Niskanen, 2014), which has entailed further investigation to justify the difference between 
family and non-family firms through the lens of SEW.   
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The SEW preservation has priority over the pursuit of economic gains in the case of a 
potential threat to non-economic utilities; otherwise, the economic logic plays a key role in firm 
decision making. More importantly, SEW is not considered limited to family businesses (Miller 
and Le Breton‐Miller, 2014). Similarly, Berrone et al. (2010) assert that family ownership or 
membership is not a condition, and in turn, non-family shareholders and managers can possess 
different kinds of SEW. In other words, like family members, non-family shareholders and 
managers also derive some SEW from the firm, extending the non-financial benefits of firms to 
different groups of family and non-family stakeholders as firm’s key actors. Therefore, drawing 
on the SEW preservation perspective, in this study, I primarily propose to portray FLDFs, in 
contrast to MLDFs, based on the priority of SEW preservation – a progressively key 
characterisation of family businesses in recent family business literature – as a family-oriented 
attitude and preference in relation to firm practices and decisions, capturing the uniqueness of 
family firm behaviour as opposed to non-family firm behaviour. In other words, detecting a 
family – and by default a non-family – firm-like behaviour, in this study, I adopt the popular 
model of SEW, namely the SEW preservation, to depict and differentiate between the 
behaviours of FLDFs and MLDFs given the contradiction and discrepancy between family and 
market logics, suggesting that FLDFs and MLDFs behave like family and non-family firms, 
respectively, in terms of their motives, objectives and essence.   
3.2.2.1 Corporate Diversification 
Corporate diversification is an effective risk-reduction strategy that establishes the scope 
of a firm’s business operations. As a trade-off, when risk is reduced, diversification tends to 
lower the overall return. In family firms, this is perceived as a moral hazard conflict between 
dominant family shareholders and minority shareholders (Faccio and Lang, 2002). Specifically, 
while diversification largely benefits controlling family shareholders, whose wealth is 
concentrated in a single business, by reducing the firm exposure to financial risk, it expropriates 
wealth from minority non-family shareholders in the form of overall return sacrificing 
(Fernandez, 2002). However, the family business literature provides empirical evidence that, for 
multiple reasons, family firms diversify less compared with non-family firms.  
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) show a negative relationship between family ownership or 
management and corporate diversification, concluding that family firms tend to mitigate the 
potential moral hazard conflict between family and non-family shareholders. In accordance with 
this, Gomez‐Mejia et al. (2010) find that family firms are less likely to engage in corporate 
diversification. On the one hand, because of their large, undiversified wealth, family 
shareholders have a substantial incentive to maintain their shareholdings at a maximum value. 
Accordingly, family firms are less likely to engage in diversification strategies that decrease 
overall returns in reaction to mitigated risk (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). On the other hand, 
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more relevantly, as diversification requires extra external funding and managerial talent and 
expertise, as well as changes to the business routines and operations imposed by the new 
diversified products or markets, it results in threatening the non-economic benefits of family 
shareholders and managers (Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2010). As such, drawing on the SEW 
preservation perspective, family firms engage in less corporate diversification to diminish 
threats to non-pecuniary benefits linked to the firm.     
3.2.2.2 Earnings Management 
Earnings management reflects the use of managerial judgement in financial reporting, 
altering the reported numbers for the purpose of either misleading some firm stakeholders about 
firm performance or influencing the contractual terms that depend on accounting figures (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999). In managing earnings, the practice is lawful and compliant with the 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); however, firms have discretion on how to 
report earnings and intentionally show managers in as positive a light as possible (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2011a). Thus, it is perceived as unethical behaviour, as managing earnings involves 
deceiving and misleading financial information users (Martin et al., 2016). Accordingly, 
although it is not illegal, earnings management is viewed as an accounting distortion that 
prevents firm stakeholders from making appropriate decisions and assessing managerial 
performance.   
Different studies have reported that family firms are less likely to manage earnings; 
instead, they provide true accounting numbers regardless of the potential financial advantages. 
Martin et al. (2016) find that, compared with non-family firms, family firms engage less in 
earnings management. Similarly, Ali et al. (2007) report that, relative to non-family firms, 
family firms less frequently manipulate discretionary accruals. Moreover, Chen et al. (2008) 
state that family firms are more likely to announce earnings warnings in the prevention of 
negative publicity. Supporting these claims and findings, Cascino et al. (2010) and Wang (2006) 
find that family firms tend to provide more accurate accounting information compared with 
their counterparts. These studies explain that, despite its financial advantages, including reduced 
market for takeover threat and increased stock price, earnings management imposes penalties 
and harms firm reputation and prestige.  
For family shareholders and managers, the preservation of non-economic utilities, in 
terms of maintaining the authority and power and a good reputation and positive image of the 
family business with which they are closely identified, as well as the job security and protection, 
outweighs the potential financial benefits associated with managing earnings. As such, family 
firms are less likely to manage earnings as a loss aversion concerning SEW. Moreover, 
according to Martin et al. (2016), as the deterioration of reputation has an adverse effect on firm 
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performance, family shareholders are unlikely to undertake practices that potentially result in 
negative financial consequences on their large, undiversified wealth, avoiding a financial 
hardship.  
Similarly, given their concentrated ownership in family firms, family shareholders have 
strong economic incentives to closely monitor managerial behaviour and performance in the 
name of protecting their financial welfare. Accordingly, drawing on the substitution effect of 
ownership concentration (Williamson, 1983), managerial remuneration is less tied to 
performance, and managers’ opportunistic behaviour is more likely to be detected and 
disciplined. Therefore, managers of family firms have fewer motives to alter the reported 
accounting numbers, and thus, they are less likely to manage earnings compared with non-
family firms (Ali et al., 2007). 
3.2.2.3 Tax Aggressiveness 
Tax aggressiveness is another firm strategy perceived as an accounting distortion, 
providing firms with the choice on how they report their taxes, probably in favour of 
management. Chen et al. (2010) define tax aggressiveness as tax management activities for the 
purpose of a downward management of taxable income. Despite the tax savings associated with 
tax avoidance or management, shareholders perceive it as an attempt to conceal the potential 
rent-seeking activities undertaken by management at their cost. 
Chen et al. (2010) and Steijvers and Niskanen (2014) show that, relative to non-family 
firms, family firms are less tax aggressive. The scholars justify the findings from a SEW 
preservation perspective where family shareholders or managers are highly concerned about the 
potential penalty and reputation damage imposed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit if 
tax management practice is detected. Emphasising the SEW perspective, family shareholders 
and managers have substantial incentives to avoid the potential bad publicity and unfavourable 
reputation associated with tax avoidance and to protect the family name and business. This is 
because, in addition to financial welfare, their job security and identities in terms of reputation, 
prestige and image are strongly tied to the firm, and they often view the family businesses as a 
legacy to be passed to future generations (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a).  
Therefore, as mentioned earlier, for family shareholders and managers, the preservation 
of affective endowments, in terms of maintaining the authority and power and a favourable 
reputation and positive image of the family business with which they are closely identified, as 
well as the job security and protection, offsets the potential financial benefits associated with tax 
management. Thus, family firms are less likely to manage taxes as a loss aversion regarding 
SEW. Further, as the deterioration of reputation has a negative effect on firm performance, 
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family shareholders are unlikely to undertake practices that potentially result in adverse 
financial consequences on their large, undiversified wealth, avoiding a financial hardship.  
3.2.2.4 R&D Investment 
In high-technology firms, R&D investment is an important force to drive growth and 
innovation for firm’s competitive advantage and survival. However, despite the economic 
benefits associated with R&D, the non-economic utilities derived by family shareholders and 
managers from the family business may be threatened due to the requirements and aftereffects 
of R&D investment. In addition, given their concentrated ownership, by undertaking uncertain 
innovative business projects, the financial welfare of dominant family shareholders is subject to 
risk because they own large, undiversified shareholdings in the firm.  
Prior studies have provided substantial evidence that family firms invest less in R&D 
relative to their counterparts, highlighting the R&D aspects that can threaten family firms. 
Munoz-Bullon and Sanchez-Bueno (2011) report that family firms have lower R&D intensity 
compared with non-family firms. Moreover, Chen and Hsu (2009) find that family ownership 
has a negative relationship with R&D investment. Similarly, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011b) report 
that, among technology-intensive firms, family ownership is negatively associated with R&D 
intensity.  
The scholars explain that, from a SEW preservation perspective, R&D investment entails 
outside specialised expertise and skills, additional funds to finance innovations and experiments 
and new routines and methods of business operation, which collectively diminishes the SEW of 
family shareholders and managers. In turn, the priority of SEW preservation provides a rational 
explanation for firm decision on less R&D investment in family firms. Moreover, from a 
financial perspective, family shareholders’ wealth is strongly linked to family businesses as they 
hold large, concentrated proportions of shares that are exposed to a potential risk regarding a 
financial hardship due to uncertain outcomes of R&D investment (Kotlar et al., 2014). 
Accordingly, relative to non-family firms, family firms are less likely to invest in R&D.  
3.2.3 Firm Identity 
According to Greenwood et al. (2011), firms are subject to multiple institutional pressures 
and demands, which they experience and respond to differently. The scholars mainly justify the 
unequal effect of pressures imposed by the contradictory logics on firms and firms’ distinct 
strategic responses to them by a filtering process, which is attributed to firm-specific 
characteristics. Among other characteristics of the firm, they point to the role of firm identity in 
reacting to the institutional pressures and demands that firms confront. Similarly, Kodeih and 
Greenwood (2014) discuss the importance of firm identity in responding to institutional 
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complexity in terms of what a firm is and what it wishes to become. They assert that the identity 
differences among firms affect the perceptions of opportunities by firms, and in turn, affect their 
adopted responses. In addition, Ravasi and Schultz (2006) highlight the role of organisational 
culture in the conceptualisation of firms, stressing the understanding of firm identity and 
supporting the idea of ‘sensemaking’ of actions that firms carry out.  
In accordance with this, Kraatz and Block (2008) point out that the specificity of firm 
identity is required for ILs to drive firm behaviour. Furthermore, Mair et al. (2015) assert that, 
underlying the firm framework and culture, ILs play a key role in shaping firm identities, and in 
effect, driving firm practices and decisions. As a sensemaking tool, firm identity interprets and 
gives meaning to firm behaviour (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006). According to organisational 
identity theory (Albert and Whetten, 2004), the identity provides the firm with a belief system, 
describing its values, nature and culture, which collectively affect firm strategy and behaviour. 
In turn, firm identity differentiates some firms from others in the eyes of firm stakeholders 
concerning the interests and priorities of firms (Scott and Lane, 2000).  
At the firm level, the identity is about differentiating firm’s attributes from those of 
counterparts. Further, according to Glynn (2008), firm identity influences the prioritisation of 
and responses to external demands and pressures, and in turn, affects firm practices that the firm 
implements. Specifically, to protect the perceived firm identity, key firm actors challenge or 
comply with the pressures and expectations based on their identity alignment (Sauder and 
Espeland, 2009). Thus, the sense of firm identity prompts the potential discretion of firms to 
resist external demands and expectations (Aguilera et al., 2018). Moreover, Greenwood et al. 
(2011) state that a stronger firm identity implies more conditions towards, and as such, 
resistance to the demands and pressures that firms encounter.  
Drawing on the SEW perspective, the priority of SEW preservation is an essential factor 
that uniquely characterises family firms, and as such, demonstrates their distinct identity relative 
to non-family firms, which affects and justifies their distinctive practices and behaviour. 
According to Berrone et al. (2012) and Cruz et al. (2014), SEW is the most prominent feature of 
family-oriented identity and a key differentiator of family firms, where it portrays a latent 
explanatory factor of their distinct behaviour. Stemming from the grounds of behavioural 
agency theory, SEW is a core reference point around which family firms’ problems, issues and 
opportunities are framed in terms of their corresponding outcomes, and in turn, strategic choices 
and managerial decisions are made (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a).  
Consistent with the concept of firm identity regarding setting firms’ goals, priorities, 
interests and responses, the SEW preservation represents a priority in family-oriented firms that 
affects the evaluation and determination of firm practices and decisions, reflecting firm identity 
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in terms of what firms are and what they want to be. Accordingly, drawing on the SEW 
preservation perspective, it is argued that FLDFs possess a unique, influential firm identity 
relative to MLDFs in relation to the concern for preserving the non-economic utilities of key 
firm actors, which influences firm practices and decisions.  
Following Ravasi and Schultz (2006) and Sauder and Espeland (2009), I integrate the 
perspectives of SEW and firm identity. Specifically, given that firm identity affects firm 
interests and priorities, in this study, I suggest that the prioritisation of SEW preservation 
predominantly reflects the characterisation and distinction of the identity of FLDFs compared 
with MLDFs, affecting firm practices and behaviour. Emphasising the sensemaking tool of firm 
identity, such a priority makes sense of the distinct firm behaviour of FLDFs in terms of 
undertaking practices and decisions that comply with their SEW-related goals, interests and 
priorities in the name of protecting the non-economic utilities of key firm actors, collectively 
presenting firm identity. This view stimulates a further investigation of firm practices and 
decisions from an ILs perspective, where, in this study, I propose a difference between FLDFs 
and MLDFs in relation to firm identity concerning the firm behaviour triggered by the dominant 
logic embedded in their decision making.  
3.2.4 Corporate Governance Deviance 
CG presents a firm aspect that displays differences among business firms. Fundamentally, 
agency theory addresses the importance of firm governance in terms of controlling the potential 
agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and management (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). It introduces the means of control 
in terms of internal CG configurations, including the board of directors as the core of CG and 
executive compensation, to handle the potential principal-agent and principal-principal 
conflicts. CG emphasises an overriding objective of maximising the wealth of shareholders, as 
the dominant stakeholder group, by increasing firm’s financial returns. Given the various CG 
configurations, firm governance exhibits a remarkable discrepancy among firms in terms of the 
firm choice of CG configurations.  
Family business literature has extensively addressed the difference between family and 
non-family firms regarding the setup of firm governance (e.g., McConaughy, 2000; Jaskiewicz 
and Klein, 2007; Jones et al., 2008a; Cruz et al., 2010). Justifying the divergence among firms 
concerning CG, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011a) and Berrone et al. (2012) shed light on the crucial 
role of SEW in family firms. They emphasise that the prioritisation of SEW preservation 
provides a key differentiator that explains the different strategic choices and managerial 
decisions of family firms relative to those of non-family firms, where SEW represents a latent 
explanatory factor. Regarding CG configurations, the preservation of SEW implies deviating 
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from the CG standards, pressures, demands and expectations, leading to different and perhaps 
questionable firm governance in terms of the board structure and managerial remuneration. 
Therefore, drawing on the SEW preservation perspective, it is argued that SEW is an impetus 
that contributes to and justifies the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs relating to CG.  
As discussed above, concerning CG configurations, the empirically proven difference 
between family and non-family firms suggests that the priority of preserving SEW demonstrates 
a unique, potent identity of family firms compared with non-family firms, which triggers and 
makes sense of the distinct firm behaviour. Interestingly, in a recent work, Aguilera et al. (2018) 
develop the concept of ‘CG deviance’ to elucidate the nonconformity of CG practices to the 
dominant governance system. Drawing on the institutional theory, entrepreneurship and CG 
literature, the scholars assert that firms derive an extent of CG discretion from the firm 
entrepreneurial identity that gives rise to the deviance of firm governance. Regarding CG, firm 
practices and decisions are assumed to conform to the national institutions’ pressures and 
demands, which are shareholder-oriented in the US context (Aguilera et al., 2018). However, 
stemming from the latitude of CG that firms possess upon their identities, firm governance 
practices can deviate or depart from the established demands, standards and expectations of CG.  
In other words, integrating the motive of firm identity and the CG perspective, the greater 
the CG discretion of firms, the more likely the nonconformity to the prevailing governance 
practices. Therefore, stressing the perspectives of SEW preservation and firm identity 
(Greenwood et al., 2011), the identity of family firms is associated with a greater CG latitude, 
leading to deviant, idiosyncratic firm governance practices relative to the dominant governance 
practices in the name of preserving the SEW of firm’s key actors. As such, emphasising the CG 
discretion of firms, it is contended that the concern for preserving SEW underpins the distinct 
identity of FLDFs, which prompts the discrepancy in firm behaviour between FLDFs and 
MLDFs regarding CG practices, namely the firm choice of internal CG configurations. 
Specifically, building on the CG deviance perspective (Aguilera et al., 2018), in this study, I 
apply the perspective of ILs – covert drivers of firm behaviour – to the CG context, suggesting a 
deviant, idiosyncratic governance system of FLDFs relative to the prevailing, shareholder-
oriented governance practices concerning the structure of the board of directors and executive 
compensation plan.  
3.2.4.1 The Board of Directors 
In the name of preserving the non-economic benefits derived from the firm, including 
authority, control and power, job security and protection, prestige and image and social ties, the 
managers of family firms are likely to prefer and support the appointment of smaller and less 
independent boards relative to non-family firms. Such a structure of the board of directors limits 
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the monitoring and advising roles of the board over managerial behaviour and performance in 
terms of reducing the minds, experience and senses on the board; this is for more manageable 
negotiation, communication and control. Therefore, firm managers more effectively can protect 
their affective endowments attached to the firm from being jeopardised in effect of the 
supervision, evaluation, control and discipline that the board of directors enacts, mitigating 
exposing SEW to risk. 
Further, emphasising the perspective of SEW preservation, the scholars point to the 
interdependence of firm’s financial status and SEW as they both contribute to each other. 
Specifically, the preservation of SEW of firm’s key actors, such as authority and power, 
reputation and prestige, job security and protection and business networks and social ties, linked 
to the firm, yields to financial returns and vice versa, given the competitiveness of managerial 
labour market and the market for takeover threat. According to Miller and Le Breton‐Miller 
(2014), although SEW-related objectives are generally perceived to conflict with financial 
objectives, economic and non-economic benefits can be mixed and attained simultaneously. 
That is, fulfilling non-economic objectives helps generate firms’ financial returns. Particularly, 
the concern for preserving or extending the non-economic utilities derived from the firm entails, 
on the part of family firm managers, making an effort in running the business, effectively 
engaging with firm stakeholders and eventually enhancing the firm competitiveness and 
survival, self-motivating managers to act efficiently and not opportunistically (Miller and Le 
Breton-Miller, 2005; Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012).  
Moreover, stressing the SEW preservation perspective, family firm managers are likely to 
bear both financial and SEW-related risks due to their dual utilities closely linked to the firm 
regarding financial wealth and SEW. Unlike shareholders, managers are undiversified in their 
financial wealth, which is attached to their careers that also permit their non-economic benefits 
of power and control, job security, reputation and prestige and social ties. Therefore, as Berrone 
et al. (2012) explain, poor performance imposes a dual threat to the managers of family firms in 
terms of financial hardship and SEW loss, given the managerial labour market competitiveness 
and the threat of takeover market. Thus, family firm managers are likely to be self-incentivised 
to act efficiently and not opportunistically to preserve both financial wealth and SEW. 
 Such an interdependence of firm’s financial standing and SEW, as well as the dual threat 
that managers cope with pose a substantial incentive for the managers of family firms to 
actively safeguard the firm financially, and as such, preserve the SEW attached to the firm. 
Thus, protecting the affective endowments against any potential loss, family firms managers are 
self-motivated to voluntarily serve as self-monitored stewards of the business, align interests 
with those of shareholders and strive to maintain the business success and continuity for a win-
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win objective of shareholders and managers. This limits the potential opportunistic behaviour of 
managers as the loss aversion of current SEW outweighs the pursuit of future gains related to 
managerial opportunism concerning, for instance, rent-seeking activities. Accordingly, 
stemming from the SEW preservation perspective, there is less necessity of the respective 
controlling role of the board of directors regarding its monitoring and advising functions. Thus, 
regarding the structure of the board of directors, the boards of family firm are smaller and less 
independent relative to non-family firms (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Voordeckers et al., 
2007; Bammens et al., 2011; Bettinelli, 2011). 
Moreover, like family firm managers, the controlling shareholders of family firms, such 
as family shareholders, are self-incentivised to voluntarily serve as self-monitored stewards of 
the business, given their large shareholdings which also endorse authority, power and influence, 
reputation and prestige and social ties. Thus, they have a substantial incentive to closely and 
effectively monitor, evaluate and discipline managerial behaviour and performance in the name 
of protecting their both economic and non-economic benefits linked to the firm. This implies an 
external control mechanism over the top management of family firms, substituting the 
monitoring and advising roles of the board regarding the need for large and independent boards 
(Williamson, 1983).  
Further, the dominant shareholders of family firms utilise the boards to practise their 
power and exercise control over management appointments and decisions (Jones et al., 2008a). 
Through the board of directors, they preserve their SEW related to authority and control, 
prestige and image and business networks endorsed by their large shareholdings, and in turn, 
ensure the fulfilment of their objectives and preferences. Enforcing their ownership and perhaps 
voting rights, the dominant shareholders prefer appointing boards that actively carry and serve 
or at least do not hinder their intentions, goals and interests (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a). 
Accordingly, in the name of protecting or expanding their affective endowments, the dominant 
shareholders support the assembly of smaller, less independent boards comprising inside or 
affiliated rather than outside directors for more attainable communication, negotiation and 
control, where they presume interlocking relations and the alignment of interests (Jones et al., 
2008a).  
Emphasising the SEW preservation perspective that underlies the family logic in the 
sense of a family-oriented attitude and preference and integrating the perspective of firm 
identity regarding CG discretion and deviance, it is argued that FLDFs implement deviant, 
idiosyncratic CG practices relative to the dominant, shareholder-oriented governance system 
regarding the structure of the board of directors. Particularly, in this study, I suggest that FLDFs 
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have different boards in terms of size and independence compared with MLDFs that are 
shareholder-oriented. Building on the above literature, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1a: Relative to MLDFs, FLDFs appoint smaller boards. 
H1b: Relative to MLDFs, FLDFs have less independent boards.   
3.2.4.2 Executive Compensation 
Building on the SEW perspective, Miller and Le Breton‐Miller (2014) assert that the 
managers of family firms are socially and emotionally motivated by ego satisfaction, career and 
reputational benefits, deriving affective endowments from the firm. Compared with non-family 
firms, family firms tend to provide executives with job security and protection, among others, in 
accordance with family-oriented values and essence. Specifically, they protect and maintain the 
financial welfare and non-financial benefits of executives and refrain from disciplining them for 
inferior performance, implying an extent of nepotism and prejudice (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011a).  
This suggests a relaxed linkage between managerial performance and pay, which can be 
described as a variable incentive pay (Cruz et al., 2010), as well as offering a secure pay, which 
can be described as fixed and cash pay. Therefore, family firm managers willingly accept 
(forgo) low (high) total compensation in exchange for the satisfactory plan, on the part of 
managers, of its components regarding their level and form – base salary, cash and incentive-
based compensation – relating to the non-economic utilities linked to the firm. Particularly, such 
a willingness of executives is in return for job security and protection, in addition to authority 
and power, prestige and image and social ties that they derive from the firm.  
Further, as mentioned above, emphasising the concern for preserving SEW in family 
firms, the managers of family firms are likely to confront both financial and SEW-related risks 
because of their dual utilities in terms of financial wealth and SEW tightly attached to the firm. 
Unlike shareholders, managers are undiversified in their financial wealth, which is tied to their 
careers that also permit their affective endowments of power and control, reputation and 
prestige, job security and protection and social ties. Accordingly, as Berrone et al. (2012) 
explain, poor performance represents a dual threat to firm managers in terms of financial 
hardship and SEW loss, given the competitiveness of managerial labour market and the market 
for takeover threat.  
Moreover, stressing the perspective of SEW preservation, the priority of preserving or 
extending the non-economic utilities derived from the firm entails, on the part of family firm 
managers, making an effort in running the business, effectively engaging with firm stakeholders 
and eventually enhancing the firm competitiveness and survival. Therefore, given the 
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competitiveness of managerial labour market and the market for takeover threat, the 
preservation of the SEW of family firm managers yields to financial returns and vice versa. This 
implies the interdependence of firm’s financial standing and SEW as they both contribute to 
each other (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012). 
As such, family firm managers are likely to be self-motivated to act efficiently and not 
opportunistically to preserve both financial wealth and SEW. Particularly, such a dual threat, as 
well as the interdependence of the financial status of firms and SEW pose a substantial incentive 
for the managers of family firms to actively safeguard the firm financially, and in turn, protect 
the non-economic benefits derived from the firm. Accordingly, they are self-incentivised to 
voluntarily serve as self-monitored stewards of the business, align interests with those of 
shareholders and strive to sustain the business success and survival for a win-win objective of 
shareholders and managers, preserving SEW against any potential risk.  
As previously discussed, this restrains the potential managerial opportunism as the loss 
aversion of the affective endowments linked to the firm offsets the chase of future gains relating 
to the opportunistic behaviour of managers.  Therefore, stemming from the perspective of SEW 
preservation, the controlling role of executive compensation related to the managerial 
motivation and the alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests is of less importance. 
Thus, concerning the level and form of pay, family firms are more likely to pay lower (higher) 
executive compensation regarding total and incentive-based compensation – equity-based 
compensation and bonus – (base salary and cash compensation as a more secure pay) compared 
with non-family firms (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Amoako-Adu et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 
2015). 
Further, like family firm managers, the dominant shareholders of family firms enjoy 
certain SEW in terms of authority, control and power, prestige and social ties and business 
networks, which they maintain through the appointment and retention of boards and 
management teams that support and serve or at least do not contradict their objectives and 
interests (Jones et al., 2008a). In return, given the large shareholdings of controlling 
shareholders, they practise their power and influence to provide executives with job security and 
protection in terms of supporting offering fixed and cash rather than variable incentive pay, 
further serving to protect the non-economic utilities, including authority and control, prestige 
and image and social ties, that managers possess. Regarding incentive-based compensation, this 
represents a lax linkage between managerial performance and pay, where managerial 
performance and variable incentive pay are decoupled. Interpreting this as an influence of SEW 
preservation, Cruz et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence of variable pay–performance 
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decoupling in a family business context for the benefit of family managers’ protection against 
bearing the full risk of incentive-based compensation.  
Moreover, given their large shareholdings, the dominant shareholders of family firms 
derive both economic and non-economic benefits from the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2017). As 
mentioned above, this provides the dominant shareholders with substantial incentive to closely 
and effectively monitor, assess and discipline managerial behaviour and performance (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003b; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Martin et al., 2016). This suggests as external 
control mechanism over family firm managers, substituting the managerial motivation and 
alignment of interests roles of executive compensation concerning the necessity of variable 
incentive pay, such as equity-based compensation and bonus (Williamson, 1983).  
Agency theory explains that, as a variable incentive pay, equity-based compensation aims 
to motivate risk-averse managers to take more risk in their strategic choices, expecting superior 
financial returns with a higher market value of firm equity (Dalton et al., 2007). In contrast, 
applying behavioural agency theory, Martin et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence of the 
mixed-risk feature of equity-based compensation, challenging the assumption of managers’ 
fixed risk preference. The scholars assert that, as the value of such incentive pay is closely 
linked to the market value of firm equity, executives encounter both risk-willing and risk-averse 
motives, balancing the fear of losing current wealth if risk-taking fails and the possibility of 
generating future wealth if it succeeds.  
Equity-based compensation has the potential to make managers take more risk in decision 
making, which may ultimately have an adverse effect on firm performance and survival due to 
unexpected factors or uncontrollable circumstances (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2017). This imposes 
threats to managers’ firm-specific wealth, both financial wealth and SEW, as their 
remuneration, reputation and prestige, authority and power and social ties are tightly attached to 
the firm. Thus, as mentioned above, the dominant shareholders of family firms exert power and 
exercise control over the boards – the board compensation committee – to constrain the use of 
equity-based compensation, providing executives with job security and protection. In doing so, 
they restrain the potential of excessive risk-taking motives among managers, preserving both the 
economic and non-economic utilities of both controlling shareholders and managers, who carry 
and fulfil the goals interests and preferences of dominant shareholders, derived from the firm in 
accordance with the SEW preservation perspective.  
Stressing the perspective of SEW preservation that underlies the family logic in terms of 
a family-oriented attitude and preference, and incorporating the perspective of firm identity in 
relation to CG latitude and nonconformity, it is contended that FLDFs undertake deviant, 
idiosyncratic CG practices in comparison with the dominant, shareholder-oriented governance 
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system concerning the plan of executive compensation. Specifically, in this study, I propose that 
FLDFs offer distinct executive compensation regarding total compensation and its components 
compared with shareholder-oriented MLDFs. Drawing on the literature above, the following 
hypotheses are formulated: 
H2a: Relative to MLDFs, FLDFs pay lower total compensation. 
H2b: Relative to MLDFs, FLDFs pay lower equity-based compensation. 
H2c: Relative to MLDFs, FLDFs pay higher base salary. 
H2d: Relative to MLDFs, FLDFs pay lower bonus. 
H2e: Relative to MLDFs, FLDFs pay higher cash compensation. 
Figure 3.1 summarises the conceptual framework of study. 
3.3 Data & Methodology Design 
3.3.1 Sample Selection & Data Description 
The sample is based on all firms listed on the S&P 1500 index during the period of 2006–
2016. To be included in the sample, firms must be first identified and reported on Compustat 
(Fundamentals Annual) regarding a range of financial and business segment data. I start with an 
initial sample of 10591 firm-year observations for about 1400 firms. I then collect the required 
data of the board and executive compensation from the Institutional Shareholder Services 
(Directors and Directors Legacy) and Execucomp (Annual Compensation) databases, 
respectively. I exclude firms with fewer than three board directors to eliminate the likely data 
entry errors, and firms with fewer than three executives as an indicative number of firm-level 
executive compensation. In addition, firms must have data on the databases of Thomson Reuters 
(Institutional 13f Holdings) and the Centre for Research in Security Prices (Monthly Stock 
Files).  
I include firms for which the complete data are available for a minimum of two years. 
Following literature, I also exclude firms operating in the public utilities and financial services 
sectors that are subject to distinct regulations (SIC code: 4900-4999 and 6000-6999, 
respectively). These criteria yield to two final samples3 for the analyses of the board of directors 
and executive compensation, separately. A sample is used of 6286 firm-year observations from 
987 firms and a sample of 6236 firm-year observations from 971 firms in the period of 2006–
2016 for the board of directors analysis and the executive compensation analysis, respectively. 
 
3 The different samples result as the analyses incorporate different sets of response and explanatory 
variables for which complete data must be available for a minimum of two years.  
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Table 3.1 reports the time series and size of the board of directors and executive compensation 
analyses samples in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. 
3.3.2 Variables Construction 
3.3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables fall into two categories of CG configurations: (1) the board of 
directors structure, and (2) executive compensation plan. The variables are measured in the 
traditional way as in the extant literature of CG. For the construction of board and compensation 
variables, I follow Boone et al. (2007), Chen and Al-Najjar (2012), Guest (2008) and Linck et 
al. (2008), and Cheng et al. (2015), Conyon (2014), Focke et al. (2017) and Lin et al. (2013), 
respectively.   
 The Board of Directors Structure 
The board of directors structure is analysed using two variables: (1) board size, and (2) 
board independence. Data of the board are retrieved from the Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) database. Board size (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) is defined as the total number of directors on the board 
of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Board independence (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) is calculated as the percentage 
of outside (independent) directors, as flagged on ISS, on the board of directors of firm 𝑖 in year 
𝑡 as the number of independent directors divided by board size.   
 Executive Compensation Plan 
The executive compensation plan is analysed using multiple measures, decomposing the 
managerial remuneration into different compensation components: (1) total compensation, (2) 
cash compensation, (3) equity-based compensation, (4) bonus, and (5) salary. Executive 
compensation data are obtained from Execucomp database where the firm-level compensation 
variables are computed based on the annual average compensation of the top-three paid 
executives of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 concerning total compensation.  
To minimise the effect of outliers, I log transform each compensation variable in the form 
of Ln(1+ ‘Compensation variable(s)’ in Execucomp) in the regression analysis. Total 
compensation (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝) is the natural logarithm of one plus “tdc1” variable in Execucomp 
which represents the sum of annual salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock 
granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other compensation. Regarding the incentive pay 
variables, equity-based compensation (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝) is measured as the natural logarithm of 
one plus the sum of grant date fair value of option ‘option_awards_fv’ and stock awards 
‘stock_awards_fv’, and bonus (𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠) is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
sum of cash bonus ‘bonus’ and non-equity incentives ‘noneq_incent’ in terms of various 
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managerial privileges and non-cash awards. Salary (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦) is the fixed component of base 
compensation measured as the natural logarithm of one plus ‘salary’ variable in Execucomp. 
Cash compensation (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝) is measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of 
salary ‘salary’ and cash bonus ‘bonus’.  
3.3.2.2 Main Independent Variable 
In this study, I primarily apply a quantitative measurement of the intangible construct of 
ILs regarding the embeddedness of particularly family and market logics. Further, I; therefore, 
suggest a new institutional-based classification of firms where the firm type in terms of the 
logic-based group represents the key explanatory variable of interest. Mainly, I introduce the 
concept of ‘firm logic orientation’ to define and depict the firm type in terms of the logic-based 
group, namely in relation to the embeddedness of family and market logics by which a firm is 
driven. Building on the opposition and contradiction of family and market logics (Miller et al., 
2011), I suggest different types of firms in effect of the incompatible norms, rules and 
prescriptions imposed by the contradictory ILs.  
Mainly, consistent with prior studies, in this study, I emphasise that the underlying 
concept of market logic lies in the focus on the primary economic business objective of 
profitability and shareholders’ value maximisation (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2010; Reay et al., 
2015), drawing on the firm theory and market discipline perspectives in the sense of aligning 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests for the best benefit of shareholders (Bliss, 2004). 
Whereas, unlike these studies, I expand the definition of family logic beyond family ownership 
or management. Particularly, building on the extensive literature emphasising the difference 
between family and non-family firms, I portray family logic as the family-oriented flavour and 
essence in running the business. Specifically, stemming from the discrepancy between family 
and non-family firms regarding firm practices and decisions, family logic captures a family-
oriented attitude and preference manifested in firm decision making. Thus, in this study, I build 
on the perspective of SEW preservation growingly highlighted in the family business literature 
as a key differentiating factor that justifies family firm behaviour (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a). 
Distinct from the existing ownership-based studies, it is argued that, in a context of 
institutional complexity, both family and non-family firms are exposed to multiple ILs, namely 
family and market logics, as covert drivers of firm behaviour imposed by the main institutions 
of society (Thornton, 2004). Accordingly, in response to the pressures and demands of ILs, I 
posit that, in practice, family firms can behave like non-family firms and vice versa, and based 
on firm practices and behaviour, firms thereby can be identified and classified differently apart 
from ownership status (family or not).  
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According to Hinings (2012), although there is general acceptance that multiple ILs can 
coexist and compete, a fairly strong sense emphasises that one logic will be dominant over 
another, which primarily drives firm behaviour implicitly. Danisman et al. (2006) point out that 
firms may embed one main culture or nature that reflects a ‘dominant logic’ at the firm level; 
however, a ‘subdominant logic’ may also exist within specific departments or occupations or as 
an alternative culture within the firm. In addition, Mair et al. (2015) find that, in contrast to 
dissenting firms that combine, balance and operate under different logics, conforming firms are 
a type of firms that identify themselves with a single, dominant logic that fully drives their 
practices and strategic objectives’ attainment. Therefore, following Danisman et al. (2006) and 
Mair et al. (2015), in this study, I suggest, and build the discussion presuming, the domination 
of either family or market logic within firms – conforming firms – that implicitly drives firm 
behaviour differently, allowing for an overlap between them, as in dissenting firms, in 
consistency with the fact that institutional complexity promotes the coexistence and interplay of 
ILs (Greenwood et al., 2010).  
To operationalise the institutional-based classification of firms, in this study, I first 
identify or proxy for and assess the embeddedness of family and market logics, implicitly 
embedding in firm decision making, using specific behavioural dimensions widely discussed in 
the family business literature to differ between family and non-family firms. Specifically, 
building on the perspective of SEW preservation, family and non-family firms contrast in terms 
of the practices of corporate diversification, earnings management, tax aggressiveness and R&D 
investment. More importantly, according to Miller and Le Breton‐Miller (2014), SEW is not 
supposed to be specific to family businesses and members, and in turn, in this study, I presume 
that key firm actors derive an extent of non-economic benefits from the firm irrespective of 
family ownership status, which frame the strategic choices of FLDFs and MLDFs differently in 
accordance with the perspective of SEW preservation (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a; Berrone et 
al., 2012).  
The institutional-based approach basically draws on the belief that the ILs embed in firm 
decision making, and as such, shape firm practices and decisions. As such, firm practices and 
decisions are best demonstration of embedded ILs (Greenwood et al., 2010). Moreover, it 
closely aligns with the underlying concept of family logic and its divergence from market logic 
in terms of emphasising the family-oriented attitude and preference regarding the concern for 
SEW preservation as opposed to the priority of profitability and shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation. To ensure the internal validity of the proposed proximal measure of the 
embeddedness of family and market logics and reduce the potential measurement error, the 
designed approach employs four behavioural dimensions together that reflect areas of contrast 
between family and non-family firms. Importantly, building on the family business literature 
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and, particularly, the concept of ‘institutional overlap’ addressing the intersection between 
families and their businesses that merely highlights a family-oriented flavour and essence 
contradictory to or inconsistent with the shareholder-oriented business setting, family and 
market logics are primarily stressed to be competing each other (Lansberg, 1983).  
Therefore, second, quantitively measuring the embeddedness of family and market logics, 
I suggest the measurement of market logic extent to be the inverse of family logic extent, 
conveyed by the constructs of ‘non-familiness’ and ‘familiness’, respectively. That is, the 
measurement of logic extent simply denotes both the familiness and non-familiness of firms 
simultaneously and conversely. For preciseness, simplicity and clarity, I refer to non-familiness 
as ‘marketness’, addressing the contrast and opposition of family and market logics. 
Accordingly, the extent of marketness is simply counter to the extent of familiness.   
 Logic Extent Operationalisation   
Measurement of Behavioural Dimensions Levels  
Corporate Diversification Intensity 
First, I start with measuring the intensity of corporate diversification (𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡). I use 
Jacquemin-Berry entropy measure, calculated using historical business segment data from 
Compustat (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985; Berry, 2010; Park and Jang, 2012). 
𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑘
𝑀
𝑘=1 
 ln (
1
𝑃𝑘
) 
where 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 is total diversification of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, including both related and unrelated 
diversification, and as 𝐶𝐷 increases, more diversification is undertaken by the firm. 𝑃𝑘 is 
segment 𝑘’s share in total firm sales. This measure considers the number of segments in which 
firms operate and the relative importance and weight of each segment in total firm sales (Palepu, 
1985). Despite its limitations as a SIC-based measure focusing on technical similarities of firm 
value chain, it remains dominant (Nocker et al., 2016). Moreover, relative to other 
diversification measures, the entropy index has a good construct validity (Berry, 2010). 
Earnings Management Magnitude 
Second, I measure the magnitude of earnings management’s (𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) as the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones 
et al., 2008b; Jiraporn and DaDalt, 2009; Linck et al., 2013). Following literature, a minimum of 
ten firms is required in each industry-year combination where industry is defined by 2-digit SIC 
code.  
3 Do Institutional Logics Shape Corporate Governance? 
76 
 
𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝐵0 +  𝐵1 (
1
𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 
) +  𝐵2 (∆𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) +  𝐵3 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 is total accruals of firm 𝑖 calculated as the difference between income before 
extraordinary items and operation cashflows of year 𝑡; 𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  is total assets of year t-1; ∆𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 
is the change in sales revenue from year 𝑡 − 1  to 𝑡; ∆𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the change in accounts receivable 
from year 𝑡 − 1  to 𝑡; 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 is gross property, plant and equipment of year 𝑡; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term. All variables are scaled by 𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 . For the measurement of earnings management in terms 
of the discretionary accruals value, it is directly estimated from the model as the residual from 
regression. Financial data used in the model are retrieved from Compustat. 
Tax Aggressiveness Extent 
Third, to measure the extent of tax aggressiveness (𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 ), I use an inverse measure of the 
effective tax rate where higher rate indicates lower tax avoidance (Chen et al., 2010; Steijvers 
and Niskanen, 2014; De Simone et al., 2017). 
𝑇𝐴 = 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 × −1 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
𝑡𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑡 
𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡
 
where 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the effective tax rate of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 multiplied by (-1) to depict the 
magnitude of tax aggressiveness. 𝑡𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑡 is total tax expense of year 𝑡; and 𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 is pre-tax income 
of year 𝑡. 𝐸𝑇𝑅 is set as zero when it is negative or greater than 1. Accounting data required in 
calculation are retrieved from Compustat. 
R&D Investment Level 
Fourth, I measure the level of R&D investment (𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡) using R&D intensity ratio 
capturing the level of R&D spending in relation to firm sales (Block, 2012; Chrisman and Patel, 
2012). 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 =
𝑥𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
 
where  𝑥𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 is firm 𝑖’s R&D expenditure of year 𝑡; and 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 is total sales of year 𝑡. This ratio 
is an input measure of firm’s innovative performance. Missing values of R&D expenditure are 
set to zero. Data used in the calculation are obtained from Compustat. 
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Measurement of Marketness (Non-familiness) Extent 
Particularly, firm-year observations are classified according to the extent of logic 
embedded in firms (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡). Stressing the embeddedness of family and market logics, the 
extent of logic is primarily determined based on the joint level of the four behavioural 
dimensions of corporate diversification, earnings management, tax avoidance and R&D 
investment, of which family firms are empirically proven to have distinct attitude and 
preference relative to non-family firms. Accordingly, family and non-family firms are well 
established in literature to be inverses in terms of carrying out above firm practices, and, as 
such, the logic extent captures the extent of both the familiness and non-familiness, also referred 
to as marketness, of firms simultaneously and inversely. In other words, drawing on the 
magnitude of firm practices, as the extent of familiness increases, the marketness extent simply 
decreases and vice versa.  
Specifically, on a year-to-year basis, the firm level of corporate diversification, earnings 
management, tax aggressiveness and R&D practices is compared with the corresponding 
industry-year median. Relative to the industry-year median, firms are assigned a value of 1 for 
high level or a value of 0 for low level of each firm practice. Stressing the SEW preservation 
perspective, the family business literature has addressed that, relative to non-family firms, 
family firms are empirically proven to engage less in corporate diversification, earnings 
management, tax aggressiveness and R&D investment (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a). Therefore, 
importantly, building on the above observed behavioural dimensions that vary between family 
and non-family firms in the name of preserving the SEW of key firm actors, adding the values 
together per firm-year, the overall logic extent ranges from 0 to 4 towards higher non-
familiness, or marketness, that is, lower familiness of firms. Accordingly, as the logic extent 
measures the extent of non-familiness which is basically the inverse of familiness, it simply 
represents both the familiness and marketness of firms simultaneously and conversely. 
Particularly, in a given year, the lowest ordinal value a firm scores is 0, where all 
practices are of low level reflecting a typical family firm-like behaviour in the sense of 
preserving SEW as a family-oriented attitude and preference, presuming the domination of 
family logic. Whereas, assuming the domination of market logic, the highest ordinal value is 4, 
where all practices are of high level reflecting an opposite behaviour to that of family firms, that 
is, an archetypal non-family firm-like behaviour. Moreover, a middle value of 2 indicates a firm 
that exhibits an overlap of both family and non-family firm-like behaviours, where the practices 
are equally high and low, suggesting an interplay of both family and market logics in the same 
way as in dissenting firms (Mair et al., 2015).  
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Therefore, concisely, the extent of logic basically measures the extent of non-familiness, 
also referred to as marketness, that ranges from 0 to 4, where the marketness (familiness) of 
firms is highest (lowest) at the value of 4 and, contrariwise, the familiness (marketness) of firms 
is highest (lowest) at the value of 0. This particularly implies that the construct of marketness is 
an inverse of the familiness construct and vice versa, while a value of 2 indicates a grey area 
between familiness and marketness; this is hybrid. Further, a value of 1 indicates hybrid-
familiness and a value of 3 implies hybrid-marketness, where the level of most practices is low 
and high, respectively.  
 Firm Logic Orientation  
Building on the extent of non-familiness, or marketness (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡), I develop the 
logic orientation index that suggests different types of firms regarding the so-called firm logic 
orientation, defining and depicting the embeddedness of family and market logics by which a 
firm is driven. Assuming the domination of a single logic as in conforming firms (Mair et al., 
2015), the index fundamentally identifies the firm type in terms of the logic-based group related 
to the familiness, hybrid or marketness logic orientation of firms. In particular, the index 
classifies firms according to the extent of embedded market logic into three logic-based groups: 
(1) FLDFs; with a logic extent of 0 or 1 (hybrid-familiness), (2) hybrid firms; with a logic 
extent of 2, and (3) MLDFs; with a logic extent of 3 (hybrid-marketness) or 4. That is, as 
illustrated in Table 3.2, firms having a marketness (non-familiness) extent of 0 or 1, 2, and 3 or 
4 are classified by the logic orientation index in the first, presenting the familiness logic 
orientation of firms; second, presenting the hybrid logic orientation of firms; and third, 
presenting the marketness logic orientation of firms, logic-based group of FLDFs, hybrid firms 
and MLDFs, respectively.  
Accordingly, emphasising the institutional-based classification of firms, I create the main 
explanatory variable of firm logic orientation (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) based on the developed logic 
orientation index. Mainly, it is a three-level4 categorical variable that takes a value of “1” for the 
familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, “2” for the hybrid logic orientation of hybrid firms, or 
“3” for the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs. Importantly, unlike the ownership-based 
classification of firms, I allow firms to shift between the categories of the institutional-based 
classification across years to closely capture the discrepancy in firm behaviour from year to 
year. So, drawing primarily on the SEW perspective, I come up with an institutional-based 
classification of firms that represents the logic orientation of firms based on a number of firm 
 
4 I first tried a five-level index where each group corresponds to one of the different extents of 
marketness. As expected, I then reduced the grouping dimensions from five to three as the descriptive 
statistics among the groups; particularly the first and last twos, were quite similar. 
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practices that vary and, in turn, basically differentiate between FLDFs, hybrid firms and 
MLDFs. 
Post-hoc Test 
Using data of the family ownership status of sample firms, I primarily compare and 
evaluate the newly proposed institutional-based classification of firms as sort of a post-hoc test, 
expecting a difference between the ownership-based and logic-based – institutional-based – 
groupings of firms. Specifically, I compare the institutional-based classification with the 
traditional classification of firms stressing the ownership criteria. I use the family ownership 
data of sample firms provided by Ron Anderson5 on his professional webpage. The dataset 
consists of the 2000 largest US firms based on total assets as of data year 2001 and spans from 
2001 through 2010 only. The data are combined and augmented from previous studies of 
Anderson et al. (2009) and Anderson et al. (2012). The definition of family firms in the dataset 
is a family ownership (or vote) of at least 5% using a binary variable indicating a family firm if 
equals to 1 or 0 for a non-family firm.  
Over the years 2006-2010, comparing the institutional-based and ownership-based 
classifications of firms results in an approximate percentage of 53% mismatch between the 
proposed logic-based groups of firms and the family-firm flag in the dataset of Ron Anderson. 
While the consistent matching supports the claim that FLDFs and MLDFs behave like family 
and non-family firms, respectively, in terms of motives, objectives and essence, the inconsistent 
matching underpins the underlying argument that, realistically, family firms can behave like 
non-family firms and vice versa, addressing the embeddedness of family and market logics by 
which a firm is driven that, in turn, shapes firm practices and decisions.  
As expected, the ownership-based classification of firms into family and non-family is 
not perfectly aligned with institutional-based classification. Particularly, reinforcing the new 
classification of firms, family-flagged firms in Ron Anderson’s dataset can be classified in the 
second or third logic-based group corresponding to hybrid firms and MLDFs, respectively, 
inferring a divergence from a family firm behaviour – this is also true for non-family firms. In 
turn, this supports the argument that ownership status alone is not an adequate indicator of the 
familiness (marketness) orientation – the firm culture and nature – of family (non-family) firms 
as it ignores the importance of firm behaviour, where, apart from family ownership status, the 
embeddedness of family and market logics uncovers a different distinction among and 
classification of firms as real firm practices and decisions manifest. 
 
5 Professor of finance and active scholar in CG research specialising in family-owned public traded firms. 
[http://www.ronandersonprofessionalpage.net/data-sets.html] 
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3.3.3 Empirical Methodology & Model Specification 
I primarily examine the effect of ILs in relation to the association between firm logic 
orientation and the firm choice of internal CG configurations in terms of the structure of the 
board of directors and the plan of executive compensation, by estimating the following baseline 
regression models using the pooled samples and ordinary least-squares (OLS) method in the 
preliminary analysis.  
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽9 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀  
 
(1) 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+   𝛽4 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + + 𝛽5 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽8 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽11 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
 
(2) 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  
+  𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +   𝛽4 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽5 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽6 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽7 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽9 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽10 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽11 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽12 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽13 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽14 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽15 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽16 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀  
 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
In model (1), the dependent variable 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the total number of directors on the 
board. In model (2), the dependent variable 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the percentage of outside 
(independent) directors on the board. In model (3), the dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 
represents multiple tested compensation variables of 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡, 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡.  
Testing H1 and H2, I am mainly interested in the effect of the firm type in terms of the 
logic-based group in light of the firm choice of internal CG configurations. Therefore, to capture 
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how the embeddedness of family and market logics affects the choice of CG configurations in 
regression models (1) through (3), I use the firm logic orientation variable 
(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡); a three-level categorical variable which is decomposed into three 
indicator or dummy variables of which, for multicollinearity-related issues, two are included in 
the model specification. Specifically, I include into the models both the logic-based group of 
FLDFs (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡), an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 
1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of firms, and 0 otherwise; and the logic-based 
group of MLDFs (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡), an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic 
orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of firms, and 0 otherwise.  
To avoid perfect collinearity, the middle logic-based group of hybrid firms 
(𝐻𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) serves as a reference category for which the firm logic orientation value is 2 
presenting the hybrid logic orientation of firms; an overlap between familiness and marketness 
that reflects in firm practices and decisions. I mainly emphasise models’ intercepts, that is, the 
regression models are designed to allow for differences in the intercepts among the logic-based 
groups. In the baseline models, there are no interaction terms. In this case, I assume that the 
independent variables in the models have the same effect; slope, for all logic-based groups. 
However, looking at the intercept of the model, it is expected to be different for hybrid firms 
(𝐻𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) than for other logic-based groups, FLDFs (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) and MLDFs 
(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡). The coefficients’ estimates for FLDFs and MLDFs tell how much higher (or 
lower) their intercepts are compared with that for the reference category of hybrid firms. Hence, 
the reported intercept (constant) from regression is the intercept for those firms that are neither 
market logic-driven nor family logic-driven, and the intercept ± coefficient’s estimate is the 
intercept of the corresponding logic-based group other than hybrid firms, indicating the effect of 
firm type in terms of the logic-based group on the CG configurations of concern.  
In models (1) through (3), I primarily stress the impact of firm logic orientation through 
the empirical window of CG. I use CG configurations, concerning the structure of the board of 
directors and executive compensation plan, as an output of models stressing firm logic 
orientation that depicts and defines the firm type in terms of the logic-based group relating to 
the embeddedness of family and market logics by which a firm is driven. Particularly, 
emphasising the ILs perspective, CG presents a key business configuration that reflects firm 
strategic behaviour and decisions, which are tangible manifestation of ILs as hidden drivers of 
firm behaviour (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2010). Accordingly, stressing 
the endogeneity concerns, the models mainly address the effect of ILs on an outcome of CG 
configurations that alone would unlikely determine or drive the logic orientation of firms, which 
reflects the firm culture and nature, as a reverse causality issue, presenting a more behavioural 
and descriptive institutional-based approach rather than a normative economic rationality. That 
3 Do Institutional Logics Shape Corporate Governance? 
82 
 
is, considering the possibility of an endogenous relationship between firm logic orientation and 
CG, I posit that this is not the case and, as such, does not affect the study.   
Following the literature (e.g., Boone et al., 2007; Guest, 2008; Linck et al., 2008; Lin et 
al., 2013; Conyon, 2014; Cheng et al., 2015), I introduce into the models different control 
variables that are known to impact each of the dependent variables in the analysis. I use multiple 
proxies for single structural constructs incorporated in the analysis, mainly mitigating the 
attenuation bias that results from the potential measurement error in proxied variables (Boone et 
al., 2007; Guest, 2008; Linck et al., 2008). In models (1) and (2), I control for the firm operation 
complexity using the firm-specific characteristics of firm size (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡), the natural 
logarithm of firm’s sales; capital structure (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡), the debt financing of firm measured by the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets; growth opportunities (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡), the natural logarithm of 
market-to-book ratio of equity measured as the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity; and firm risk (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡), the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the 
12-month period preceding year end. 
To control for the monitoring and advising benefits, managers’ potential private benefits 
(𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡) are proxied by the free cashflow measure as the cash holdings divided by 
total assets. Controlling for the managerial characteristics, I emphasise the managerial 
entrenchment in terms of CEO bargaining power, proxied by CEO ability as perceived by firm 
performance as the lagged value of market-based performance (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) 
using Tobin’s Q value as the sum of total assets and market value of equity mins book value of 
equity scaled by total assets; and CEO influence and seniority in firm, proxied by both CEO age 
(𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) and tenure (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) which is the number of years a CEO has 
been in firm’s position, in addition to CEO ownership (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡) which is the 
shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings 
divided by total number of outstanding shares.  
 In model (3), I control for the scope of firm business in terms of the firm-specific 
economic attributes using firm size (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1), the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; 
growth opportunities (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1), the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity; 
capital structure (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1), the debt financing of firm measured by the ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets; firm age (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1), the natural logarithm of the number of years since a 
firm has been first appeared on CRSP; and firm risk (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1), the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over the 12-month period preceding year end. To control for the 
managerial characteristics6, I stress the managerial entrenchment in terms of managerial control, 
 
6 Due to the unavailability of required data, the variables of concern are based on the data of CEO instead 
of the top-three paid executives. 
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power and seniority in firm using CEO age (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) and tenure 
(𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) as the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; and CEO 
bargaining power using the perceived ability of CEO in terms of firm performance, measured by 
the market-based (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) and stock-based performance 
(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) measure of Tobin’s Q value and the annual average stock return, 
respectively. 
Controlling for the ownership structure, I use managerial ownership6 
(𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1), the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; and institutional 
ownership (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1), the shares held by outside institutional investors as 
a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided 
by total number of outstanding shares. I also control for the governance characteristics using 
board size (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1), the total number of directors on board; board independence 
(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1), the percentage of outside directors on the board as the number of 
outside directors divided by the total number of directors on board; and CEO duality 
(𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1), an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions 
are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise. Following the literature, the above variables are 
lagged one year to mitigate the reverse effect as an issue of potential endogeneity, assuming 
weakly exogenous variables.  
I also use year and industry dummies, controlling respectively for the systematic time 
effects and trends and the industry fixed effects using Fama and French (1997) 30-industry 
classification, to control for endogeneity concerns. Moreover, following Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988), the board structure and executive compensation plan are relatively persistent 
where their sample correlation across years is very high, raising the concern about the 
independence of firm year-to-year observations. Therefore, throughout the regression analysis, I 
also estimate robust Huber-White standard errors where the observations are clustered at firm 
level by firm’s gvkey to control for the serial correlation. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the effect of influential outliers.  
3.3.4 Descriptive Statistics  
3.3.4.1 Full Sample 
Table 3.3 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample of the board of directors 
analysis on the logic-based groups, firm-specific characteristics, CEO-specific characteristics, 
ownership structure and board structure variables. All data are as of the accounting reporting 
period end. Panel A summarises the logic-based groups of firms. Of the sample observations, 
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44% is classified in the first group of the logic orientation index presenting FLDFs 
(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚), 35% in the second group of hybrid firms (𝐻𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) and 21% in the third 
group of MLDFs (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚).  
Panel B reports summary statistics on key firm-specific characteristics. The mean 
(median) unlogged firm size (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) is $6.14 ($1.80) billion. On average (median), debt 
financing (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡) is 17% (15%) of firm’s total assets and unlogged firm growth opportunities 
(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) is 3.38 (2.50). The mean (median) firm risk (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) is 10% (9%). The mean (median) 
free cashflow (𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤) is positive at 12% (9%) of firm’s total assets. The average 
(median) market-based performance (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) is 2.04 (1.72).  
Panels C and D summarise CEO-specific characteristics and ownership structure, 
respectively. The mean CEO age (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒) is 56 years and the CEO has been in position 
for an average of 12 years (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒). On average, CEOs in the sample hold 2% of 
firm’s outstanding shares (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝). Panel E reports summary statistics on the 
board structure. The average board size (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) is 9. The mean (median) percentage of 
outside (independent) directors on the board (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) is 79% (80%).  
Table 3.4 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample of executive compensation 
analysis on the logic-based groups, executive compensation, firm-specific characteristics, 
executive-specific characteristics, ownership structure and board structure variables. All data are 
as of the accounting reporting period end. Panel A summarises the logic-based group 
membership. Of the sample observations, 44% is classified in the first group of the logic 
orientation index presenting FLDFs (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚), 35% in the second group of hybrid firms 
(𝐻𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) and 21% in the third group of MLDFs (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚).  
Panel B reports summary statistics on unlogged executive compensation based on the 
annual average compensation of firm’s top-three paid executives. The mean (median) total 
executive compensation (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝) is $3771 ($2757) thousands. On average (median), 
executive compensation plan comprises a fixed salary (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦) of $583 ($542) thousands and 
cash compensation (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝) of $677 ($592) thousands of salary and cash bonus. Regarding 
the variable incentive pay, the mean (median) bonus (𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠) is $814 ($520) thousands and the 
average (median) equity-based compensation (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝) is $2159 ($1384) thousands of 
granted stock and options. 
Panel C reports summary statistics on key firm-specific characteristics. The mean 
(median) unlogged firm size (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) is $6.31 ($1.80) billion. The mean (median) unlogged 
firm growth opportunities (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) is 3.36 (2.50). The firm performance measures are positive 
with an average (median) market-based performance (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) of 2.04 (1.72) 
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and an average stock-based performance (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) of 1% (1%). On average, firm 
age (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒) is 32 years and debt financing (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡) is 17% (15%) of firm’s total assets. The 
mean (median) firm risk (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) is 10% (9%).  
Panels D and E summarise executive-specific characteristics and ownership structure, 
respectively. The mean CEO age (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒) is 56 years and the CEO has been in position 
for an average of 12 years (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒). On average, CEOs in the sample hold 2% of 
firm’s outstanding shares (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) and institutional investors own 84% of total 
shares outstanding (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝). 
Panel F reports summary statistics on the board structure. The average board size 
(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) is 9. The mean (median) percentage of outside (independent) directors on the 
board (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) is 79% (80%) and 47% of observations report a CEO duality 
(𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) where the CEO is also the chairman of the board. 
3.3.4.2 Subsamples by Logic-based Group 
Tables 3.5 and 3.7 report summary statistics on the board structure and executive 
compensation for the subsamples of the logic-based groups of FLDFs, hybrid firms, and 
MLDFs. Table 3.5 shows that the logic-based groups of firms differ regarding average board 
size and independence. On average, FLDFs have smaller and less independent boards compared 
with hybrid firms and MLDFs. Interestingly, this is consistent with prior studies that have found 
boards of smaller size and less independence in genuine family firms relative to non-family 
firms. In consistency, the individual mean-difference t-tests in Table 3.6 suggest that the 
difference between each pair of the logic-based groups is statistically different from zero for 
both board size and independence. 
Similarly, Table 3.7 shows that average executive compensation varies among the logic-
based groups of firms. In comparison with hybrid firms and MLDFs, on average, FLDFs pay 
lower salary, bonus, equity-based, cash and total compensation. In consistency, the individual 
mean-difference t-tests in Table 3.8 indicate that the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs 
regarding the executive compensation plan is statistically different from zero.  
In Tables 3.6 and 3.8, I compare the means of the board of directors and executive 
compensation variables between each two logic-based groups . I use independent t-tests to test 
the significance of difference in mean of several dependent variables of interest. According to 
the primary construction and definition of logic-based groups, I expect significant difference 
particularly between FLDFs and MLDFs in terms of their board structure and executive 
compensation plan. Overall, the results of individual t-tests empirically prove that FLDFs, 
hybrid firms and MLDFs are different to some extent in running their businesses concerning the 
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setup of firm governance. This supports the argument regarding the role of ILs in shaping firm 
practices and behaviour, which primarily advocates and validates the study’s proposed 
institutional-based classification of firms based on the logic orientation of firms in terms of the 
extent of embedded family and market logics.  
3.3.5 Correlation Matrix 
In Tables 3.9 and 3.10, I provide the correlation matrix for all variables included in the 
board of directors and executive compensation regression models, respectively. Overall, among 
the main independent and control variables, there is no strong cross-correlation (> 0.50), except 
between a few variables. A strong correlation among variables possibly indicates their 
redundancy which may give rise to multicollinearity concerns and attenuation bias of regression 
results for estimating one structural variable with multiple proxies. Addressing the effect of 
multicollinearity, I also run the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) measure upon regressions to 
check for potential multicollinearity problem where it reports values between 1 and 10.  
The correlation between firm type in terms of the logic-based group and both board 
structure and executive compensation indicates a difference particularly between FLDFs and 
MLDFs. Interestingly, there is a significant negative (positive) correlation between the 
familiness (marketness) logic orientation of firms and each of board size, board independence 
and executive compensation variables. As Table 3.9 reports, in line with the perspectives SEW 
preservation, firm identity and CG deviance, FLDFs appoint smaller and less independent 
boards, whereas MLDFs have larger and more independent boards relative to other firms. 
Further, as shown in Table 3.10, FLDFs (MLDFs) offer lower (higher) total, cash, equity-based, 
bonus and salary compensation in comparison with other firms. 
3.4 Empirical Results & Discussion 
3.4.1 Main Multivariate Analysis 
3.4.1.1 The Board of Directors  
Column (1) in Table 3.11 reports the results from estimating the board size baseline 
regression model. The coefficients on the indicator variables of FLDFs (FamilyFirm) and 
MLDFs (MarketFirm) are interpreted as the difference in board size between both FLDFs and 
MLDFs and the reference category of hybrid firms driven by both family and market logics 
(HybridFirm), controlling for the firm operation complexity, monitoring and advising benefits 
and managerial characteristics in the model. The main coefficients are significant at the 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. Ceteris paribus, it is found that FLDFs (–0.188) appoint 
smaller boards compared with hybrid firms, whereas the boards of MLDFs (0.272) are larger 
relative to hybrid firms. Compared with the reference category of hybrid firms, this is consistent 
3 Do Institutional Logics Shape Corporate Governance? 
87 
 
with hypothesis H1a, which predicts that the boards of FLDFs will be smaller compared with 
MLDFs.   
Column (1) in Table 3.13 shows the results from estimating the board independence 
baseline regression model. The coefficients on the indicator variables of FLDFs (FamilyFirm) 
and MLDFs (MarketFirm) are interpreted as the difference in board independence between both 
FLDFs and MLDFs and the reference category of hybrid firms driven by both family and 
market logics (HybridFirm), controlling for the firm operation complexity, monitoring and 
advising benefits and managerial characteristics in the model. The main coefficients are 
significant at the 10% and 5% significance levels, respectively. Ceteris paribus, it is also found 
that the boards of FLDFs (–0.00710) are less independent, in terms of the representation of 
outside directors on the board, relative to hybrid firms. In contrast, MLDFs (0.0102) have more 
independent boards compared with hybrid firms. In comparison with the reference category of 
hybrid firms, this supports hypothesis H1b, which proposes that the boards of FLDFs will be 
less independent relative to MLDFs.  
3.4.1.2 Executive Compensation  
In Tables 3.15–3.19, Column (1) reports the results from estimating the executive’s total, 
cash, equity-based, bonus and salary compensation baseline regression models, respectively. 
The coefficients on the indicator variables of FLDFs (FamilyFirm) and MLDFs (MarketFirm) 
are interpreted as the difference in each executive compensation measure between both FLDFs 
and MLDFs and the reference category of hybrid firms driven by both family and market logics 
(HybridFirm), controlling for the firm business scope, governance characteristics, ownership 
structure and managerial characteristics in the model.  
As Table 3.15 reports, ceteris paribus, it is found that the managers of FLDFs (–0.0555) 
receive lower total compensation compared with hybrid firms, whereas MLDFs (0.0706) pay 
higher total compensation relative to hybrid firms, at a significant level of 1%. Compared with 
the reference category of hybrid firms, this is consistent with hypothesis H2a, which predicts 
that, on average, FLDFs will offer lower total compensation relative to MLDFs.  
As shown in Table 3.17, ceteris paribus, it is also found that FLDFs (–0.140) pay lower 
equity-based compensation relative to hybrid firms, significant at a 5% significance level. In 
contrast, the managers of MLDFs (0.0937) receive higher equity-based compensation compared 
with hybrid firms, at a significance level of 5%. In comparison with the reference category of 
hybrid firms, this supports hypothesis H2b, which proposes that, on average, FLDFs will offer 
lower equity-based compensation compared with MLDFs. 
3 Do Institutional Logics Shape Corporate Governance? 
88 
 
In both cash compensation and bonus regressions reported in Tables 3.16 and 3.18, 
respectively, the coefficients on both FLDFs and MLDFs are insignificant. This indicates that 
FLDFs and MLDFs are not significantly different from hybrid firms in terms of such 
compensation forms, and as such, their executives receive similar cash compensation and bonus; 
this result is inconsistent with hypotheses H2d and H2e. In addition, the coefficients do not fit 
the hypotheses, which predicts that FLDFs will pay less (higher) bonus (cash compensation) 
relative to MLDFs. Similarly, in the salary regression reported in Table 3.19, although the 
coefficients are consistent with hypothesis H2c, the positive coefficients on both FLDFs and 
MLDFs are insignificant, indicating that FLDFs and MLDFs are not significantly different from 
hybrid firms in terms of managers’ base salary. That is, FLDFs and MLDFs offer an equivalent 
fixed pay, which does not support the hypothesis. Given that cash compensation encompasses 
both base salary and cash bonus, a key element of bonus compensation comprising cash and 
non-cash incentives, the above results suggest that FLDFs and MLDFs pay managers relatively 
similar base salary and bonus, and thus, an equivalent cash compensation. 
3.4.1.3 Discussion 
In the main regression analysis, I contrast between FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs 
regarding the choice of internal CG configurations in terms of the structure of the board of 
directors and executive compensation plan. I emphasise the main effect of firm logic 
orientation, which may be familiness, hybrid or marketness. Generally, the results show 
differences among the logic-based groups of firms in board size, board independence and 
executive compensation, namely total and equity-based compensation. Overall, the findings 
suggest that, relative to MLDFs, FLDFs adopt deviant, idiosyncratic governance practices, 
departing from the dominant shareholder-oriented governance system; this is in line with the 
SEW preservation perspective. 
The analysis of the board of directors suggests interesting results, emphasising the 
institutional-based classification of firms. The results provide empirical evidence of the 
association between the logic orientation of firms – familiness and marketness – and CG 
configurations related to the board of directors structure. The findings show a significant 
difference between FLDFs and MLDFs in board size and independence. Consistent with the 
perspective of CG deviance (Aguilera et al., 2018), compared with MLDFs, FLDFs exhibit an 
extent of CG discretion concerning the board structure. In line with the CG and family business 
literature regarding the discrepancy in CG practices between family and non-family firms, the 
results show that FLDFs appoint smaller and less independent boards relative to MLDFs.  
Drawing on the core of market logic, shareholder-oriented MLDFs emphasise the 
overarching objective of CG in relation to shareholders’ wealth maximisation. Thus, unlike 
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FLDFs, MLDFs are likely to comply with the prevailing US governance practices that are, as 
Aguilera et al. (2018) assert, shareholder-oriented. According to agency theory, which 
emphasises the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the board of 
directors is elected by shareholders – the dominant stakeholder group – to act on their behalf, 
playing both monitoring and advising roles over the top management of firm. To accomplish 
this, directors’ experience, senses, minds and independence are important, which, controlling for 
the free-rider problem, entails appointing large and independent boards, such as those of 
MLDFs, to effectively carry out their monitoring and advising functions.  
The deviant structure of the board of directors of FLDFs; however, reveals a unique, 
influential firm identity that enacts firm’s CG latitude in compliance with SEW-related interests, 
concerns and goals, building on the SEW preservation perspective. According to Berrone et al. 
(2012) and Cruz et al. (2014), SEW portrays the most prominent feature of family-oriented 
identity, representing a latent explanatory factor of the distinct behaviour of FLDFs relative to 
MLDFs. This is in line with the view of Aguilera et al. (2018) that CG discretion is derived 
from a powerful entrepreneurial identity of firms, yielding to CG deviance.  
In accordance with this, Greenwood et al. (2011) point out that the stronger the firm 
identity, the more the conditions against, and in turn, resistance to pressures and demands. 
Therefore, it can be said that FLDFs resist the standards, pressures, and demands of CG 
imposed by the dominant governance system compared with MLDFs; this is in conformity to 
firm interests and priorities associated with firm identity. Stemming from the institutional theory 
literature, firm identity determines what a firm is and what it wishes to be (Kodeih and 
Greenwood, 2014). Accordingly, as Glynn (2008) asserts, the identity of firms plays a key role 
in setting firm interests and priorities. Emphasising the affective endowments of firm’s key 
actors, the priority of SEW preservation is a distinguishing factor that uniquely characterises 
FLDFs, and as such, reflects their distinct, potent identity, which affects and justifies their 
distinctive practices and behaviour.  
Thus, incorporating the firm identity and SEW perspectives, it can be stated that the 
concern for preserving SEW provides a demonstration of the characterisation and distinction of 
the identity of FLDF concerning their SEW-related interests and goals. Unlike MLDFs, which 
prioritise a primary economic business objective of profitability and shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation by definition, FLDFs identify themselves with a family-oriented attitude and 
preference in terms of prioritising SEW preservation. Particularly, following Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2007), SEW poses a key reference point for FLDFs around which they frame their practices 
and decisions. Thus, regarding the structure of the board of directors, FLDFs avoid CG practices 
that expose the SEW of key firm actors to risk. 
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Accordingly, in the name of preserving their non-economic utilities, such as authority, 
control and power, job security and protection, prestige and image and social ties, derived from 
the firm, it can be said the managers of FLDFs are likely to favour and advocate the 
appointment of smaller and less independent boards relative to MLDFs. Thus, such a structure 
of the board of directors restrains the monitoring and advising roles of the board over 
managerial behaviour and performance in terms of lessening the minds, experience and senses 
on the board. In turn, FLDF managers more effectively can protect their affective endowments 
attached to the firm from being jeopardised in effect of the supervision, evaluation, control and 
discipline that the board of directors enacts, alleviating the risk exposure of SEW. Accordingly, 
the boards of FLDFs show to be smaller and less independent compared with MLDFs. 
Moreover, the preservation of the SEW of FLDF managers contributes to financial 
returns and vice versa, given the competitiveness of managerial labour market and the market 
for takeover threat. In other words, according to Miller and Le Breton‐Miller (2014), economic 
and non-economic benefits can be mixed and attained simultaneously. Therefore, fulfilling the 
non-economic objectives helps generate firms’ financial returns, implying the interdependence 
of firm’s financial standing and SEW. Thus, the concern for preserving or extending the non-
economic utilities derived from the firm entails, on the part of FLDF managers, making an 
effort in running the business, effectively engaging with firm stakeholders and eventually 
enhancing firm’s competitive advantage and survival (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005; 
Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012). As such, it can be stated that the managers of 
FLDFs are self-motivated to act efficiently and not opportunistically in the name of protecting 
SEW.  
Further, stressing the SEW perspective, the managers of FLDFs are likely to endure both 
financial and SEW-related risks in accordance with their dual utilities closely attached to the 
firm in terms of financial wealth and SEW. Unlike shareholders, managers are undiversified in 
their financial wealth, which is linked to their careers that also endorse their non-economic 
benefits of power and control, job security and protection, reputation and prestige and business 
networks. As such, as Berrone et al. (2012) explain, poor performance presents a dual threat to 
FLDF managers regarding financial hardship and SEW loss, given the managerial labour market 
competitiveness and the threat of takeover market. Accordingly, it can be said they are likely to 
be self-incentivised to act efficiently and not opportunistically to preserve both financial wealth 
and SEW. 
 Such an interdependence of firm’s financial status and SEW, as well as the dual threat 
that they encounter provide FLDF managers with a substantial incentive to actively safeguard 
the firm financially, and as such, protect the non-economic utilities derived from the firm. 
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Therefore, preserving the affective endowments against any potential loss, it can be stated that 
the managers of FLDFs are self-motivated to voluntarily serve as self-monitored stewards of the 
business, align interests with those of shareholders and strive to maintain the business success 
and continuity for a win-win objective of shareholders and managers. This restricts the potential 
opportunistic behaviour of managers as the loss aversion of current SEW offsets the chase of 
future gains related to managerial opportunism. Thus, stemming from the SEW preservation 
perspective, it can be said that the respective controlling role of the board of directors relating to 
monitoring an advising top management are of less importance in FLDFs. Specifically, there is 
less need for large, independent boards in FLDFs compared with MLDFs. As such, FLDFs 
appear to appoint smaller and less independent boards relative to MLDFs. 
Further, like FLDF managers, it can be stated that the controlling shareholders of FLDFs 
are self-motivated to voluntarily act as self-monitored stewards of the business, given their large 
shareholdings that permit their non-economic utilities as well, including authority and power, 
prestige and social ties. Accordingly, they closely and effectively oversee, evaluate and 
discipline managerial behaviour and performance in the name of protecting their both economic 
and non-economic benefits linked to the firm. This substitutes the monitoring and advising roles 
of the boards of FLDFs, relative to MLDFs, in relation to such an external control mechanism 
over top management (Williamson, 1983), diminishing the necessity of large, independent 
boards.  
Moreover, the dominant shareholders of FLDFs portray the boards as a tool to practise 
their power and exercise control over management appointments and decisions (Jones et al., 
2008a). Through the board of directors, they preserve their affective endowments of authority 
and control, prestige and business networks entitled by their large shareholdings, and in turn, 
ensure the satisfaction of their interests and preferences. Taking advantage of their ownership 
and perhaps voting rights, it can be said the controlling shareholders appoint boards that actively 
advocate and serve or at least do not deter their intentions and goals (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011a). Therefore, in the name of protecting their SEW, the dominant shareholders of FLDFs 
support the appointment of smaller, less independent boards compared with MLDFs for more 
attainable communication, negotiation and control. Particularly, they elect inside or affiliated 
rather than outside directors, presuming interlocking relations and the alignment of interests 
(Jones et al., 2008a). Accordingly, relative to MLDFs, FLDFs show to have smaller and less 
independent boards. 
Stressing the institutional-based classification of firms, the results provide interesting 
empirical findings on the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs in terms of the board of 
directors structure. The empirical evidence of the distinct choices of internal CG configurations 
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relating to the board of directors among the logic-based groups of firms – FLDFs, hybrid firms 
and MLDFs – provides a new institutional-based explanation for the discrepancy in CG 
observed among firms. Additionally, witnessed by the CG configurations of board size and 
independence, the results demonstrate distinct types of firms relating to the firm logic 
orientations of familiness and marketness, which are associated with different CG practices. 
Importantly, emphasising the logic orientation of firms, the difference between FLDFs and 
MLDFs in the structure of the board of directors gives empirical evidence on the role of ILs in 
shaping firm practices and behaviour (Greenwood et al., 2010).  
This supports the operationalisation of both family and market logics regarding the 
embeddedness of ILs in firm decision making, as well as the institutional-based classification of 
firms in this study. Moreover, emphasising the institutional-based classification, the results also 
oppose the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 relating to enhancing the internal 
CG configurations of US public firms (Valenti, 2008), which suggest that the board structure 
across firms is homogeneous; this supports the claim regarding the role of ILs in driving firm 
behaviour apart from ownership status (family or not). From the regulators’ point of view, this 
indicates that the CG pressures and demands to standardise the structure of the board of 
directors have not been effective.  
The analysis of executive compensation suggests different, inconsistent results, 
emphasising the institutional-based classification of firms. In line with the board of directors 
analysis, the results provide empirical evidence of the association between the logic orientation 
of firms – familiness and marketness – and CG configurations related to the executive 
compensation plan. The findings report a significant difference between FLDFs and MLDFs in 
total and equity-based compensation. Again, the results are in line with the perspective of CG 
deviance (Aguilera et al., 2018), illustrating the CG discretion of FLDFs over the configuration 
of executive compensation regarding the level and form of pay relative to MLDFs.  
The findings show that the executives of FLDFs receive lower total and equity-based 
compensation compared with MLDFs, consistent with the CG and family business literature in 
relation to the difference in CG practices between family and non-family firms. Building on the 
core of family logic, FLDFs prioritise the preservation of the SEW of key firm actors as a 
family-oriented attitude and preference. This contrasts with the economic logic of running the 
business relating to the primary economic business objective of profitability and shareholders’ 
wealth maximisation prioritised by MLDFs. Therefore, unlike shareholder-oriented MLDFs, 
FLDFs do not conform to the prevailing governance system, which is shareholder-oriented in 
the US context in terms of its central objective of maximising shareholders’ wealth.  
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Agency theory mainly regards executive compensation as a contractual relationship 
between managers and firms. The executive compensation plan serves as an internal governance 
tool to control and discipline the potential opportunistic behaviour of managers and facilitate the 
alignment of the interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
suggests the optimal executive contract in terms of level and components. However, as 
discussed above, the distinct executive compensation plan of FLDFs implies a unique, 
influential firm identity. In turn, the identity of FLDFs drives their CG discretion in accordance 
with firm interests and priorities in terms of SEW-related concerns and goals, drawing on the 
perspective of SEW preservation.  
This results in departing from the dominant governance practices, as Aguilera et al. 
(2018) assert. As firm identity becomes more powerful, firms enforce more conditions towards, 
and in turn, resistance to pressures and standards, exerting an extent of latitude over firm 
practices and decisions (Greenwood et al., 2011). Thus, in conformity to firm interests and 
priorities associated with firm identity, it can be said that FLDFs oppose the demands and 
expectations of CG imposed by the prevailing governance practices compared with MLDFs, 
deviating from the prevailing governance system. According to Kodeih and Greenwood (2014), 
firm identity presents what a firm is and what it wants to become. Therefore, it affects how 
firms determine their interests and priorities (Glynn, 2008).  
As discussed above, building on the perspectives of firm identity and SEW, the priority of 
SEW preservation reflects the characterisation and distinction of FLDFs’ identity regarding 
their interests and concerns. As mentioned earlier, in contrast to MLDFs that prioritise 
profitability and shareholders’ wealth maximisation, FLDFs present a family-oriented attitude 
and preference in terms of the priority of SEW preservation. Specifically, the non-economic 
benefits attached to the firm are a main reference point around which FLDFs frame their 
practices and decisions. Accordingly, regarding the executive compensation plan, FLDFs avoid 
CG practices that impose a potential loss of the SEW of firm’s key actors. 
Drawing on the SEW perspective, it can be stated that FLDF managers are socially and 
emotionally motivated by ego satisfaction, career and reputational benefits (Miller and Le 
Breton‐Miller, 2014), in terms of deriving the affective endowments of authority, control and 
power, job security and protection, image and prestige and social ties from the firm. 
Accordingly, in return, they accept lower total compensation relative to MLDFs. In accordance 
with this, the managers of FLDFs receive lower equity-based compensation compared with 
MLDFs in relation to job security and protection in terms of decoupling managerial 
performance and pay.  
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Particularly, it can be said that FLDFs protect the financial welfare of top executives 
associated with their career positions in terms of avoiding disciplining them for inferior 
performance, which implies an extent of nepotism and prejudice (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a). 
This suggests a relaxed linkage between managerial performance and pay (Cruz et al., 2010). As 
such, relative to MLDFs, FLDF managers forgo high total compensation given the satisfactory 
plan of its components, namely low equity-based compensation, in relation to the non-economic 
utilities linked to the firm. In other words, the job security and protection, as well as authority 
and power, prestige and reputation and business networks that the managers of FLDFs derive 
from the firm prompt such a willingness. As such, compared with MLDFs, FLDFs appear to 
offer lower total and equity-based compensation. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned, emphasising the priority of preserving SEW, FLDF 
managers are likely to confront both financial and SEW-related risks because of their dual 
utilities linked to the firm regarding financial wealth and SEW. Unlike shareholders, managers 
are undiversified in their financial wealth, which is attached to their careers that also permit 
their affective endowments of power and control, reputation and image, job security and social 
ties. Accordingly, as Berrone et al. (2012) state, poor performance imposes a dual threat to 
managers of FLDFs in terms of financial hardship and the risk exposure of SEW, given the 
competitiveness of managerial labour market and the market for takeover threat.  
Further, stressing the perspective of SEW preservation, the priority of preserving or 
extending the non-economic utilities derived from the firm entails, on the part of FLDF 
managers, making an effort in running the business, effectively engaging with firm stakeholders 
and eventually enhancing the firm competitiveness and survival. Therefore, given the 
competitiveness of managerial labour market and the market for takeover threat, the 
preservation of SEW of FLDF managers yields to financial returns and vice versa. This 
indicates the interdependence of firm’s financial status and SEW as they both contribute to each 
other (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it can be stated that FLDF managers are likely to be self-incentivised to act 
efficiently and not opportunistically to protect their both financial wealth and SEW. Particularly, 
such a dual threat, as well as the interdependence of the financial standing of firms and SEW 
provide them with a substantial incentive to actively protect the firm financially, and as such, 
preserve the affective endowments attached to the firm. Accordingly, preserving their SEW 
against risk exposure, the managers of FLDFs are self-motivated to voluntarily serve as self-
monitored stewards of the business, conform interests to those of shareholders and keenly work 
to maintain business success and continuity for a win-win goal of shareholders and managers.  
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Thus, as discussed above, this limits the potential opportunistic behaviour of FLDF 
managers as the loss aversion of the non-economic utilities derived from the firm outweighs the 
pursuit of any future gains. Accordingly, stemming from the perspective of SEW preservation, it 
can be said the necessity of the respective controlling role of executive compensation related to 
the managerial motivation and alignment of interests is restricted. Thus, regarding the level and 
form of pay, FLDFs show to offer less executive compensation concerning total and equity-
based compensation relative to MLDFs.  
Like FLDF managers, the dominant shareholders derive some SEW in terms of authority, 
control and power, prestige and social ties, which they sustain through the appointment and 
retention of boards and management teams that support and fulfil or at least do not hinder their 
objectives and interests (Jones et al., 2008a). Thus, given their large shareholdings, it can be 
stated that FLDF controlling shareholders practise their authority and power to provide 
managers with job security and protection in terms of advocating the fixed and cash rather than 
variable incentive pay of mangers, further serving to maintain the affective endowments, 
including authority and control, reputation and image and social ties and business networks, that 
managers enjoy. Concerning equity-based compensation, this represents a lax linkage between 
performance and pay, where managerial performance and pay are decoupled in FLDFs 
compared with MLDFs to refrain bearing the full risk of such incentive-based compensation by 
managers.  
Further, as mentioned above, the controlling shareholders of FLDFs derive both 
economic and non-economic benefits from the firm given their large shareholdings (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2017). Therefore, it can be said that they have a substantial incentive to closely and 
effectively oversee, evaluate and discipline managerial behaviour and performance to protect 
their both financial wealth and SEW attached to the firm (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2003; Martin et al., 2016), voluntarily serving as self-monitored stewards of the 
business. Emphasising the managerial motivation and the alignment of interests roles of 
executive compensation, this limits the need for high variable incentive pay, such as equity-
based compensation, and total compensation due to the substitution effect of such an external 
control mechanism.  
Moreover, drawing on behavioural agency theory, equity-based compensation challenges 
the assumption of managers’ fixed risk preference in relation to its mixed risk feature (Martin et 
al., 2013). As the value of such variable incentive pay is closely linked to the market value of 
firm equity, executives encounter both risk-willing and risk-averse motives, balancing the fear 
of losing current wealth if risk-taking fails and the possibility of generating future wealth if it 
succeeds. Accordingly, equity-based compensation has the potential to make FLDF managers 
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take more risk in decision making, which may ultimately have an adverse effect on firm 
performance and survival due to unexpected factors or uncontrollable circumstances (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2017).  
This imposes threat to managers’ firm-specific wealth, both financial wealth and SEW, as 
their remuneration, authority and power, reputation and prestige, job security and business 
networks are tightly attached to the firm. Thus, as discussed earlier, it can be stated that the 
dominant shareholders of FLDFs exert power and influence over the boards, namely the board 
compensation committee, to restrict the use of equity-based compensation, providing managers 
with job security and protection. Accordingly, they limit the potential of excessive risk-taking 
motives among managers, protecting both the economic and non-economic utilities of both 
controlling shareholders and managers of FLDFs, who in return support and serve the goals and 
preferences of dominant shareholders, derived from the firm in line with the SEW preservation 
perspective. Therefore, compared with MLDFs, FLDFs appear to pay lower equity-based 
compensation. 
Stressing the institutional-based classification of firms, the results provide interesting 
empirical findings on the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs in terms of the executive 
compensation plan. The empirical evidence of the distinct choices of internal CG configurations 
relating to executive compensation among the logic-based groups of firms – FLDFs, hybrid 
firms and MLDFs – provides a new institutional-based explanation for the difference in CG 
observed among firms. In addition, viewed by the CG configurations of total and equity-based 
compensation, the findings reveal different types of firms in terms of the logic orientations of 
familiness and marketness, which are associated with distinct CG practices. Importantly, 
emphasising the logic orientation of firms, the discrepancy between FLDFs and MLDFs in the 
plan of executive compensation puts forward empirical evidence of the role of ILs in shaping 
firm practices and behaviour (Greenwood et al., 2010). This supports the operationalisation of 
both family and market logics regarding the embeddedness of ILs in firm decision making, as 
well as the institutional-based classification of firms in this study.  
As shown by the non-significant results, FLDFs and MLDFs seem to be homogenous 
regarding base salary, bonus and cash compensation. This points to another, interesting finding 
that FLDFs and MLDFs pay quite similar managerial remuneration to top managers concerning 
such compensation forms. Perhaps the sample firms do not act differently in terms of planning 
base salary, bonus and cash compensation because, first, they all belong to the S&P 1500 index, 
which relates to a single competitive managerial labour market. As a matter of fact, US firms 
compete for the same executives, so they cannot offer significantly different pay from 
competitors; otherwise, they will not recruit satisfactory and sufficient managerial talent and 
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skills to run the business. Thus, given the competitiveness of managerial labour market, MLDFs 
may attract and maintain experienced managers by offering similar compensation forms, namely 
base salary and cash compensation, which are primarily more appealing and secure in terms of 
securing the financial wealth and welfare of managers, as well as bonus in terms of various 
managerial privileges and non-cash incentives, to those paid by FLDFs in the name of providing 
job security and protection. 
Second, FLDFs may no longer be seen as entities that do not reward the risk coped by, 
and thus, the performance of managers regarding bonus compensation. It is perhaps because 
FLDFs may competitively catch up with the trend of MLDFs relating to executive 
compensation given the competitiveness of managerial labour market. In the sense that FLDFs 
are mimicking MLDFs, the professionals on the boards of FLDFs may set well-designed 
executive compensation plans concerning bonus as a variable incentive pay of short-term focus. 
Emphasising the perspective of SEW, this implies short-term rather than long-term coupling of 
managerial performance and pay in compliance with job security and protection. Therefore, 
compared with MLDFs, FLDFs may offer similar bonus to hire and hold talented managers in a 
competitive managerial labour market. In addition, the big audit firms may play an essential role 
in aligning the executive compensation of bonus offered by FLDFs with that paid by their 
competitors on the S&P 1500 index. 
3.4.2 Robustness Checks 
In this study, I include additional techniques accounting for econometric and endogeneity 
concerns. Regarding the board of directors analysis, instrumental variables are introduced for 
board size and independence into the models as a robustness check. Specifically, the 
instrumental variables of the lagged values of other board characteristics are included because 
board size and independence are likely to be endogenously determined. As shown in Column 
(2) in Tables 3.11 and 3.13, the results do not change the conclusions about the difference in the 
structure of the board of directors between FLDFs and MLDFs; however, the significance of the 
main independent variables’ coefficients changes slightly downward.   
As an additional robustness check, the board size, board independence and executive 
compensation models are estimated with the firm random effects, as shown in Column (3) in 
Tables 3.11, 3.13 and Column (2) in Tables 3.15–3.19, respectively, controlling for firms’ 
idiosyncratic trends that could randomly affect the setup of firm governance. This is in line with 
the fact that, according to the observed behavioural dimensions, firms are allowed to shift 
between the logic-based groups of the institutional-based classification across years to closely 
capture the variation in firm behaviour from year to year, not restricting firms to a fixed firm 
type across years. The results do not alter the conclusions about the difference between FLDFs 
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and MLDFs in the various dependent variables of the board of directors and executive 
compensation; however, some power of the main independent variables is lost.   
To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, both the industry and year effects are included in 
all the models, controlling for the industry and time trends of CG. As a robustness check 
accounting for endogeneity, the models are estimated using a dynamic panel-data estimation 
procedure that only assumes weak exogeneity; this allows the corresponding dependent 
variables to be affected by past changes in the board structure and executive compensation. As 
Column (4) in Tables 3.11 and 3.13 and Column (3) in Tables 3.15–3.19 report, the results 
verify the conclusions about the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs in the various 
dependent variables of the board of directors and executive compensation; however, the 
significance of the main independent variables’ coefficients changes slightly downward. 
Running another robustness check, I go a step further. Apart from the institutional-based 
classification of firms, the family ownership status of firms is used to categorise the sample 
firms under the same empirical setting. Instead of using the indicators of the logic orientation of 
firms, the ownership-based classification of firms is applied using a traditional indicator to flag 
family (=1) and non-family (=0) firms based on family ownership. The data of family 
ownership are retrieved from the list prepared and provided online by Ron Anderson, restricting 
the sample to years 2006 through 2010 per the availability of family ownership data. For a firm 
to be flagged as a family firm, the threshold is holdings of a 5% ownership or voting rights. 
Overall, as shown in Tables 3.12, 3.14 and 3.20, the results of the main regression 
analysis are robust regarding the difference in the structure of the board of directors, in terms of 
board size and independence, and the executive compensation of total and equity-based 
compensation, comparing the sample of family and non-family firms with FLDFs and MLDFs, 
respectively. The robustness of the main regression analysis findings underpins the argument 
that, stressing the ILs perspective, FLDFs and MLDFs behave like family and non-family firms, 
respectively, in terms of their motives, objectives and essence, emphasising firm behaviour 
irrespective of ownership status (family or not). That is, some commonalities and similarities 
between FLDFs (MLDFs) and family (non-family) firms are expected.  
Paralleling family and non-family firms with FLDFs and MLDFs, respectively, it is found 
that the boards of family firms are smaller and less independent compared with non-family 
firms, which is consistent with hypotheses H1a and H1b. In addition, supporting hypotheses 
H2a and H2b, it is also found that non-family firms pay higher total and equity-based 
compensation relative to family firms. Further, like FLDFs and MLDFs, respectively, family 
and non-family firms offer similar compensation forms regarding base salary, cash 
compensation and bonus in terms of various managerial privileges and non-cash incentives. 
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Therefore, FLDFs and MLDFs demonstrate isomorphic behaviour compared with that of family 
and non-family firms, respectively, in terms of the choice of internal CG configurations. Thus, 
relative to the traditional split of family and non-family firms, in this study, I establish an 
institutional-based classification of firms that depends on actual firm behaviour irrespective of 
ownership status (family or not), building on the idea that ILs provide the guidance and 
prescriptions of firm practices and decisions. 
Stressing family ownership status, the robustness of results supports the underlying 
concept concerning the role of ILs, namely family and market logics, in driving firm behaviour 
and shaping firm practices and decisions relating to CG configurations. Moreover, the alignment 
of results reinforces the institutional-based classification of firms that builds on a number of 
observed behavioural dimensions, underpinning the developed logic orientation index that 
essentially identifies and classifies firms based on the differences in real firm practices and 
decisions. Therefore, the results empirically support the different view of the familiness and 
marketness of firms, namely the concept of firm logic orientation that depicts and defines the 
firm type in terms of the logic-based group in relation to the embeddedness of family and 
market logics by which a firm is driven. That is, interestingly, such a robustness strongly 
supports and validates the proposed institutional-based approach of categorising firms compared 
with the traditional ownership-based classification. The emphasis on ILs as covert drivers of 
firm behaviour particularly sheds light on a latent explanatory institutional factor, namely the 
logic orientation of firms; this presents the culture and nature of firms, and in turn, flags firms in 
a different manner beyond the ownership criteria.  
Moreover, this addresses that relative to the traditional classification of family and non-
family firms, grouping firms as FLDFs and MLDFs has the advantage of being a faster and 
smarter approach. The conventional ownership-based classification of firms requires time and 
effort spent browsing the proxy statements and annual reports of firms to find out about 
ownership status (family or not). In contrast, the institutional-based classification of firms is an 
accounting-based process that stresses real firm practices and decisions. Particularly, it 
incorporates multiple behavioural dimensions measured using financial data easily accessible 
through various databases, drawing primarily on the existing family business research. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Emphasising firm behaviour, firms exhibit different practices and decisions that prompt 
various areas of investigation. To explain such a difference, Friedland and Alford (1991) 
introduce the notion of ILs as being latently embedded in firm decision making, underlying the 
culture and nature of firms, and as such, driving firm behaviour. ILs provide the prescriptions 
and means of appropriate behaviour, proxying for firm behaviour (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; 
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Greenwood et al., 2011). Despite the growing literature of ILs, no attention has been paid to the 
role of ILs as latent drivers of firm behaviour in shaping firm governance practices. The core of 
this study lies in the application of ILs perspective to the concept of distinction among firms 
beyond the conventional understanding and classification of firms, emphasising the context of 
CG regarding whether and how firms vary in CG practices.  
Stressing the role of ILs in shaping firm practices and decisions, I emphasised and 
operationalised both family and market logics. I built on the perspective of SEW relating to the 
non-economic benefits of key firm actors – owners and managers – derived from the firm that 
present a main reference point of firm practices and decisions. SEW is a key distinguishing 
factor that captures the uniqueness of family firm behaviour, which has increasingly been 
highlighted in the family business literature. Particularily, drawing on the priority of SEW 
preservation, I identified and classified firms according to real firm practices and decisions.  
In doing so, this study differentiates itself from the the extant family-oriented studies that 
have commonly emphsised the ownership criteria in terms of ownership status (family or not), 
which is believed to neglect the importance of firm behaviour. To investigate the discrepancy in 
firm behaviour, in this study, I presented the concept of firm logic orientation, specifically the 
constructs of familiness and marketness to define and depict the firm type in terms of the logic-
based group in relation to the embeddedness of family and market logics by which a firm is 
driven. In doing so, I developed an index of the logic orientation of firms and introduced an 
institutional-based classification of FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs based on several 
behavioural dimensions.  
Drawing on the SEW preservation perspective, in this study, I portrayed FLDFs and 
MLDFs as behaving similarly to family and non-family firms, respectively, in terms of their 
motives, objectives and essence. Primarily, I depicted MLDFs as shareholder-oriented firms that 
prioritise the primary economic business objective of profitability and shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation, exhibiting an archetypal business setting. In contrast, presenting a different 
business setting, FLDFs exhibit a family-oriented attitude and preference in terms of prioritising 
the preservation of SEW attached to the firm, overlapping the family and business systems. 
Moreover, hybrid firms display an intersection between FLDFs and MLDFs concerning firm 
practices and decisions, overlapping family and market logics. 
In this study, I provided empirical evidence that ILs give a viable explanation for the 
difference in CG among firms by examining the association between firm logic orientation and 
the firm choice of internal CG configurations. This study has an important implication for 
detecting the contrast between FLDFs and MLDFs concerning CG configurations. It stressed 
whether and how firm logic orientation affects the firm choice of internal CG configurations. 
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Consistent with the perspective of ILs, the structure of the board of directors and executive 
compensation plan showed to vary according to the logic orientation of firms, where family and 
market logics drive firm practices and decisions differently. Overall, I found that, relative to 
MLDFs, FLDFs exhibit a distinct choice of board size, board independence and executive 
compensation. Particularly, the boards of FLDFs are smaller and less independent compared 
with MLDFs. Moreover, relative to MLDFs, FLDFs pay lower total and equity-based 
compensation.  
In line with the CG deviance perspective (Aguilera et al., 2018), these findings suggested 
a unique, influential identity of FLDFs in accordance with the priority of SEW preservation, 
which yields their CG discretion. SEW is the most prominent feature of family-oriented identity 
(Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014), which characterises FLDFs as opposed to MLDFs 
regarding SEW-related interests and goals. Accordingly, FLDFs showed to adopt deviant, 
idiosyncratic CG practices relative to the prevailing shareholder-oriented governance system in 
the name of preserving the non-economic utilities of firm’s key actors, including authority, 
control and power, job security and protection, reputation and prestige and social ties, closely 
attached to the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a).  
As Ravasi and Schultz (2006) note, firm identity is a sensemaking tool that interprets and 
gives meaning to firm behaviour. It defines what a firm is and how it wishes to be, determining 
firm interests and priorities (Glynn, 2008; Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014). Therefore, the 
priority of SEW preservation primarily reflects a distinct identity of FLDFs in terms of SEW-
related concerns and goals. Thus, according to Greenwood et al. (2011), FLDFs’ identity 
imposes conditions against, and as such, resistance to the demands, standards and expectations 
of CG imposed by the dominant governance practices, that is, the CG latitude of FLDFs.  
Stemming from the perspective of SEW preservation, the executives of FLDFs actively 
seek to maintain or extend the non-economic benefits linked to the firm and mitigate the risk 
exposure of SEW. Accordingly, concerning CG configurations, they favour and support 
configuring the board of directors and executive compensation in a way that facilitates or at 
least does not deter preserving their affective endowments. Particularly, this is related to 
restricting the monitoring and advising functions of the board in terms of smaller and less 
independent boards of FLDFs, as well as sacrificing managerial remuneration and decoupling 
managerial performance and pay in terms of lower total and equity-based compensation, 
respectively.  
Likewise, for the dominant shareholders of FLDFs, the board of directors is a tool 
through which they fulfil their goals and preferences including both economic and non-
economic benefits, supporting smaller and less independent boards for more attainable 
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negotiation, communication and control over management appointment and decisions. In 
addition, the controlling shareholders enforce their ownership and/or voting rights to advocate 
and protect managers, who in return support and carry out their interests and objectives, in the 
sense of a lax linkage between managerial performance and pay. As such, FLDFs appeared to 
adopt distinct CG practices compared with MLDFs, avoiding CG configurations that expose 
their non-economic utilities, such as authority and power, reputation and prestige, job security 
and protection and business networks, attached to the firm to threat.  
Moreover, drawing on the perspective of SEW preservation, the affective endowments 
derived from the firm provide both the managers and dominant shareholders of FLDFs with a 
substantial incentive to voluntarily serve as self-monitored stewards of the business. 
Specifically, FLDF managers effectively safeguard the firm financially, and in turn, preserve or 
extend their SEW, given the interdependence of firm’s financial standing and SEW, as well as 
the dual financial and SEW-related risks borne by managers because of their undiversified 
financial wealth. Therefore, preserving their both financial wealth and SEW, the managers of 
FLDFs are self-incentivised to act efficiently and not opportunistically, given the 
competitiveness of managerial labour market and the market for takeover threat.  
Similarly, given their large shareholdings that permit the non-economic benefits of 
authority and control, prestige and social ties as well, the dominant shareholders of FLDFs are 
self-motivated to closely and effectively oversee, evaluate and discipline top management, 
preserving their both economic and non-economic benefits derived from the firm. Concerning 
their respective controlling roles, this limits the necessity of large and independent boards and 
restricts the need for high total compensation and equity-based compensation, justifying the 
difference in CG configurations between FLDFs and MLDFs.  
Irrespective of family ownership status (or not), FLDFs and MLDFs showed to 
implement CG practices similar to those adopted by archetypal family and non-family firms, 
respectively. Addressing a different view of the familiness and marketness of firms, FLDFs and 
MLDFs, thereby, respectively match family-owned or managed and non-family firms in terms 
of firm practices and decisions, displaying family and non-family firm-like behaviours, 
respectively. Regarding the underlying concept of family logic, it endorses a family-oriented 
flavour and essence in terms of prioritising the SEW preservation as opposed to the core of 
market logic, which lies in the priority of profitability and maximisation of shareholders’ 
wealth. Thus, drawing on the popular SEW model, in this study, I explained that FLDFs 
structure the boards and plan executive compensation in a way that aligns with and protects or 
expands the non-economic benefits of firm’s key actors derived from the firm, avoiding the 
potential loss of SEW.  
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Given the logic orientation of firms, in this study, I provided empirical evidence that 
firms vary in internally configuring the firm business in terms of firm governance regarding the 
firm choice of internal CG configurations. This confirms the role of ILs as being latent drivers 
of firm behaviour. Importantly, such evidence draws attention to and supports the introduced 
notion of firm logic orientation and approves the functionality of familiness and marketness 
constructs, differentiating among firms regarding CG practices. In this way, in this study, I 
established a different classification of firms and a distinct view of their familiness and 
marketness. Stressing the embeddedness of family and market logics, the key idea is that firms 
differ in the culture and nature of running a business that covertly embed in their decision 
making, and in turn, shape and explain the differences in firm practices and decisions; this is 
primarily a covert logic-based root. Therefore, this study emphasises that it is not family 
ownership status (or not), but the firm practices and behaviour that characterise and define firms 
in terms of their different culture and nature.   
Building on the difference in CG configurations between FLDFs and MLDFs, in this 
study, I provided the ILs, CG and family business scholars, as well as policymakers and 
regulators with a new institutional-based explanation for the difference in firm governance 
practices that expands the understanding of ILs and CG. The study has important implications 
and feedback regarding the understanding and conceptualisation of the familiness and 
marketness of firms, applying the ILs perspective to identify and classify firms in terms of 
depicting and differentiating between family and non-family firm-like behaviours. Emphasising 
the SEW perspective, in this study, I incorporated ILs to primarily detect family-oriented firms 
and – by extension – their counterparts as a different manner for the distinction among firms; in 
doing so, I stressed family and market logics irrespective of ownership status (family or not).  
Moreover, drawing on the SEW preservation perspective, I developed a quantitative 
approach to identify and assess the embeddedness of family and market logics. I incorporated 
several behavioural dimensions that capture variations among the logic-based groups of firms, 
generating an institutional-based classification of firms beyond the traditional understanding of 
the firm types relating to the ownership criteria. Further, I applied a distinct view of the 
familiness and marketness of firms to the CG context, revealing an effect of firm logic 
orientation on firm governance practices, namely the firm choice of internal CG configurations.  
Driving firm behaviour, the familiness logic orientation evidently differentiates firms 
from the standard, shareholder-oriented view of firms – the marketness logic orientation – 
which manifests in a different choice of internal CG configurations. This can extend the 
knowledge of scholars, policymakers and regulators on ILs and CG. Primarily, they need to 
consider that, apart from family ownership status (or not), FLDFs prioritise the preservation of 
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SEW, which demonstrates a distinct, powerful firm identity, and as such, interferes in the 
adoption of prevailing shareholder-oriented governance practices, namely CG deviance.  
Stemming from the SEW preservation perspective, FLDFs configure firm governance in 
a way that best fits them, highlighting FLDFs as a distinct business form or approach relative to 
shareholder-oriented MLDFs (Greenwood et al., 2010). Specifically, this study implies that the 
familiness logic orientation of firms displays a family-oriented attitude and preference that 
prompt the tendency of FLDFs to depart from the archetypal shareholder-oriented business 
setting of MLDFs where a marketness logic orientation, underpinning the difference in CG. 
This impacts the understanding and evaluation of firm strategies and practices, where the 
discrepancy among firms may be explained against market and government regulations and 
policies. Fundamentally, this study can expand the understanding of CG scholars, policymakers 
and regulators regarding firm governance, giving them an insight that a single governance 
system does not fit all firms. However, the firm logic orientation of firms implicitly plays an 
important role in configuring the CG of firms, shedding light on the influence of the logic 
orientation of firms on the firm choice of internal CG configurations given the difference in 
board size, board independence and executive compensation measures among the logic-based 
groups of firms. Providing a different, institutional-based explanation for the discrepancy in CG 
among firms, this can help CG scholars, policymakers and regulators understand the role of ILs 
in triggering the differences in firm behaviour related to firm governance and develop CG 
research, policies and regulations. This indicates the importance to consider the latent 
institutional factor of firm logic orientation to achieve a better understanding of firms and by 
extension firm practices and behaviour. 
Emphasising the logic orientation of firms as a latent explanatory – institutional – factor 
of CG configurations, this study also sheds light on an area of investigation on whether the 
effect of established CG determinants on CG configurations is a function of the firm type in 
terms of the logic-based group. In other words, given the association between firm logic 
orientation and CG configurations, it remains a viable question whether the logic orientation of 
firms plays a moderating role concerning the relationship between CG determinants and 
configurations. Importantly, in this study, I addressed the advantage of the institutional-based 
classification of firms over the conventional ownership-based classification as a simpler, faster 
and smarter approach. The traditional widely used classification of family and non-family firms 
requires time and effort spent browsing the proxy statements and annual reports of firms to 
determine the ownership status (family or not) of firms. In contrast, the proposed institutional-
based classification of firms is basically an accounting-based process that stresses real firm 
practices and decisions. Specifically, it incorporates several behavioural dimensions measured 
3 Do Institutional Logics Shape Corporate Governance? 
105 
 
using financial data easily accessible via different databases, drawing mainly on the extant 
family business research. 
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Figure 3.1 - Conceptual framework. 
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Table 3.1 - Sample distribution by year. 
This table reports the time series and size of samples used in analysis.  start with all S&P 1500 index constituents 
from 2006 through 2016.  restrict the samples to firms with complete financial, board, executive compensation, 
ownership and monthly stock data on Compustat, ISS, Execucomp, TR-13f and CRSP.  include firms with a 
minimum of two-year observations and exclude regulated firms with the first two-digit SIC codes being 49 and 60-
69.  
Panel A- Board of directors’ sample distribution by year 
Year N Percent 
2006 244 3.88 
2007 466 7.41 
2008 610 9.70 
2009 655 10.42 
2010 670 10.66 
2011 676 10.75 
2012 655 10.42 
2013 638 10.15 
2014 609 9.67 
2015 559 8.89 
2016 504 8.02 
Total firm-year observations 6286 100 
Total unique firms 987  
Panel B- Executive compensation sample distribution by year 
Year  N Percent 
2006 246 3.94 
2007 469 7.52 
2008 613 9.83 
2009 658 10.55 
2010 665 10.66 
2011 664 10.65 
2012 645 10.34 
2013 629 10.09 
2014 599 9.61 
2015 548 8.79 
2016 500 8.02 
Total firm-year observations 6236  
Total unique firms 971  
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Table 3.2 - Logic orientation index development. 
This table demonstrates designing the measurement of non-familiness, or marketness, extent and the development of 
the logic orientation index in terms of the logic-based groups of FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs, considering all the 
possible combinations of behavioural dimensions. CD is the entropy measure of total diversification measuring the 
level of corporate diversification; EM is the absolute value of discretionary accruals measuring the magnitude of 
earnings management; TA is an inverse measure of the effective tax rate, as the total tax expense scaled by pre-tax 
income, times minus one measuring the level of tax aggressiveness; RD is the R&D ratio of R&D expenditure to 
firm’s total sales measuring the level of R&D investment. 
Level of behavioural dimension Non-
familiness/ 
Marketness 
extent 
(LogicExtentit) 
 
Logic  
orientation 
 index 
(LogicOrientationit) 
 
 
Firm type: 
the logic-
based group 
of firms 
 
Corporate 
diversification 
(CDit) 
 
Earnings 
management 
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Tax 
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investment 
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driven 
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(FLDFs) 
Low (0) Low (0) Low (0) High (1) 1 
Low (0) Low (0) High (1) Low (0) 1 
Low (0) High (1) Low (0) Low (0) 1 
High (1) Low (0) Low (0) Low (0) 1 
Low (0) Low (0) High (1) High (1) 2 
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Low (0) High (1) Low (0) High (1) 2 
High (1) Low (0) Low (0) High (1) 2 
Low (0) High (1) High (1) Low (0) 2 
High (1) Low (0) High (1) Low (0) 2 
High (1) High (1) Low (0) Low (0) 2 
High (1) High (1) High (1) Low (0) 3 
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(3) 
Market 
logic-
driven 
firms 
(MLDFs) 
High (1) High (1) Low (0) High (1) 3 
High (1) Low (0) High (1) High (1) 3 
Low (0) High (1) High (1) High (1) 3 
High (1) High (1) High (1) High (1) 4 
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Table 3.3 - Descriptive statistics: Board of directors analysis. 
This table reports the full sample summary statistics on all variables used in board of directors’ analysis. FamilyFirm 
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation 
of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; HybridFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 2 
presenting the hybrid logic orientation of hybrid firms, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 
1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; 
FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; 
Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; 
FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of 
equity scaled by firm’s total assets; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO 
has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; BoardSize is the total number of 
directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the 
number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Full sample 
Variable Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Panel A- Logic-based groups 
FamilyFirm 0.44 0 0.50 
HybridFirm 0.35 0 0.48 
MarketFirm 0.21 0 0.40 
Panel B- Firm-specific characteristics  
FirmSize (Unlogged, $000’000) 6140.17 1785.42 13277.33 
Debt 0.17 0.15 0.15 
Growth (Unlogged) 3.38 2.50 3.10 
Risk 0.10 0.09 0.05 
FreeCashFlow 0.12 0.09 0.11 
MarketPerformance  2.04 1.72 1.10 
Panel C- CEO-specific characteristics 
ExecutiveAge 56.29 56 6.90 
ExecutiveTenure 12.37 11 7.98 
Panel D- Ownership structure 
ExecutiveOwnership 0.02 0.01 0.05 
Panel E- Board structure 
BoardSize 8.89 9 1.97 
BoardIndependence 0.79 0.80 0.11 
Observations 6286 
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Table 3.4 - Descriptive statistics: Executive compensation analysis. 
This table reports the full sample summary statistics on all variables used in executive compensation analysis. 
FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness 
logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; HybridFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic 
orientation value is 2 presenting the hybrid logic orientation of hybrid firms, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of 
MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; Salary is the fixed component of compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (salary) 
variable in Execucomp; Bonus is a variable pay as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of cash bonus and non-
equity incentives; EquityComp is a variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one 
plus the sum of grant date fair value of option and stock awards; CashComp is the cash compensation as the natural 
logarithm of one plus the sum of salary and cash bonus; TotalComp is the total compensation as the natural logarithm 
of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual salary, bonus, value of stock options and 
restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other compensation; FirmSize is the natural logarithm 
of firm’s sales; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by 
book value of equity; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum 
of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; StockPerformance 
is the annual average stock return; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; FirmAge is 
the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Risk is the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; 
ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held 
by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of 
outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares 
outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) 
directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; 
Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Full Sample 
Variable Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Panel A- Logic-based groups  
FamilyFirm 0.44 0 0.50 
HybridFirm 0.35 0 0.48 
MarketFirm 0.21 0 0.41 
Panel B- Executive compensation (Unlogged, $000) 
Salary 582.70 541.80 222.90 
Bonus 814.48 520.15 992.12 
EquityComp 2159.13 1383.56 2352.17 
CashComp 677.29 591.67 377.53 
TotalComp 3771.39 2756.76 3341.18 
Panel C- Firm-specific characteristics 
FirmSize (Unlogged, $000’000) 6310.66 1797.45 13742.08 
Growth (Unlogged) 3.36 2.50 3.05 
MarketPerformance 2.04 1.72 1.09 
StockPerformance 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Debt 0.17 0.15 0.15 
FirmAge (Unlogged) 31.65 25.00 18.68 
Risk 0.10 0.09 0.05 
Panel D- Executive-specific characteristics 
ExecutiveAge 56.30 56 6.86 
ExecutiveTenure 12.35 11 7.97 
Panel E- Ownership structure 
ExecutiveOwnership 0.02 0.01 0.05 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.84 0.87 0.13 
Panel F- Board structure 
BoardSize 8.91 9 1.97 
BoardIndependence 0.79 0.80 0.11 
Duality 0.47 0 0.50 
Observations 6236 
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Table 3.5 - Descriptive statistics: Board structure by logic-based group.  
BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) 
directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Subsamples by logic-based group 
 
Variable 
Group of FLDFs 
 (FamilyFirm =1) 
Group of hybrid firms  
(HybridFirm =1) 
Group of MLDFs  
(MarketFirm =1) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
BoardSize 8.76 1.89 8.91 1.99 9.14 2.08 
BoardIndependence 0.78 0.11 0.79 0.11 0.80 0.10 
Observations 2768 2227 1291 
 
Table 3.6 - Difference-in-mean t-test: Board structure. 
BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) 
directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Variable 
Mean-difference 
FamilyFirm & 
HybridFirm 
FamilyFirm & 
MarketFirm 
HybridFirm & 
MarketFirm 
BoardSize 0.150** 
(2.73) 
0.373*** 
(5.66) 
0.223** 
(3.14) 
BoardIndependence 0.0121*** 
(3.96) 
0.0268*** 
(7.50) 
0.0147*** 
(3.93) 
Observations 4995 4059 3518 
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Table 3.7 - Descriptive statistics: Executive compensation plan by logic-based group. 
Salary is the fixed component of compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (salary) variable in Execucomp; 
Bonus is a variable pay as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of cash bonus and non-equity incentives; 
EquityComp is a variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant 
date fair value of option and stock awards; CashComp is the cash compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus 
the sum of salary and cash bonus; TotalComp is the total compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) 
variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock 
granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other compensation. 
Subsamples by logic-based group 
Variable 
(Unlogged, $000) 
Group of FLDFs  
(FamilyFirm =1) 
Group of hybrid firms  
(HybridFirm =1) 
Group of MLDFs  
(MarketFirm =1) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Salary  574.08 215.08 582.00 221.22 602.18 240.34 
Bonus 772.32 946.34 816.13 968.95 901.06 1113.91 
EquityComp 1865.51 2120.41 2198.04 2330.56 2715.21 2723.80 
CashComp 667.24 364.31 675.11 370.87 702.33 413.81 
TotalComp 3392.66 3004.75 3820.03 3336.20 4491.33 3865.29 
Observations 2736 2210 1290 
 
Table 3.8 - Difference-in-mean: Executive compensation plan. 
Salary is the fixed component of compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (salary) variable in Execucomp; 
Bonus is a variable pay as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of cash bonus and non-equity incentives; 
EquityComp is a variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant 
date fair value of option and stock awards; CashComp is the cash compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus 
the sum of salary and cash bonus; TotalComp is the total compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) 
variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock 
granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other compensation. 
t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Variable 
Mean-difference 
FamilyFirm & 
HybridFirm 
FamilyFirm & 
MarketFirm 
HybridFirm & 
MarketFirm 
Salary 7.918 
(1.27) 
28.10*** 
(3.72) 
20.18* 
(2.52) 
Bonus 43.81 
(1.60) 
128.7*** 
(3.80) 
84.93* 
(2.37) 
EquityComp 332.5*** 
(5.24) 
849.7*** 
(10.79) 
517.2*** 
(5.95) 
CashComp 7.867 
(0.75) 
35.10** 
(2.73) 
27.23* 
(2.01) 
TotalComp 427.4*** 
(4.73) 
1098.7*** 
(9.84) 
671.3*** 
(5.41) 
Observations 4946 4026 3500 
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Table 3.9 - Correlation matrix: Board of directors analysis. 
This table reports the correlation between all variables used in board of directors’ analysis. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the 
familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; HybridFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 2 presenting the hybrid logic orientation of hybrid firms, 
and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural 
logarithm of firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by 
book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; 
MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) 
directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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FamilyFirm 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
HybridFirm -0.66*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
MarketFirm -0.45*** -0.38*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . 
FirmSize (Unlogged) -0.06*** -0.02 0.10*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . 
Debt 0.03*** -0.01 -0.03** 0.08*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . 
Growth (Unlogged) -0.02* 0.02 0.01 0.07*** 0.13*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 0.03** -0.21*** 0.02 -0.19*** 1.00 . . . . . . . 
FreeCashFlow -0.11*** 0.03** 0.10*** -0.14*** -0.37*** 0.16*** 0.06*** 1.00 . . . . . . 
MarketPerformance -0.01 0.03** -0.02 -0.07*** -0.25*** 0.70*** -0.22*** 0.33*** 1.00 . . . . . 
ExecutiveAge 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.06*** 0.02 -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.08*** 1.00 . . . . 
ExecutiveTenure 0.03** -0.02* -0.01 -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.33*** 1.00 . . . 
ExecutiveOwnership 0.03*** -0.00 -0.04*** -0.12*** -0.19*** -0.05*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.21*** 0.49*** 1.00 . . 
BoardSize -0.06*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.39*** 0.25*** 0.05*** -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.09*** 0.07*** -0.17*** -0.23*** 1.00 . 
BoardIndependence -0.08*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.05*** -0.09*** -0.02* -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.17*** -0.23*** 0.19*** 1.00 
Observations 6286              
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Table 3.10 - Correlation matrix: Executive compensation analysis. 
This table reports the correlation between all variables used in executive compensation analysis. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the 
familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; HybridFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 2 presenting the hybrid logic orientation of hybrid firms, 
and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; Salary is the fixed 
component of compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (salary) variable in Execucomp; Bonus is a variable pay as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of cash bonus and non-equity 
incentives; EquityComp is a variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant date fair value of option and stock awards; CashComp is the cash 
compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of salary and cash bonus; TotalComp is the total compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing 
the sum of annual salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other compensation; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Growth is 
the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term 
debt scaled by firm’s total assets; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a 
fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a 
fraction of shares outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; 
BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; Duality is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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FamilyFirm 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
HybridFirm -0.66*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . 
MarketFirm -0.45*** -0.38*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . 
Salary -0.03*** -0.00 0.04*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . 
Bonus -0.04*** 0.00 0.04*** 0.63*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . 
EquityComp -0.11*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.59*** 0.50*** 1.00 . . . . . . . 
CashComp -0.02* -0.00 0.03*** 0.72*** 0.60*** 0.51*** 1.00 . . . . . . 
TotalComp -0.10*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.70*** 0.73*** 0.94*** 0.62*** 1.00 . . . . . 
FirmSize (Unlogged) -0.06*** -0.02 0.10*** 0.55*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.57*** 1.00 . . . . 
Growth (Unlogged) -0.02* 0.02 0.01 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.04*** 0.16*** 0.07*** 1.00 . . . 
MarketPerformance -0.01 0.03** -0.02 -0.08*** 0.01 0.12*** -0.06*** 0.07*** -0.07*** 0.71*** 1.00 . . 
StockPerformance 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05*** -0.02* -0.01 -0.00 -0.02* 0.13*** 0.17*** 1.00 . 
Debt 0.03*** -0.01 -0.03** 0.26*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.08*** 0.12*** -0.25*** -0.04*** 1.00 
FirmAge (Unlogged) -0.12*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.37*** 0.28*** 0.19*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.38*** -0.00 -0.12*** -0.01 0.07*** 
Risk -0.02 -0.01 0.03** -0.25*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.15*** -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.22*** 0.02 0.02 
ExecutiveAge -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 0.00 0.01 
ExecutiveTenure 0.03** -0.02* -0.01 -0.09*** -0.04*** -0.09*** -0.02 -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.06*** 0.02* 0.01 -0.12*** 
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ExecutiveOwnership 0.03** -0.00 -0.04*** -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.15*** -0.08*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.05*** 0.04*** -0.01 -0.19*** 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.05*** -0.01 -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.00 -0.10*** -0.03*** -0.19*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.09*** 
BoardSize -0.06*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.52*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.43*** 0.39*** 0.05*** -0.09*** -0.01 0.25*** 
BoardIndependence -0.09*** 0.02* 0.08*** 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.16*** 0.04*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.05*** -0.06*** 0.01 0.15*** 
Duality -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.16*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** -0.01 -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 
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FirmAge (Unlogged) 1.00 . . . . . . . .     
Risk -0.17*** 1.00 . . . . . . .     
ExecutiveAge 0.11*** -0.05*** 1.00 . . . . . .     
ExecutiveTenure -0.08*** 0.05*** 0.32*** 1.00 . . . . .     
ExecutiveOwnership -0.13*** 0.05*** 0.20*** 0.48*** 1.00 . . . .     
InstitutionalOwnership -0.24*** -0.01 -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.26*** 1.00 . . .     
BoardSize 0.38*** -0.19*** 0.07*** -0.17*** -0.23*** -0.12*** 1.00 . .     
BoardIndependence 0.20*** -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.17*** -0.24*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 1.00 .     
Duality 0.11*** -0.05*** 0.25*** 0.34*** 0.23*** -0.06*** 0.03** 0.16*** 1.00     
Observations 6236             
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Table 3.11 - Multivariate analysis: Board size. 
The results of (1) preliminary OLS multivariate analysis, and robustness tests (2) including instrumental variables in 
OLS multivariate analysis, (3) random-effects estimation and (4) dynamic estimation. The dependent variable is 
BoardSize representing the total number of directors on board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; 
MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic 
orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; 
MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of 
total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; ExecutiveOwnership 
is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total 
number of outstanding shares; BoardIndependence is the lagged value of the percentage of outside directors on 
board.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FamilyFirm -0.188* -0.176* -0.0351+ -0.0300+ 
 (0.0790) (0.0791) (0.0223) (0.0160) 
MarketFirm 0.272** 0.252* -0.0270* 0.0211+ 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.0110) (0.0126) 
FirmSize 0.759*** 0.768*** 0.671*** 0.484*** 
 (0.0380) (0.0342) (0.0260) (0.0102) 
Debt 1.725*** 1.573*** 0.553** 0.230** 
 (0.369) (0.362) (0.202) (0.0890) 
Growth 0.371*** 0.343*** 0.0534* 0.0588* 
 (0.0891) (0.0901) (0.0228) (0.0259) 
Risk -8.270*** -7.945*** -1.313** -1.388*** 
 (1.0131) (1.00821) (0.409) (0.305) 
FreeCashFlow -1.391** -1.457*** -0.488* -0.235* 
 (0.439) (0.440) (0.234) (0.115) 
MarketPerformance -0.242*** -0.219*** -0.0755** -0.0318* 
 (0.0500) (0.0504) (0.0242) (0.0156) 
ExecutiveOwnership -7.706*** -7.0422*** -3.100* -1.270*** 
 (1.433) (1.434) (1.251) (0.217) 
BoardIndependence  1.732**   
  (0.542)   
(lag) BoardSize    0.865*** 
    (0.00713) 
Constant 10.591*** 9.235*** 10.250*** 1.530*** 
 (0.421) (0.611) (0.343) (0.115) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE - - Yes - 
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.206 - 0.812 
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Table 3.12 - Robustness test (Family status of ownership): Board size. 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using the family ownership status indicator. The dependent variable is 
BoardSize representing the total number of directors on board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 for 
family firm, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term 
debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value 
of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month 
period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is 
the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market 
value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by 
CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding 
shares.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
FamilyFirm -0.425* 
 (0.169) 
FirmSize 0.662*** 
 (0.0385) 
Debt 1.256** 
 (0.477) 
Growth 0.475*** 
 (0.111) 
Risk -7.0135*** 
 (1.128) 
FreeCashFlow -1.112+ 
 (0.655) 
MarketPerformance -0.304*** 
 (0.0759) 
ExecutiveOwnership -10.643*** 
 (2.130) 
Constant 10.821*** 
 (0.485) 
Observations 3611 
Industry Effect Yes 
Year Effect Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.176 
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Table 3.13 - Multivariate analysis: Board independence. 
The results of (1) preliminary OLS multivariate, and robustness tests (2) including instrumental variables in OLS 
multivariate analysis, (3) random-effects estimation and (4) dynamic estimation. The dependent variable is 
BoardIndependence representing the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of 
outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; 
MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic 
orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; 
MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of 
total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; ExecutiveOwnership 
is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total 
number of outstanding share; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has 
been in firm’s position; BoardSize is the lagged value of the total numbers of directors on board. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FamilyFirm -0.00710+ -0.00679+ -0.00328+ -0.00261+ 
 (0.00401) (0.00403) (0.00209) (0.00156) 
MarketFirm 0.0102* 0.00949+ 0.00648* 0.00336+ 
 (0.00503) (0.00501) (0.00252) (0.00208) 
FirmSize 0.0116*** 0.00903** 0.0102*** 0.00176** 
 (0.00211) (0.00310) (0.00226) (0.000626) 
Debt 0.0741*** 0.0822*** 0.0279* 0.0133* 
 (0.0193) (0.0201) (0.0136) (0.00610) 
Growth 0.0424*** 0.0411*** 0.0132** 0.0115** 
 (0.00403) (0.00502) (0.00381) (0.00369) 
Risk -0.0952+ -0.129* -0.0506* -0.0597** 
 (0.0501) (0.0530) (0.0253) (0.0211) 
FreeCashFlow 0.0466* 0.0563* 0.0361* 0.0159* 
 (0.0242) (0.0254) (0.0158) (0.00784) 
MarketPerformance  -0.0121*** -0.0113*** -0.00971*** -0.0108*** 
 (0.00310) (0.00311) (0.00212) (0.00113) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.278*** -0.270*** -0.0923+ -0.0651** 
 (0.0744) (0.0780) (0.0561) (0.0217) 
ExecutiveAge -0.000328 -0.000344 -0.000383 -1.70e-06 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000299) (0.000130) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.000636 -0.000552 -4.53e-05 -9.81e-05 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000372) (0.000117) 
BoardSize  0.00323   
  (0.00201)   
(lag) BoardIndependence    0.819*** 
    (0.0112) 
Constant 0.654*** 0.692*** 0.605*** 0.135*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0380) (0.0291) (0.0127) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE - - Yes - 
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.148 - 0.745 
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Table 3.14 - Robustness test (Family status of ownership): Board independence. 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using the family ownership status indicator. The dependent variable is 
BoardIndependence representing the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of 
outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 for family firm, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; 
MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of 
total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; ExecutiveOwnership 
is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total 
number of outstanding share; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has 
been in firm’s positions; BoardSize is the lagged value of the total numbers of directors on board. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
FamilyFirm -0.0698*** 
 (0.0102) 
FirmSize 0.0124*** 
 (0.00301) 
Debt 0.0569* 
 (0.0237) 
Growth 0.0163** 
 (0.00590) 
Risk -0.0400 
 (0.0597) 
FreeCashFlow 0.00573 
 (0.0308) 
MarketPerformance  -0.0105** 
 (0.00303) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.0347 
 (0.108) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00111+ 
 (0.000601) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.000106 
 (0.000611) 
Constant 0.673*** 
 (0.0430) 
Observations 3611 
Industry Effect Yes 
Year Effect Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.221 
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Table 3.15 - Multivariate analysis: Total compensation. 
The results of (1) preliminary OLS multivariate analysis, and robustness tests (2) random-effects estimation and (3) 
dynamic estimation. The dependent variable is TotalComp representing the total compensation as the natural 
logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual salary, bonus, value of stock 
options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other compensation. FamilyFirm is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of 
FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 
presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is 
the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio 
of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by 
firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number 
of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the 
number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; 
ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held 
by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of 
outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares 
outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. 
Lagged values are used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
(1) (2) (3) 
FamilyFirm -0.0555** -0.0324* -0.0230+ 
 (0.0190) (0.0128) (0.0120) 
MarketFirm 0.0706** 0.0209+ 0.0350* 
 (0.0240) (0.0137) (0.0140) 
FirmSize 0.384*** 0.339*** 0.136*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.00903) 
FirmAge 0.0480* 0.0399+ 0.0233* 
 (0.0231) (0.0238) (0.0103) 
Debt 0.197* 0.151* 0.109* 
 (0.0982) (0.0754) (0.0466) 
Growth 0.0727* 0.0595* 0.0807* 
 (0.0320) (0.0244) (0.0362) 
Risk -0.279 -0.448** -0.467** 
 (0.249) (0.167) (0.150) 
MarketPerformance 0.0836*** 0.0510** 0.0345** 
 (0.0241) (0.0171) (0.0114) 
StockPerformance 1.974*** 1.546*** 1.674*** 
 (0.276) (0.235) (0.247) 
Duality 0.0909*** 0.0783*** 0.0462*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0181) (0.0123) 
BoardSize 0.0262** 0.00965 0.0116** 
 (0.00811) (0.00611) (0.00372) 
BoardIndependence 0.349* 0.416*** 0.185** 
 (0.143) (0.0933) (0.0659) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00357+ 0.00677*** 0.00194* 
 (0.00214) (0.00142) (0.000928) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.00324 0.000427 0.000229 
 (0.00202) (0.00169) (0.000981) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.611 -1.080*** -0.289+ 
 (0.380) (0.290) (0.168) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.678*** 0.238** 0.280*** 
 (0.103) (0.0875) (0.0496) 
(lag) TotalComp   0.614*** 
   (0.0188) 
Constant 3.604*** 4.262*** 1.408*** 
 (0.216) (0.183) (0.122) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE - Yes - 
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Adjusted R2 0.657 - 0.786 
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Table 3.16 - Multivariate analysis: Cash compensation. 
The results of (1) preliminary OLS multivariate analysis, and robustness tests (2) random-effects estimation and (3) 
dynamic estimation. The dependent variable is CashComp representing the cash compensation as the natural 
logarithm of one plus the sum of salary and cash bonus. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm 
logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of 
MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the 
number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by 
firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity 
divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period 
preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum 
of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; StockPerformance 
is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman 
positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; 
BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables CashComp 
(1) (2) (3) 
FamilyFirm -0.00208 0.00320 -0.000960 
 (0.0122) (0.00734) (0.00622) 
MarketFirm -0.00166 0.00884 0.00257 
 (0.0151) (0.00923) (0.00830) 
FirmSize 0.182*** 0.172*** 0.0506*** 
 (0.0100) (0.00817) (0.00490) 
FirmAge 0.0184 0.0155 0.00286 
 (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.00605) 
Debt 0.123+ 0.137** 0.0540* 
 (0.0661) (0.0495) (0.0247) 
Growth 0.0158 0.000715 0.00433 
 (0.0234) (0.0177) (0.00969) 
Risk -0.0880 -0.0142 -0.0142 
 (0.163) (0.101) (0.0814) 
MarketPerformance 0.0159 0.00347 0.00816 
 (0.0160) (0.00982) (0.00611) 
StockPerformance 0.397* 0.409** 0.217 
 (0.172) (0.130) (0.143) 
Duality 0.0497** 0.0358*** 0.0165* 
 (0.0181) (0.0108) (0.00669) 
BoardSize 0.0182** 0.0102* 0.00460* 
 (0.00612) (0.00418) (0.00210) 
BoardIndependence -0.264** -0.0919+ -0.0536+ 
 (0.0920) (0.0539) (0.0314) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00514*** 0.00469*** 0.00152** 
 (0.00110) (0.000977) (0.000522) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.000149 0.000491 0.000127 
 (0.00211) (0.00114) (0.000568) 
ExecutiveOwnership 0.0463 0.0243 0.0514 
 (0.300) (0.224) (0.108) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.0974 -0.0387 0.0308 
 (0.0791) (0.0525) (0.0257) 
(lag) CashComp   0.716*** 
   (0.0193) 
Constant 4.688*** 4.863*** 1.351*** 
 (0.146) (0.119) (0.0989) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE - Yes - 
Adjusted R2 0.519 - 0.776 
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Table 3.17 - Multivariate analysis: Equity-based compensation. 
The results of (1) preliminary OLS multivariate analysis, and robustness tests (2) random-effects estimation and (3) 
dynamic estimation. The dependent variable is EquityComp representing a variable pay of the equity-based 
compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant date fair value of option and stock awards. 
FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness 
logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic 
orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural 
logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first 
appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural 
logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the 
firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus 
book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 
otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside 
(independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the 
board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside 
institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ shareholdings 
divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership 
variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
(1) (2) (3) 
FamilyFirm -0.140* -0.0827+ -0.0646* 
 (0.0662) (0.0439) (0.0312) 
MarketFirm 0.0937* 0.0774+ 0.0532+ 
 (0.0761) (0.0439) (0.0297) 
FirmSize 0.550*** 0.520*** 0.229*** 
 (0.0390) (0.0363) (0.0270) 
FirmAge 0.165* 0.128+ 0.0826* 
 (0.0782) (0.0747) (0.0389) 
Debt 0.233* 0.159* 0.169+ 
 (0.0957) (0.0718) (0.0886) 
Growth 0.0525* 0.0683+ 0.0335* 
 (0.0221) (0.0451) (0.0155) 
Risk -0.613 -0.803 -1.025+ 
 (0.746) (0.709) (0.574) 
MarketPerformance 0.147+ 0.122* 0.0828* 
 (0.0810) (0.0538) (0.0420) 
StockPerformance 1.766+ 0.879 2.452** 
 (1.00712) (0.836) (0.884) 
Duality 0.154+ 0.165** 0.0733 
 (0.0880) (0.0640) (0.0469) 
BoardSize 0.0447 0.0116 0.0294* 
 (0.0281) (0.0230) (0.0149) 
BoardIndependence 2.419*** 1.835*** 1.149*** 
 (0.453) (0.351) (0.242) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00419 -0.00256 -9.49e-05 
 (0.00621) (0.00541) (0.00335) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.0152+ -0.00750 -0.00594 
 (0.00801) (0.00730) (0.00414) 
ExecutiveOwnership -2.348+ -5.113** -1.013 
 (1.252) (1.576) (0.676) 
InstitutionalOwnership 1.830*** 1.223*** 0.932*** 
 (0.390) (0.329) (0.218) 
(lag) EquityComp   0.537*** 
   (0.0331) 
Constant 0.831*** 0.209*** -0.386*** 
 (0.764) (0.712) (0.426) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE - Yes - 
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Adjusted R2 0.342 - 0.552 
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Table 3.18 - Multivariate analysis: Bonus. 
The results of (1) preliminary OLS multivariate analysis, and robustness tests (2) random-effects estimation and (3) 
dynamic estimation. The dependent variable is Bonus representing a variable pay as the natural logarithm of one plus 
the sum of cash bonus and non-equity incentives. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic 
orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, 
and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of 
years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total 
assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book 
value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; 
MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and 
market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual 
average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are 
occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; BoardIndependence is 
the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO 
has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares 
held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are used for FirmSize through 
InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables Bonus 
(1) (2) (3) 
FamilyFirm 0.0572 0.0701 0.0292 
 (0.0580) (0.0546) (0.0497) 
MarketFirm 0.157 0.104 0.102 
 (0.0982) (0.0874) (0.0803) 
FirmSize 0.453*** 0.422*** 0.300*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0319) (0.0284) 
FirmAge 0.0138 0.00487 0.00631 
 (0.0660) (0.0657) (0.0499) 
Debt 0.00298 0.198 0.0635 
 (0.253) (0.265) (0.203) 
Growth 0.118 0.0779 0.0325 
 (0.0862) (0.0833) (0.0699) 
Risk -1.976* -1.447+ -1.530* 
 (0.803) (0.766) (0.724) 
MarketPerformance 0.000463 -0.0158 -0.00843 
 (0.0510) (0.0479) (0.0415) 
StockPerformance 12.62*** 11.97*** 9.610*** 
 (1.0801) (1.091) (1.166) 
Duality 0.116+ 0.103+ 0.0921+ 
 (0.0622) (0.0608) (0.0498) 
BoardSize 0.0572* 0.0495* 0.0468** 
 (0.0231) (0.0206) (0.0176) 
BoardIndependence 0.375 0.551+ 0.324 
 (0.358) (0.318) (0.270) 
ExecutiveAge -0.0105* -0.00924+ -0.00698+ 
 (0.00520) (0.00529) (0.00404) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.00540 -0.00397 -0.00422 
 (0.00601) (0.00532) (0.00437) 
ExecutiveOwnership -1.475 -0.957 -1.060 
 (1.281) (1.009) (0.918) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.421 -0.118 0.207 
 (0.312) (0.298) (0.232) 
(lag) Bonus   0.306*** 
   (0.0263) 
Constant 0.718*** 1.369*** 0.653*** 
 (0.622) (0.589) (0.472) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE - Yes - 
Adjusted R2 0.258 - 0.319 
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Table 3.19 - Multivariate analysis: Salary. 
The results of (1) preliminary OLS multivariate analysis, and robustness tests (2) random-effects estimation and (3) 
dynamic estimation. The dependent variable is Salary representing the fixed component of compensation as the 
natural logarithm of one plus (salary) variable in Execucomp. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm 
is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of 
MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the 
number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by 
firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity 
divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period 
preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum 
of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; StockPerformance 
is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman 
positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; 
BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables Salary 
(1) (2) (3) 
FamilyFirm 0.00896 0.00597 0.00203 
 (0.00901) (0.00555) (0.00419) 
MarketFirm 0.00439 -0.00279 0.00246 
 (0.0115) (0.00595) (0.00477) 
FirmSize 0.166*** 0.160*** 0.0351*** 
 (0.00701) (0.00624) (0.00325) 
FirmAge 0.0235+ 0.0373** 0.00445 
 (0.0124) (0.0115) (0.00345) 
Debt 0.102* 0.106** 0.0381* 
 (0.0512) (0.0333) (0.0151) 
Growth 0.0267 0.00200 0.00680 
 (0.0163) (0.0100) (0.00553) 
Risk -0.175 -0.151* -0.00199 
 (0.117) (0.0675) (0.0476) 
MarketPerformance -0.0144 0.00121 -0.000121 
 (0.0145) (0.00606) (0.00403) 
StockPerformance 0.344** 0.399*** 0.363*** 
 (0.115) (0.0790) (0.0789) 
Duality 0.0626*** 0.0355*** 0.0189*** 
 (0.0121) (0.00785) (0.00425) 
BoardSize 0.0159*** 0.00663* 0.00330** 
 (0.00425) (0.00275) (0.00119) 
BoardIndependence -0.115+ 0.0161 -0.00530 
 (0.0673) (0.0391) (0.0193) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00334** 0.00198** 9.54e-05 
 (0.00110) (0.000713) (0.000325) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.0000594 9.47e-05 1.46e-05 
 (0.00120) (0.000862) (0.000324) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.354+ -0.390* -0.0750 
 (0.212) (0.195) (0.0576) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.159** 0.0137 0.0389* 
 (0.0535) (0.0350) (0.0156) 
(lag) Salary   0.777*** 
   (0.0156) 
Constant 4.685*** 4.886*** 1.129*** 
 (0.103) (0.0800) (0.0802) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE  Yes - 
Adjusted R2 0.671 - 0.875 
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Table 3.20 - Robustness test (Family status of ownership): Executive compensation. 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using the family ownership status indicator. The dependent variables are 
Salary representing the fixed component of compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (salary) variable in 
Execucomp; Bonus representing a variable pay as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of cash bonus and non-
equity incentives; EquityComp representing a variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm 
of one plus the sum of grant date fair value of option and stock awards; CashComp representing the cash 
compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of salary and cash bonus; TotalComp representing the 
total compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual 
salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other 
compensation. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 for family firm, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the 
natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first 
appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural 
logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the 
firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus 
book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 
otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside 
(independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the 
board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside 
institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ shareholdings 
divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership 
variables.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp CashComp EquityComp Bonus Salary 
FamilyFirm -0.133** -0.0733 -0.267*** 0.0886 0.0242 
 (0.0485) (0.0603) (0.0711) (0.114) (0.0324) 
FirmSize 0.375*** 0.181 0.528*** 0.140 0.0363 
 (0.0173) (0.130) (0.0511) (0.0912) (0.0237) 
FirmAge 0.0736* 0.00170 0.132* 0.0453 0.0416* 
 (0.0347) (0.0279) (0.0613) (0.0906) (0.0182) 
Debt 0.0891 0.0471 0.244+ 0.217 0.0823 
 (0.130) (0.0852) (0.157) (0.325) (0.0619) 
Growth 0.0728+ 0.00777 0.0422 0.123 0.0329+ 
 (0.0413) (0.0290) (0.159) (0.107) (0.0195) 
Risk -0.127 -0.102 -0.507 -2.0286* -0.0736 
 (0.320) (0.206) (0.798) (0.972) (0.135) 
MarketPerformance 0.0928* 0.00179 0.118 0.0393 -0.0125 
 (0.0378) (0.0234) (0.139) (0.0714) (0.0186) 
StockPerformance 2.0001*** 0.527* 1.364 13.824*** 0.526*** 
 (0.325) (0.209) (1.102) (1.433) (0.139) 
Duality 0.101*** 0.0636** 0.173 0.122 0.0881*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0215) (0.105) (0.0770) (0.0140) 
BoardSize 0.0370*** 0.0218** 0.0525+ 0.0481+ 0.0181*** 
 (0.00981) (0.00752) (0.0285) (0.0269) (0.00490) 
BoardIndependence 0.418* -0.0944 2.0216*** 0.321 -0.0750 
 (0.181) (0.128) (0.513) (0.456) (0.0904) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00449+ 0.00464* -0.00579 -0.0139* 0.00314* 
 (0.00251) (0.00185) (0.00740) (0.00684) (0.00132) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.00209 0.000143 -0.00954 -0.00139 0.000689 
 (0.00291) (0.00202) (0.0108) (0.00752) (0.00146) 
ExecutiveOwnership -1.129* -0.388 -2.775 -4.891* -0.567* 
 (0.550) (0.369) (1.952) (1.926) (0.275) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.607*** 0.0637 1.315* 0.0439 0.175* 
 (0.132) (0.109) (0.522) (0.376) (0.0682) 
Constant 3.428*** 4.627*** 3.171*** 3.567*** 4.667*** 
 (0.299) (0.225) (1.00461) (0.830) (0.135) 
Observations 3621 3621 3621 3621 3621 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.651  0.501 0.348 0.260 0.658 
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4 Corporate Governance Drivers & the Moderating Role of 
Institutional Logics  
4.1 Introduction 
CG presents a standing topic that carries differences among firms. Fundamentally, agency 
theory addresses the importance of firm governance in terms of controlling the potential agency 
conflicts arising from the separation of ownership and management (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). It introduces the means of control in terms of 
internal CG configurations, including the board of directors as the core of CG and executive 
compensation, to manage the potential agency problems between owners and managers. CG 
emphasises an overriding objective of maximising the wealth of shareholders, as the dominant 
stakeholder group, by increasing firm’s financial returns. However, given the various CG 
configurations, CG practices display a remarkable discrepancy among firms in terms of the 
setup of firm governance.  
While economic hypotheses largely explain the implementation of CG in relation to the 
structure of the board of directors and executive compensation design, there remains an 
unexplained idiosyncratic component. Therefore, the CG configurations adopted in firms where 
ownership status (family or not) is emphasised fall short of adequately explaining the 
uniqueness of firm governance practices. Emphasising firm practices and decisions, in this 
study, I direct attention to the notion of ILs – underpinned by institutional theory – as hidden 
drivers of firm behaviour (Friedland and Alford, 1991). ILs form the core of the main societal 
sectors of the context where firms exist and operate, providing the guidance and taken-for-
granted rules of social actions in terms of the prescriptions of appropriate behaviour and means 
to achieve it (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011).  
Institutional research scholars assert that firm practices are tangible manifestation of the 
ILs embedded in firm decision making, implying distinct responses to the demands and 
pressures that firms encounter, given the multiplicity of institutions that society comprises 
(Greenwood et al., 2010; Pache and Santos, 2010). This sheds light on the influence of ILs on 
CG configurations in light of established CG determinants. To the extent that ILs covertly drive 
firm behaviour, and as such, firms vary in making strategic choices and managerial decisions, 
the literature lacks attention to the effect of ILs on the relationship between well-known CG 
determinants and configurations. Given the empirical evidence of the association between ILs 
and CG regarding the firm choice of internal CG configurations – Chapter 3, a question arises 
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regarding whether and how ILs influences the CG determinant-configuration relationships, 
namely the moderating role of ILs.  
The scholars portray ILs as an intangible construct connected to the culture and nature of 
firms (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Danisman et al., 2006), explaining the discrepancy in firm 
behaviour among firms, where firm practices and decisions best manifest the embeddedness of 
ILs in firm decision making (Greenwood et al., 2010). However, ILs have not been measured 
directly or applied to the context CG. Addressing such a gap, in this study, I extend the initial 
argument of the previous chapter, examining whether CG determinant-configuration 
relationships differ according to the ILs embedded in the decision making of firms. Particularly, 
I seek to empirically investigate whether and how ILs affects the effect of CG determinants on 
CG configurations.  
In doing this, I take an important step in terms of using an institutional-based approach to 
identify and classify firms beyond the ownership criteria. Building on the rapidly growing 
notion of SEW in the family business literature (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011a; Berrone et al., 2012; Miller and Le Breton‐Miller, 2014), I group firms as FLDFs and 
MLDFs based on the embeddedness of family and market logics, respectively, as revealed in a 
number of behavioural dimensions in terms of real firm practices apart from family ownership 
status (or not). In contrast to ownership-based studies, I suggest that ownership status (family or 
not) alone is an inadequate indicator for determining whether or not a firm is family-oriented. 
This is because it overlooks the importance of firm behaviour, where it fails to consider real 
firm practices and decisions that demonstrate the firm culture and nature of running a business. 
That is, incorporating the role of ILs regarding the concept of distinction among firms, in this 
study, I rethink of family and non-family firms in terms of firm behaviour beyond the 
conventional understanding and classification of firms. 
Specifically, in this study, I depict FLDFs as a distinct business setting in the sense of a 
family-oriented attitude and preference concerning the priority of SEW preservation, 
overlapping the family and business systems. In contrast, MLDFs present a shareholder-oriented 
business setting, prioritising the primary economic business objective of profitability and 
shareholders’ wealth maximisation in an archetypal business system. In doing this, I put forward 
the firm logic orientations of familiness and marketness, depicting and defining the firm type in 
terms of the logic-based group in relation to the embeddedness of family and market logics by 
which a firm is driven.  
Further, I stress the logic orientation of firms as a moderator of the CG determinant-
configuration relationships. Therefore, in this study, I emphasise the moderating role of firm 
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logic orientation concerning the relationship between established CG determinants and 
configurations, in terms of the structure of the board of directors and execution compensation 
design, as a more subtle and in-depth articulation of firm type – firm logic orientation – in firm 
behaviour. The purpose of this study is to advance the knowledge of ILs and expand the 
understanding of the discrepancy in CG among firms. 
Emphasising the perspective of SEW preservation, the main premises justifying the 
moderating role of firm logic orientation lie in the application of an organismal filter. According 
to Greenwood et al. (2011), external pressures and demands do not affect all firms equally; 
however, they pass through organisational filters enacted by the characteristics of firms 
themselves, namely firm identity. Firm identity affects the interests and priorities, and as such, 
responses of firms to external demands and pressures, which shape the practices and decisions 
that firms undertake, making sense of firm behaviour (Scott and Lane, 2000; Albert and 
Whetten, 2004).  
Therefore, building on the priority of SEW preservation, the identity of FLDFs acts as an 
organisational filter of the CG pressures and demands imposed by the dominant shareholder-
oriented governance practices, where SEW poses the leading aspect of family-oriented identity 
(Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014). Applying the organisational filter of firm identity 
between CG determinants and configurations, FLDFs respond differently to CG determinants 
concerning CG configurations relative to MLDFs, mainly aligning CG practices with SEW-
related interests and concerns irrespective of the prevailing governance system, consistent with 
the CG deviance perspective (Aguilera et al., 2018).  
Moreover, stemming from the ILs perspective, firms encounter institutional complexity, 
given the multiple, typically conflicting logics to which they respond differently in the way that 
best fits them, namely firm response strategy (Greenwood et al., 2011). The response strategy of 
decoupling basically implies that firms implement practices that are best aligned with firm 
interests and goals, mainly separating between the operational and normative structures (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Tilcsik, 2010; Bromley and Powell, 2012). 
Emphasising the SEW preservation perspective, FLDFs carry out practices that most likely 
comply with their interests, goals and preferences in the name of protecting the affective 
endowments of key firm actors, including authority and control, reputation and prestige, job 
security and protection and social ties, attached to the firm.  
Accordingly, adopting decoupling response strategy, FLDFs create a distinction or 
separation between the adopted and standard or prevailing systems concerning CG, where they 
decouple CG configurations from their determinants. That is, responding distinctly to CG 
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determinants regarding CG configurations, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs do not implement the 
predominant governance practices at their operational level; instead, according to Mair et al. 
(2015), they abide by the minimum standards for legitimacy-seeking purposes. Thus, they 
undertake CG practices that align with their priorities, interests and concerns relating to the 
preservation of SEW that collectively reflect their identity.  
Further, stressing the SEW preservation perspective, the non-economic utilities derived 
from the firm self-motivate FLDF managers to willingly serve as self-monitored stewards of the 
business. Given the dual threat that they cope with in terms of bearing both financial and SEW-
related risks and the interdependence of firm’s financial standing and SEW (Berrone et al., 
2012; Miller and Le Breton‐Miller, 2014), the managers of FLDFs possess a substantial 
incentive to protect the firm financially, and in turn, maintain their both financial wealth and 
SEW closely attached to the firm. Therefore, they actively act efficiently and not 
opportunistically, given the competitiveness of managerial labour market and the threat of 
takeover market. This hinders the potential opportunistic behaviour of FLDF managers as the 
loss aversion of current non-economic benefits linked to the firm offsets the pursuit of future 
gains.  
Accordingly, the self-incentivisation of FLDF managers triggers their stewardship and, 
according to van Aaken et al. (2017), self-governance. This underpins the substitution effect of 
SEW for the respective controlling roles of the board of directors and executive compensation 
(Williamson, 1983). Specifically, the importance of the board of directors and executive 
compensation as internal CG configurations, regarding their roles of monitoring and advising, as 
well as managerial motivation and the alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests, 
respectively, is limited in FLDFs where the preservation of SEW is a priority. 
I use samples of 6286 and 6236 firm-year observations from 987 and 971 firms on the 
S&P 1500 index throughout the period of 2006–2016 for the board of directors and executive 
compensation analyses, respectively. Required data are retrieved from various databases, 
including Compustat, Institutional Shareholder Services, Execucomp, Thomson Reuters and 
Centre for Research in Security Prices. Generally, emphasising the relationship between CG 
determinants and configurations, the study finds that the firm logic orientations of familiness 
and marketness have different effects. Overall, considering several constructs of and proxies for 
CG determinants, it reports that the positive effect of CG determinants on board size, board 
independence, total and equity-based compensation is a function of or conditional by the firm 
logic orientation.  
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Specifically, the results indicate that, compared with the marketness logic orientation, the 
familiness of firms mitigates the positive CG determinant-configuration relationships. The study 
applies an interaction empirical setting to provide empirical evidence that, irrespective of 
ownership status (family or not), the logic orientation of firms moderates the effect of well-
known CG determinants, including firm-specific, managerial and governance characteristics, on 
the structure of the board of directors and executive compensation design, addressing the 
moderating role of firm logic orientation.  
Using CG as the focal empirical window, the results give empirical evidence advocating 
the notion of ILs as being hidden drivers of firm behaviour relating to the firm culture and 
nature of running the business. The importance of this study lies in suggesting a distinct view of 
the familiness and marketness of firms, identifying and classifying firms based on the 
embeddedness of family and market logics, which tangibly exhibits in firm practices and 
decisions. In this study, I mainly show how family and market logics play a covert role in 
influencing firm behaviour, and in turn, differentiating among firms, emphasising the CG 
context regarding the internal CG configurations in light of specific CG determinants. Looking 
beyond firm strategies, I particularly shed light on the covert logic-based root; that is, the 
culture and nature of firms, underlying how firms internally configure businesses concerning the 
setup of firm governance, in terms of the structure of the board of directors and executive 
compensation design, to deliver their strategies and goals.  
Given this study, I contribute to the literature of ILs, CG and family business in different 
ways. First, I emphasise, define and operationalise family and market logics. Second, I develop 
and validate a quantitative measurement of the embeddedness of family and market logics, and I 
establish an institutional-based classification of firms, identifying and grouping them as FLDFs, 
hybrid firms or MLDFs beyond the traditional understanding of firm types. Third, I introduce 
the concept of firm logic orientation, particularly the constructs of familiness and marketness, to 
define and depict the embeddedness of family and market logics by which a firm is driven. 
Therefore, I mainly develop an index of the logic orientation of firms based on real firm 
practices and behaviour. Fourth, relative to the existing ownership-based studies, I use a 
different approach to view and determine the familiness and marketness of firms, applying the 
perspective of ILs to identify and classify firms in terms of depicting and differentiating 
between family and non-family firm-like behaviours irrespective of family ownership status (or 
not). 
Fifth, from an empirical perspective, I report a contrast between FLDFs and MLDFs 
concerning the magnitude of CG determinant-configuration relationships, pointing out the 
influence of firm logic orientation on the CG of firms. Sixth, I empirically approve and expand 
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the understanding of the implicit role of ILs – family and market logics – as latent drivers of 
firm behaviour in terms of affecting the setup of firm governance, distinguishing the effect of 
established CG determinants on CG configurations among the logic-based groups of firms. 
Further, in applying the ILs perspective to the context of CG, I thereby provide scholars, 
policymakers and regulators with a distinct explanation for and advance their understanding of 
the discrepancy in CG among firms, helping them better develop future CG research, policies 
and regulators. Lastly, emphasising a different view of the familiness and marketness of firms to 
explain the difference in CG among firms, I consider an array of CG variables of the board and 
executive compensation and several constructs of CG determinants. 
The next sections of this chapter proceed as follows: Section 2 provides the literature 
review and hypothesis development. Descriptions of the data, sample and methodology design 
are provided in Section 3. Section 4 discloses the findings of the empirical tests of hypotheses, 
discusses the results of the multivariate analysis and provides remarks on the robustness checks. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Literature Review & Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 The Substitution Effect of Socioemotional Wealth 
Emphasising the SEW perspective, FLDFs are characterised by the priority of preserving 
the non-economic utilities of key firm actors – owners and managers – as a family-oriented 
attitude and preference in contrast to shareholder-oriented MLDFs. In other words, as a primary 
distinguishing factor, SEW underlies the difference between and classification of FLDFs and 
MLDFs. Stressing the perspective of SEW preservation, FLDFs are governed by the same logic 
of, and in turn, display similar behaviour to family-owned or controlled firms regarding certain 
firm practices and decisions, which are empirically proven to vary between family and non-
family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a; Berrone et al., 2012; Miller and Le Breton‐Miller, 
2014). Importantly, concerning the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs, this is drawn on the 
assumption that SEW is not supposed to be limited to family businesses or members (Miller and 
Le Breton‐Miller, 2014). That is, as Berrone et al. (2010) assert, family ownership or 
membership is not a necessary condition to derive, and as such, prioritise preserving such non-
economic benefits, where both non-family shareholders and managers can possess different 
kinds of SEW attached to the firm. 
As Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) explain, SEW has a multidimensional character that 
captures the non-economic utilities derived from the firm, namely the exercise of authority and 
control, enjoyment of power and influence over the business, satisfaction relating to job security 
and protection, identification with the firm in terms of reputation, prestige and image, and social 
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ties and business networks. Founded on behavioural agency theory, SEW serves as an essential 
reference point for firm’s key actors in relation to making strategic choices and managerial 
decisions, avoiding the potential loss of SEW (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a; Berrone et al., 2012). 
Therefore, drawing on the SEW preservation perspective, the managers of FLDFs refrain 
undertaking firm practices and decisions that expose SEW to risk. This facilitates the protection 
or expansion of their affective endowments as the preservation of SEW presents a vital criterion 
against which the outcomes of strategic choices and managerial decisions are fundamentally 
evaluated.  
Unlike shareholders, managers are undiversified regarding their financial wealth, which is 
tightly tied to their careers that also permit reputation and prestige, job security, authority and 
power and social ties. Accordingly, as Berrone et al. (2012) explain, poor financial performance 
imposes a dual threat to FLDF managers in terms of financial hardship and SEW loss, given the 
competitiveness of managerial labour market and the threat of takeover market. Likewise, given 
the mutual outcomes of firms’ financial and SEW-related goals, the financial status of firms and 
SEW are interdependent as they both yield to each other (Kabbach de Castro et al., 2016; Fitz‐
Koch and Nordqvist, 2017).  
According to Miller and Le Breton‐Miller (2014), although SEW-related objectives are 
generally perceived to contradict the financial objectives of firms, economic and non-economic 
goals can be mixed and attained simultaneously. That is, fulfilling the non-economic objectives 
in the name of preserving the affective endowments of key firm actors contributes to the 
financial performance, and in turn, financial standing of firms, and vice versa. Particularly, 
preserving and extending the non-economic utilities linked to the firm entails, on the part of 
FLDF managers, significant effort to run the business, effectively engaging with firm 
stakeholders and ultimately improving firm competitiveness and survival (Miller and Le Breton-
Miller, 2005; Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012). That is, drawing on the concern 
for SEW preservation, the managers of FLDFs are self-motivated to act efficiently and not 
opportunistically.  
Therefore, given both financial and SEW-related risks that FLDFs bear and the 
interdependence of firm’s financial status and SEW, they have a substantial incentive to actively 
safeguard the firm financially, and consequently, preserve the non-economic utilities derived 
from the firm. In other words, protecting their affective endowments, the managers of FLDFs 
are self-incentivised to voluntarily serve as self-monitored stewards of the business, align their 
interests with those of shareholders and strive for maintaining the business success and 
continuity for a win-win objective of shareholders and managers. Accordingly, this limits the 
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potential opportunistic behaviour of FLDF managers as the loss aversion of current SEW offsets 
the pursuit of future gains.  
Thus, stressing the self-motivation of FLDF managers regarding their stewardship, it is 
contended that SEW itself serves a governance, disciplinary role in FLDFs, substituting for the 
respective controlling roles of internal CG configurations in terms of controlling and 
disciplining managerial behaviour and performance. The core of CG lies in the potential agency 
problem that arises upon the separation of ownership and management, namely the principal-
agent conflict, which is characterised by managerial opportunism that increases agency costs 
(Jensen, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Therefore, for controlling and directing the top management of firms, CG is introduced as 
a means of control to align the interests of managers and shareholders, mitigating the agency 
problem that can otherwise harm firm shareholders’ financial wealth. Drawing on the SEW 
preservation perspective, the self-motivation of the managers of FLDFs implies that the priority 
of protecting or expanding the affective endowments derived from the firm substitutes for the 
internal CG configurations, namely the structure of the board of directors and executive 
compensation design, as it helps restrict the potential managerial opportunism, and in turn, 
mitigate the principal-agent conflict.  
Building on the suggestion of Williamson (1983) on the substitute hypothesis, it is argued 
that SEW has a substitution effect in FLDFs for the respective controlling roles of internal CG 
configurations, limiting their need and necessity. Therefore, in this study, I propose that the 
importance of the board of directors and executive compensation as internal CG configurations, 
in terms of the monitoring and advising roles, as well as the managerial motivation and 
alignment of interests roles, respectively, is less in FLDFs where the preservation of SEW is a 
priority.  
Emphasising the substitution effect in the context of CG, the scholars have addressed the 
substitution effect between internal and external mechanisms of CG (e.g., Desai et al., 2005; 
Bozec and Bozec, 2007; Misangyi and Acharya, 2014), which diminishes the effectiveness and 
necessity of some control configurations. Discussing family businesses, Gnan et al. (2015) 
address the substitution effect of family councils for the role of the board, given the need to 
protect family tangible assets, in terms of financial welfare, and intangible assets, in terms of 
unity, name, reputation and authority. They find that the presence of a family council limits the 
monitoring role played by the board of directors.  
Following the work of Gnan et al. (2015), in this study, I shed light on SEW – a key 
distinguishing factor between FLDFs and MLDFs – in terms of playing a disciplinary role for 
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FLDF managers in accordance with the concern for preserving the non-economic utilities 
attached to the firm. This leaves a little room for internal CG configurations. Emphasising the 
self-motivation of FLDF managers concerning their stewardship, SEW enacts the ‘self-
governance’ of managers, which has a substitution effect (van Aaken et al., 2017). Stemming 
from the family business literature, the scholars assert that self-governance mainly places 
restrictions on managers’ scope of action, particularly handling self-control problems.  
That is, it suggests a self-control regarding a set of self-imposed rules that restrict the 
doer’s self-serving opportunities. Thus, building on the self-governance perspective, the 
affective endowments linked to the firm, including prestige and reputation, job security, social 
ties and business networks and control and authority, prevent the managers of FLDFs from 
behaving opportunistically. Otherwise, self-control problems can emerge that are at odds with 
shareholders’ interests, harming the long-term interests of business, and in turn, threatening the 
SEW of FLDF managers.  
For handling self-control problems, the rules are self-imposed by the managers of FLDFs 
to protect or expand SEW in compliance with the fulfilment of the financial objectives of firms. 
Building on the priority of SEW preservation, FLDF managers are likely to avoid actions that 
expose the derived non-economic utilities to risk, indicating that decision making is far from an 
economic logic. However, given the dual threat that FLDF managers confront, as well as the 
interdependence of firm’s financial status and SEW, both economic and non-economic 
objectives can align for a win-win objective of shareholders and managers. Therefore, the 
decisions of FLDF executives become coherent concerning the competitiveness and survival of 
firms for the best interests of shareholders, mitigating the risk exposure of SEW. This implies a 
self-governance of FLDF managers in the name of SEW preservation. That is, drawing on the 
self-governance perspective, the priority of SEW preservation prompts the self-governance of 
FLDF managers, which substitutes for the respective controlling roles of CG configurations in 
terms of the structure of the board of directors and executive compensation design.   
Specifically, emphasising the substitution effect of SEW, the need for large and 
independent boards and the necessity of high total and incentive-based compensation to control 
and discipline the top management of FLDFs may be diminished. Therefore, it is contended that 
FLDFs are less likely to expand the size and independence of the board or raise the total and 
incentive-based compensation of executives in response to CG determinants compared with 
MLDFs. That is, stressing the logic orientation of firms, it is argued that the positive 
relationship between CG determinants and configurations differs between FLDFs and MLDFs. 
Thus, given the familiness logic orientation of firms, there may be an interplay between CG 
configurations, determinants and the SEW derived from the firm. Particularly, drawing on the 
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substitution effect perspective, in this study, I suggest that the positive relationship between CG 
determinants and configuration is less pronounced in FLDFs relative to MLDFs. That is, given 
the disciplinary role of SEW, FLDFs may restrict the positive CG determinant-configuration 
relationships. 
4.2.2 Organisational Filters  
Given the difference in CG configurations among firms, Aguilera et al. (2018) shed light 
on the concept of ‘CG deviance’ regarding the nonconformity of firm governance practices to 
the dominant governance system that is shareholder-oriented in the US context. Explaining the 
antecedent of the deviance of firm governance, they mainly claim that firm entrepreneurial 
identity helps firms derive some CG discretion that yields to distinct, idiosyncratic firm 
governance practices, drawing on the entrepreneurship and CG literature. According to Ravasi 
and Schultz (2006), Glynn (2008) and Kodeih and Greenwood (2014), this is because firm 
identity determines firm interests and priorities, making sense of firm practices and behaviour.  
Building on the priority of SEW preservation, FLDFs possess a unique, potent firm 
identity in relation to SEW-related interests and goals. Following Greenwood et al. (2011), 
FLDFs’ identity, thereby, implies conditions against, and as such, resistance to the pressures and 
expectations of CG imposed by the prevailing governance practices in the name of protecting 
the non-economic utilities of key firm actors. Thus, such an identity prompts the CG latitude of 
FLDFs, given that SEW portrays the leading feature of family-oriented identity (Berrone et al., 
2012; Cruz et al., 2014). 
Emphasising the perspective of CG deviance (Aguilera et al., 2018), the more CG 
discretion that FLDF’s identity drives, the more likely is their deviance from the prevailing 
governance system. That is, firm identity underpins the distinct CG configurations as evident by 
the difference in the choices of internal CG configurations between FLDFs and MLDFs –
Chapter 3. Integrating the perspectives of SEW preservation and firm identity, the structure of 
the board of directors and the executive compensation plan show to vary as a function of the 
firm type in terms of the logic-based group. Consistent with the CG deviance perspective, this 
suggests deviant CG practices of FLDFs relative to the dominant governance system, which is, 
drawing on the firm theory and market discipline perspectives, more likely obeyed in 
shareholder-oriented MLDFs given the overarching objective of CG concerning shareholders’ 
wealth maximisation. 
Stemming from the ILs perspective, Greenwood et al. (2011) assert that firms encounter 
multiple institutional pressures and demands to which firms expose and respond distinctly as a 
function of firm identity. According to Ravasi and Schultz (2006), firms exhibit different 
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practices as a manifestation of firm identity, which interprets and gives meaning to firm 
behaviour as a sensemaking tool. Similarly, Kodeih and Greenwood (2014) point to the role of 
firm identity in terms of determining what a firm is and what it wishes to become, affecting the 
perceptions of firm opportunities and adopted firm responses to cope with such pressures and 
demands.  
As Greenwood et al. (2011) point out, external pressures and demands do not affect all 
firms equally; however, they pass through organisational filters enacted by the characteristics of 
firms themselves, namely firm identity. Thus, emphasising the firm identity perspective, there 
seems to be a process of filtering the pressures and demands that firms encounter, where firm 
identity serves as an organisational filter, justifying how and why firms behave differently. 
Therefore, incorporating the CG and organisational filter perspectives, it is argued that the 
pressures, demands and expectations of CG are filtered at the firm level by firm identity, 
framing and determining the setup of firm governance.  
Drawing on the perspective of SEW preservation, SEW presents the core family-oriented 
facet that differentiates between FLDFs and MLDFs. Therefore, the SEW preservation provides 
a demonstration of the characterisation and distinction of the identity of FLDFs concerning firm 
interests and priorities. Accordingly, such an identity may impose an organisational filter in 
relation to the CG expectations and demands enforced by the prevailing governance system. 
According to Albert and Whetten (2004) and Scott and Lane (2000), firm identity influences the 
priorities of and responses to external demands, along with the practices and decisions that firms 
undertake.  
This clarifies how firm behaviour complies with firm concerns, goals, interests and 
priorities that collectively present firm identity. Thus, it is contended that the organisational 
filter of firm identity frames how FLDFs fulfil and respond to the pressures and demands of CG 
in accordance with the concern for SEW preservation, filtering the CG demands and 
expectations enforced by the dominant governance system. Therefore, building on the 
organisational filter perspective, in this study, I suggest that the firm response to CG 
determinants regarding CG configurations differs according to the firm type in terms of the 
logic-based group. Accordingly, as empirically proven in the previous chapter, CG 
configurations in terms of the structure of the board of directors and executive compensation 
plan differ between FLDFs and MLDFs. 
Following Aguilera et al. (2018), firm identity feasibly drives the CG discretion of FLDFs 
in relation to resisting the pressures and expectations of CG imposed by the dominant 
governance practices that contradict SEW-related concerns and goals. Stressing the priority of 
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SEW preservation, this results in CG deviance in terms of departing from the prevailing 
shareholder-oriented governance system, where the identity of FLDFs may filter the pressures 
and demands of CG. As such, drawing on the perspective of SEW preservation, in this study, I 
posit that FLDFs apply an organisational filter of a unique, potent firm identity between CG 
determinants and configurations, responding differently to CG determinants regarding CG 
configurations in alignment with the concern for protecting the non-economic benefits of firm’s 
key actors. Thus, stressing the perspective of organisational filter, it is argued that the 
relationship between CG determinants and configurations varies as a function of firm logic 
orientation.  
Particularly, in this study, I propose less pronounced relationship between CG 
determinants and configurations in FLDFs relative to MLDFs. In other words, applying an 
organisation filter between CG determinants and configurations, FLDFs may limit the CG 
determinant-configuration relationships in the name of preserving or extending SEW, refraining 
undertaking CG practices that expose SEW to risk. That is, concerning the structure of the board 
of directors and executive compensation design, it is contended that FLDFs are less likely to 
enlarge the size and independence of the board or increase the total and incentive-based 
compensation in response to CG determinants relative to MLDFs.  
4.2.3 Decoupling Response Strategy  
Stemming from the perspective of ILs, Greenwood et al. (2011) assert that as firms 
experience institutional complexity, they confront multiple and incompatible institutional 
pressures, norms and demands. Specifically, the central logics of the main institutions of society 
in which firms exist and operate impose conflicting demands and pressures in terms of 
practices, norms and values. In this context, firms need to find ways to deal with such demands 
and expectations to obtain legitimacy from key external institutional referents (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991). Conceptually, ILs provide resilient prescriptions and guidance of social actions 
in terms of the taken-for-granted rules of appropriate behaviour and means to achieve it 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). As the incompatibility between ILs increases, firms face more 
challenges and eventually respond in a way that best fits them (Greenwood et al., 2011).  
Regarding firm response strategies, institutional research has largely pointed to 
decoupling as a response strategy, among others, to institutional pressures and demands in the 
context of coexisting and contradictory ILs. Like other response strategies, decoupling basically 
implies that firms implement practices that are best aligned with firm interests and goals (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Bromley and Powell, 2012). Therefore, firms 
adopt a decoupling response strategy particularly when the pressures and demands that they 
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confront contradict their interests and undermine their priorities, where they keep their 
operational structures separate and distinct from the normative structures (Tilcsik, 2010; 
Bromley and Powell, 2012).  
This indicates that firms undertake practices that most likely comply with their interests, 
goals and preferences, creating a distinction or separation between the adopted and standard or 
prevailing systems. In other words, by adopting a decoupling response strategy, firms do not 
implement the predominant practices at their operational level; instead, according to Mair et al. 
(2015), they abide by the minimum standards for legitimacy-seeking purposes. Accordingly, 
consistent with the perspective of the organisational filter of firm identity, by decoupling, firms 
undertake the practices that align with their priorities, interests and concerns that collectively 
present firm identity, filtering and insulating from the demands and pressures that firms 
encounter. As Greenwood et al. (2011) note, emphasising the identity of firms, this indicates 
more conditions towards, and as such, resistance to such demands, expectations and pressures.   
Thus, the adoption of decoupling response strategy aligns with firm identity in relation to 
firm interests and priorities, which initially drive the differences among firms, influencing firm 
practices and decisions. Building on the SEW preservation perspective, it is argued that FLDFs 
separate the implemented and dominant governance practices in accordance with SEW-related 
interests and concerns, where SEW reflects the characterisation and distinction of the identity of 
FLDFs. Drawing on the firm theory and market discipline perspectives, MLDFs are more likely 
to abide by the prevailing shareholder-oriented governance practices, while FLDFs deviate from 
the dominant governance system to the extent that helps protect or extend SEW. In doing so, in 
this study, I propose that FLDFs adopt decoupling response strategy regarding the response of 
CG configurations to their determinants. 
Stressing the concern of for SEW preservation, it can be stated that incompatibility is 
expected regarding the dominant governance practices and SEW-related concerns and goals in 
FLDFs. In other words, the expectations and demands of CG imposed by the prevailing 
governance system may contradict the interest and challenge the priority of FLDFs concerning 
preserving the affective endowments of key firm actors, including authority and control, 
reputation and prestige, job security and protection and social ties, attached to the firm. 
Therefore, stemming from the perspective of SEW preservation, it is contended that FLDFs 
respond to the pressures and expectations of CG in a way that best fits them by adopting a 
decoupling response strategy, where they depart from the dominant governance practices if 
these contradict firm priorities and interests regarding the preservation of SEW.  
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Specifically, in this study, I suggest that FLDFs adopt decoupling response strategy to the 
pressures and demands of CG imposed by the prevailing governance system, separating 
between CG determinants and configurations, where they implement CG practices that best 
align with SEW-related interests and goals. Accordingly, the adoption of decoupling response 
strategy to CG demands and expectations enforced by the dominant governance system suggests 
deviant, idiosyncratic CG practices of FLDFs. Emphasising the concern for SEW preservation, 
they may isolate themselves from the CG pressures and demands imposed by the prevailing 
shareholder-oriented governance practices that conflict with SEW-related concerns and goals to 
fulfil firm interests and priorities, in line with the CG deviance perspective (Aguilera et al., 
2018). Particularly, adopting a decoupling response strategy, FLDFs may restrain the CG 
determinant-configuration relationships in the name of protecting or expanding SEW, 
decoupling CG configurations from their determinants.  
 Therefore, in this study, I propose that, the relationship between CG determinants and 
configurations differs according to firm logic orientation, where, by decoupling, FLDFs respond 
distinctly to CG determinants concerning CG configurations in compliance with the priority of 
preserving the non-economic utilities of key firm actors, avoiding implementing CG practices 
that threaten SEW. Emphasising the response strategy of decoupling, it is argued that the CG 
determinant-configuration relationships are less pronounced in FLDFs relative to MLDFs. 
Therefore, in this study, I posit that FLDFs are less likely to increase the size and independence 
of the boards or raise the total and incentive-based compensation of executives in response to 
CG determinants compared with MLDFs. 
4.2.4 Corporate Governance Drivers  
4.2.4.1 The Board of Directors 
A key aspect of firm governance is the structure of the board of directors, which is 
explained based on efficiency and power, mainly following the arguments of firm operations 
complexity, monitoring and advising benefits and costs and managerial entrenchment (e.g., 
Boone et al., 2007; Guest, 2008). Boone et al. (2007) assert that board size and independence 
vary among firms as a function of firm-specific and managerial characteristics. Drawing on 
agency theory, the board of directors presents an internal control configuration that primarily 
serves the functions of monitoring and advising top managers, where the directors on the board 
are elected by firm shareholders – the dominant stakeholder group – to act on their behalf 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In this way, the board of directors monitors, advises, evaluates, 
controls and disciplines managerial behaviour and performance, ensuring the best interests of 
shareholders.  
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The advising function of the board lies in providing top management with expertise, 
advice, direction, information and access to resources, both financial and human capital in terms 
of social ties and business networks, mandatory to run the business. As such, controlling for the 
potential free-rider problem, larger boards introduce a variety of skills, minds, senses, expertise, 
shared efforts and channels that enrich the advising role for the benefit of firms, improving the 
board efficiency and power. Further, emphasising the efficiency of the board, independent 
directors are particularly perceived to serve the advising role of the board more efficiently as 
being financially and emotionally independent of the firm. They provide managers with 
presumably objective advice and direction, essential expertise and business networks (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Therefore, according to Guest (2008), as larger number of directors and higher 
percentage of independent directors on the board enhance the board advising role regarding 
directing, assessing, controlling and disciplining managerial behaviour and performance, both 
board size and independence increase as the need for advice and expertise increases.  
Lehn et al. (2009) assert that such need raises as the complexity of firm operations 
increases. In accordance with this, Coles et al. (2008) note that more complex firm operations 
require larger boards in terms of the senses, competency, minds and experience of directors on 
the board. Therefore, they advise, evaluate, control and discipline top management and bring in 
specialised skills and knowledge to fulfil the demands and challenges associated with firm 
operations complexity. Moreover, building on the perception of outside directors’ competency, 
Anderson et al. (2000) and Coles et al. (2008) explain that firm operations complexity gives rise 
to severe agency conflicts, demanding considerable monitoring of managerial behaviour and 
performance. This implies an effect on the board composition in terms of a higher proportion of 
independent directors on the board. Most of the vast existing studies have found that board size 
and independence are positively related to the measures of firm operations complexity, such as 
firm size, firm risk, growth opportunities and the capital structure of debt (e.g., Baker and 
Gompers, 2003; Berry et al., 2006; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 2009).  
The monitoring function of the board is about monitoring the behaviour and performance 
of top management and maintaining the alignment of managers’ interests with those of 
shareholders to ensure their best interests. Unlike inside directors, outside directors are 
presumed to perform the monitoring role of the board more effectively and objectively due to 
being financially and emotionally independent of the firm. Stressing the board efficiency, they 
act as a watchdog to mitigate the potential managerial opportunism and align the interests of 
both managers and shareholders, delivering effective monitoring competence and experience 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). In addition, controlling for the potential problem of free riders, larger 
boards represent wider oversight of top management in relation to more skills, minds, 
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competency and senses on the board, enhancing the efficiency and power of the board. 
According to Anderson et al. (2004) and Williams et al. (2005), board size is positively related 
to board monitoring effectiveness.   
Because of greater shared effort, competency, senses, skills, expertise and channels, 
larger number of directors and higher representation of independent directors on the board 
improve the board monitoring role concerning supervising, evaluating, controlling and 
disciplining managerial behaviour and performance (Lehn et al., 2009). Raheja (2005) states 
that the benefits of monitoring indicate the extent and effectiveness of the monitoring function 
of the board, determining both board size and independence. Specifically, as the benefits of 
monitoring and advising increase, the boards will need to oversee top management more closely 
and effectively to control and discipline the potential opportunistic behaviour of managers. 
Therefore, board size and independence are positively related to monitoring and advising 
benefits, in a trade-off between the benefits and costs of appointing a new board director (Boone 
et al., 2007). According to Guest (2008), drawing on the potential managerial opportunism 
related to rent-seeking activities, the benefits of monitoring increase as the potential managers; 
private benefits increase at the expense of shareholders.  
Empirical studies widely use free cashflows to indicate the potential private benefits of 
managers as a proximal measure of the monitoring and advising benefits. Jensen (1986) 
provides the rationale for free cashflows as incentivising managers to derive private benefits and 
expropriate shareholders’ wealth as a rent-seeking activity, instead of acting in the best interests 
of shareholders, giving rise to an agency conflict between managers and shareholders. The 
extant studies have found that board size and independence are positively related to the potential 
private benefit of managers as a measure of monitoring and advising benefits (e.g., Baker and 
Gompers, 2003; Berry et al., 2006; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008).   
4.2.4.2 Executive Compensation 
Another essential firm governance aspect is the design of executive compensation, which 
is primarily aimed at motivating top managers and aligning their interests with those of 
shareholders. Due to the separation between management and ownership, the potential of 
managerial opportunism arises in terms of deriving private benefits – both economic and non-
economic – from controlling business resources and decisions at the cost of shareholders, 
jeopardising the fundamental duty of top management regarding acting in the best interests of 
shareholders (Chalmers et al., 2006). Particularly, given their undiversified financial wealth in 
comparison with shareholders, executives are presumed to behave opportunistically, pursuing 
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both financial and non-financial benefits at the expense of shareholders in a self-serving manner 
unless they are controlled. 
Therefore, agency theory suggests the enforcement of executive compensation contracts 
as an internal control configuration to motivate, control and discipline managerial behaviour and 
performance. Thus, emphasising the contractual relationship between managers and 
shareholders, top executives are incentivised to make an effective effort to maximise 
shareholders’ wealth, providing shareholders with outstanding and stable returns for which 
executives are rewarded in the form of compensation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) assert that executive compensation contracts, as such, present a means of 
mitigating the potential dysfunctional and opportunistic behaviour of managers, aligning the 
interests of both managers and shareholders. 
Emphasising the perspective of managerial opportunism, executive compensation aims to 
impose a substantial incentive for outstanding managerial performance and – by extension – 
considerable discipline for inferior performance of managers; it also yields a dismissal threat, 
controlling and disciplining managerial behaviour and performance. Thus, given the 
competitiveness of managerial labour market and the takeover market threat, this primarily 
motivates top management and prompts the alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests. 
As executive compensation components differ regarding their incentive implications (Chalmers 
et al., 2006), the measures of executive compensation exhibit heterogeneous patterns among and 
within firms. Extensive research has examined the determinants of the design of executive 
compensation, attributing its variations to firm-specific economic attributes, governance and 
managerial characteristics.  
Regarding the economic attributes of firms, the firm-specific characteristics, such as firm 
size, firm age, firm risk, the capital structure of debt and growth opportunities, indicate the 
scope of firm business that is positively related to the level of executive compensation and 
affects its form (Elloumi and Gueyie, 2001; Boschen et al., 2003). Greater economic attributes 
of firms reflect wider scope of firm business, imposing more demands and challenges that 
managers cope with. Accordingly, as the scope of firm business widens, firms tend to motivate, 
control and discipline top managers by offering higher total and incentive-based compensation, 
such as equity-based compensation, coupling managerial performance and pay. 
However, wider firm business scope entails more qualified and experienced executives 
who, in return, demand higher or lower managerial remuneration based on its form in order to 
be attracted and retained. Therefore, stressing the managerial power, influence and seniority 
perspective, greater expertise, tenure and skills of managers denote managerial entrenchment in 
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terms of the bargaining and negotiation power of managers over the design of executive 
compensation (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). As such, given the managerial labour 
market competitiveness and the threat of takeover market, managers can expropriate private 
benefits at the cost of shareholders via managerial remuneration. Emphasising the managerial 
characteristics, this implies that firms pay managers higher total compensation, but lower 
incentive-based compensation, perhaps more than optimal executive compensation.  
For a complete executive compensation model, Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia (2002) 
incorporate the behavioural dimension of power possessed by managers in a competitive 
managerial labour market and the managerial risk-averseness to empirically test managerial 
remuneration. Specifically, they assert that the managerial entrenchment presents a power base 
for executives. Emphasising the managerial characteristics, as the tenure and experience of 
executives extends, they become more entrenched in the firm in terms of managerial control, 
power and seniority, and in turn, their interests and preferences are more likely satisfied.  
In addition, greater managerial expertise, talent and skills help legitimise the negotiation 
discretion of managers over the board decisions on executive compensation, exerting 
managerial power that probably results in total compensation beyond what is optimal and higher 
fixed, secure pay. Particularly, the ability of managers as perceived by firm performance entitles 
them to derive an extent of bargaining power that they willingly exercise over firm resources 
and decisions to attain self-interests. Thus, stressing the managerial entrenchment perspective, 
executives can practise influence and control over both the level and form of executive 
compensation. Supporting this, Amoako-Adu et al. (2011) and Bebchuk et al. (2002) assert that 
top managers take advantage of the bargaining power, managerial control and seniority in the 
firm derived from the managerial characteristics in terms of determining their remuneration, 
implying a rent extraction via excess executive compensation. 
Concerning the governance characteristics, the board of directors plays a key role in 
controlling the contractual relationship between the top managers and shareholders of firms 
regarding executive compensation contracts, where the compensation committee of the board is 
in charge of the decisions on the design of executive compensation. Stressing the effectiveness 
of the board structure, effective boards in terms of higher board independence – a lower 
proportion of insider or affiliate directors on the board – indicate stronger CG. Higher 
percentage of outside directors on the board improves the monitoring and advising roles of the 
board in relation to supervising, directing, assessing, controlling and disciplining managerial 
behaviour and performance, limiting the managerial power that managers exert.  
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Thus, incentive-based compensation, such as equity-based compensation, is used more 
extensively in firms appointing more independent boards, effectively coupling the performance 
and pay of managers (Mehran, 1995). Therefore, this basically restricts the potential managerial 
opportunism in terms of weakening the managerial entrenchment relating to managerial control, 
influence and seniority in the firm, as well as bargaining power (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-
Mejia, 2002). Accordingly, managers are impeded from both maintaining relaxed linkage 
between managerial performance and pay, and obtaining managerial remuneration in excess of 
optimal executive compensation, which, as such, alleviates the rent-seeking activities of 
managers at the expense of shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 2002).  
In contrast, ineffective boards are associated with higher (less) total (incentive-based) 
compensation of managers. Specifically, weak CG gives top executives an extent of latitude to 
exert power and practise control that serve their self-interests and private benefits regarding the 
design of executive compensation (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). The 
ineffectiveness of the board affects the executive compensation components in terms of 
decoupling managerial performance and pay, given that managers are undiversified and risk-
averse agents of the firm. Emphasising the ineffectiveness of the board structure, Grabke-
Rundell and Gomez-Mejia (2002) assert that managers derive power and discretion with which 
they more effectively can bargain over variable incentive pay. Given the competitiveness of 
managerial labour market and the market for takeover threat, they favour lax linkage between 
managerial performance and pay, protecting themselves for bearing the full risk in accordance 
with their risk-averseness. 
Stressing several well-known CG determinants, it is contended that the relationship 
between CG determinants and configurations in terms of the structure of the board of directors 
and executive compensation design differs as a function of the logic orientation of firms, 
stemming from the perspective of SEW preservation that underlies family logic in the sense of a 
family-oriented attitude and preference. That is, in this study, I extend the initial argument of the 
previous chapter on the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs in the choices of internal CG 
configurations to further suggest a moderating role of firm logic orientation concerning the CG 
determinant-configuration relationships, as a more subtle and in-depth manifestation of firm 
type – the logic orientation of firms – in firm behaviour. Building on the literature above, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: Relative to the marketness logic orientation, the familiness of firms mitigates the 
positive effect of firm-specific, managerial and governance characteristics on CG 
configurations. 
Figure 4.1 encapsulates the conceptual framework of the study.  
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4.3 Data & Methodology Design  
4.3.1 Sample Selection & Data Description  
The same samples are used as in the previous chapter. The board of directors analysis 
sample is comprised of 6286 firm-year observations from 987 firms and the sample of the 
executive compensation analysis is comprised of 6236 firm-year observations from 971 firms in 
the period of 2006–2016. The mandatory financial, board, executive compensation, institutional 
holdings and stock data are obtained from the databases of Compustat (Fundamentals Annual), 
Institutional Shareholder Services (Directors and Directors Legacy), Execucomp (Annual 
Compensation), Thomson Reuters (Institutional 13f Holdings) and the Centre for Research in 
Security Prices (Monthly Stock Files), respectively. I exclude firms with fewer than three board 
directors to eliminate the likely data entry errors, and firms with fewer than three executives as 
an indicative number of firm-level compensation. Also, I include firms for which the complete 
data are available for a minimum of two years. Further, I exclude firms operating in the public 
utilities and financial services sectors that are subject to distinct regulations (SIC code: 4900-
4999 and 6000-6999, respectively).  
4.3.2 Variables Construction  
4.3.2.1  Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables fall into two categories of CG configurations: (1) the board of 
directors structure, and (2) executive compensation design. The variables are measured in the 
traditional way as in the extant literature of CG. For the construction of board and compensation 
variables, I follow Boone et al. (2007), Chen and Al-Najjar (2012), Guest (2008) and Linck et 
al. (2008), and Cheng et al. (2015), Conyon (2014), Focke et al. (2017) and Lin et al. (2013), 
respectively.   
 The Board of Directors Structure 
The structure of the board of directors is analysed using two variables: (1) board size, and 
(2) board independence. Data of the board are retrieved from the Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) database. Board size (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) is defined as the total number of directors on 
the board of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Board independence (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) is calculated as the 
percentage of outside (independent) directors, as flagged on ISS, on the board of directors of 
firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 as the number of independent directors divided by board size.   
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 Executive Compensation Design 
The design of executive compensation is analysed stressing two main compensation 
measures: (1) total compensation and (2) equity-based compensation. Executive compensation 
data are obtained from Execucomp database where the firm-level compensation variables are 
computed based on the annual average compensation of the top-three paid executives of firm 𝑖 
in year 𝑡 regarding total compensation.  
To minimise the effect of outliers, I log transform each compensation variable in the form 
of Ln(1+ ‘Compensation variable(s)’ in Execucomp) in the regression analysis. Total 
compensation (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝) is the natural logarithm of one plus ‘tdc1’ variable in Execucomp 
which represents the sum of annual salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock 
granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other compensation. Equity-based compensation 
(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝) is a variable incentive pay calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
sum of grant date fair value of option ‘option_awards_fv’ and stock awards ‘stock_awards_fv’.  
4.3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Stemming from the range of control variables known to affect CG configurations and 
integrated in the analysis of the previous chapter concerning the firm choice of CG 
configurations, the independent variable of interest is the interaction term of firm logic 
orientation – familiness and marketness – and the proximal measure of each CG determinant of 
concern, stressing the contrast particularly between FLDFs and MLDFs regarding a number of 
well-known CG determinant-configuration relationships. Incorporating such interaction mainly 
addresses the moderation effect of firm logic orientation on the relationship between CG 
determinants and configurations, extending the argument of the main effect of firm logic 
orientation on the firm choice of CG configurations.  
Regarding CG determinants, I use different variables to proxy for a set of structural 
constructs that are documented in the literature as established drivers of CG whose effect on CG 
configurations, in terms of the board of directors structure and executive compensation design, I 
expect to vary as a function of firm logic orientation. I mainly use multiple proxies for single 
structural constructs, alleviating the attenuation bias that results from the potential measurement 
error in proxied variables (Boone et al., 2007; Guest, 2008; Linck et al., 2008). Concerning the 
complexity of firm operations and the scope of firm business, I use the firm-specific 
characteristics of firm size (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), the natural logarithm of firm’s sale; firm age 
(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒), the natural logarithm of the number of years a firm has been listen on CRSP; 
capital structure (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡), the debt financing of firm measured by the ratio of long-term debt to 
firm’s total assets; growth opportunities (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ), the natural logarithm of the market-to-book 
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ratio as the market value of equity divided by book value of equity; and firm risk (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘), the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the 12-month period preceding year end.  
Regarding the monitoring and advising benefits, I emphasise managers’ potential private 
benefits using the measure of free cashflow (𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤) as the cash holdings divided by 
firm’s total assets. Concerning the governance characteristics, I stress the effectiveness of the 
board structure using board size (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), the total number of directors on the board; and 
board independence (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒), the percentage of outside directors on the board as 
the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on board. Regarding the 
managerial characteristics, I stress the managerial entrenchment in terms of managerial 
influence, power and seniority in firm using CEO age (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒) and tenure 
(𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒), the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; and CEO 
bargaining power using the perceived ability of CEO in terms of firm performance, measured by 
the stock-based performance measure of the annual average stock return (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) 
and the market-based performance measure of Tobin’s Q value as the sum of total assets and 
market value of equity mins book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets 
(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒).  
To gain insight about the moderation effect of firm logic orientation on the relationship 
between CG determinants and configurations, I use two dichotomous variables of firm type, in 
terms of logic-based group, as moderators or conditioning variables, capturing the firm logic 
orientations of familiness and marketness against other logic orientations separately. According 
to the developed logic orientation index, firms are classified in the first, presenting the 
familiness logic orientation of firms; second, presenting the hybrid logic orientation of firms; or 
third, presenting the marketness logic orientation of firms, logic-based group of FLDFs, hybrid 
firms and MLDFs, respectively.  
Therefore, building on the logic orientation index, the first moderator (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) is 
an indicator variables that equals 1 for the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 
otherwise – hybrid firms and MLDFs, and the second moderator (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 for the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise – hybrid 
firms and FLDFs, to simplify the structure of data and results interpretation. As hybrid firms 
exhibit an overlap between familiness and marketness regarding firm practices and behaviour, 
they represent a grey area between FLDFs and MLDFs. Thereby, they are basically thought 
neutral in terms of firm logic orientation as they do not have strongly marked practices. In turn, 
I stress the contrast particularly between the extreme logic-based groups of FLDFs and MLDFs. 
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4.3.3 Empirical Methodology & Model Specification 
I primarily investigate the influence of ILs concerning the moderation effect of firm logic 
orientation on, namely the magnitude of, the relationship between CG determinants and 
configurations, emphasising the contrast primarily between FLDFs and MLDFs. The analysis 
mainly goes into two steps. First, an interaction empirical setting of multiple regression analysis 
that tests the presence of interaction, the moderation effect of firm logic orientation. Second, a 
post-hoc probing analysis of the significant interaction. 
4.3.3.1 Testing Presence of Interaction 
Testing H1, I incorporate family and market logics as moderators or conditioning 
variables in terms of firm logic orientation, both familiness and marketness, respectively, to 
examine whether a moderation effect presents regarding the relationship between well-known 
CG determinants and configurations. Namely, the study focuses on whether the effect of a given 
CG determinant on a specific CG configuration is a function of the firm type in terms of the 
logic-based group; MLDFs or FLDFs. By definition, the moderator of firm logic orientation 
specifies the conditions under which a predictor of CG determinant is related to an outcome of 
CG configuration. As such, apart from the traditional split of family and non-family firms, the 
familiness and marketness logic orientations of firms represent two different conditions under 
which a given CG determinant-configuration relationship is analysed. Therefore, I empirically 
test whether and how FLDFs and MLDFs differ regarding the effect of a number of CG 
determinants on CG configurations in an empirical setting of interactions.  
Following Holmbeck (1997) concerning the strategy of testing the interaction, I first test 
for the presence of a moderation effect of firm logic orientation within a multiple regression. 
Specifically, I examine whether the interaction term of firm logic orientation and the CG 
determinant variable – a moderator and an independent variable – is a statistically significant 
predictor of the CG configuration of concern, after controlling for the effect of both variables of 
interaction and other control variables documented in the literature. Therefore, using the 
multiple regression approach (Holmbeck, 1997), I analyse the significance of the moderation 
effect of firm logic orientation – familiness and marketness – on the CG determinant-
configuration relationships by estimating the following baseline regression models using the 
pooled samples and ordinary least-squares (OLS) method in the preliminary analysis.  
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1
+  𝛽3 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀                                                                       
 
(1) 
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𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡.𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 ×  𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
(2) 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
(3) 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 ×  𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀 
 
(4) 
In models (1) and (2), the dependent variable 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 represents the structure of the 
board of directors in terms of board size (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡) and board independence 
(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡). In models (3) and (4), the dependent variable 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 
represents the design of executive compensation in terms of total (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡) and equity-
based compensation (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡).  
Testing H1, I emphasise the contrast particularly between FLDFs and MLDFs regarding 
the moderation effect of the logic orientation of firms – familiness and marketness – on the 
relationship between CG determinants and configurations. To simplify the structure of data and 
results interpretation, I employ two different interaction models, separately capturing the firm 
logic orientations of familiness (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) and marketness (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) against other 
logic orientations in models (1) and (3) and models (2) and (4), respectively.  
That is, testing for the presence of a moderation effect of firm logic orientation in the 
multiple regression in terms of a statistically significant interaction term, I examine each of the 
logic orientations of firms separately and, as such, compare them indirectly. Unlike the 
empirical setting of analysis of the first chapter that emphasises the main effect of firm logic 
orientation on the firm choice of CG configurations by, namely looking at the intercepts of 
models, models (1-4) include interaction terms to address the difference in the effect; simple 
slope, of CG determinants on CG configurations as a function of firm type in terms of the logic-
based group.  
That is, apart from the main effect of firm logic orientation, I shed light on the 
moderation effect of firm logic orientations of familiness and marketness, expecting a different 
relationship between certain CG determinant and configuration as a function of the logic 
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orientation of firm. Specifically, in models (1-4), the moderators of familiness and marketness; 
indicator variables that equal 1 for the corresponding firm logic orientation, and 0 otherwise, are 
separately interacted with the focal variable proxying for the CG determinant of interest 
(𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1)
7 in an interaction term which is the main predictor of the corresponding 
CG configuration.  
Specifically, the interaction term is the product of marketness or familiness indicator and 
the continuous variable of CG determinant, stressing the difference in CG determinant-
configuration relationships among the logic-based groups of firms. In an interaction empirical 
setting, the CG determinant variable is mean-centred putting the observations of a variable into 
deviation observation form by simply subtracting the industry-year mean from all firms’ 
observations of the variable (Holmbeck, 2002). According to the computation of interaction, the 
main effects are highly correlated with the interaction term, so mean-centring mitigates the 
potential problematic multicollinearity between the first-term predictors and any higher order 
interaction terms among them and facilitates testing the simple slopes (Aiken et al., 1991; 
Holmbeck, 1997; Holmbeck, 2002). Further, following the literature, the CG determinant 
variable is lagged one year, as appropriate, to mitigate the reverse effect of the corresponding 
CG configuration as an issue of potential endogeneity, assuming weakly exogenous variables. 
Mainly, given the logic orientation of firms, I analyse the effect of a number of well-
known CG determinants (𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1) on CG configurations in terms of the board of 
directors structure and executive compensation design, stemming from the range of control 
variables integrated in the analysis of the firm choice of CG configurations in the first empirical 
chapter. Regarding board size and independence in models (1) and (2), respectively, I primarily 
look at the effect of different aspects concerning (1) firm operations complexity, proxied by 
firm size, risk, growth opportunities and the capital structure of debt; and (2) monitoring and 
advising benefits, proxied by the potential private benefits of managers.  
Concerning total and equity-based compensation in models (3) and (4), I mainly examine 
the effect of (1) the scope of firm business, proxied by firm size, age, risk, the capital structure 
of debt and growth opportunities; (2) the governance characteristics regarding the effectiveness 
of the board structure, proxied by board size and board independence; and (3) the managerial 
characteristics in terms of managerial entrenchment, proxied by CEO age, tenure and perceived 
 
7 Following the literature regarding the well-known models of the board of directors and executive 
compensation analysis, I use the current value (𝑡) or lagged value (𝑡 − 1) of the focal variable 
accordingly. 
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ability in terms of firm performance. As outlined above, regarding CG determinants, I employ 
different proximal measures widely used in the literature. 
As introduced in the previous chapter, I add to the models a range of control variables 
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1) that have been addressed in the literature to impact the CG configurations of 
the board of directors and executive compensation, including firm-specific, managerial, 
ownership and governance characteristics. Mainly, the control variables represent the proximal 
measures of multiple structural constructs – CG drivers – other than the focal variable being 
tested. To reduce the concern of endogeneity relating to reverse causality, the lag value of 
variables is appropriately used following the literature. Using year and industry dummies, I also 
control respectively for the systematic time effects and industry fixed effects using Fama and 
French (1997) 30-industry classification to control for endogeneity concerns. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to lower the effect of influential outliers. 
Throughout the regression analysis, the standard errors are robust, and the observations are 
clustered by firm’s gvkey to control for serial correlation.  
4.3.3.2 Post-hoc Probing of Significant Interaction 
According to Holmbeck (2002), a statistically significant interaction indicates a 
significant moderation effect, that is, a given relationship between CG determinant and 
configuration is significantly different among the logic-based groups of firms denoted by the 
moderator or conditioning variable. Therefore, the CG determinant-configuration relationship is 
a function of or conditional by firm logic orientation, thereby, it significantly differs between 
the first and comparable logic-based groups of firms. However, as explained by Holmbeck 
(2002), the significance of interaction tells nothing about the significance of the individual 
simple slopes; singificant difference from zero, that respresent the relationship between CG 
determinant and configuration given the logic orientation of firms.  
In other words, the initial significant moderation effect does not provide information on 
whether the CG determinant-configuration relationship is significant for the first logic-based 
group of firms, the comparable logic-based group of firms, both or none of the opposing logic-
based groups of firms of the moderator or conditioning variable. Via the computation of simple 
slopes with statistical tests, the post-hoc probing analysis of significant moderation effects 
provides information on the specific conditions where a specific relationship significantly holds 
to prevent leading the scholars to false-positive results (Holmbeck, 2002). Therefore, using a 
simple slope test, I determine whether a given CG determinant-configuration relationship, 
initially observed to vary among the logic-based groups of firms of the moderator, is significant 
for one, both or none of of the opposing logic-based groups of firms. 
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Following Holmbeck (2002), to conduct a post-hoc probe of the significant moderation 
effects, I go through a sequential process. First, for each original moderator – familiness 
(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) and marketness (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) – I create two new conditional moderator 
variables – 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, and 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 
and 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, respectively – to run two separate post-hoc regressions. 
Specifically, as detailed below, one logic-based group of firms is assigned a value of 0 in one 
regression and the other logic-based group of firms is assigned a value of 0 in the other 
regression, upholding that one group is always higher than the other when running both 
regressions.  
For the familiness moderator (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡, 1 for FLDFs and 0 otherwise): 
▪ 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 (values are equivalent to the original 
moderator; 0 for other firms and 1 for FLDFs). 
▪ 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 – 1 (values are -1 for other firms and 0 
for FLDFs). 
For the marketness moderator (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡, 1 for MLDFs and 0 otherwise): 
▪ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 (values are equivalent to the original 
moderator; 0 for other firms and 1 for MLDFs). 
▪ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 – 1 (values are -1 for other firms and 
0 for MLDFs). 
 
Second, I compute new interactions incorporating each of the new conditional modertor 
variables above. Note that the continuous independent variables are mean-centred before 
conducting any regression analysis. 
▪ For the familiness new conditional moderator variables, I compute below 
interactions: 
• 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 
• 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 
▪ For the marketness new conditional moderator variables, I compute below 
interactions: 
• 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 
• 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 
Third, using the above new conditional moderator variables and interactions, I run two 
post-hoc regressions, one for each of the two new conditional moderator variables of familiness 
and marketness, to test the significance of the simple slope for each category – the logic-based 
group of firms – of the original moderators. Specifically, running the post-hoc regressions, I 
generate the individual simple slopes, representing the relationship between CG determinant and 
configuration, for the (1) FLDFs category, (2) other firms category of hybrid firms and MLDFs, 
(3) MLDFs category and (4) other firms category of hybrid firms and FLDFs. Basically, 
stemming from models (1) through (4), in each post-hoc regression model, I enter 
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simultaneously the main effect of CG determinant variable, one new conditional moderator 
variable and the interaction among them, controlling for the year and industry fixed effects, as 
shown in models (1.1) through (4.2).  
This, in turn, generates logic-based group-specific regression models. Holmbeck (2002) 
further explains that substitsuting a value of 0 for the new conditional moderator variable in 
each regression model, for both main effect and interaction term, keeps only the coeffiecient of 
the predictor variable of concern, namely the CG determinant variable, and the intercept of 
regression model. Interestingly, plugging in a value of 0, the coefficient on CG determinant 
variable is the simple slope of the regression line representing the relationship – I test for its 
significance – between the CG determinant and configuration for a signle category, which is a 
logic-based group(s) of firms, of the original moderatorfor which the value is 0 and is, as such, 
represented by an individual post-hoc regression model in the following form (Holmbeck, 
2002). 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1
+  𝛽3 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡  × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀                                                                                            
 
(1.1) 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡  × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀                                                                                            
 
(1.2) 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡  × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀  
 
(2.1) 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡  × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀                                                                                            
 
(2.2) 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡  × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
(3.1) 
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𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡  × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
(3.2) 
  
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡  × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀                                                   
 
(4.1) 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡  × 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
(4.2) 
 
4.4 Empirical Results & Discussion 
4.4.1 Main Analysis: Multivariate & Post-hoc Regressions 
4.4.1.1 The Board of Directors  
Regarding the CG configuration of the board of directors, several individual empirical 
tests are performed in an interaction empirical setting emphasising the effect of different 
structural constructs known to affect the structure of the board of directors, given the logic 
orientation of firms. Multiple proxies are used namely for the firm operations complexity and 
monitoring and advising benefits as determinants of the board of directors structure. 
Emphasising board size and independence, a statistically significant interaction8 is found 
between the logic orientation of firms – familiness and marketness – and both firm operation 
complexity; proxied by the capital structure of debt, growth opportunities and firm risk, and 
monitoring and advising benefits; proxied by the potential private benefits of managers, ceteris 
paribus. The results are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 on board size and Tables 4.11 and 4.12 on 
board independence.  
The significant interaction implies that the relationship between both board size and 
independence and such determinants varies significantly as a function of the firm type in terms 
of the logic-based group, suggesting a moderation effect of firm logic orientation that partly 
 
8 Regarding insignificant interaction terms, using other proxies of tested structural constructs, they lack 
statistical power to provide evidence of the difference in CG determinant-configuration relationships 
concerning the structure of the board of directors as a function of firm logic orientation.   
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confirms the hypothesis in terms of the difference among firms. Further, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 on 
board size and Tables 4.13 and 4.14 on board independence report the results of the post-hoc 
probing of the significant moderation effects of familiness and marketness regarding the 
significance and magnitude of the individual simple slopes representing the relationship of 
concern, given the firm type in terms of the logic-based group. The positive coefficients on debt 
and growth opportunities indicate a positive relationship between both board size and 
independence and firm operation complexity, where board size and independence increase as 
the complexity of firm operations grows.  
Stressing the demands and challenges imposed by complex firm operations, the directors 
on the board present an important source in terms of providing the firm with valuable 
information, skills and access to resources – both financial and human capital – that help 
managers run the business efficiently. This improves the advising role of the board. Outside 
directors, in particular, play an essential role in relation to effectively and closely monitoring top 
management encountering firm operations complexity, thereby controlling and disciplining 
managerial behaviour and performance. Taking advantage of larger and more independent 
boards, the collective minds, knowledge, skills, senses and expertise possessed by and the 
shared efforts of the directors on the board help monitor and advise top managers who cope with 
complex firm operations. 
Supporting the hypothesis, it is found that the positive relationship between board size 
and growth opportunities is mitigated in FLDFs (17.1%) relative to other firms (30.5%), 
significant at the 10% and 1% significance levels, respectively. In consistency, compared with 
other firms (18.2%), this positive relationship is more pronounced in MLDFs (50.5%), at the 
significance levels of 5% and 0.1%, respectively. Similarly, the results show a less pronounced 
positive relationship between board size and debt in FLDFs (2.573) relative to other firms 
(3.065), significant at a 0.1% significance level. Supporting this, such a positive relationship is 
amplified in MLDFs (2.918) compared with other firms (2.432), at the significance levels of 
0.1% and 1%, respectively.  
Consistent with the hypothesis, it is also found that the positive relationship between 
board independence and growth opportunities is lessened in FLDFs (0.0114) relative to other 
firms (0.0154), significant at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Supporting this, 
compared with other firms (0.0267), such a positive relationship is amplified in MLDFs 
(0.0423), at a significance level of 0.1%. Likewise, the results show a less pronounced positive 
relationship between board independence and debt in FLDFs (0.112) relative to other firms 
(0.137), significant at a 0.1% significance level. In consistency, this positive relationship is 
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more pronounced in MLDFs (0.118) compared with other firms (0.0923), at the significance 
levels of 0.1% and 5%, respectively.  
For firm risk, the negative coefficients suggest a negative, rather than positive, 
relationship with both board size and independence. As Boone et al. (2007) state, in line with 
the complexity of firm operations, firm risk implies more volatility and uncertainty of firm 
performance. This imposes the potential difficulty, ambiguity and inefficiency that the board 
directors cope with, especially on the part of independent or outside directors. Particularly, this 
challenges and restrains the board concerning observing, assessing and disciplining managerial 
behaviour and performance. This suggests a costly monitoring and advising of the board 
regarding the cost of appointing a new board director, which offsets monitoring and advising 
benefits. Apart from firm operations complexity, here, firm risk indicates the monitoring and 
advising costs that adversely affect both board size and independence due to the dysfunction of 
the respective controlling role of the board of directors regarding its monitoring and advising 
functions.  
Interestingly, it is found that the negative relationship between board size and firm risk is 
less pronounced in FLDFs (−8) compared with other firms (−11.81), significant at a 0.1% 
significance level. Supporting this, this negative relationship is more pronounced in MLDFs 
(−12.62) relative to other firms (−9.081), at a significance level of 0.1%. Similarly, compared 
with other firms (−0.321), the negative relationship between board independence and firm risk 
is mitigated in FLDFs (−0.165), significant at the 0.1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
In consistency, such a negative relationship is amplified in MLDFs (−0.303) relative to other 
firms (−0.247), at the significance levels of 1% and 0.1%, respectively.  
The coefficients on free cashflows indicate a positive (negative) relationship between 
board independence (board size) and monitoring and advising benefits. As monitoring and 
advising benefits increase in terms of greater potential private benefits of managers, the 
necessity of independent boards raises, where board independence increases as managers’ 
private benefits raise as outside directors are perceived more effective and objective in 
delivering the monitoring role of the board over top management. However, despite more skills, 
knowledge and oversight in terms of the minds and senses of directors appointed in larger 
boards, which serve to monitor and control top managers regarding the potential managerial 
opportunism related to expropriating private benefits, the results indicate that boards decrease in 
size as the potential private benefits of managers increase. This is likely because of the potential 
free-rider problem, which may hinder the effectiveness of the monitoring and advising functions 
of the board.  
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Consistent with the hypothesis, it is found that the positive relationship between board 
independence and free cashflows is less pronounced in FLDFs (0.0379) compared with other 
firms (0.0516), significant at a 5% significance level. Supporting this, such a positive 
relationship is more pronounced in MLDFs (0.0534) relative to other firms (0.0431), at the 
significance levels of 5% and 10%, respectively. Further, interestingly, it is also found that the 
negative relationship between board size and free cashflows is lessened in FLDFs (−2.848) 
relative to other firms (−3.188), significant at a 0.1% significance level. In consistency, this 
negative relationship is amplified in MLDFs (−3.135) compared with other firms (−2.776), at 
the significance levels of 0.1% and 1%, respectively.  
The above results are consistent with hypothesis H1, which predicts that the familiness of 
firms will reduce the positive effect of CG determinants, including firm-specific and managerial 
characteristics, on CG configurations in terms of the structure of the board of directors 
compared with the marketness logic orientation. Likewise, emphasising the negative effect of 
firm risk on both board size and independence and the negative effect of free cashflows on 
board size, the results point to another, surprising finding that the negative CG determinant-
configuration relationships are mitigated in FLDFs relative to MLDFs. 
4.4.1.2 Executive Compensation 
Concerning the CG configuration of executive compensation, several individual empirical 
tests are performed in an interaction empirical setting stressing the effect of different structural 
constructs known to affect the design of executive compensation, given the logic orientation of 
firms. Multiple proxies are used namely for the scope of firm business, governance and 
managerial characteristics as determinants of executive compensation design. Emphasising total 
compensation, a statistically significant interaction9 is found between the logic orientation of 
firms – familiness and marketness – and both firm business scope; proxied by firm age, the 
capital structure of debt and growth opportunities, and managerial entrenchment; proxied by 
CEO age and perceived ability in terms of firm performance, ceteris paribus. Similarly, 
regarding equity-based compensation, a statistically significant interaction is also found 
between the logic orientation of firms – familiness and marketness – and both firm business 
scope and the effectiveness of the board of directors in terms of board independence, ceteris 
paribus. The findings are reported in Tables 4.21 and 4.22 on total compensation and Tables 
4.31 and 4.32 on equity-based compensation.  
 
9 Regarding insignificant interaction terms, using other proxies of tested structural constructs, they lack 
statistical power to provide evidence of the difference in CG determinant-configuration relationships in 
terms of the design of executive compensation as a function of firm logic orientation.   
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The significant interaction implies that the relationship between both total and equity-
based compensation and such determinants varies significantly as a function of the firm type in 
terms of the logic-based group, indicating a moderation effect of firm logic orientation that 
partly supports the hypothesis in terms of the discrepancy among firms. Moreover, Tables 4.23 
and 4.24 on total compensation show the findings of the post-hoc probing of the significant 
moderation effects of familiness and marketness regarding the significance and magnitude of 
the individual simple slopes representing the relationship of concern, given the firm type in 
terms of the logic-based group.  
The positive coefficients on firm age, debt and growth opportunities indicate a positive 
relationship between total compensation and the scope of firm business, where managers’ total 
compensation increases as the firm business scope becomes wider and more complex, 
motivating, attracting and maintaining qualified managers in a competitive context of 
managerial labour market. In addition, the positive coefficients on CEO age and firm 
performance suggest that total compensation and managerial entrenchment are positively 
related, where managers exercise power and influence to obtain high total compensation, 
perhaps in excess of optimal executive compensation.  
Consistent with the hypothesis, it is found that the positive relationship between total 
compensation and firm age is less pronounced in FLDFs (0.323) relative to other firms (0.387), 
significant at a 0.1% significance level. Supporting this, compared with other firms (0.339), 
such a positive relationship is more pronounced in MLDFs (0.447), at a significance level of 
0.1%. Similarly, the results show that the positive relationship between total compensation and 
debt is mitigated in FLDFs (1.110) relative to other firms (1.503), significant at a 0.1% 
significance level. In consistency, compared with other firms (1.205), this positive relationship 
is amplified in MLDFs (1.760), at a significance level of 0.1%.  
Likewise, the results show a less pronounced positive relationship between total 
compensation and growth opportunities in FLDFs (0.173) relative to other firms (0.356), at a 
significance level of 0.1%. Supporting this, such a positive relationship is more pronounced in 
MLDFs (0.518) compared with other firms (0.215), significant at a 0.1% significance level. 
Moreover, it is also found that the positive relationship between total compensation and CEO 
age is lessened in FLDFs (0.00568) relative to other firms (0.00778), at a significance level of 
10%. In consistency, compared with other firms (0.00680), this positive relationship is 
amplified in MLDFs (0.00751), at a significance level of 10%. Similarly, the results show that 
the positive relationship between total compensation and both firm market- and stock-based 
performance is mitigated in FLDFs (0.0635, 2.442) relative to other firms (0.0870, 2.580), 
significant at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% significance levels. Supporting this, such a positive 
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relationship is more pronounced in MLDFs (0.197, 4.394) compared with other firms (0.171, 
2.035), at a significance level of 0.1%.  
Further, Tables 4.33 and 4.34 on equity-based compensation report the findings of the 
post-hoc probing of the significant moderation effects of familiness and marketness concerning 
the significance and magnitude of the individual simple slopes representing the relationship of 
concern, given the firm type in terms of the logic-based group. Likewise, the positive 
coefficients on firm age, debt and growth opportunities indicate a positive relationship between 
equity-based compensation and the scope of firm business, where the equity-based 
compensation of managers increases as the firm business scope becomes wider and more 
complex, linking managerial performance and pay to motivate, control and discipline managers. 
In addition, the positive coefficient on board independence suggests that equity-based 
compensation and the board effectiveness regarding the structure of the board of directors are 
positively related, where outside directors effectively and closely control and discipline 
managers by coupling managerial performance and pay in terms of extensively using stock and 
option awards.  
Consistent with the hypothesis, it is found that the positive relationship between equity-
based compensation and firm age is less pronounced in FLDFs (0.288) relative to other firms 
(0.559), significant at the 5% and 0.1% significance levels, respectively. In consistency, 
compared with other firms (0.408), this positive relationship is more pronounced in MLDFs 
(0.602), at a significance level of 0.1%. Similarly, the results show a lessened positive 
relationship between equity-based compensation and growth opportunities in FLDFs (0.291) 
relative to other firms (0.623), at the significance levels of 5% and 0.1%, respectively. 
Supporting this, such a positive relationship is amplified in MLDFs (0.817) compared with 
other firms (0.394), significant at a 0.1% significance level.  
Moreover, it is also found that the relationship between equity-based compensation and 
debt is mitigated in FLDFs (1.872) relative to other firms (2.424), significant at a 0.1% 
significance level. In consistency, compared with other firms (2.039), this positive relationship 
is amplified in MLDFs (2.611), at a significance level of 0.1%. Likewise, the results show that 
the positive relationship between equity-based compensation and board independence is less 
pronounced in FLDFs (4.726) relative to other firms (5.238), at a significance level of 0.1%. 
Supporting this, compared with other firms (4.941), such a positive relationship is more 
pronounced in MLDFs (5.001), significant at a 0.1% significance level. The above findings 
support hypothesis H1, which expects that the familiness of firms will lessen the positive effect 
of CG determinants, including firm-specific, managerial and governance characteristics, on CG 
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configurations in terms of the design of executive compensation relative to the marketness logic 
orientation. 
4.4.1.3 Discussion 
In the main regression analysis, I contrast FLDFs with MLDFs regarding the CG 
determinant-configuration relationships concerning the structure of the board of directors and 
executive compensation design. I stress the moderation effect of firm logic orientation, which 
may be familiness or marketness. Overall, the findings show differences among the logic-based 
groups of firms regarding the relationship between established CG determinants, such as firm-
specific, managerial and governance characteristics, and CG configurations in terms of board 
size, board independence and the measures of executive compensation, specifically total and 
equity-based compensation. Generally, they point to that FLDFs implement distinct, 
idiosyncratic governance practices, departing from the prevailing shareholder-oriented 
governance system; this is consistent with the SEW preservation perspective. 
The analysis of the board of directors and executive compensation suggests stimulating 
results, emphasising the institutional-based classification of firms. Overall, the findings provide 
empirical evidence of the effect of the logic orientation of firms – familiness and marketness – 
on the CG determinant-configuration relationships; this is the moderating role of firm logic 
orientation. The results show a significant difference between FLDFs and MLDFs regarding the 
effect of firm-specific, managerial and governance characteristics on board size and 
independence, as well as total and equity-based compensation. The findings suggest that, 
compared with the marketness logic orientation, the familiness of firms mitigates the positive, 
as well as negative, effect of CG determinants on CG configurations, in line with the 
perspective of substitution effect in the CG context (Gnan et al., 2015; van Aaken et al., 2017).  
Emphasising the perspective of SEW, FLDF managers prioritise the preservation of the 
non-economic utilities, including authority and power, job security and protection, prestige and 
social ties, derived from the firm, and as such, make distinct strategic choices and managerial 
decisions compared with MLDFs. Accordingly, given their undiversified financial wealth in 
contrast to shareholders, the managers of FLDFs are more likely to encounter a dual threat 
imposed by poor financial performance since both their financial wealth and SEW tightly attach 
to their career positions (Berrone et al., 2012). In other words, emphasising their dual utilities 
linked to the firm, FLDF managers confront both financial and SEW-related risks in relation to 
financial hardship and SEW loss, given the competitiveness of managerial labour market and 
the threat of takeover market.  
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Moreover, according to Fitz‐Koch and Nordqvist (2017) and Kabbach de Castro et al. 
(2016), the joint outcomes of financial and SEW-related objectives imply an interdependence of 
firm’s financial status and SEW. Specifically, as Miller and Le Breton‐Miller (2014) assert, 
while they are commonly perceived to contradict each other, SEW-related goals can be mixed 
with the financial goals of firms and both achieved at the same time, where both contribute to 
each other as mutual objectives. Therefore, in the name of preserving their non-economic 
benefits attached to the firms, the managers of FLDFs need to make an effective effort to run the 
business, actively engage with firm stakeholders and ultimately improve the firm 
competitiveness and survival (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Cennamo et al., 2012; 
Kellermanns et al., 2012). As such, the fulfilment of the non-economic objectives of key firm 
actors contributes to the financial performance, and in turn, financial standing of firms and vice 
versa.  
Thus, building on the dual threat that FLDF managers confront due to the their 
undiversified financial wealth, as well as the interdependence of firm’s financial status and 
SEW, the managers of FLDFs have a substantial incentive to act efficiently and not 
opportunistically, actively safeguarding the firm financially, and in turn, preserving both the 
economic and non-economic benefits derived from the firm. That is, given the concern for SEW 
preservation, FLDF managers are self-incentivised to voluntarily serve as self-monitored 
stewards of the business, maintaining business success and continuity to achieve a win-win 
objective of shareholders and managers.  
Building on the SEW preservation perspective, this implies that the self-motivation of 
FLDF managers regarding their stewardship limits the potential managerial opportunism, where 
the loss aversion of current SEW outweighs the chase of future gains. Accordingly, stressing the 
priority of preserving the affective endowments derived from the firm, it can be stated that SEW 
has a substitution effect for the respective controlling roles of internal CG configurations in 
FLDFs compared with MLDFs. In other words, the concern for SEW preservation diminishes 
the need for and necessity of the board of directors and executive compensation in relation to 
controlling and discipling managerial behaviour and performance. That is, SEW itself serves a 
governance, disciplinary role in FLDFs.  
Particularly, following van Aaken et al. (2017), the priority of SEW preservation enacts 
the self-governance of FLDF managers, protecting or expanding the non-economic utilities 
linked to the firm in alignment with the fulfilment of the financial objectives of firms. This 
suggests a self-control of the managers of FLDFs related to a set of self-imposed rules that 
restrict their opportunistic behaviour to mitigate a total loss of SEW. Otherwise, FLDF 
managers would presumably behave opportunistically, which is at odds with shareholders’ best 
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interests, harming the long-term interests and survival of the business, and in turn, exposing 
their SEW to risk. 
Emphasising the substitution effect of SEW, it can be said that the concern for preserving 
the non-economic benefits that FLDF managers derive from the firm has the effect of limiting, 
first, the necessity of large and independent boards to monitor and advise managers on behalf of 
shareholders, and second, the need for high total and equity-based compensation to motivate, 
control and discipline managers. In other words, the priority of SEW preservation leaves a little 
room for internal CG configurations in FLDFs.  
Particularly, the importance of the board of directors and executive compensation 
regarding their respective controlling roles of monitoring and advising, as well as managerial 
motivation and the alignment of interests, respectively, is mitigated in FLDFs, relative to 
MDLFs, where the SEW preservation is a priority. As such, the positive relationship between 
well-known CG determinants and configurations appear to be less pronounced in FLDFs 
compared with MLDFs. In other words, given the stewardship and self-governance of FLDF 
managers that the concern for preserving SEW enacts, FLDFs show to less likely expand board 
size and independence and increase total and equity-based compensation in response to CG 
determinants relative to MLDFs, limiting the positive CG determinant-configuration 
relationships. 
SEW underlies the difference between and classification of FLDFs and MLDFs, 
highlighting a unique and influential identity of FLDFs relating to SEW-related interests and 
priorities. Kodeih and Greenwood (2014) point out that firm identity indicates what a firm is 
and what it wishes to become, influencing the perceptions of firm opportunities, and thus, firm 
responses to demands and expectations. Similarly, Albert and Whetten (2004) and Scott and 
Lane (2000) note that firm practices and behaviour manifest firm identity in compliance with 
the concerns, goals, interests and priorities of firms, where firm identity interprets and gives 
meaning to firm behaviour (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006).  
Accordingly, emphasising SEW as the most prominent aspect of family-oriented identity 
(Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014), firm identity makes sense of the different firm practices 
and decisions between FLDFs and MLDFs that are shareholder-oriented. Following Aguilera et 
al. (2018), the identity of FLDFs helps them derive CG discretion over the setup of firm 
governance, resisting the demands and standards of CG imposed by the prevailing shareholder-
oriented governance practices that conflict with SEW-related interests and goals. Specifically, 
stressing the SEW preservation perspective, the stronger identity of FLDFs implies more 
conditions versus, and as such, resistance to such CG expectations and pressures (Greenwood et 
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al., 2011). Consistent with the perspective of CG deviance (Aguilera et al., 2018), this results in 
the deviant, idiosyncratic governance practices of FLDFs as opposed to MLDFs, which more 
likely abide by the dominant shareholder-oriented governance system, building on the firm 
theory and market discipline perspectives. 
Accordingly, drawing on the organisational filter perspective (Greenwood et al., 2011), it 
can be stated that the identity of FLDFs acts as an organisational filter that explains how and 
why FLDFs behave differently, filtering the demands and pressures that they encounter in 
compliance with their interests and goals relating to preserving the non-economic utilities of 
firm’s key actors. Particularly, building on the perspective of SEW preservation, FLDFs apply 
an organisational filter of firm identity between CG determinants and configurations of the 
board of directors and executive compensation in accordance with the priority of preserving 
SEW. Therefore, FLDFs’ identity filters the CG pressures and expectations enforced by the 
prevailing governance practices that contradict the concern for SEW preservation.  
That is, in the name of protecting the non-economic utilities attached to the firm, such as 
authority and power, social ties, prestige and reputation and job security and protection, it can 
be said that FLDFs respond differently to CG determinants concerning CG configurations, 
aligning CG practices with SEW-related interests and priorities, avoiding undertaking CG 
practices that threaten SEW. Specifically, FLDFs restrict the CG determinant-configuration 
relationships, applying an organisational filter of the CG pressures and demands imposed by the 
dominant shareholder-oriented governance practices. Accordingly, the positive effect of well-
known CG determinants on CG configurations shows to be mitigated in FLDFs relative to 
MLDFs. In other words, given their distinct, potent identity, FLDFs appear to less likely enlarge 
board size and board independence and raise total and equity-based compensation in response to 
CG determinants compared with MLDFs, in the name of protecting SEW.  
Moreover, given the lessened positive CG determinant-configuration relationships in 
FLDFs in comparison with MLDFs, it can be stated that FLDFs adopt decoupling response 
strategy (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011; Bromley and Powell, 2012), 
responding differently to CG determinants concerning CG configurations. FLDFs adopt the 
response strategy of decoupling to the pressures and demands of CG enforced by the prevailing 
governance practices when these contradict their interests and challenge their priorities 
regarding the SEW preservation. Therefore, by decoupling, FLDFs implement CG practices that 
are best aligned with SEW-related goals and concerns, whereas, drawing on the firm theory and 
market discipline perspectives, MLDFs more likely obey the dominant shareholder-oriented 
governance system. 
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Following Greenwood et al. (2011), it can be said that FLDFs decouple by undertaking 
CG practices that best fit their goals, interests and concerns that collectively reflect their unique, 
potent identity, consistent with the perspective of organisational filter enacted by firm identity. 
Therefore, emphasising the CG determinant-configuration relationships, FLDFs keep their 
operational structures separate and distinct from the normative structures (Tilcsik, 2010; 
Bromley and Powell, 2012). In other words, by adopting decoupling response strategy, FLDFs 
do not undertake the prevailing governance practices at their operational level; instead, as Mair 
et al. (2015) explain, they comply with the minimum standards for legitimacy-seeking purposes, 
creating a distinction or separation between the implemented and standard or dominant 
governance systems. 
Particularly, stemming from the concern for SEW preservation, it can be stated that 
FLDFs insulate themselves from the pressures and demands of CG imposed by the prevailing 
shareholder-oriented governance system, decoupling CG configurations from their 
determinants. That is, by decoupling, FLDFs restrain the relationship between CG determinants 
and configurations, refraining implementing CG practices that expose SEW to risk. Thus, in line 
with the perspective of CG deviance (Aguilera et al., 2018), the governance practices of FLDFs 
depart from the dominant shareholder-oriented governance system to protect or expand the non-
economic benefits of key firm actors, including authority, control and power, prestige and 
reputation, job security and protection and social ties and business networks, attached to the 
firm. Therefore, the familiness of firms appears to reduce the positive effect of established CG 
determinants on CG configurations. Particularly, stressing the response strategy of decoupling, 
FLDFs show to less likely expand board size and independence and increase total and equity-
based compensation in response to CG determinants relative to MLDFs, in the name of 
protecting SEW. 
As mentioned above, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs appear to deviate from the prevailing 
governance practices that are shareholder-oriented in the US context in terms of having smaller 
and less independent boards – empirically proven in Chapter 3. Given the importance of the 
board of directors as the core of CG (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Eisenhardt, 1989), this potentially indicates under-governed firms to firm stakeholders who fear 
the potential agency problems in relation to the ineffectiveness of the board structure of FLDFs 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a).  
From a CG perspective, Zona and Gomez-Mejia (2011) assert that this imposes additional 
weight on the board of directors regarding firm governance quality. As such, stemming from the 
rationale of endorsing the quality of firm governance in the eyes of firm stakeholders, it can be 
stated that FLDFs tend to maintain the structure of the board concerning board size and 
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independence more steadily and unwaveringly. In doing this, FLDFs perhaps mitigate firm 
stakeholders’ fears in relation to the questioned quality of the structure of the board of directors. 
From a SEW perspective, the board of directors provides the managers of FLDFs with expertise 
and skills, as well as access to resources including human capital in the form of social ties and 
business networks (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Drawing on the SEW preservation perspective, 
such human capital presents a non-economic benefit closely attached to the firm, which FLDF 
managers highly value and strive to maintain or extend. Therefore, emphasising the priority of 
SEW, it can be said that the boards of FLDFs are maintained more consistently regarding board 
size and independence in terms of sustaining the board directors. As such, the managers of 
FLDFs perhaps more effectively can protect their affective endowments, such as authority and 
control and social ties, through maintaining the board of directors that they are familiar with and 
advocate.  
Therefore, it can be stated that FLDFs have strong motives to less dramatically sway the 
board directors – both insiders and outsiders – out of the board in response to CG determinants, 
where FLDFs have more stable boards in terms of upholding rather than unwavering board 
directors compared with MLDFs. Thus, the negative effect of CG determinants on board size 
and independence appears to be less pronounced in FLDFs relative to MLDFs. Consistent with 
the perspectives of organisational filter and decoupling response strategy, this sheds light on 
another, surprising conclusion that the familiness of firms lessens the negative relationship 
between CG determinants and configurations, namely the structure of the board of directors.  
In essence, FLDFs apply organisational filter and adopt decoupling response strategy, 
concerning such negative CG determinant-configuration relationships, in the name of assuring 
firm governance quality regarding the effectiveness of the board structure, as well as preserving 
the non-economic utilities of key firm actors that the board of directors permits or facilitates, 
limiting the relationship between CG determinants and configurations. In other words, FLDFs 
respond distinctly to CG determinants regarding CG configurations, in terms of the structure of 
the board of directors, in compliance with the concern for endorsing the effectiveness of the 
board structure and preserving the SEW derived from the firm, specifically the board. 
Particularly, given their distinct, influential identity and emphasising the response strategy of 
decoupling, FLDFs show to less likely decrease board size and independence in response to CG 
determinants relative to MLDFs.  
Stressing the institutional-based classification of firms, the results provide interesting 
empirical findings on the discrepancy between FLDFs and MLDFs regarding the CG 
determinant-configuration relationships. The empirical evidence of the moderating role of firm 
logic orientation – familiness and marketness – gives a new institutional-based explanation for 
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the difference in CG observed among firms. Moreover, witnessed by the moderation effect of 
firm logic orientation, the results reveal different types of firms in terms of the logic-based 
groups, which are associated with distinct CG practices. Importantly, emphasising the logic 
orientation of firms, the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs in the relationship between CG 
determinants and configurations presents empirical evidence of the role of ILs in shaping firm 
practices and behaviour (Greenwood et al., 2010). This advocates the operationalisation of both 
family and market logics regarding the embeddedness of ILs in firm decision making, as well as 
the institutional-based classification of firms in this study. 
4.4.2 Robustness Checks 
In this study, different robustness checks are run to test the presence of interaction 
between firm logic orientation and multiple proxies for a variety of CG determinants of the 
board of directors structure and executive compensation design, accounting for econometric and 
endogeneity concerns. The results of the preliminary regression analyses of the board of 
directors and executive compensation regarding the significant interaction terms are robust 
using random-effects estimation and dynamic estimation – accounting for endogeneity10 – 
robustness checks. These checks primarily stress the influence of firm random effects and the 
previous idiosyncratic trends of firms relating to CG configurations that could normally affect 
the setup of firm governance. However, the significance of some interaction terms’ coefficients 
changes slightly downward. Tables 4.5–4.8, 4.15–4.18, 4.25–4.28 and 4.35–4.38 report the 
results on board size, board independence, total and equity-based compensation, respectively.  
As an additional robustness check, I use a reduced sample that restricts the comparison to 
FLDFs and MLDFs, excluding hybrid firms as a neutral logic-based group that overlaps 
familiness and marketness concerning the observed firm practices. Unlike in the main 
regression analysis, a single moderator is applied to directly contrast FLDFs (=1) with MLDFs 
(=0) regarding the moderation effect of firm logic orientation – familiness and marketness –  on 
the relationship between CG determinants and configurations. As shown in Tables 4.9, 4.19, 
4.29 and 4.39 on board size, board independence, total and equity-based compensation, 
respectively, the results of the main regression analyses are robust regarding the presence of 
interaction, endorsing that the relationship between CG determinants and configurations of the 
 
10 To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, both the year and industry fixed effects are also included in all 
the models, controlling for the time and industry trends of CG. 
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board of directors and executive compensation varies as a function of the logic orientation of 
firms. However, some power of the interaction terms is lost. 
The results of the post-hoc probing of the significant interaction concerning board size, 
board independence, total and equity-based compensation, respectively reported in Tables 4.10, 
4.20, 4.30 and 4.40, do not change the conclusions about the significance and magnitude of the 
effect of CG determinants on CG configurations, given the firm type in terms of the logic-based 
group. However, the significance of some main independent variables’ coefficients changes 
slightly downward. Specifically, highlighting the moderating role of firm logic orientation, the 
results show that the positive effect of well-known CG determinants, including firm-specific, 
managerial and governance characteristics, on the structure of the board of directors and 
executive compensation design is less pronounced in FLDFs relative to MLDFs. Further, the 
negative relationship between specific CG determinants and configurations in terms of board 
size and independence is mitigated in FLDFs compared with MLDFs. 
4.4.3 Post-hoc Test 
Going a step further, the ownership-based classification of firms is applied to group the 
sample firms. Under the same empirical setting, an indicator of family ownership status is used 
instead of the institutional-based classification that emphasises firm logic orientation. Using 
family ownership data from Ron Anderson’s sample available online, I use a single moderator 
that flags the sample firms as family (=1) and non-family (=0) firms. As Tables 4.41–4.44 
report, unlike the main regression analyses, the regression analyses incorporating the 
ownership-based classification of firms do not produce pronounced results on the moderation 
effect of family ownership status on the relationship between established CG determinants and 
configurations of the board of directors and executive compensation in terms of board size, 
board independence, total and equity-based compensation.  
Except for a few proxies11, the interactions by family ownership status are generally 
insignificant, implying no interaction between firm type in terms of the family ownership status 
of firms and the CG determinants of concern. Thus, unlike the results of the preliminary 
regression analyses, the results show unconditional CG determinant-configuration relationships 
among firms – family and non-family. Importantly, the findings suggest that the institutional-
based classification of firms captures the interaction regarding such CG determinant-
configuration relationships more effectively relative to the ownership-based classification. This 
 
11 The interaction of family ownership status and the variables of growth opportunities, debt, firm age and 
market-based performance and board independence in regressions of board size, board independence, 
total and equity-based compensation, respectively, is significant at a 10%  significance level. 
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gives an insight into why and how firms vary in terms of the internal CG configuration, 
applying a different view of the familiness and marketness of firms. 
It should be reiterated that the findings of the preliminary regression analyses in the first 
empirical chapter – Chapter 3 – are found to be consistent and robust when applying the 
ownership-based classification of firms regarding the main effect of family ownership status on 
the firm choice of internal CG configurations. In contrast, here, I find inconsistency of the 
results concerning the moderation effect of family ownership status on the CG determinant–
configuration relationships, which is perhaps not surprising. Fundamentally, this is because, in 
the previous chapter, I emphasise a more simplistic empirical setting concerning the difference 
among firms regarding the firm choice of internal CG configurations, given the firm type in 
terms of the logic-based group. Emphasising ILs as covert drivers of firm behaviour, I mainly 
portray FLDFs and MLDFs as behaving similarly to family and non-family firms, respectively, 
in terms of their motives, objectives and essence; thereby, I expect similarities and 
commonalities between FLDFs (MLDFs) and family (non-family) firms. In essence, embedding 
family (market) logic in firm decision making, FLDFs and MLDFs display family and non-
family firm-like behaviours, respectively, as tangible manifestation of family and market logics, 
drawing on the SEW preservation perspective.  
Therefore, in the previous chapter, the robust findings indicate that the traditional 
ownership-based classification emphasising family ownership status does capture some of those 
parallels and similarities regarding CG configurations. Interestingly, this validates the notion of 
the logic orientation of firms, namely familiness and marketness, that defines and depicts the 
firm type in terms of the logic-based group in relation to the embeddedness of family and 
market logics, matching FLDFs and MLDFs with family and non-family firms, respectively, in 
terms of depicting and differentiating between family and non-family firm-like behaviours. The 
fundamental claim of the study is that, overlooking firm behaviour, ownership status (family or 
not) alone is an insufficient indicator to identify and classify firms. Instead, the familiness and 
marketness constructs are conceptually superior to view and determine the type of firms 
regarding their familiness or non-familiness, also referred to as marketness, on the basis of real 
firm practices and decisions. Therefore, stemming from perspective of ILs, the notion of firm 
logic orientation is proposed to underlie the distinction among firms beyond the ownership 
criteria.  
Whereas, in this chapter, I emphasise a more perceptive and in-depth articulation of firm 
character – the logic orientation of firms – in firm behaviour. According to the results, it is clear 
that the ownership-based classification of firms fails to capture the moderation effect of firm 
type when an interaction empirical setting is applied that stresses the effect of CG determinants, 
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or drivers, on CG configurations. Relative to the conventional split of family and non-family 
firms, which basically ignores the importance of firm behaviour, the institutional-based 
classification emphasising the logic orientation of firms allows the interactions to be more 
significant. This proves the superiority of firm logic orientation, namely the familiness and 
marketness constructs, over ownership status (family or not) to identify and classify firms, given 
the success of the institutional-based classification related to the empirical evidence of both the 
main and moderation effects of firm type – firm logic orientation – in the CG context. 
Particularly, besides capturing the association between firm logic orientation and CG 
regarding the firm choice of internal CG configurations, the institutional-based classification of 
firms is empirically proven to be theoretically and conceptually superior in detecting the 
moderating role of firm logic orientation concerning the relationship between established CG 
determinants and configurations. This primarily validates and supports the institutional-based 
approach regarding the identification of and distinction among firms, compared with the 
traditional ownership-based classification – in relation to the different view of the familiness 
and marketness of firms, where firm practices and behaviour, rather than family ownership 
status (or not), characterise and define firms in terms of their different culture and nature.  
Further, the institutional-based classification has the advantage of simplicity, speed and 
elegance over the conventional ownership-based classification of firms. The traditional 
classification of family and non-family firms requires time and effort spent browsing firms’ 
proxy statements and annual reports to find out about ownership status (family or not). In 
contrast, the institutional-based classification of firms is an accounting-based process that 
emphasises real firm practices and decisions. Specifically, it incorporates multiple behavioural 
dimensions measured using easily accessible financial data available on various databases, 
drawing mainly on the extant family business research.   
4.5 Conclusion 
CG configurations display an area of difference among firms that has been largely 
addressed and investigated. However, no attention has been paid to the role of ILs, as latent 
drivers of firm behaviour (Friedland and Alford, 1991), in shaping firm governance practices. 
ILs provide the prescriptions and means of appropriate behaviour, underlying the culture and 
nature of firms, and in turn, shape their practices and decisions (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; 
Greenwood et al., 2011). The core of this study lies in the application of ILs perspective to the 
concept of distinction among firms, stressing the CG context concerning whether the CG 
determinant-configuration relationships differ among the logic-based groups of firms. In this 
study, I emphasised the institutional-based classification of firms – FLDFs and MLDFs –  apart 
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from ownership status (family or not), addressing the logic orientation of firms – both 
familiness and marketness – that depicts and defines the firm type in terms of the logic-based 
group relating to the embeddedness of family and market logics by which a firm is driven.   
Drawing on the SEW preservation perspective, in this study, I portrayed FLDFs and 
MLDFs as behaving similarly to family and non-family firms, respectively, in terms of their 
motives, objectives and essence. Primarily, I depicted MLDFs as shareholder-oriented firms that 
prioritise the primary economic business objective of profitability and shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation, exhibiting an archetypal business setting. In contrast, presenting a different 
business setting, FLDFs display a family-oriented attitude and preference in terms of prioritising 
the preservation of SEW attached to the firm, overlapping the family and business systems. In 
doing so, this study differentiates itself from the the extant family-oriented studies that have 
commonly emphsised the ownership criteria in terms of ownership status (family or not), which 
is believed to disregard the importance of firm behaviour. 
In this study, I provided empirical evidence that ILs give a viable explanation for the 
discrepancy in CG among firms by examining the moderating role of firm logic orientation in 
configuring the CG of firms. This study has an important implication for detecting the contrast 
between FLDFs and MLDFs regarding the magnitude of the CG determinant-configuration 
relationships. It emphasised whether and how firm logic orientation influences the relationship 
between well-known CG determinants and configurations in terms of the board of directors 
structure and executive compensation design. In line with the perspective of ILs, the positive – 
as well as negative – effect of CG determinants on CG configurations showed to be a function 
of the logic orientation of firms, where family and market logics drive firm practices and 
decisions differently, highlighting the moderation effect of firm logic orientation.  
To the extent that the CG determinant-configuration relationships are generally well-
established in the literature, they showed to operate differently among firms that vary 
conceptually in terms of the embeddedness of family and market logics. Overall, I found that 
the familiness and marketness of firms have different effects on this relationship, where the 
familiness of firms lessens the positive relationship between CG determinants and 
configurations compared with the marketness logic orientation. Specifically, emphasising the 
complexity of firm operations and monitoring and advising benefits, the positive effect on both 
board size and independence is less pronounced in FLDFs relative to MLDFs. This is also true 
for the negative effect of certain CG determinants on board size and independence. Similarly, 
for executive total and equity-based compensation, the positive effect of the scope of firm 
business, the effectiveness of the board structure and managerial entrenchment is mitigated in 
FLDF compared with MLDFs.  
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In contrast to shareholder-oriented MLDFs, FLDFs display a family-oriented attitude and 
preference regarding prioritising the protection of the non-economic benefits of key firm actors, 
drawing on the perspective of SEW preservation. Given that SEW is the leading aspect of 
family-oriented identity (Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014), the priority of SEW 
preservation posits a unique, influential identity of FLDFs. FLDFs’ identity enforces conditions 
against, and in turn, resistance to external demands and pressures (Greenwood et al., 2011) 
concerning CG in accordance with SEW-related interests and concerns.  
As such, consistent with the CG deviance perspective (Aguilera et al., 2018), these results 
indicated that such an identity drives the discretion of FLDFs over firm governance in the name 
of preserving SEW, yielding different, idiosyncratic governance practices relative to the 
dominant shareholder-oriented governance system. Stemming from the ILs perspective, the 
identity of FLDFs thereby serves as an organisational filter (Greenwood et al., 2011), which 
frames how firms fulfil and respond to the demands, standards and expectations of CG imposed 
by the prevailing governance system in compliance with the concern for SEW preservation.  
Specifically, emphasising the firm identity perspective, FLDFs apply an organisational 
filter between CG determinants and configurations, filtering the CG demands and pressures 
enforced by the dominant governance practices that conflict with SEW-related interests and 
goals. Therefore, relative to MLDFs, FLDFs respond differently to CG determinants concerning 
CG configurations, where the CG practices of FLDFs are aligned with their priorities and 
interests regarding the SEW preservation, which reflects the characterisation and distinction of 
their identity, irrespective of the prevailing governance practices. Accordingly, limiting the 
relationship between CG determinants and configurations, FLDFs avoid undertaking CG 
practices that threaten SEW.  In contrast, prioritising the profitability and shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation, MLDFs appear to obey the external demands and pressures imposed by the 
dominant shareholder-oriented governance system, given the overriding objective of CG 
regarding the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth. Thus, drawing on the firm theory and 
market discipline perspectives, they undertake the dominant governance practices to avoid being 
disciplined by the market. 
Further, as FLDFs tend to implement CG practices that support their goals, interests and 
concerns, which collectively demonstrate firm identity, FLDFs seem to adopt the response 
strategy of decoupling to the pressures, standards, and expectations of CG, responding distinctly 
to CG determinants regarding CG configurations. Specifically, FLDFs decouple CG 
configurations from their determinants, insulating themselves from the CG pressures and 
demands enforced by the prevailing governance practices if these contradict their interest and 
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undermine their priority of SEW preservation. That is, restraining the CG determinant-
configuration relationships, FLDFs refrain implementing CG practices that expose SEW to risk. 
Accordingly, by decoupling, FLDFs separate between the implemented and standard or 
normative structures (Tilcsik, 2010; Bromley and Powell, 2012) concerning CG. In other words, 
adopting decoupling response strategy, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs do not undertake the dominant 
governance practices at their operational level; instead, according to Mair et al. (2015), they 
conform to the minimum standards for legitimacy-seeking purposes. Thus, they depart from the 
prevailing governance system in the name of preserving SEW; in line with the CG deviance 
perspective (Aguilera et al., 2018), this results in different, idiosyncratic firm governance 
practices.  
Moreover, given the dual threat that FLDFs managers cope with and the interdependence 
of the financial standing of firms and SEW (Berrone et al., 2012; Miller and Le Breton‐Miller, 
2014), the affective endowments linked to the firm self-motivate the managers of FLDFs to 
voluntarily serve as self-monitored stewards of the business. The economic and non-economic 
objectives can be fulfilled simultaneously, where preserving the SEW of key firm actors 
benefits the financial performance, and as such, financial status of the firm and vice versa. 
Preserving and extending the non-economic utilities derived from the firm – including authority 
and power, social ties, reputation and prestige and job security – entail, on the part of FLDF 
managers, making an extensive effort to run the business, effectively engaging with firm 
stakeholders and improving firm competitiveness and survival (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2005; Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012). Therefore, such interdependence of 
firm’s financial status and SEW provides FLDF managers with a substantial incentive to 
actively protect the firm business financially, and in turn, maintain the non-economic benefits 
attached to the firm for a win-win objective of shareholders and managers.  
Relatedly, unlike shareholders, managers are undiversified in their financial wealth. Their 
financial welfare is closely linked to their careers, which also grant reputation and prestige, 
authority and control, job security and protection and social ties. Accordingly, given the 
competitiveness of managerial labour market and the threat of takeover market, poor financial 
performance has the potential of a dual threat that FLDF managers confront in terms of financial 
hardship and SEW loss (Berrone et al., 2012). Likewise, bearing both financial and SEW-
related risks poses a substantial incentive for FLDF managers to actively safeguard the firm 
financial, and consequently, protect their both economic and non-economic utilities derived 
from the firms. That is, emphasising the concern for preserving their SEW, the managers of 
FLDFs are self-incentivised to act efficiently and not opportunistically.  
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This constrains the potential opportunistic behaviour of FLDF managers because the loss 
aversion of current SEW offsets the chase of future gains. Therefore, stemming from the SEW 
preservation perspective, the self-motivation of FLDF managers triggers their stewardship and, 
as van Aaken et al. (2017) assert, self-governance. This thereby underlies the substitution effect 
of SEW for the respective controlling roles of the board of directors and executive 
compensation (Williamson, 1983). In other words, the importance of the board of directors and 
executive compensation as internal CG configurations, regarding the roles of monitoring and 
advising, and managerial motivation and the alignment of interests, respectively, is alleviated in 
FLDFs where the preservation of SEW is a priority. Specifically, SEW plays a disciplinary role 
for the managers of FLDFs given the concern for protecting their affective endowments linked 
to the firm, leaving little room for internal CG configurations in terms of restricting the 
relationship between CG determinants and configurations. 
Irrespective of ownership status (family or not), the response of CG configurations to 
their determinants showed to differ as a function of or conditional by firm logic orientation. 
Given the empirical evidence of the difference in the choices of CG configurations between 
FLDFs and MLDFs addressed in the previous chapter, in this study, I directed attention to a 
further underlying explanation, highlighting the moderation effect of the logic orientation of 
firms on the CG determinant-configuration relationships. Regarding the logic orientation of 
firms, while the marketness logic orientation endorses the priority of profitability and 
shareholders’ wealth maximisation, the familiness logic orientation captures a family-oriented 
essence in terms of prioritising the SEW preservation. Therefore, building on the popular model 
of SEW, in this study, I explained that FLDFs structure the board and design executive 
compensation in a way that aligns with and preserves or extends the non-economic benefits of 
firm’s key actors attached to the firm, mitigating the exposure of SEW to threat.  
Given the firm type in terms of the logic-based group, in this study, I provided empirical 
evidence that firms vary in internally configuring the firm business in terms of firm governance 
concerning the relationship between established CG determinants and configurations. This 
approves the role of ILs as being hidden drivers of firm behaviour. Importantly, such evidence 
draws attention to and supports the introduced notion of firm logic orientation and approves the 
functionality of familiness and marketness constructs, differentiating among firms concerning 
governance practices. In this way, in this study, I presented a different classification of firms 
and a distinct view of their familiness and marketness.  
Emphasising the embeddedness of family and market logics, the main idea is that firms 
vary in the culture and nature that implicitly embed in their decision making, and in turn, shape 
and explain the differences in firm practices and decisions; this is primarily a hidden logic-based 
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root. Thus, this study emphasises that it is not family ownership status (or not), but the firm 
practices and behaviour that characterise and define firms in terms of their distinctive culture 
and nature. Drawing on the difference in CG determinant-configuration relationships between 
FLDFs and MLDFs, in this study, I provided ILs, CG and family business scholars, as well as 
policymakers and regulators with a new institutional-based explanation for the difference in 
firm governance practices, expanding the understanding of ILs and CG.  
Driving firm behaviour, the familiness logic orientation evidently differentiates firms 
from the standard, shareholder-oriented view of firms – the marketness logic orientation – 
which reveals in a different relationship between CG determinants and configurations. This can 
extend the knowledge of scholars, policymakers and regulators on ILs and CG. Primarily, they 
need to consider that, apart from family ownership status (or not), FLDFs prioritise the 
preservation of SEW, which characterises a unique, influential firm identity, and in turn, 
interferes in the adoption of dominant shareholder-oriented governance practices, specifically 
CG deviance.  
Stemming from the SEW preservation perspective, FLDFs configure firm governance in 
a way that best fits them, highlighting FLDFs as a distinct business form or approach compared 
with shareholder-oriented MLDFs (Greenwood et al., 2010). Particularly, the study suggests 
that the familiness logic orientation of firms exhibits a family-oriented attitude and preference 
that prompt FLDFs’ propensity to deviate from the archetypal shareholder-oriented business 
setting of MLDFs where a marketness logic orientation, underlying the discrepancy in CG. This 
affects the understanding and evaluation of firm strategies and practices, where the difference 
among firms may be justified against market and government regulations and policies.  
Fundamentally, this study can expand the understanding of firm governance among CG 
scholars, policymakers and regulators, providing them with an insight that a single governance 
system does not fit all firms. Yet, the logic orientation of firms covertly plays a key role in 
configuring the CG of firms, shedding light on the effect of firm logic orientation on the 
relationship between CG determinants and configurations given the variation in these 
relationships among the logic-based groups of firms. Providing a distinct, institutional-based 
explanation for the difference in CG among firms, this can help CG scholars, policymakers and 
regulators understand the role of ILs in prompting the discrepancies in firm behaviour related to 
firm governance and develop CG research, regulations and policies. This implies the importance 
to deliberate the latent institutional factor of firm logic orientation to achieve a better 
understanding of firms and by extension firm practices and behaviour. 
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Emphasising the logic orientation of firms as a latent explanatory institutional factor of 
CG configurations, as well as its moderating role related to the CG determinant-configuration 
relationships, this study raises the potential to apply the notion of firm logic orientation, namely 
the constructs of familiness and marketness, to a different area of investigation on firm practices 
and decisions. Moreover, in this study, I highlighted the advantage of the institutional-based 
classification of firms over the traditional ownership-based classification in terms of simplicity, 
speed and elegance. Unlike the conventional split of family and non-family firms, which relies 
on browsing the proxy statements and annual reports of firms for information on ownership 
status (family or not), the institutional-based classification of firms is an accounting-based 
process that emphasises real firm practices and decisions. Particularly, it integrates several 
behavioural dimensions measured using easily accessible financial data on various databases, 
building mainly on the existing family business research.
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Figure 4.1 - Conceptual framework. 
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Table 4.1 - Preliminary multivariate analysis of moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation: Board size. 
The results of preliminary OLS multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is BoardSize representing the total 
number of directors on board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 
presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by 
firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
FamilyFirm -0.296*** -0.298*** -0.290*** -0.295*** 
 (0.0828) (0.0829) (0.0818) (0.0826) 
FirmSize 0.727***    0.726***    0.725***   0.728*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0411) (0.0409) (0.0408) 
Debt 1.970*** 1.670*** 1.683*** 1.681*** 
 (0.476) (0.394) (0.393) (0.394) 
Growth 0.365*** 0.452*** 0.367*** 0.366*** 
 (0.0950) (0.110) (0.0949) (0.0952) 
Risk -9.092*** -9.090*** -10.58*** -9.061*** 
 (1.074) (1.072) (1.292) (1.070) 
FreeCashFlow -1.545** -1.573*** -1.522** -1.687** 
 (0.469) (0.471) (0.467) (0.563) 
MarketPerformance -0.258*** -0.258*** -0.258*** -0.258*** 
 (0.0530) (0.0530) (0.0529) (0.0529) 
ExecutiveOwnership -7.272*** -7.322*** -7.304*** -7.283*** 
 (1.419) (1.419) (1.421) (1.424) 
FamilyFirm × Debt -0.641*    
 (0.254)    
FamilyFirm × Growth  -0.202+   
  (0.111)   
FamilyFirm × Risk   3.775*  
   (1.720)  
FamilyFirm × FreeCashFlow    0.357* 
    (0.172) 
Constant 9.801*** 9.809*** 9.801*** 9.806*** 
 (0.384) (0.384) (0.386) (0.385) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.192 0.192 0.191 
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Table 4.2 - Preliminary multivariate analysis of moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation: Board size. 
The results of preliminary OLS multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is BoardSize representing the total 
number of directors on board. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 
presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by 
firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
MarketFirm 0.392*** 0.401*** 0.408*** 0.390*** 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) 
FirmSize 0.727***     0.725***    0.724***     0.726***    
 (0.0406) (0.0412) (0.0410) (0.0407) 
Debt 1.664*** 1.670*** 1.686*** 1.679*** 
 (0.413) (0.393) (0.392) (0.394) 
Growth 0.357*** 0.294** 0.361*** 0.356*** 
 (0.0937) (0.0965) (0.0934) (0.0938) 
Risk -9.156*** -9.180*** -7.914*** -9.168*** 
 (1.072) (1.068) (1.171) (1.070) 
FreeCashFlow -1.548*** -1.539*** -1.500** -1.602** 
 (0.466) (0.465) (0.463) (0.497) 
MarketPerformance -0.250*** -0.248*** -0.252*** -0.249*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0523) (0.0523) (0.0525) 
ExecutiveOwnership -7.282*** -7.320*** -7.276*** -7.278*** 
 (1.413) (1.412) (1.411) (1.414) 
MarketFirm × Debt 0.962*    
 (0.429)    
MarketFirm × Growth  0.280*   
  (0.140)   
MarketFirm × Risk   -5.316**  
   (1.955)  
MarketFirm × FreeCashFlow    -0.339* 
    (0.151) 
Constant 9.592*** 9.622*** 9.590*** 9.595*** 
 (0.387) (0.386) (0.386) (0.387) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.193 0.194 0.192 
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Table 4.3 - Post-hoc regressions for other firms category (Hybrid firms and MLDFs) and FLDFs 
category: Board size. 
The results of preliminary post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and board size in firms 
other than FLDFs -Panel A- and FLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is BoardSize representing the total number 
of directors on board. FamilyFirm_Other is an indicator variable that equals 1 for FLDF, and 0 otherwise; 
FamilyFirm_Family is an indicator variable that equals 0 for FLDF, and -1 otherwise; Risk is the standard deviation 
of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-
book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term 
debt scaled by firm’s total assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
Panel A- Other firms category (Hybrid firms and MLDFs) 
FamilyFirm_Other -0.303*** -0.259** -0.262** -0.292*** 
 (0.0828) (0.0857) (0.0843) (0.0846) 
Risk -11.810***    
 (1.374)    
FamilyFirm_Other × Risk 3.809*    
 (1.744)    
Growth  0.305**   
  (0.0933)   
FamilyFirm_Other × Growth  -0.134   
  (0.110)   
Debt   3.065***  
   (0.477)  
FamilyFirm_Other × Debt   -0.492  
   (0.567)  
FreeCashFlow    -3.188*** 
    (0.548) 
FamilyFirm_Other × FreeCashFlow    0.340 
    (0.679) 
Constant 9.906*** 9.919*** 9.889*** 9.909*** 
 (0.407) (0.408) (0.406) (0.401) 
Panel B- FLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Family -0.303*** -0.259** -0.262** -0.292*** 
 (0.0828) (0.0857) (0.0843) (0.0846) 
Risk -8.000***    
 (1.446)    
FamilyFirm_Family × Risk 3.809*    
 (1.744)    
Growth  0.171+   
  (0.0940)   
FamilyFirm_Family × Growth  -0.134   
  (0.110)   
Debt   2.573***  
   (0.461)  
FamilyFirm_Family × Debt   -0.492  
   (0.567)  
FreeCashFlow    -2.848*** 
    (0.564) 
FamilyFirm_Family × FreeCashFlow    0.340 
    (0.679) 
Constant 9.603*** 9.660*** 9.627*** 9.617*** 
 (0.413) (0.415) (0.413) (0.407) 
Observations 6286 6286 6286 6286 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.0765 0.107 0.0933 
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Table 4.4 - Post-hoc regressions for other firms category (Hybrid firms and FLDFs) and MLDFs 
category: Board size. 
The results of preliminary post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and board size in firms 
other than MLDFs -Panel A- and MLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is BoardSize representing the total 
number of directors on board. MarketFirm_Other is an indicator variable that equals 1 for MLDF, and 0 otherwise; 
MarketFirm_Market is an indicator variable that equals 0 for MLDF, and -1 otherwise; Risk is the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; Growth is the natural logarithm of 
market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
Panel A- Other firms category (Hybrid firms and FLDFs) 
MarketFirm_Other  0.470*** 0.396*** 0.375*** 0.419*** 
 (0.102) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) 
Risk -9.081***    
 (1.189)    
MarketFirm_Other × Risk -5.541**    
 (2.056)    
Growth  0.182*   
  (0.0792)   
MarketFirm_Other × Growth  0.323*   
  (0.142)   
Debt   2.432**  
   (0.741)  
MarketFirm_Other × Debt   -0.485  
   (0.740)  
FreeCashFlow    -2.776** 
    (0.851) 
MarketFirm_Other × FreeCashFlow    0.359 
    (0.868) 
Constant 9.712*** 9.775*** 9.729*** 9.725*** 
 (0.406) (0.411) (0.407) (0.402) 
Panel B- MLDFs category 
MarketFirm_Market 0.470*** 0.396*** 0.375*** 0.419*** 
 (0.102) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) 
Risk -12.620***    
 (1.956)    
MarketFirm_Market × Risk -5.541**    
 (2.056)    
Growth  0.505***   
  (0.138)   
MarketFirm_Market × Growth  0.323*   
  (0.142)   
Debt   2.918***  
   (0.386)  
MarketFirm_Market × Debt   -0.485  
   (0.740)  
FreeCashFlow    -3.135*** 
    (0.460) 
MarketFirm_Market × FreeCashFlow    0.359 
    (0.868) 
Constant 10.18*** 10.17*** 10.10*** 10.14*** 
 (0.404) (0.410) (0.408) (0.402) 
Observations 6286 6286 6286 6286 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.0798 0.108 0.0954 
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Table 4.5 - Robustness test (Random-effects estimation, Moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation): Board size. 
The results of random-effects estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is BoardSize representing the total 
number of directors on board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 
presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by 
firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
FamilyFirm -0.153* -0.141+ -0.132+ -0.136+ 
 (0.0715) (0.0709) (0.0713) (0.0713) 
FirmSize 0.673**    0.671**    0.669**  0.672** 
 (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0260) 
Debt 0.746** 0.631** 0.628** 0.631** 
 (0.227) (0.200) (0.200) (0.199) 
Growth 0.164** 0.124* 0.120* 0.188** 
 (0.0536) (0.0592) (0.0536) (0.0536) 
Risk -1.188** -1.186** -1.799** -1.183** 
 (0.453) (0.453) (0.607) (0.453) 
FreeCashFlow -0.420+ -0.418+ -0.416+ -0.414+ 
 (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) 
MarketPerformance -0.0817** -0.0815** -0.0823** -0.0814** 
 (0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0262) 
ExecutiveOwnership -2.565* -2.572* -2.562* -2.570* 
 (1.204) (1.203) (1.204) (1.203) 
FamilyFirm × Debt -0.278*    
 (0.129)    
FamilyFirm × Growth  -0.0812+   
  (0.0492)   
FamilyFirm × Risk   1.455+  
   (0.780)  
FamilyFirm × FreeCashFlow    0.232+ 
    (0.126) 
Constant 9.615*** 9.617*** 9.616*** 9.617*** 
 (0.337) (0.336) (0.336) (0.336) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4.6 - Robustness test (Random-effects estimation, Moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation): Board size 
The results of random-effects estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is BoardSize representing the total 
number of directors on board. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 
presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by 
firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
MarketFirm 0.189* 0.173+ 0.139+ 0.158+ 
 (0.0922) (0.0920) (0.0921) (0.0923) 
FirmSize 0.672**    0.670**    0.670**  0.672** 
 (0.0260) (0.0261) (0.0260) (0.0261) 
Debt 0.554** 0.636** 0.636** 0.635** 
 (0.207) (0.199) (0.199) (0.200) 
Growth 0.215** 0.204** 0.218** 0.216** 
 (0.0637) (0.0652) (0.0637) (0.0637) 
Risk -1.168* -1.169* -1.210* -1.171** 
 (0.454) (0.455) (0.488) (0.454) 
FreeCashFlow -0.428+ -0.414+ -0.417+ -0.413+ 
 (0.236) (0.235) (0.235) (0.246) 
MarketPerformance -0.0822** -0.0818** -0.0819** -0.0818** 
 (0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0262) 
ExecutiveOwnership -2.577* -2.576* -2.588* -2.581* 
 (1.205) (1.205) (1.205) (1.204) 
MarketFirm × Debt 0.393+    
 (0.244)    
MarketFirm × Growth  0.163*   
  (0.0690)   
MarketFirm × Risk   -0.458*  
   (0.213)  
MarketFirm × FreeCashFlow    -0.193+ 
    (0.106) 
Constant 9.603*** 9.601*** 9.606*** 9.606*** 
 (0.338) (0.338) (0.337) (0.337) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4.7 - Robustness test (Dynamic estimation, Moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation): Board size. 
The results of dynamic estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is BoardSize representing the total number 
of directors on board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 
presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by 
firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
FamilyFirm -0.0548* -0.0552* -0.0549* -0.0557* 
 (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0232) 
FirmSize 0.483***    0.481***    0.484***   0.481*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0103) 
Debt 0.353** 0.249** 0.253** 0.246** 
 (0.127) (0.0916) (0.0915) (0.0918) 
Growth 0.0557* 0.0656* 0.0570* 0.0548* 
 (0.0267) (0.0318) (0.0267) (0.0266) 
Risk -1.420*** -1.416*** -2.160*** -1.425*** 
 (0.320) (0.321) (0.448) (0.321) 
FreeCashFlow -0.281* -0.284* -0.270* -0.287+ 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.150) 
MarketPerformance -0.0341* -0.0339* -0.0340* -0.0338* 
 (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) 
ExecutiveOwnership -1.142*** -1.151*** -1.158*** -1.148*** 
 (0.214) (0.215) (0.217) (0.214) 
(lag) BoardSize 0.866*** 0.866*** 0.866*** 0.867*** 
 (0.00708) (0.00711) (0.00713) (0.00708) 
FamilyFirm × Debt -0.225*    
 (0.0869)    
FamilyFirm × Growth  -0.0231+   
  (0.0126)   
FamilyFirm × Risk   1.864**  
   (0.636)  
FamilyFirm × FreeCashFlow    0.153+ 
    (0.101) 
Constant 1.327*** 1.329*** 1.329*** 1.328*** 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.812 0.812 0.812 0.812 
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Table 4.8 - Robustness test (Dynamic estimation, Moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation): Board size. 
The results of dynamic estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is BoardSize representing the total number 
of directors on board. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 
presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by 
firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
MarketFirm 0.0820** 0.0813** 0.0815** 0.0818** 
 (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0301) 
FirmSize 0.484***    0.480***    0.482***   0.481*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Debt 0.185+ 0.250** 0.250** 0.249** 
 (0.102) (0.0916) (0.0915) (0.0914) 
Growth 0.0552* 0.0595* 0.0558* 0.0551* 
 (0.0265) (0.0273) (0.0266) (0.0266) 
Risk -1.410*** -1.408*** -1.237*** -1.412*** 
 (0.321) (0.322) (0.364) (0.321) 
FreeCashFlow -0.284* -0.278* -0.272* -0.283* 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.132) 
MarketPerformance -0.0344* -0.0336* -0.0338* -0.0334* 
 (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0163) 
ExecutiveOwnership -1.155*** -1.144*** -1.150*** -1.148*** 
 (0.214) (0.215) (0.215) (0.214) 
(lag) BoardSize 0.867*** 0.867*** 0.866*** 0.867*** 
 (0.00710) (0.00713) (0.00715) (0.00712) 
MarketFirm × Debt 0.215*    
 (0.0981)    
MarketFirm × Growth  0.0398+   
  (0.0258)   
MarketFirm × Risk   -0.757*  
   (0.301)  
MarketFirm × FreeCashFlow    -0.230+ 
    (0.124) 
Constant 1.310*** 1.309*** 1.315*** 1.313*** 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.812 0.812 0.812 0.812 
 
  
4 Corporate Governance Drivers & the Moderating Role of 
Institutional Logics 
187 
 
Table 4.9 - Robustness test (Reduced sample): Board size. 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using a reduced sample, excluding hybrid firms. The dependent variable is 
BoardSize representing the total number of directors on board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 if the firm logic 
orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of 
firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of 
market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings 
scaled by firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total 
assets; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
FamilyFirm -0.685*** -0.692*** -0.697*** -0.688*** 
 (0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.157) 
FirmSize 0.755***    0.753***    0.758***   0.752***    
 (0.0518) (0.0539) (0.0529) (0.0525) 
Debt 1.971* 1.322* 1.350** 1.389** 
 (0.961) (0.520) (0.516) (0.518) 
Growth 0.417** 0.671*** 0.440*** 0.422** 
 (0.130) (0.188) (0.130) (0.130) 
Risk -9.530*** -9.610*** -10.510*** -9.445*** 
 (1.442) (1.438) (2.370) (1.436) 
FreeCashFlow -1.310* -1.305* -1.216* -1.876+ 
 (0.608) (0.606) (0.598) (1.035) 
MarketPerformance -0.320*** -0.318*** -0.326*** -0.320*** 
 (0.0750) (0.0764) (0.0751) (0.0752) 
ExecutiveOwnership -6.325*** -6.360*** -6.277*** -6.275*** 
 (1.760) (1.754) (1.763) (1.773) 
FamilyFirm × Debt -1.542**    
 (0.577)    
FamilyFirm × Growth  -0.369+   
  (0.199)   
FamilyFirm × Risk   6.390*  
   (2.854)  
FamilyFirm × FreeCashFlow    0.899+ 
    (0.501) 
Constant 9.703*** 9.754*** 9.716*** 9.713*** 
 (0.503) (0.499) (0.505) (0.503) 
Observations 2241 2241 2241 2241 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.175 0.175 0.173 
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Table 4.10 - Post-hoc regression for MLDFs category and FLDFs category: Board size. 
The results of robustness post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and board size in MLDFs -
Panel A- and FLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is BoardSize representing the total number of directors on 
board. FamilyFirm_Market is an indicator variable that equals 1 for FLDF, and 0 for MLDF; FamilyFirm_Family is 
an indicator variable that equals 0 for FLDFs, and -1 for MLDF; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity 
as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s 
total assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
Panel A- MLDFs category  
FamilyFirm_Market -0.618*** -0.499*** -0.498*** -0.553*** 
 (0.145) (0.149) (0.149) (0.151) 
Risk -11.012***    
 (2.355)    
FamilyFirm_Market × Risk 5.715*    
 (2.813)    
Growth  0.530**   
  (0.162)   
FamilyFirm_Market × Growth  -0.414*   
  (0.189)   
Debt   2.649**  
   (0.929)  
FamilyFirm_Market × Debt   -0.238  
   (1.038)  
FreeCashFlow    -2.717** 
    (1.024) 
FamilyFirm_Market × FreeCashFlow    0.213 
    (1.177) 
Constant 9.773*** 9.795*** 9.671*** 9.724*** 
 (0.472) (0.483) (0.509) (0.477) 
Panel B- FLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Family -0.618*** -0.499*** -0.498*** -0.553*** 
 (0.145) (0.149) (0.149) (0.151) 
Risk -8.290***    
 (1.641)    
FamilyFirm_Family × Risk 5.715*    
 (2.813)    
Growth  0.315**   
  (0.111)   
FamilyFirm_Family × Growth  -0.414*   
  (0.189)   
Debt   2.412***  
   (0.517)  
FamilyFirm_Family × Debt   -0.238  
   (1.038)  
FreeCashFlow    -2.504*** 
    (0.643) 
FamilyFirm_Family × FreeCashFlow    0.213 
    (1.177) 
Constant 9.155*** 9.296*** 9.173*** 9.171*** 
 (0.479) (0.489) (0.514) (0.485) 
Observations 3006 3006 3006 3006 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.0779 0.0970 0.0848 
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Table 4.11 - Preliminary multivariate analysis of moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation: Board independence. 
The results of preliminary OLS multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is BoardIndependence representing the 
percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value 
is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by 
firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding share; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s positions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
FamilyFirm -0.0115** -0.0117** -0.0115** -0.0116** 
 (0.00419) (0.00419) (0.00418) (0.00419) 
FirmSize 0.0116*** 0.0113*** 0.0114*** 0.0116*** 
 (0.00228) (0.00228) (0.00229) (0.00228) 
Debt 0.0654** 0.0734*** 0.0734*** 0.0729*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) 
Growth 0.0144* 0.0210** 0.0145* 0.0141* 
 (0.00581) (0.00596) (0.00582) (0.00581) 
Risk -0.114* -0.119* -0.168* -0.115* 
 (0.0528) (0.0527) (0.0670) (0.0527) 
FreeCashFlow 0.0388 0.0363 0.0389 0.0481+ 
 (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0284) 
MarketPerformance  -0.0123***     -0.0124*** -0.0124***    -0.0123***    
 (0.00343) (0.00341)   (0.00345) (0.00346) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.261*** -0.264*** -0.260*** -0.261*** 
 (0.0765) (0.0763) (0.0764) (0.0764) 
ExecutiveAge -0.000439 -0.000444 -0.000427 -0.000439 
 (0.000435) (0.000435) (0.000435) (0.000435) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.000519 -0.000519 -0.000542 -0.000522 
 (0.000456) (0.000455) (0.000457) (0.000457) 
FamilyFirm × Debt -0.0470*    
 (0.0227)    
FamilyFirm × Growth  -0.0141*   
  (0.00623)   
FamilyFirm × Risk   0.0564*  
   (0.0251)  
FamilyFirm × FreeCashFlow    -0.0352+ 
    (0.0204) 
Constant 0.724*** 0.721*** 0.722*** 0.723*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0184) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.139 0.138 0.138 
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Table 4.12 - Preliminary multivariate analysis of moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation: Board independence. 
The results of preliminary OLS multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is BoardIndependence representing the 
percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value 
is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of 
firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of 
market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings 
scaled by firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total 
assets; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding share; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s positions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
MarketFirm 0.0151** 0.0156** 0.0151** 0.0151** 
 (0.00490) (0.00487) (0.00490) (0.00495) 
FirmSize 0.0116*** 0.0112*** 0.0116*** 0.0115*** 
 (0.00229) (0.00229) (0.00230) (0.00229) 
Debt 0.0784*** 0.0723*** 0.0725*** 0.0726*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0203) 
Growth 0.0142* 0.0202** 0.0141* 0.0146* 
 (0.00582) (0.00591) (0.00582) (0.00583) 
Risk -0.116* -0.121* -0.118* -0.116* 
 (0.0527) (0.0525) (0.0585) (0.0525) 
FreeCashFlow 0.0393 0.0381 0.0384 0.0390+ 
 (0.0246) (0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0241) 
MarketPerformance  -0.0120***    -0.0124***    -0.0123***      -0.0121***    
 (0.00344) (0.00342) (0.00346) (0.00345) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.259*** -0.262*** -0.259*** -0.260*** 
 (0.0761) (0.0757) (0.0760) (0.0760) 
ExecutiveAge -0.000444 -0.000449 -0.000447 -0.000447 
 (0.000436) (0.000435) (0.000436) (0.000436) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.000525 -0.000540 -0.000530 -0.000530 
 (0.000455) (0.000454) (0.000455) (0.000455) 
MarketFirm × Debt 0.0601+    
 (0.0369)    
MarketFirm × Growth  0.0185*   
  (0.00753)   
MarketFirm × Risk   -0.0924*  
   (0.0452)  
MarketFirm × FreeCashFlow    0.0488* 
    (0.0210) 
Constant 0.715*** 0.716*** 0.715*** 0.714*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.140 0.138 0.138 
 
 
  
4 Corporate Governance Drivers & the Moderating Role of 
Institutional Logics 
191 
 
Table 4.13 - Post-hoc regressions for other firms category (Hybrid firms and MLDFs) and 
FLDFs category: Board independence. 
The results of preliminary post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and board independence in 
firms other than FLDFs -Panel A- and FLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is BoardIndependence representing 
the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board. FamilyFirm_Other is an indicator variable that equals 1 for FLDF, and 0 
otherwise; FamilyFirm_Family is an indicator variable that equals 0 for FLDF, and -1 otherwise; Risk is the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; Growth is the natural 
logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Debt is the 
debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total 
assets. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
Panel A- Other firms category (Hybrid firms and MLDFs) 
FamilyFirm_Other -0.0149*** -0.0140** -0.0141** -0.0143** 
 (0.00437) (0.00436) (0.00430) (0.00439) 
Risk -0.321***    
 (0.0713)    
FamilyFirm_Other × Risk 0.156+    
 (0.0907)    
Growth  0.0154**   
  (0.00490)   
FamilyFirm_Other × Growth  -0.0153*   
  (0.00655)   
Debt   0.137***  
   (0.0258)  
FamilyFirm_Other × Debt   0.00510  
   (0.0289)  
FreeCashFlow    0.0516* 
    (0.0237) 
FamilyFirm_Other × FreeCashFlow    -0.0137 
    (0.0370) 
Constant 0.723*** 0.721*** 0.722*** 0.723*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0196) (0.0204) (0.0210) 
Panel B- FLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Family -0.0149*** -0.0140** -0.0141** -0.0143** 
 (0.00437) (0.00436) (0.00430) (0.00439) 
Risk -0.165*    
 (0.0749)    
FamilyFirm_Family × Risk 0.156+    
 (0.0907)    
Growth  0.0112*   
  (0.00481)   
FamilyFirm_Family × Growth  -0.0153*   
  (0.00655)   
Debt   0.112***  
   (0.0236)  
FamilyFirm_Family × Debt   0.00510  
   (0.0289)  
FreeCashFlow    0.0379* 
    (0.0179) 
FamilyFirm_Other × FreeCashFlow    -0.0137 
    (0.0370) 
Constant 0.709*** 0.710*** 0.708*** 0.709*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0196) (0.0203) (0.0209) 
Observations 6286 6286 6286 6286 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.0758 0.0708 0.0862 0.0680 
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Table 4.14 - Post-hoc regressions for other firms category (Hybrid firms and FLDFs) and 
MLDFs category: Board independence. 
The results of preliminary post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and board independence in 
firms other than MLDFs -Panel A- and MLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is BoardIndependence 
representing the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided 
by the total number of directors on the board. MarketFirm_Other is an indicator variable that equals 1 for MLDF, 
and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm_Market is an indicator variable that equals 0 for MLDF, and -1 otherwise; Risk is the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; Growth is the natural 
logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Debt is the 
debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total 
assets. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
Panel A- Other firms category (Hybrid firms and FLDFs) 
MarketFirm_Other  0.0200*** 0.0189*** 0.0179*** 0.0186*** 
 (0.00508) (0.00508) (0.00512) (0.00517) 
Risk -0.247***    
 (0.0636)    
MarketFirm_Other × Risk -0.0558    
 (0.102)    
Growth  0.0267***   
  (0.00707)   
MarketFirm_Other × Growth  0.0225**   
  (0.00782)   
Debt   0.0923*  
   (0.0367)  
MarketFirm_Other × Debt   -0.0258  
   (0.0391)  
FreeCashFlow    0.0431+ 
    (0.0260) 
FamilyFirm_Other × FreeCashFlow    -0.000350 
    (0.0438) 
Constant 0.714*** 0.717*** 0.714*** 0.714*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0207) (0.0202) (0.0208) 
Panel B- MLDFs category 
MarketFirm_Market 0.0200*** 0.0189*** 0.0179*** 0.0186*** 
 (0.00508) (0.00508) (0.00512) (0.00517) 
Risk -0.303**    
 (0.0930)    
MarketFirm_Market × Risk -0.0558    
 (0.102)    
Growth  0.0423***   
  (0.00496)   
MarketFirm_Market × Growth  0.0225**   
  (0.00782)   
Debt   0.118***  
   (0.0217)  
MarketFirm_Market × Debt   -0.0258  
   (0.0391)  
FreeCashFlow    0.0534* 
    (0.0215) 
FamilyFirm_Other × FreeCashFlow    -0.000350 
    (0.0438) 
Constant 0.734*** 0.736*** 0.732*** 0.733*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0206) (0.0212) 
Observations 6286 6286 6286 6286 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.0759 0.0724 0.0866 0.0685 
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Table 4.15 - Robustness test (Random-effects estimation, Moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation): Board independence. 
The results of random-effects estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is BoardIndependence representing 
the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value 
is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by 
firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding share; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s positions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
FamilyFirm -0.00683* -0.00681* -0.00695* -0.00689* 
 (0.00306) (0.00305) (0.00305) (0.00306) 
FirmSize 0.00983*** 0.00972*** 0.00970*** 0.00987*** 
 (0.00221) (0.00222) (0.00222) (0.00221) 
Debt 0.0280+ 0.0262+ 0.0254+ 0.0279* 
 (0.0146) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0135) 
Growth 0.0117* 0.0128* 0.0118* 0.0114* 
 (0.00451) (0.00498) (0.00467) (0.00468) 
Risk -0.0751** -0.0766** -0.113** -0.0748** 
 (0.0273) (0.0274) (0.0368) (0.0274) 
FreeCashFlow 0.0103 0.00921 0.01000 0.0257+ 
 (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0146) 
MarketPerformance  -0.00961***     -0.00963*** -0.00970***  -0.00965***   
 (0.00210) (0.00212)   (0.00209) (0.00214) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.0724 -0.0731 -0.0716 -0.0733 
 (0.0574) (0.0574) (0.0574) (0.0569) 
ExecutiveAge -0.000391 -0.000391 -0.000397 -0.000390 
 (0.000303) (0.000303) (0.000303) (0.000303) 
ExecutiveTenure -1.99e-05 -1.39e-05 -6.12e-06 -1.55e-05 
 (0.000369) (0.000369) (0.000370) (0.000370) 
FamilyFirm × Debt -0.0170+    
 (0.0102)    
FamilyFirm × Growth  -0.0105**   
  (0.00382)   
FamilyFirm × Risk   0.0880+  
   (0.0461)  
FamilyFirm × FreeCashFlow    0.0396+ 
    (0.0205) 
Constant 0.701*** 0.701*** 0.701*** 0.701*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4.16 - Robustness test (Random-effects estimation, Moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation): Board independence. 
The results of random-effects estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is BoardIndependence representing 
the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value 
is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of 
firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of 
market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings 
scaled by firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total 
assets; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding share; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s positions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
MarketFirm 0.00263+ 0.00262+ 0.00267+ 0.00265+ 
 (0.00146) (0.00141) (0.00142) (0.00142) 
FirmSize 0.00985*** 0.00970*** 0.00979*** 0.00982*** 
 (0.00222) (0.00221) (0.00222) (0.00221) 
Debt 0.0276+ 0.0278* 0.0261+ 0.0281* 
 (0.0144) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0135) 
Growth 0.0110* 0.0156*** 0.0115* 0.0118* 
 (0.00467) (0.00479) (0.00476) (0.00469) 
Risk -0.0748** -0.0754** -0.0745* -0.0756** 
 (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0306) (0.0274) 
FreeCashFlow 0.0111 0.00992 0.0103 0.0285+ 
 (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0174) 
MarketPerformance  -0.00963***     -0.00962*** -0.00969***  -0.00964***   
 (0.00209) (0.00210)   (0.00211) (0.00212) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.0735 -0.0739 -0.0729 -0.0726 
 (0.0574) (0.0573) (0.0573) (0.0571) 
ExecutiveAge -0.000384 -0.000392 -0.000389 -0.000389 
 (0.000303) (0.000302) (0.000303) (0.000304) 
ExecutiveTenure -1.96e-05 -1.24e-05 -1.50e-05 -1.47e-05 
 (0.000369) (0.000369) (0.000369) (0.000369) 
MarketFirm × Debt 0.0233+    
 (0.0127)    
MarketFirm × Growth  0.0112*   
  (0.00456)   
MarketFirm × Risk   -0.0295+  
   (0.0166)  
MarketFirm × FreeCashFlow    0.0414+ 
    (0.0220) 
Constant 0.700*** 0.700*** 0.700*** 0.700*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4.17 - Robustness test (Dynamic estimation, Moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation): Board independence. 
The results of dynamic estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is BoardIndependence representing the 
percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value 
is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by 
firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding share; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s positions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
FamilyFirm -0.00244+ -0.00243+ -0.00249+ -0.00245+ 
 (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00146) (0.00145) 
FirmSize 0.00185** 0.00170** 0.00175** 0.00185** 
 (0.000626) (0.000629) (0.000630) (0.000625) 
Debt 0.0132+ 0.0129* 0.0129* 0.0122+ 
 (0.00798) (0.00637) (0.00636) (0.00636) 
Growth 0.00261* 0.00293* 0.00267* 0.00269* 
 (0.00124) (0.00132) (0.00125) (0.00125) 
Risk -0.0695** -0.0719** -0.0870** -0.0717** 
 (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0311) (0.0229) 
FreeCashFlow 0.0129 0.0118 0.0129 0.0277** 
 (0.00792) (0.00792) (0.00793) (0.00981) 
MarketPerformance  -0.0110***    -0.0112*** -0.0109***    -0.0108***    
 (0.00111) (0.00110)   (0.00113) (0.00111) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.0654** -0.0670** -0.0654** -0.0651** 
 (0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0222) 
ExecutiveAge -3.54e-05 -4.07e-05 -3.36e-05 -3.59e-05 
 (0.000132) (0.000131) (0.000131) (0.000131) 
ExecutiveTenure -3.85e-05 -3.36e-05 -4.17e-05 -4.15e-05 
 (0.000120) (0.000120) (0.000120) (0.000120) 
(lag) BoardIndependence 0.820*** 0.820*** 0.820*** 0.820*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
FamilyFirm × Debt -0.0102+    
 (0.00583)    
FamilyFirm × Growth  -0.00223*   
  (0.00110)   
FamilyFirm × Risk   0.0403+  
   (0.0204)  
FamilyFirm × FreeCashFlow    -0.0174* 
    (0.00734) 
Constant 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745 
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Table 4.18 - Robustness test (Dynamic estimation, Moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation): Board independence. 
The results of dynamic estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is BoardIndependence representing the 
percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value 
is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of 
firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of 
market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings 
scaled by firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total 
assets; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding share; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s positions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
MarketFirm 0.00443* 0.00470* 0.00461* 0.00473* 
 (0.00184) (0.00184) (0.00183) (0.00184) 
FirmSize 0.00178** 0.00172** 0.00185** 0.00179** 
 (0.000631) (0.000635) (0.000635) (0.000630) 
Debt 0.0127+ 0.0127* 0.0126* 0.0125+ 
 (0.00697) (0.00636) (0.00637) (0.00637) 
Growth 0.00263* 0.00289* 0.00264* 0.00261* 
 (0.00125) (0.00130) (0.00125) (0.00126) 
Risk -0.0713** -0.0724** -0.0848** -0.0719** 
 (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0261) (0.0230) 
FreeCashFlow 0.0126 0.0125 0.0122 0.0220* 
 (0.00792) (0.00792) (0.00793) (0.00914) 
MarketPerformance  -0.0114***    -0.0110*** -0.0111***    -0.0110***    
 (0.00113) (0.00111)   (0.00112) (0.00112) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.0652** -0.0660** -0.0648** -0.0649** 
 (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222) 
ExecutiveAge -3.91e-05 -4.05e-05 -4.01e-05 -3.77e-05 
 (0.000132) (0.000132) (0.000132) (0.000131) 
ExecutiveTenure -3.71e-05 -3.81e-05 -3.64e-05 -3.91e-05 
 (0.000120) (0.000120) (0.000120) (0.000120) 
(lag) BoardIndependence 0.820*** 0.820*** 0.820*** 0.820*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
MarketFirm × Debt 0.0222+    
 (0.0137)    
MarketFirm × Growth  0.00348+   
  (0.00211)   
MarketFirm × Risk   -0.0612*  
   (0.0257)  
MarketFirm × FreeCashFlow    0.0169+ 
    (0.0105) 
Constant 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Observations 5299 5299 5299 5299 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745 
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Table 4.19 - Robustness test (Reduced sample): Board independence. 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using a reduced sample, excluding hybrid firms. The dependent variable is 
BoardIndependence representing the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of 
outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 if the firm 
logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs; FirmSize is the natural logarithm 
of firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm 
of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings 
scaled by firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total 
assets; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding share; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s positions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
FamilyFirm -0.0180** -0.0189** -0.0183** -0.0183** 
 (0.00688) (0.00685) (0.00690) (0.00693) 
FirmSize 0.0123*** 0.0114*** 0.0121*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.00286) (0.00287) (0.00289) (0.00288) 
Debt 0.0715** 0.0695** 0.0696** 0.0700** 
 (0.0255) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0260) 
Growth 0.0282*** 0.0369*** 0.0278*** 0.0273*** 
 (0.00803) (0.00828) (0.00805) (0.00811) 
Risk -0.0516 -0.0639 -0.0806 -0.0526 
 (0.0695) (0.0687) (0.107) (0.0690) 
FreeCashFlow 0.0306 0.0380+ 0.0302 0.0491+ 
 (0.0309) (0.0216) (0.0307) (0.0310) 
MarketPerformance  -0.0137***    -0.0139***    -0.0136***    -0.0137***    
 (0.00473) (0.00469) (0.00477) (0.00477) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.227* -0.235* -0.228* -0.229* 
 (0.0992) (0.0989) (0.0991) (0.0990) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00119* -0.00120* -0.00119* -0.00119* 
 (0.000535) (0.000534) (0.000535) (0.000534) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.000454 -0.000479 -0.000467 -0.000458 
 (0.000541) (0.000536) (0.000540) (0.000542) 
FamilyFirm × Debt -0.0540*    
 (0.0253)    
FamilyFirm × Growth  -0.0226*   
  (0.0101)   
FamilyFirm × Risk   0.0729+  
   (0.0459)  
FamilyFirm × FreeCashFlow    -0.0354+ 
    (0.0212) 
Constant 0.721*** 0.723*** 0.720*** 0.720*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0249) 
Observations 2241 2241 2241 2241 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.150 0.153 0.149 0.149 
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Table 4.20 - Post-hoc regressions for MLDFs category and FLDFs category: Board 
independence. 
The results of robustness post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and board independence in 
MLDFs -Panel A- and FLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is BoardIndependence representing the percentage 
of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of 
directors on the board. FamilyFirm_Market is an indicator variable that equals 1 for FLDF, and 0 for MLDF; 
FamilyFirm_Family is an indicator variable that equals 0 for FLDF, and -1 for MLDF; Risk is the standard deviation 
of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-
book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term 
debt scaled by firm’s total assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
Panel A- MLDFs category  
FamilyFirm_Market -0.0235** -0.0213** -0.0216** -0.0222** 
 (0.00717) (0.00714) (0.00714) (0.00726) 
Risk -0.292**    
 (0.113)    
FamilyFirm_Market × Risk 0.119    
 (0.141)    
Growth  0.0283***   
  (0.00797)   
FamilyFirm_Market × Growth  -0.0266*   
  (0.0105)   
Debt   0.114***  
   (0.0297)  
FamilyFirm_Market × Debt   0.0199  
   (0.0542)  
FreeCashFlow    0.0603+ 
    (0.0322) 
FamilyFirm_Market × FreeCashFlow    0.0149 
    (0.0624) 
Constant 0.724*** 0.721*** 0.727*** 0.723*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0251) (0.0242) (0.0245) 
Panel B- FLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Family -0.0235** -0.0213** -0.0216** -0.0222** 
 (0.00717) (0.00714) (0.00714) (0.00726) 
Risk -0.174+    
 (0.0918)    
FamilyFirm_Family × Risk 0.119    
 (0.141)    
Growth  0.0171*   
  (0.00742)   
FamilyFirm_Family × Growth  -0.0266*   
  (0.0105)   
Debt   0.0939*  
   (0.0467)  
FamilyFirm_Family × Debt   0.0199  
   (0.0542)  
FreeCashFlow    0.0454+ 
    (0.0269) 
FamilyFirm_Family × FreeCashFlow    0.0149 
    (0.0624) 
Constant 0.700*** 0.700*** 0.705*** 0.701*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0247) (0.0239) (0.0242) 
Observations 3006 3006 3006 3006 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.0883 0.100 0.0902 0.0843 
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Table 4.21 - Preliminary multivariate analysis of moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation: Total compensation. 
The results of preliminary OLS multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is TotalComp representing the total 
compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual 
salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other 
compensation. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the 
familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is 
the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and 
board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on 
board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
FamilyFirm -0.0895*** -0.0894*** -0.0892*** -0.0886*** -0.0891*** -0.0897*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
FirmSize 0.391*** 0.390*** 0.389*** 0.390*** 0.390*** 0.390*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0126) 
FirmAge 0.104*** 0.0671** 0.0682** 0.0659** 0.0678** 0.0677** 
 (0.0282) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0242) 
Debt 0.201+ 0.277* 0.201+ 0.194+ 0.196+ 0.197+ 
 (0.109) (0.130) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) 
Growth 0.0847* 0.0846* 0.0871* 0.0843* 0.0849* 0.0849* 
 (0.0349) (0.0347) (0.0382) (0.0343) (0.0347) (0.0348) 
Risk -0.222 -0.225 -0.244 -0.249 -0.230 -0.226 
 (0.275) (0.275) (0.273) (0.272) (0.275) (0.275) 
MarketPerformance 0.0813** 0.0832** 0.0832** 0.110*** 0.0828** 0.0831** 
 (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0256) (0.0269) (0.0260) (0.0261) 
StockPerformance 1.752*** 1.746*** 1.732*** 1.707*** 2.032*** 1.751*** 
 (0.313) (0.313) (0.313) (0.312) (0.426) (0.314) 
Duality 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0264) (0.0264) 
BoardSize 0.0293*** 0.0294*** 0.0293*** 0.0291*** 0.0294*** 0.0293*** 
 (0.00801) (0.00803) (0.00804) (0.00804) (0.00803) (0.00803) 
BoardIndependence 0.354* 0.346* 0.343* 0.343* 0.346* 0.345* 
 (0.144) (0.144) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144) (0.144) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00466* 0.00473* 0.00472* 0.00472* 0.00470* 0.00406+ 
 (0.00204) (0.00205) (0.00204) (0.00204) (0.00205) (0.00246) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.00347 0.00337 0.00332 0.00337 0.00333 0.00335 
 (0.00240) (0.00241) (0.00240) (0.00239) (0.00241) (0.00241) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.710+ -0.717+ -0.742+ -0.753+ -0.724+ -0.720+ 
 (0.392) (0.392) (0.392) (0.392) (0.393) (0.393) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.704*** 0.710*** 0.701*** 0.700*** 0.709*** 0.708*** 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) 
FamilyFirm × FirmAge -0.0796*      
 (0.0320)      
FamilyFirm × Debt  -0.101+     
  (0.0619)     
FamilyFirm × Growth   -0.0787*    
   (0.0345)    
FamilyFirm × 
MarketPerformance 
   -0.0622*   
    (0.0255)   
FamilyFirm ×     -0.699*  
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StockPerformance 
     (0.334)  
FamilyFirm × ExecutiveAge      -0.00357+ 
      (0.00209) 
Constant 7.778*** 7.774*** 7.776*** 7.778*** 7.774*** 7.773*** 
 (0.0716) (0.0717) (0.0713) (0.0713) (0.0718) (0.0718) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.641 0.640 0.641 0.641 0.640 0.640 
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Table 4.22 - Preliminary multivariate analysis of moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation: Total compensation. 
The results of preliminary OLS multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is TotalComp representing the total 
compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual 
salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other 
compensation. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the 
marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge 
is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and 
board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on 
board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
MarketFirm 0.123*** 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0238) (0.0248) (0.0245) 
FirmSize 0.393*** 0.391*** 0.389*** 0.390*** 0.391*** 0.391*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0126) 
FirmAge 0.0892** 0.0644** 0.0662** 0.0637** 0.0660** 0.0647** 
 (0.0257) (0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0243) (0.0243) 
Debt 0.193+ 0.237+ 0.200+ 0.197+ 0.195+ 0.200+ 
 (0.109) (0.128) (0.108) (0.107) (0.109) (0.109) 
Growth 0.0849* 0.0843* 0.0886* 0.0848* 0.0849* 0.0842* 
 (0.0346) (0.0347) (0.0380) (0.0340) (0.0347) (0.0347) 
Risk -0.210 -0.224 -0.254 -0.265 -0.235 -0.225 
 (0.275) (0.275) (0.269) (0.268) (0.275) (0.275) 
MarketPerformance 0.0844** 0.0866*** 0.0867*** 0.0655** 0.0857*** 0.0860*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0260) (0.0255) (0.0254) (0.0259) (0.0260) 
StockPerformance 1.818*** 1.797*** 1.756*** 1.739*** 1.401*** 1.797*** 
 (0.312) (0.312) (0.310) (0.309) (0.353) (0.313) 
Duality 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0264) 
BoardSize 0.0286*** 0.0288*** 0.0288*** 0.0284*** 0.0287*** 0.0288*** 
 (0.00801) (0.00803) (0.00804) (0.00803) (0.00803) (0.00802) 
BoardIndependence 0.347* 0.341* 0.334* 0.336* 0.341* 0.337* 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) (0.144) (0.145) (0.145) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00457* 0.00461* 0.00464* 0.00470* 0.00455* 0.00518* 
 (0.00205) (0.00206) (0.00206) (0.00205) (0.00205) (0.00221) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.00360 0.00343 0.00354 0.00361 0.00337 0.00346 
 (0.00240) (0.00241) (0.00240) (0.00239) (0.00241) (0.00241) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.675+ -0.686+ -0.717+ -0.726+ -0.702+ -0.697+ 
 (0.394) (0.393) (0.394) (0.396) (0.393) (0.394) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.712*** 0.723*** 0.711*** 0.709*** 0.715*** 0.718*** 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) 
MarketFirm × FirmAge 0.135***      
 (0.0377)      
MarketFirm × Debt  0.189+     
  (0.109)     
MarketFirm × Growth   0.134**    
   (0.0441)    
MarketFirm × MarketPerformance    0.117***   
    (0.0322)   
MarketFirm × StockPerformance     1.687*  
     (0.809)  
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MarketFirm × ExecutiveAge      0.00421* 
      (0.00208) 
Constant 7.712*** 7.711*** 7.724*** 7.730*** 7.710*** 7.711*** 
 (0.0716) (0.0728) (0.0733) (0.0731) (0.0729) (0.0729) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.642 0.640 0.642 0.643 0.641 0.640 
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Table 4.23 - Post-hoc regressions for other firms category (Hybrid firms and MLDFs) and 
FLDFs category: Total compensation. 
The results of preliminary post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and total compensation in 
firms other than FLDFs -Panel A- and FLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is TotalComp representing the total 
compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual 
salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other 
compensation. FamilyFirm_Other is an indicator variable that equals 1 for FLDF, and 0 otherwise; 
FamilyFirm_Family is an indicator variable that equals 0 for FLDF, and -1 otherwise; FirmAge is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term 
debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value 
of equity divided by book value of equity; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total 
assets; StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO. Lagged values are 
used.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
Panel A- Other firms category (Hybrid firms and MLDFs) 
FamilyFirm_Other -0.118*** -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.154*** -0.159*** -0.154*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0355) (0.0358) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0364) 
FirmAge 0.387***      
 (0.0524)      
FamilyFirm_Other × FirmAge -0.0644      
 (0.0660)      
Debt  1.503***     
  (0.200)     
FamilyFirm_Other × Debt  -0.393     
  (0.247)     
Growth   0.356***    
   (0.0444)    
FamilyFirm_Other × Growth   -0.182***    
   (0.0550)    
MarketPerformance    0.0807**   
    (0.0274)   
FamilyFirm_Other × 
MarketPerformance 
   -0.0840*   
    (0.0348)   
StockPerformance     2.580***  
     (0.637)  
FamilyFirm_Other × 
StockPerformance 
    -0.138  
     (0.923)  
ExecutiveAge      0.00778+ 
      (0.00402) 
FamilyFirm_Other × 
ExecutiveAge 
     0.00610 
      (0.00496) 
Constant 7.863*** 7.868*** 7.899*** 7.888*** 7.878*** 7.872*** 
 (0.132) (0.133) (0.147) (0.145) (0.144) (0.145) 
Panel B- FLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Family -0.118*** -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.154*** -0.159*** -0.154*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0355) (0.0358) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0364) 
FirmAge 0.323***      
 (0.0553)      
FamilyFirm_Family × 
FirmAge 
-0.0644      
 (0.0660)      
Debt  1.110***     
  (0.204)     
FamilyFirm_Family × Debt  -0.393     
  (0.247)     
Growth   0.173***    
   (0.0442)    
FamilyFirm_Family × Growth   -0.182***    
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   (0.0550)    
MarketPerformance    0.0635*   
    (0.0308)   
FamilyFirm_Family × 
MarketPerformance 
   -0.0840*   
    (0.0348)   
StockPerformance     2.442***  
     (0.649)  
FamilyFirm_Family × 
StockPerformance 
    -0.138  
     (0.923)  
ExecutiveAge      0.00568+ 
      (0.00325) 
FamilyFirm_Family × 
ExecutiveAge 
     0.00610 
      (0.00496) 
Constant 7.745*** 7.707*** 7.737*** 7.734*** 7.719*** 7.718*** 
 (0.133) (0.134) (0.147) (0.146) (0.145) (0.145) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.147 0.149 0.107 0.106 0.103 
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Table 4.24 - Post-hoc regressions for other firms category (Hybrid firms and FLDFs) and 
MLDFs category: Total compensation. 
The results of preliminary post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and total compensation in 
firms other than MLDFs -Panel A- and MLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is TotalComp representing the total 
compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual 
salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other 
compensation. MarketFirm_Other is an indicator variable that equals 1 for MLDF, and 0 otherwise; 
MarketFirm_Market is an indicator variable that equals 0 for MLDF, and -1 otherwise; FirmAge is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term 
debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value 
of equity divided by book value of equity; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total 
assets; StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO. Lagged values are 
used. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
Panel A- Other firms category (Hybrid firms and FLDFs) 
MarketFirm_Other 0.137** 0.179*** 0.195*** 0.183*** 0.188*** 0.174*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0464) (0.0449) (0.0474) (0.0482) (0.0484) 
FirmAge 0.339***      
 (0.0433)      
MarketFirm_Other × FirmAge 0.108      
 (0.0818)      
Debt  1.205***     
  (0.170)     
MarketFirm_Other × Debt  0.555+     
  (0.322)     
Growth   0.215***    
   (0.0371)    
MarketFirm_Other × Growth   0.303***    
   (0.0609)    
MarketPerformance    0.171***   
    (0.0241)   
MarketFirm_Other × 
MarketPerformance 
   0.186***   
    (0.0378)   
StockPerformance     2.035***  
     (0.476)  
MarketFirm_Other × 
StockPerformance 
    2.359+  
     (1.239)  
ExecutiveAge      0.00680+ 
      (0.00359) 
MarketFirm_Other × 
ExecutiveAge 
     -0.00292 
      (0.00756) 
Constant 7.784*** 7.764*** 7.817*** 7.809*** 7.771*** 7.772*** 
 (0.131) (0.134) (0.148) (0.149) (0.145) (0.146) 
Panel B- MLDFs category 
MarketFirm_Market 0.137** 0.179*** 0.195*** 0.183*** 0.188*** 0.174*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0464) (0.0449) (0.0474) (0.0482) (0.0484) 
FirmAge 0.447***      
 (0.0818)      
MarketFirm_Market × 
FirmAge 
0.108      
 (0.0818)      
Debt  1.760***     
  (0.313)     
MarketFirm_Market × Debt  0.555+     
  (0.322)     
Growth   0.518***    
   (0.0576)    
MarketFirm_Market × Growth   0.303***    
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   (0.0609)    
MarketPerformance    0.197***   
    (0.0365)   
MarketFirm_Market × 
MarketPerformance 
   0.186***   
    (0.0378)   
StockPerformance     4.394***  
     (1.145)  
MarketFirm_Market × 
StockPerformance 
    2.359+  
     (1.239)  
ExecutiveAge      0.00751+ 
      (0.00426) 
MarketFirm_Market × 
ExecutiveAge 
     -0.00292 
      (0.00756) 
Constant 7.920*** 7.943*** 8.012*** 7.992*** 7.959*** 7.946*** 
 (0.135) (0.140) (0.154) (0.154) (0.150) (0.151) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.145 0.152 0.111 0.106 0.102 
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Table 4.25 - Robustness test (Random-effects estimation, Moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation): Total compensation. 
The results of random-effects estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is TotalComp representing the total 
compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual 
salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other 
compensation. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the 
familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is 
the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and 
board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on 
board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
FamilyFirm -0.0317* -0.0313* -0.0319* -0.0318* -0.0312* -0.0315* 
 (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0131) 
FirmSize 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.315*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) 
FirmAge 0.0477+ 0.0433+ 0.0437+ 0.0434+ 0.0437+ 0.0435+ 
 (0.0257) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
Debt 0.159* 0.177+ 0.159* 0.159* 0.159* 0.159* 
 (0.0804) (0.0920) (0.0805) (0.0804) (0.0805) (0.0805) 
Growth 0.0568* 0.0561* 0.0610* 0.0564* 0.0560* 0.0562* 
 (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0279) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) 
Risk -0.385* -0.384* -0.385* -0.383* -0.389* -0.383* 
 (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) 
MarketPerformance 0.0428* 0.0430* 0.0431* 0.0483** 0.0427* 0.0430* 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0183) 
StockPerformance 1.389*** 1.386*** 1.384*** 1.379*** 1.583*** 1.389*** 
 (0.256) (0.256) (0.255) (0.255) (0.337) (0.256) 
Duality 0.0889*** 0.0884*** 0.0882*** 0.0883*** 0.0885*** 0.0884*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0185) 
BoardSize 0.0117+ 0.0117+ 0.0117+ 0.0117+ 0.0117+ 0.0118+ 
 (0.00627) (0.00627) (0.00627) (0.00627) (0.00627) (0.00627) 
BoardIndependence 0.340*** 0.340*** 0.341*** 0.342*** 0.341*** 0.339*** 
 (0.0952) (0.0953) (0.0952) (0.0951) (0.0954) (0.0953) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00764*** 0.00765*** 0.00764*** 0.00763*** 0.00761*** 0.00729*** 
 (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00167) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.000858 0.000833 0.000848 0.000853 0.000849 0.000845 
 (0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00180) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.974** -0.972** -0.972** -0.975** -0.974** -0.972** 
 (0.318) (0.319) (0.319) (0.319) (0.319) (0.319) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.271** 0.273** 0.271** 0.271** 0.272** 0.272** 
 (0.0887) (0.0889) (0.0891) (0.0890) (0.0888) (0.0888) 
FamilyFirm × FirmAge -0.0314+      
 (0.0195)      
FamilyFirm × Debt  -0.106+     
  (0.0623)     
FamilyFirm × Growth   -0.0420+    
   (0.0219)    
FamilyFirm × 
MarketPerformance 
   -0.0227+   
    (0.0140)   
FamilyFirm ×     -0.974*  
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StockPerformance 
     (0.482)  
FamilyFirm × ExecutiveAge      -0.00410* 
      (0.00185) 
Constant 7.806*** 7.806*** 7.806*** 7.806*** 7.806*** 7.806*** 
 (0.0793) (0.0798) (0.0797) (0.0798) (0.0797) (0.0797) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4.26 - Robustness test (Random-effects estimation, Moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation): Total compensation. 
The results of random-effects estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is TotalComp representing the total 
compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual 
salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other 
compensation. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the 
marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge 
is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and 
board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on 
board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
MarketFirm 0.0241+ 0.0240+ 0.0239+ 0.0235+ 0.0229+ 0.0244+ 
 (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0136) 
FirmSize 0.316*** 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.316*** 0.315*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) 
FirmAge 0.0481+ 0.0434+ 0.0456+ 0.0444+ 0.0445+ 0.0437+ 
 (0.0249) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
Debt 0.156+ 0.150+ 0.155+ 0.156+ 0.155+ 0.157+ 
 (0.0803) (0.0855) (0.0802) (0.0802) (0.0804) (0.0804) 
Growth 0.0561* 0.0559* 0.0523+ 0.0543* 0.0558* 0.0558* 
 (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0266) (0.0260) (0.0262) (0.0261) 
Risk -0.381* -0.381* -0.389* -0.393* -0.394* -0.384* 
 (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.183) (0.182) 
MarketPerformance 0.0435* 0.0432* 0.0432* 0.0341+ 0.0430* 0.0434* 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0188) (0.0183) (0.0182) 
StockPerformance 1.405*** 1.393*** 1.388*** 1.397*** 1.169*** 1.401*** 
 (0.256) (0.256) (0.254) (0.254) (0.277) (0.256) 
Duality 0.0890*** 0.0880*** 0.0876*** 0.0877*** 0.0883*** 0.0883*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
BoardSize 0.0119+ 0.0117+ 0.0118+ 0.0117+ 0.0118+ 0.0119+ 
 (0.00628) (0.00627) (0.00626) (0.00626) (0.00628) (0.00628) 
BoardIndependence 0.339*** 0.339*** 0.336*** 0.339*** 0.339*** 0.336*** 
 (0.0954) (0.0954) (0.0951) (0.0952) (0.0954) (0.0955) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00761*** 0.00760*** 0.00768*** 0.00765*** 0.00756*** 0.00805*** 
 (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00160) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.000921 0.000855 0.000941 0.000961 0.000834 0.000895 
 (0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00179) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.959** -0.968** -0.976** -0.976** -0.969** -0.971** 
 (0.321) (0.320) (0.320) (0.321) (0.318) (0.320) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.273** 0.273** 0.264** 0.264** 0.272** 0.273** 
 (0.0887) (0.0890) (0.0892) (0.0891) (0.0890) (0.0888) 
MarketFirm × FirmAge 0.0551*      
 (0.0258)      
MarketFirm × Debt  0.0984+     
  (0.0610)     
MarketFirm × Growth   0.0619**    
   (0.0217)    
MarketFirm × 
MarketPerformance 
   0.0475***   
    (0.0142)   
MarketFirm ×     1.009+  
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StockPerformance 
     (0.518)  
MarketFirm × ExecutiveAge      0.00210+ 
      (0.00121) 
Constant 7.796*** 7.796*** 7.800*** 7.803*** 7.796*** 7.796*** 
 (0.0792) (0.0797) (0.0799) (0.0801) (0.0797) (0.0799) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4.27 - Robustness test (Dynamic estimation, Moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation): Total compensation. 
The results of dynamic estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is TotalComp representing the total 
compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual 
salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other 
compensation. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the 
familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is 
the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and 
board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on 
board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
FamilyFirm -0.0372*** -0.0369*** -0.0371*** -0.0369*** -0.0366** -0.0369*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
FirmSize 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 
 (0.00891) (0.00892) (0.00889) (0.00886) (0.00891) (0.00892) 
FirmAge 0.0454** 0.0288** 0.0299** 0.0291** 0.0299** 0.0293** 
 (0.0138) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Debt 0.0999* 0.0792+ 0.100* 0.0973* 0.0974* 0.0981* 
 (0.0487) (0.0419) (0.0486) (0.0485) (0.0487) (0.0486) 
Growth 0.0321+ 0.0322+ 0.0396* 0.0321+ 0.0320+ 0.0322+ 
 (0.0169) (0.0167) (0.0188) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0168) 
Risk -0.410** -0.409** -0.419** -0.419** -0.416** -0.413** 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) 
MarketPerformance 0.0305* 0.0313** 0.0314** 0.0401** 0.0308* 0.0314** 
 (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0132) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
StockPerformance 1.448*** 1.443*** 1.440*** 1.433*** 1.769*** 1.441*** 
 (0.274) (0.274) (0.273) (0.273) (0.377) (0.274) 
Duality 0.0521*** 0.0517*** 0.0505*** 0.0511*** 0.0512*** 0.0509*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) 
BoardSize 0.0122*** 0.0122*** 0.0122*** 0.0122** 0.0123*** 0.0123*** 
 (0.00370) (0.00370) (0.00370) (0.00370) (0.00369) (0.00369) 
BoardIndependence 0.178** 0.174** 0.174** 0.174** 0.175** 0.175** 
 (0.0653) (0.0650) (0.0650) (0.0650) (0.0652) (0.0652) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00231* 0.00234* 0.00234* 0.00234* 0.00230* 0.00301* 
 (0.000922) (0.000924) (0.000925) (0.000925) (0.000924) (0.00130) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.000308 0.000280 0.000243 0.000266 0.000222 0.000263 
 (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00102) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.277 -0.279 -0.291+ -0.292+ -0.287+ -0.277 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.282*** 0.286*** 0.282*** 0.282*** 0.283*** 0.285*** 
 (0.0491) (0.0491) (0.0493) (0.0493) (0.0491) (0.0491) 
(lag) TotalComp 0.631*** 0.632*** 0.631*** 0.630*** 0.631*** 0.632*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0183) 
FamilyFirm × FirmAge -0.0348+      
 (0.0200)      
FamilyFirm × Debt  -0.0684+     
  (0.0403)     
FamilyFirm × Growth   -0.0229*    
   (0.0104)    
FamilyFirm × 
MarketPerformance 
   -0.0206+   
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    (0.0111)   
FamilyFirm × StockPerformance     -0.793*  
     (0.354)  
FamilyFirm × ExecutiveAge      -0.00192+ 
      (0.00112) 
Constant 2.897*** 2.890*** 2.898*** 2.902*** 2.890*** 2.888*** 
 (0.146) (0.146) (0.145) (0.145) (0.146) (0.146) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.783 
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Table 4.28 - Robustness test (Dynamic estimation, Moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation): Total compensation. 
The results of dynamic estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is TotalComp representing the total 
compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual 
salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other 
compensation. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the 
marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge 
is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and 
board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on 
board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
MarketFirm 0.0542*** 0.0514*** 0.0532*** 0.0531*** 0.0543*** 0.0508*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0131) 
FirmSize 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 
 (0.00889) (0.00888) (0.00881) (0.00875) (0.00883) (0.00887) 
FirmAge 0.0191+ 0.0285** 0.0295** 0.0282** 0.0298** 0.0284** 
 (0.0112) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Debt 0.0974* 0.104* 0.101* 0.0950* 0.0960* 0.0978* 
 (0.0486) (0.0523) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0484) (0.0485) 
Growth 0.0320+ 0.0321+ 0.0383* 0.0320+ 0.0322+ 0.0320+ 
 (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0179) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0168) 
Risk -0.408** -0.414** -0.431** -0.435** -0.426** -0.411** 
 (0.155) (0.155) (0.153) (0.153) (0.155) (0.155) 
MarketPerformance 0.0320** 0.0327** 0.0330** 0.0221+ 0.0322** 0.0325** 
 (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0120) 
StockPerformance 1.479*** 1.470*** 1.450*** 1.443*** 1.105*** 1.465*** 
 (0.273) (0.273) (0.271) (0.271) (0.295) (0.273) 
Duality 0.0521*** 0.0512*** 0.0505*** 0.0510*** 0.0510*** 0.0508*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
BoardSize 0.0120** 0.0120** 0.0121** 0.0119** 0.0119** 0.0120** 
 (0.00371) (0.00370) (0.00373) (0.00374) (0.00371) (0.00370) 
BoardIndependence 0.175** 0.172** 0.168** 0.170** 0.171** 0.176** 
 (0.0655) (0.0654) (0.0652) (0.0654) (0.0655) (0.0658) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00227* 0.00228* 0.00231* 0.00234* 0.00224* 0.00193+ 
 (0.000927) (0.000926) (0.000931) (0.000933) (0.000925) (0.00101) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.000353 0.000285 0.000356 0.000394 0.000233 0.000269 
 (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00102) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.263 -0.267 -0.284+ -0.289+ -0.279 -0.263 
 (0.172) (0.172) (0.173) (0.174) (0.172) (0.171) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.287*** 0.290*** 0.285*** 0.286*** 0.285*** 0.291*** 
 (0.0494) (0.0496) (0.0493) (0.0494) (0.0495) (0.0495) 
(lag) TotalComp 0.630*** 0.631*** 0.629*** 0.627*** 0.631*** 0.631*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
MarketFirm × FirmAge 0.0501*      
 (0.0219)      
MarketFirm × Debt  0.0741+     
  (0.0432)     
MarketFirm × Growth   0.0745***    
   (0.0220)    
MarketFirm × MarketPerformance    0.0612***   
    (0.0147)   
4 Corporate Governance Drivers & the Moderating Role of 
Institutional Logics 
214 
 
MarketFirm × StockPerformance     1.569*  
     (0.694)  
MarketFirm × ExecutiveAge      0.00190+ 
      (0.00105) 
Constant 2.877*** 2.867*** 2.888*** 2.903*** 2.867*** 2.862*** 
 (0.145) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.783 0.783 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.783 
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Table 4.29 - Robustness test (Reduced sample): Total compensation. 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using a reduced sample, excluding hybrid firms. The dependent variable is 
TotalComp representing the total compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp 
representing the sum of annual salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive 
pay-outs and all other compensation. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation 
value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 
presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is 
the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and 
board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on 
board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
FamilyFirm -0.216*** -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.207*** -0.213*** -0.211*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0360) (0.0358) (0.0352) (0.0361) (0.0360) 
FirmSize 0.395*** 0.392*** 0.388*** 0.389*** 0.392*** 0.393*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0166) (0.0167) 
FirmAge 0.153** 0.0651* 0.0681* 0.0635* 0.0681* 0.0662* 
 (0.0489) (0.0315) (0.0314) (0.0311) (0.0315) (0.0314) 
Debt 0.224+ 0.286* 0.228+ 0.224+ 0.229+ 0.221+ 
 (0.113) (0.131) (0.119) (0.117) (0.113) (0.116) 
Growth 0.0614* 0.0612* 0.0676** 0.0619* 0.0617* 0.0610* 
 (0.0258) (0.0257) (0.0221) (0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0256) 
Risk -0.255 -0.271 -0.323 -0.347 -0.305 -0.274 
 (0.415) (0.416) (0.402) (0.403) (0.416) (0.415) 
MarketPerformance 0.0668+ 0.0695+ 0.0673+ 0.170** 0.0665 0.0692+ 
 (0.0406) (0.0408) (0.0397) (0.0515) (0.0407) (0.0408) 
StockPerformance 1.380** 1.361** 1.273* 1.206* 3.294*** 1.365** 
 (0.526) (0.526) (0.518) (0.522) (0.960) (0.524) 
Duality 0.104** 0.1000** 0.0978** 0.102** 0.100** 0.102** 
 (0.0331) (0.0330) (0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0332) (0.0334) 
BoardSize 0.0215* 0.0218* 0.0221* 0.0214* 0.0215* 0.0220* 
 (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
BoardIndependence 0.257 0.257 0.234 0.231 0.258 0.241 
 (0.197) (0.195) (0.191) (0.192) (0.195) (0.193) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00408+ 0.00426+ 0.00413+ 0.00417+ 0.00420+ 0.00429* 
 (0.00253) (0.00253) (0.00253) (0.00254) (0.00254) (0.00208) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.00293 0.00269 0.00297 0.00320 0.00268 0.00266 
 (0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00281) (0.00278) (0.00282) (0.00282) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.649 -0.672 -0.725 -0.719 -0.707 -0.681 
 (0.464) (0.461) (0.463) (0.467) (0.463) (0.467) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.654*** 0.662*** 0.626*** 0.626*** 0.649*** 0.656*** 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.137) (0.136) (0.135) (0.136) 
FamilyFirm × FirmAge -0.120*      
 (0.0596)      
FamilyFirm × Debt  -0.115*     
  (0.0492)     
FamilyFirm × Growth   -0.156*    
   (0.0678)    
FamilyFirm × MarketPerformance    -0.135**   
    (0.0489)   
FamilyFirm × StockPerformance     -2.953**  
     (1.142)  
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FamilyFirm × ExecutiveAge      -0.00364+ 
      (0.00240) 
Constant 7.672*** 7.664*** 7.683*** 7.684*** 7.664*** 7.670*** 
 (0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) (0.106) (0.108) 
Observations 2219 2219 2219 2219 2219 2219 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.635 0.634 0.637 0.639 0.636 0.634 
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Table 4.30 - Post-hoc regressions for MLDFs category and FLDFs category: Total 
compensation. 
The results of robustness post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and total compensation in 
MLDFs -Panel A- and FLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is TotalComp representing the total compensation as 
the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp representing the sum of annual salary, bonus, value of 
stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive pay-outs and all other compensation. 
FamilyFirm_Market is an indicator variable that equals 1 for FLDF, and 0 for MLDF; FamilyFirm_Family is an 
indicator variable that equals 0 for FLDF, and -1 for MLDF; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years 
since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; 
Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets 
and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual 
average stock return; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO. Lagged values are used.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
Panel A- MLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Market -0.228*** -0.300*** -0.283*** -0.275*** -0.295*** -0.281*** 
 (0.0683) (0.0694) (0.0695) (0.0726) (0.0731) (0.0730) 
FirmAge 0.475***      
 (0.108)      
FamilyFirm_Market × 
FirmAge 
-0.175      
 (0.125)      
Debt  2.127***     
  (0.446)     
FamilyFirm_Market × Debt  -1.118*     
  (0.500)     
Growth   0.555***    
   (0.0743)    
FamilyFirm_Market × Growth   -0.428***    
   (0.0889)    
MarketPerformance    0.309***   
    (0.0365)   
FamilyFirm_Market × 
MarketPerformance 
   -0.242***   
    (0.0583)   
StockPerformance     4.889**  
     (1.560)  
FamilyFirm_Market × 
StockPerformance 
    -3.740*  
     (1.738)  
ExecutiveAge      0.00687+ 
      (0.00374) 
FamilyFirm_Market × 
ExecutiveAge 
     0.00579 
      (0.0119) 
Constant 7.784*** 7.791*** 7.904*** 7.873*** 7.833*** 7.819*** 
 (0.178) (0.191) (0.219) (0.209) (0.199) (0.197) 
Panel B- FLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Family -0.228*** -0.300*** -0.283*** -0.275*** -0.295*** -0.281*** 
 (0.0683) (0.0694) (0.0695) (0.0726) (0.0731) (0.0730) 
FirmAge 0.300***      
 (0.0653)      
FamilyFirm_Family × 
FirmAge 
-0.175      
 (0.125)      
Debt  1.009***     
  (0.232)     
FamilyFirm_Family × Debt  -1.118*     
  (0.500)     
Growth   0.128*    
   (0.0540)    
FamilyFirm_Family × Growth   -0.428***    
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   (0.0889)    
MarketPerformance    0.211***   
    (0.0481)   
FamilyFirm_Family × 
MarketPerformance 
   -0.242***   
    (0.0583)   
StockPerformance     3.148*  
     (1.316)  
FamilyFirm_Family × 
StockPerformance 
    -3.740*  
     (1.738)  
ExecutiveAge      0.00408+ 
      (0.00213) 
FamilyFirm_Family × 
ExecutiveAge 
     0.00579 
      (0.0119) 
Constant 7.556*** 7.491*** 7.621*** 7.597*** 7.538*** 7.538*** 
 (0.176) (0.189) (0.216) (0.206) (0.197) (0.196) 
Observations 2219 2219 2219 2219 2219 2219 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.182 0.186 0.150 0.139 0.134 
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Table 4.31 - Preliminary multivariate analysis of moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation: Equity-based compensation. 
The results of preliminary OLS multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is EquityComp representing a variable 
pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant date fair value of option 
and stock awards. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting 
the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; 
FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the 
debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of 
equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by 
firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number 
of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the 
number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; 
ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held 
by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of 
outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares 
outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. 
Lagged values are used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
FamilyFirm -0.187** -0.187** -0.187** -0.184** 
 (0.0710) (0.0710) (0.0708) (0.0705) 
FirmSize 0.554*** 0.555*** 0.552*** 0.554*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0407) (0.0408) (0.0406) 
FirmAge 0.194* 0.197* 0.200* 0.192* 
 (0.0985) (0.0811) (0.0815) (0.0806) 
Debt 0.148+ 0.159+ 0.147+ 0.149+ 
 (0.0921) (0.0961) (0.0920) (0.0921) 
Growth 0.633*** 0.539*** 0.630*** 0.636*** 
 (0.128) (0.141) (0.127) (0.126) 
Risk -0.534 -0.528 -0.572 -0.532 
 (0.852) (0.851) (0.851) (0.851) 
MarketPerformance 0.153+ 0.153+ 1.530 0.153+ 
 (0.0900) (0.0890) (1.124) (0.0887) 
StockPerformance 1.562 1.559 0.153+ 1.525 
 (1.128) (1.127) (0.0880) (1.128) 
Duality 0.189* 0.190* 0.184* 0.188* 
 (0.0883) (0.0886) (0.0883) (0.0888) 
BoardSize 0.0493+ 0.0492+ 0.0491+ 0.0495+ 
 (0.0293) (0.0293) (0.0293) (0.0294) 
BoardIndependence 2.360*** 2.360*** 2.355*** 1.905*** 
 (0.460) (0.461) (0.460) (0.516) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00177 -0.00178 -0.00180 -0.00190 
 (0.00630) (0.00630) (0.00631) (0.00629) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.0163+ -0.0164+ -0.0162+ -0.0166+ 
 (0.00857) (0.00860) (0.00856) (0.00857) 
ExecutiveOwnership -2.624* -2.623* -2.680* -2.630* 
 (1.303) (1.304) (1.302) (1.304) 
InstitutionalOwnership 1.791*** 1.793*** 1.772*** 1.785*** 
 (0.400) (0.400) (0.400) (0.400) 
FamilyFirm × FirmAge -0.136+    
 (0.0810)    
FamilyFirm × Debt  -0.123*   
  (0.0479)   
FamilyFirm × Growth   -0.267*  
   (0.110)  
FamilyFirm × BoardIndependence    -1.071* 
    (0.456) 
Constant 6.156*** 6.157*** 6.161*** 6.171*** 
 (0.263) (0.262) (0.262) (0.264) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 
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Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.329 0.329 0.330 0.330 
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Table 4.32 - Preliminary multivariate analysis of moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation: Equity-based compensation. 
The results of preliminary OLS multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is EquityComp representing a variable 
pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant date fair value of option 
and stock awards. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting 
the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; 
FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the 
debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of 
equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by 
firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number 
of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the 
number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; 
ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held 
by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of 
outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares 
outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. 
Lagged values are used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
MarketFirm 0.203* 0.193* 0.197* 0.200* 
 (0.0822) (0.0824) (0.0827) (0.0832) 
FirmSize 0.560*** 0.558*** 0.554*** 0.558*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0405) (0.0409) (0.0407) 
FirmAge 0.156+ 0.190* 0.193* 0.189* 
 (0.0843) (0.0808) (0.0812) (0.0804) 
Debt 0.149+ 0.163+ 0.147+ 0.148+ 
 (0.0922) (0.0959) (0.0920) (0.0921) 
Growth 0.636*** 0.541*** 0.631*** 0.634*** 
 (0.128) (0.149) (0.127) (0.127) 
Risk -0.452 -0.479 -0.511 -0.476 
 (0.852) (0.852) (0.851) (0.852) 
MarketPerformance 0.157+ 0.161+ 1.547 0.159+ 
 (0.0901) (0.0898) (1.124) (0.0897) 
StockPerformance 1.629 1.613 0.160+ 1.609 
 (1.128) (1.131) (0.0893) (1.130) 
Duality 0.191* 0.189* 0.186* 0.187* 
 (0.0885) (0.0889) (0.0886) (0.0888) 
BoardSize 0.0483 0.0485 0.0485 0.0481 
 (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0295) 
BoardIndependence 2.371*** 2.360*** 2.353*** 2.525*** 
 (0.464) (0.466) (0.465) (0.491) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00204 -0.00197 -0.00195 -0.00219 
 (0.00631) (0.00632) (0.00633) (0.00630) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.0167+ -0.0165+ -0.0166+ -0.0165+ 
 (0.00863) (0.00865) (0.00866) (0.00863) 
ExecutiveOwnership -2.553* -2.561* -2.610* -2.575* 
 (1.301) (1.296) (1.298) (1.293) 
InstitutionalOwnership 1.796*** 1.818*** 1.795*** 1.798*** 
 (0.400) (0.401) (0.400) (0.401) 
MarketFirm × FirmAge 0.184*    
 (0.0812)    
MarketFirm × Debt  0.150**   
  (0.0512)   
MarketFirm × Growth   0.185+  
   (0.111)  
MarketFirm × BoardIndependence    0.977* 
    (0.425) 
Constant 6.041*** 6.041*** 6.057*** 6.047*** 
 (0.269) (0.269) (0.270) (0.270) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 
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Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.329 
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Table 4.33 - Post-hoc regressions for other firms category (Hybrid firms and MLDFs) and 
FLDFs category: Equity-based compensation. 
The results of preliminary post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and equity-based 
compensation in firms other than FLDFs -Panel A- and FLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is EquityComp 
representing a variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant 
date fair value of option and stock awards. FamilyFirm_Other is an indicator variable that equals 1 for FLDF, and 0 
otherwise; FamilyFirm_Family is an indicator variable that equals 0 for FLDF, and -1 otherwise; FirmAge is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-
term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market 
value of equity divided by book value of equity; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) 
directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Lagged values are used.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
Panel A- Other firms category (Hybrid firms and MLDFs) 
FamilyFirm_Other -0.250** -0.307*** -0.308*** -0.235** 
 (0.0833) (0.0817) (0.0817) (0.0786) 
FirmAge 0.559***    
 (0.111)    
FamilyFirm_Other × FirmAge -0.271+    
 (0.149)    
Debt  2.424***   
  (0.404)   
FamilyFirm_Other × Debt  -0.552   
  (0.593)   
Growth   0.623***  
   (0.0823)  
FamilyFirm_Other × Growth   -0.332*  
   (0.133)  
BoardIndependence    5.238*** 
    (0.817) 
FamilyFirm_Other × BoardIndependence    0.512 
    (0.900) 
Constant 6.292*** 6.311*** 6.362*** 6.262*** 
 (0.360) (0.357) (0.371) (0.332) 
Panel B- FLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Family -0.250** -0.307*** -0.308*** -0.235** 
 (0.0833) (0.0817) (0.0817) (0.0786) 
FirmAge 0.288*    
 (0.127)    
FamilyFirm_Family × FirmAge -0.271+    
 (0.149)    
Debt  1.872***   
  (0.517)   
FamilyFirm_Family × Debt  -0.552   
  (0.593)   
Growth   0.291*  
   (0.128)  
FamilyFirm_Family × Growth   -0.332*  
   (0.133)  
BoardIndependence    4.726*** 
    (0.665) 
FamilyFirm_Family × BoardIndependence    0.512 
    (0.900) 
Constant 6.042*** 6.004*** 6.054*** 6.027*** 
 (0.364) (0.359) (0.374) (0.336) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.0873 0.0925 0.0966 0.139 
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Table 4.34 - Post-hoc regressions for other firms category (Hybrid firms and FLDFs) and 
MLDFs category: Equity-based compensation. 
The results of preliminary post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and equity-based 
compensation in firms other than MLDFs -Panel A- and MLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is EquityComp 
representing a variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant 
date fair value of option and stock awards. MarketFirm_Other is an indicator variable that equals 1 for MLDF, and 0 
otherwise; MarketFirm_Market is an indicator variable that equals 0 for MLDF, and -1 otherwise; FirmAge is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-
term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market 
value of equity divided by book value of equity; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) 
directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Lagged values are used.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
Panel A- Other firms category (Hybrid firms and FLDFs) 
MarketFirm_Other 0.241* 0.298** 0.324** 0.220* 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.103) 
FirmAge 0.408***    
 (0.0979)    
MarketFirm _Other × FirmAge 0.194    
 (0.168)    
Debt  2.039***   
  (0.393)   
MarketFirm _Other × Debt  0.572   
  (0.679)   
Growth   0.394***  
   (0.0929)  
MarketFirm _Other × Growth   0.423**  
   (0.134)  
BoardIndependence    4.941*** 
    (0.612) 
MarketFirm _Other × BoardIndependence    0.0601 
    (1.131) 
Constant 6.152*** 6.127*** 6.205*** 6.113*** 
 (0.364) (0.360) (0.376) (0.334) 
Panel B- MLDFs category 
MarketFirm_Market 0.241* 0.298** 0.324** 0.220* 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.103) 
FirmAge 0.602***    
 (0.163)    
MarketFirm_Market × FirmAge 0.194    
 (0.168)    
Debt  2.611***   
  (0.618)   
MarketFirm_Market × Debt  0.572   
  (0.679)   
Growth   0.817***  
   (0.113)  
MarketFirm_Market × Growth   0.423**  
   (0.134)  
BoardIndependence    5.001*** 
    (1.111) 
MarketFirm_Market × BoardIndependence    0.0601 
    (1.131) 
Constant 6.393*** 6.425*** 6.530*** 6.334*** 
 (0.368) (0.367) (0.384) (0.341) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.0852 0.0902 0.0951 0.137 
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Table 4.35 - Robustness test (Random-effects estimation, Moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation): Equity-based compensation. 
The results of random-effects estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is EquityComp representing a 
variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant date fair value of 
option and stock awards. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 
presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is 
the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio 
of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by 
firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number 
of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the 
number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; 
ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held 
by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of 
outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares 
outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. 
Lagged values are used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
FamilyFirm -0.0945* -0.0964* -0.0971* -0.0963* 
 (0.0429) (0.0427) (0.0430) (0.0419) 
FirmSize 0.495*** 0.495*** 0.495*** 0.496*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0369) 
FirmAge 0.189* 0.177* 0.176* 0.176* 
 (0.0851) (0.0770) (0.0770) (0.0768) 
Debt 0.0868+ 0.0896+ 0.0862+ 0.0860+ 
 (0.0504) (0.0532) (0.0503) (0.0503) 
Growth 0.166+ 0.168+ 0.193* 0.168+ 
 (0.0923) (0.0924) (0.0962) (0.0925) 
Risk -0.590 -0.600 -0.595 -0.589 
 (0.758) (0.759) (0.758) (0.758) 
MarketPerformance 0.118* 0.117* 0.117* 0.118* 
 (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0585) (0.0588) 
StockPerformance 1.045 1.056 1.041 1.057 
 (0.929) (0.930) (0.928) (0.930) 
Duality 0.177** 0.178** 0.178** 0.179** 
 (0.0626) (0.0626) (0.0627) (0.0627) 
BoardSize 0.0176 0.0176 0.0174 0.0175 
 (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) 
BoardIndependence 1.753*** 1.754*** 1.756*** 1.813*** 
 (0.359) (0.359) (0.359) (0.393) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00568 -0.00567 -0.00561 -0.00564 
 (0.00563) (0.00561) (0.00562) (0.00561) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.00796 -0.00801 -0.00809 -0.00801 
 (0.00743) (0.00744) (0.00744) (0.00744) 
ExecutiveOwnership -5.338*** -5.338*** -5.348*** -5.344*** 
 (1.617) (1.618) (1.617) (1.616) 
InstitutionalOwnership 1.208*** 1.203*** 1.195*** 1.205*** 
 (0.334) (0.334) (0.335) (0.334) 
FamilyFirm × FirmAge -0.132+    
 (0.0742)    
FamilyFirm × Debt  -0.0680*   
  (0.0311)   
FamilyFirm × Growth   -0.0869+  
   (0.0512)  
FamilyFirm × BoardIndependence    -0.753+ 
    (0.443) 
Constant 6.037*** 6.035*** 6.039*** 6.037*** 
 (0.297) (0.297) (0.296) (0.297) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 
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Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4.36 - Robustness test (Random-effects estimation, Moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation): Equity-based compensation. 
The results of random-effects estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is EquityComp representing a 
variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant date fair value of 
option and stock awards. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 
presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is 
the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio 
of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by 
firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number 
of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the 
number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; 
ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held 
by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of 
outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares 
outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. 
Lagged values are used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
MarketFirm 0.0941+ 0.0861+ 0.0864+ 0.0891+ 
 (0.0507) (0.0491) (0.0486) (0.0502) 
FirmSize 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.495*** 0.496*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0370) (0.0372) (0.0368) 
FirmAge 0.166* 0.175* 0.178* 0.175* 
 (0.0821) (0.0768) (0.0769) (0.0769) 
Debt 0.0860+ 0.0889+ 0.0864+ 0.0861+ 
 (0.0503) (0.0529) (0.0504) (0.0501) 
Growth 0.169+ 0.168+ 0.181+ 0.167+ 
 (0.0925) (0.0924) (0.0944) (0.0924) 
Risk -0.583 -0.579 -0.597 -0.576 
 (0.756) (0.755) (0.760) (0.756) 
MarketPerformance 0.118* 0.118* 0.118* 0.119* 
 (0.0587) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0587) 
StockPerformance 1.079 1.065 1.057 1.062 
 (0.928) (0.930) (0.928) (0.928) 
Duality 0.179** 0.178** 0.177** 0.179** 
 (0.0628) (0.0627) (0.0626) (0.0627) 
BoardSize 0.0176 0.0174 0.0175 0.0172 
 (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) 
BoardIndependence 1.750*** 1.753*** 1.745*** 1.668*** 
 (0.360) (0.360) (0.359) (0.376) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00555 -0.00554 -0.00567 -0.00562 
 (0.00561) (0.00561) (0.00561) (0.00560) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.00814 -0.00810 -0.00823 -0.00810 
 (0.00744) (0.00744) (0.00745) (0.00744) 
ExecutiveOwnership -5.326** -5.332*** -5.347*** -5.328*** 
 (1.620) (1.617) (1.619) (1.617) 
InstitutionalOwnership 1.204*** 1.205*** 1.189*** 1.210*** 
 (0.334) (0.334) (0.336) (0.334) 
MarketFirm × FirmAge 0.125+    
 (0.0735)    
MarketFirm × Debt  0.107*   
  (0.0435)   
MarketFirm × Growth   0.106+  
   (0.0625)  
MarketFirm × BoardIndependence    0.713+ 
    (0.403) 
Constant 6.012*** 6.011*** 6.020*** 6.007*** 
 (0.299) (0.299) (0.299) (0.298) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 
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Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4.37 - Robustness test (Dynamic estimation, Moderation effect of familiness logic 
orientation): Equity-based compensation. 
The results of dynamic estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is EquityComp representing a variable pay 
of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant date fair value of option and 
stock awards. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the 
familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is 
the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and 
board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on 
board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
FamilyFirm -0.0895* -0.0895* -0.0894* -0.0891* 
 (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0415) (0.0414) 
FirmSize 0.227*** 0.228*** 0.227*** 0.228*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0277) 
FirmAge 0.136** 0.103** 0.104** 0.102** 
 (0.0512) (0.0392) (0.0394) (0.0391) 
Debt 0.109+ 0.161* 0.114+ 0.115+ 
 (0.0606) (0.0722) (0.0607) (0.0607) 
Growth 0.141* 0.146* 0.173* 0.139* 
 (0.0686) (0.0689) (0.0679) (0.0681) 
Risk -0.921 -0.916 -0.939 -0.917 
 (0.615) (0.615) (0.616) (0.615) 
MarketPerformance 0.0822+ 0.0806+ 0.0806+ 0.0806+ 
 (0.0455) (0.0451) (0.0445) (0.0451) 
StockPerformance 2.226* 2.230* 2.211* 2.224* 
 (0.967) (0.967) (0.966) (0.967) 
Duality 0.0852+ 0.0868+ 0.0840+ 0.0865+ 
 (0.0464) (0.0467) (0.0466) (0.0468) 
BoardSize 0.0309* 0.0308* 0.0307* 0.0309* 
 (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156) 
BoardIndependence 1.110*** 1.117*** 1.115*** 1.039*** 
 (0.242) (0.242) (0.242) (0.313) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00172 -0.00166 -0.00164 -0.00163 
 (0.00338) (0.00337) (0.00338) (0.00337) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.00665 -0.00675 -0.00669 -0.00679 
 (0.00432) (0.00434) (0.00432) (0.00433) 
ExecutiveOwnership -1.054 -1.049 -1.084 -1.051 
 (0.694) (0.694) (0.694) (0.695) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.912*** 0.908*** 0.897*** 0.907*** 
 (0.220) (0.220) (0.220) (0.220) 
(lag) EquityComp 0.545*** 0.544*** 0.544*** 0.544*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0328) (0.0327) (0.0327) 
FamilyFirm × FirmAge -0.0857+    
 (0.0492)    
FamilyFirm × Debt  -0.0788+   
  (0.0421)   
FamilyFirm × Growth   -0.104+  
   (0.0611)  
FamilyFirm × BoardIndependence    -0.685+ 
    (0.352) 
Constant 2.983*** 2.988*** 2.993*** 2.992*** 
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 (0.255) (0.254) (0.254) (0.254) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.549 0.549 0.549 0.549 
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Table 4.38 - Robustness test (Dynamic estimation, Moderation effect of marketness logic 
orientation): Equity-based compensation. 
The results of dynamic estimation robustness test. The dependent variable is EquityComp representing a variable pay 
of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant date fair value of option and 
stock awards. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the 
marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge 
is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; 
StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and 
board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on 
board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
MarketFirm 0.100* 0.0995* 0.102* 0.102* 
 (0.0494) (0.0489) (0.0490) (0.0496) 
FirmSize 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.227*** 0.230*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0276) (0.0278) (0.0276) 
FirmAge 0.0960* 0.101* 0.102** 0.0993* 
 (0.0416) (0.0391) (0.0393) (0.0390) 
Debt 0.112+ 0.174* 0.110+ 0.114+ 
 (0.0606) (0.0731) (0.0606) (0.0607) 
Growth 0.144* 0.142* 0.169* 0.140* 
 (0.0681) (0.0686) (0.0676) (0.0680) 
Risk -0.891 -0.886 -0.926 -0.896 
 (0.615) (0.615) (0.616) (0.615) 
MarketPerformance 0.0831+ 0.0822+ 0.0840+ 0.0833+ 
 (0.0456) (0.0454) (0.0450) (0.0454) 
StockPerformance 2.258* 2.242* 2.217* 2.260* 
 (0.968) (0.971) (0.967) (0.970) 
Duality 0.0865+ 0.0852+ 0.0847+ 0.0858+ 
 (0.0466) (0.0468) (0.0466) (0.0467) 
BoardSize 0.0304+ 0.0304+ 0.0304+ 0.0302+ 
 (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0157) 
BoardIndependence 1.118*** 1.119*** 1.108*** 1.186*** 
 (0.243) (0.243) (0.243) (0.247) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00154 -0.00152 -0.00158 -0.00146 
 (0.00338) (0.00338) (0.00339) (0.00337) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.00684 -0.00681 -0.00693 -0.00683 
 (0.00435) (0.00435) (0.00436) (0.00435) 
ExecutiveOwnership -1.021 -1.031 -1.053 -1.024 
 (0.692) (0.690) (0.692) (0.690) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.914*** 0.909*** 0.906*** 0.912*** 
 (0.220) (0.220) (0.220) (0.221) 
(lag) EquityComp 0.545*** 0.545*** 0.545*** 0.545*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0328) (0.0328) 
MarketFirm × FirmAge 0.0781+    
 (0.0404)    
MarketFirm × Debt  0.103*   
  (0.0426)   
MarketFirm × Growth   0.139+  
   (0.0729)  
MarketFirm × BoardIndependence    0.530* 
    (0.220) 
Constant 2.928*** 2.925*** 2.943*** 2.932*** 
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 (0.257) (0.257) (0.257) (0.256) 
Observations 5265 5265 5265 5265 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.549 0.549 0.549 0.549 
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Table 4.39 - Robustness test (Reduced sample): Equity-based compensation. 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using a reduced sample, excluding hybrid firms. The dependent variable is 
EquityComp representing a variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
sum of grant date fair value of option and stock awards. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm 
logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 if the firm logic orientation 
value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; 
FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the 
debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of 
equity as market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by 
firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number 
of directors on board; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the 
number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; 
ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held 
by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of 
outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares 
outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. 
Lagged values are used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
FamilyFirm -0.418** -0.415** -0.414** -0.422** 
 (0.144) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148) 
FirmSize 0.548*** 0.546*** 0.538*** 0.548*** 
 (0.0551) (0.0537) (0.0559) (0.0544) 
FirmAge 0.324** 0.268* 0.273* 0.260* 
 (0.105) (0.108) (0.110) (0.107) 
Debt 0.124+ 0.159* 0.121+ 0.127+ 
 (0.0701) (0.0732) (0.0701) (0.0702) 
Growth 0.513*** 0.549*** 0.511*** 0.515*** 
 (0.114) (0.137) (0.118) (0.116) 
Risk -0.708 -0.716 -0.802 -0.722 
 (1.378) (1.380) (1.379) (1.381) 
MarketPerformance 0.109 0.111 0.107 0.114 
 (0.180) (0.179) (0.177) (0.178) 
StockPerformance 1.015 0.999 0.856 0.925 
 (1.861) (1.867) (1.836) (1.879) 
Duality 0.141 0.138 0.135 0.135 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.131) (0.133) 
BoardSize 0.0253 0.0256 0.0259 0.0244 
 (0.0443) (0.0444) (0.0445) (0.0447) 
BoardIndependence 2.906*** 2.908*** 2.870*** 2.849* 
 (0.717) (0.717) (0.714) (1.222) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00156 -0.00144 -0.00165 -0.00228 
 (0.00962) (0.00962) (0.00970) (0.00957) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.0168 -0.0167 -0.0171 -0.0173 
 (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0133) 
ExecutiveOwnership -2.353 -2.371 -2.459 -2.343 
 (1.760) (1.753) (1.769) (1.732) 
InstitutionalOwnership 1.755** 1.758** 1.698** 1.755** 
 (0.567) (0.574) (0.588) (0.573) 
FamilyFirm × FirmAge -0.255*    
 (0.109)    
FamilyFirm × Debt  -0.145*   
  (0.0616)   
FamilyFirm × Growth   -0.316+  
   (0.204)  
FamilyFirm × BoardIndependence    -1.751+ 
    (1.110) 
Constant 5.761*** 5.755*** 5.787*** 5.794*** 
 (0.529) (0.529) (0.533) (0.536) 
Observations 2219 2219 2219 2219 
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Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.313 0.314 0.314 
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Table 4.40 - Post-hoc regressions for MLDFs category and FLDFs category: Equity-based 
compensation. 
The results of robustness post-hoc analysis of the relationship between CG determinants and equity-based 
compensation in MLDFs -Panel A- and FLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is EquityComp representing a 
variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of grant date fair value of 
option and stock awards. FamilyFirm_Market is an indicator variable that equals 1 for FLDF, and 0 for MLDF; 
FamilyFirm_Family is an indicator variable that equals 0 for FLDF, and -1 for MLDF; FirmAge is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term 
debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value 
of equity divided by book value of equity; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors 
on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. Lagged values 
are used.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
Panel A- MLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Market -0.470** -0.557*** -0.531** -0.245*** 
 (0.168) (0.166) (0.168) (0.0721) 
FirmAge 0.579**    
 (0.214)    
FamilyFirm_Market × FirmAge -0.388    
 (0.259)    
Debt  3.263***   
  (0.932)   
FamilyFirm_Market × Debt  -1.437   
  (1.121)   
Growth   0.870***  
   (0.154)  
FamilyFirm_Market × Growth   -0.667**  
   (0.221)  
BoardIndependence    2.028*** 
    (0.611) 
FamilyFirm_Market × BoardIndependence    -0.314 
    (0.696) 
Constant 5.966*** 5.973*** 6.147*** 7.757*** 
 (0.647) (0.635) (0.687) (0.195) 
Panel B- FLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Family -0.470** -0.557*** -0.531** -0.245*** 
 (0.168) (0.166) (0.168) (0.0721) 
FirmAge 0.391**    
 (0.142)    
FamilyFirm_Family × FirmAge -0.388    
 (0.259)    
Debt  1.826**   
  (0.603)   
FamilyFirm_Family × Debt  -1.437   
  (1.121)   
Growth   0.403**  
   (0.138)  
FamilyFirm_Family × Growth   -0.667**  
   (0.221)  
BoardIndependence    1.714*** 
    (0.343) 
FamilyFirm_Family × BoardIndependence    -0.314 
    (0.696) 
Constant 5.496*** 5.415*** 5.616*** 7.511*** 
 (0.658) (0.642) (0.695) (0.191) 
Observations 2219 2219 2219 2219 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.0995 0.113 0.113 0.179 
 
4 Corporate Governance Drivers & the Moderating Role of 
Institutional Logics 
236 
 
Table 4.41 - Post-hoc test (Family status of ownership): Board size. 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using the family ownership status indicator. The dependent variable is 
BoardSize representing the total number of directors on board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 for 
family firm, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term 
debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value 
of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month 
period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; MarketPeformance is 
the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and market 
value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by 
CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding 
shares.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardSize 
FamilyFirm -0.201 -0.192 -0.205 -0.183 
 (0.157) (0.157) (0.158) (0.159) 
FirmSize 0.753***    0.756***    0.752***    0.752***    
 (0.0501) (0.0501) (0.0502) (0.0503) 
Debt 1.648** 1.544** 1.511** 1.551** 
 (0.539) (0.475) (0.475) (0.477) 
Growth 0.432*** 0.377** 0.434*** 0.431*** 
 (0.114) (0.129) (0.114) (0.114) 
Risk -8.504*** -8.475*** -9.239*** -8.508*** 
 (1.191) (1.194) (1.446) (1.188) 
FreeCashFlow -1.571* -1.538* -1.577* -2.138** 
 (0.648) (0.648) (0.649) (0.751) 
MarketPerformance -0.298*** -0.310*** -0.295*** -0.293*** 
 (0.0770) (0.0769) (0.0773) (0.0770) 
ExecutiveOwnership -8.104*** -8.019*** -7.940*** -8.296*** 
 (2.141) (2.092) (2.091) (2.080) 
FamilyFirm × Debt -0.368    
 (0.992)    
FamilyFirm × Growth  -0.224+   
  (0.134)   
FamilyFirm × Risk   2.224  
   (2.633)  
FamilyFirm × FreeCashFlow    1.846 
    (1.398) 
Constant 9.946*** 9.992*** 9.955*** 9.937*** 
 (0.415) (0.415) (0.416) (0.416) 
Observations 3891 3891 3891 3891 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.174 0.174 0.175 
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Table 4.42 - Post-hoc test (Family status of ownership): Board independence. 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using the family ownership status indicator. The dependent variable is 
BoardIndependence representing the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of 
outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 for family firm, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Debt is the debt ratio as 
long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 
12-month period preceding year end; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; 
MarketPeformance is the lagged value of firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of 
total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; ExecutiveOwnership 
is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total 
number of outstanding share; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has 
been in firm’s positions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables BoardIndependence 
FamilyFirm -0.0695*** -0.0691*** -0.0696*** -0.0693*** 
 (0.00857) (0.00864) (0.00862) (0.00856) 
FirmSize 0.00932*** 0.00945*** 0.00932** 0.00933** 
 (0.00280) (0.00280) (0.00282) (0.00283) 
Debt 0.0809** 0.0625* 0.0606* 0.0611* 
 (0.0253) (0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0244) 
Growth 0.0168*** 0.0221*** 0.0231** 0.0228** 
 (0.00521) (0.00529) (0.00519) (0.00521) 
Risk -0.0382 -0.0342 -0.0648 -0.0361 
 (0.0623) (0.0621) (0.0731) (0.0623) 
FreeCashFlow 0.0180 0.0178 0.0161 0.0247 
 (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0355) 
MarketPerformance  -0.0119**    -0.0124***     -0.0118**     -0.0119***    
 (0.00459) (0.00454) (0.00453) (0.00455) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.102 -0.0886 -0.0829 -0.0897 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.100) 
ExecutiveAge -0.000983+ -0.000943+ -0.000962+ -0.000961+ 
 (0.000545) (0.000541) (0.000543) (0.000545) 
ExecutiveTenure -9.09e-05 -8.15e-05 -5.50e-05 -6.92e-05 
 (0.000531) (0.000532) (0.000531) (0.000528) 
FamilyFirm × Debt -0.0515+    
 (0.0284)    
FamilyFirm × Growth  -0.00873   
  (0.0131)   
FamilyFirm × Risk   0.0339  
   (0.149)  
FamilyFirm × FreeCashFlow    -0.0225 
    (0.0687) 
Constant 0.749*** 0.752*** 0.750*** 0.750*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0194) 
Observations 3,891 3,891 3,891 3,891 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.222 0.222 0.222 
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Table 4.43 - Post-hoc test (Family status of ownership): Total compensation. 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using the family ownership status indicator. The dependent variable is 
TotalComp representing the total compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus (tdc1) variable in Execucomp 
representing the sum of annual salary, bonus, value of stock options and restricted stock granted, long-term incentive 
pay-outs and all other compensation. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 for family firm, and 0 
otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the number of years 
since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; 
Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; 
MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum of total assets and 
market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; StockPerformance is the annual 
average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are 
occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; BoardIndependence is 
the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO 
has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; InstitutionalOwnership is the shares 
held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of institutional investors’ 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are used for FirmSize through 
InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables TotalComp 
FamilyFirm -0.105* -0.104* -0.105* -0.105* -0.103* -0.102* 
 (0.0409) (0.0411) (0.0415) (0.0414) (0.0412) (0.0412) 
FirmSize 0.385*** 0.386*** 0.385*** 0.385*** 0.386*** 0.386*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0173) 
FirmAge 0.0691+ 0.0690+ 0.0698+ 0.0683+ 0.0689+ 0.0690+ 
 (0.0377) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0351) 
Debt 0.0791 0.103 0.0746 0.0678 0.0788 0.0821 
 (0.136) (0.156) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.135) 
Growth 0.0310* 0.0320* 0.0455** 0.0284* 0.0327* 0.0319* 
 (0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0146) (0.0117) (0.0132) (0.0130) 
Risk -0.0150 -0.0148 -0.0259 -0.0230 -0.00878 -0.0135 
 (0.339) (0.340) (0.340) (0.338) (0.340) (0.339) 
MarketPerformance 0.0943* 0.0925* 0.0973* 0.119** 0.0926* 0.0933* 
 (0.0400) (0.0399) (0.0390) (0.0393) (0.0399) (0.0397) 
StockPerformance 1.655*** 1.664*** 1.673*** 1.649*** 1.466*** 1.665*** 
 (0.380) (0.379) (0.381) (0.378) (0.422) (0.380) 
Duality 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0306) 
BoardSize 0.0376*** 0.0381*** 0.0385*** 0.0387*** 0.0380*** 0.0378*** 
 (0.00969) (0.00974) (0.00974) (0.00980) (0.00975) (0.00976) 
BoardIndependence 0.256 0.245 0.254 0.250 0.246 0.248 
 (0.182) (0.181) (0.182) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00550* 0.00540* 0.00534* 0.00533* 0.00545* 0.00464 
 (0.00258) (0.00255) (0.00257) (0.00256) (0.00257) (0.00292) 
ExecutiveTenure 0.00307 0.00290 0.00309 0.00327 0.00295 0.00304 
 (0.00317) (0.00314) (0.00316) (0.00313) (0.00317) (0.00320) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.552 -0.573 -0.532 -0.484 -0.551 -0.584 
 (0.607) (0.613) (0.611) (0.612) (0.610) (0.599) 
InstitutionalOwnership 0.653*** 0.668*** 0.658*** 0.657*** 0.670*** 0.667*** 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.134) (0.134) (0.132) (0.132) 
FamilyFirm × FirmAge -0.0565+      
 (0.0349)      
FamilyFirm × Debt  -0.0645     
  (0.266)     
FamilyFirm × Growth   -0.0300    
   (0.0631)    
FamilyFirm × MarketPerformance    -0.0650+   
    (0.0379)   
FamilyFirm × StockPerformance     -0.558  
     (0.856)  
FamilyFirm × ExecutiveAge      -0.00201 
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      (0.00500) 
Constant 7.771*** 7.765*** 7.758*** 7.762*** 7.767*** 7.766*** 
 (0.0821) (0.0825) (0.0820) (0.0816) (0.0816) (0.0816) 
Observations 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,884 3,884 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.624 0.624 0.624 0.625 0.624 0.624 
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Table 4.44 - Post-hoc test (Family status of ownership): Equity-based compensation. 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using the family ownership status indicator. The dependent variable is 
EquityComp representing a variable pay of the equity-based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
sum of grant date fair value of option and stock awards. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 for family 
firm, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; FirmAge is the natural logarithm of the 
number of years since a firm has been first appeared on CRSP; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by 
firm’s total assets; Growth is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of equity as market value of equity 
divided by book value of equity; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period 
preceding year end; MarketPeformance is the firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q value as sum 
of total assets and market value of equity minus book value of equity scaled by firm’s total assets; StockPerformance 
is the annual average stock return; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman 
positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardSize is the total number of directors on board; 
BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is 
the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction 
of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
InstitutionalOwnership is the shares held by outside institutional investors as a fraction of shares outstanding as the 
number of institutional investors’ shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares. Lagged values are 
used for FirmSize through InstitutionalOwnership variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables EquityComp 
FamilyFirm -0.304* -0.308* -0.308* -0.289* 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) 
FirmSize 0.517*** 0.515*** 0.515*** 0.517*** 
 (0.0474) (0.0477) (0.0474) (0.0476) 
FirmAge 0.263* 0.245* 0.245* 0.234* 
 (0.122) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) 
Debt 0.344 0.360 0.350 0.292 
 (0.390) (0.417) (0.392) (0.383) 
Growth 0.0776*** 0.0684*** 0.0968*** 0.0722*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0166) (0.0157) 
Risk -0.364 -0.417 -0.394 -0.436 
 (0.907) (0.914) (0.909) (0.908) 
MarketPerformance 0.124 0.125 0.133 0.125 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.142) (0.144) 
StockPerformance 0.781 0.834 0.800 0.855 
 (1.287) (1.276) (1.285) (1.282) 
Duality 0.210* 0.207* 0.207* 0.211* 
 (0.105) (0.104) (0.103) (0.105) 
BoardSize 0.0683* 0.0676* 0.0685* 0.0689* 
 (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0288) (0.0291) 
BoardIndependence 1.792*** 1.789*** 1.817*** 2.003+ 
 (0.506) (0.517) (0.523) (1.142) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00501 -0.00527 -0.00509 -0.00502 
 (0.00747) (0.00748) (0.00757) (0.00751) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.0140 -0.0138 -0.0144 -0.0134 
 (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0114) 
ExecutiveOwnership -2.184 -2.415 -2.151 -2.000 
 (1.951) (1.935) (1.953) (1.926) 
InstitutionalOwnership 1.470** 1.434** 1.435** 1.457** 
 (0.500) (0.492) (0.490) (0.491) 
FamilyFirm × FirmAge -0.0763    
 (0.286)    
FamilyFirm × Debt  -0.197   
  (0.747)   
FamilyFirm × Growth   -0.0580  
   (0.227)  
FamilyFirm × BoardIndependence    -0.816+ 
    (0.467) 
Constant 6.179*** 6.168*** 6.169*** 6.232*** 
 (0.260) (0.260) (0.262) (0.258) 
Observations 3884 3884 3884 3884 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.332 
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5 The Interplay of Institutional Logics, Legitimacy Seeking 
& Corporate Social Responsibility  
5.1 Introduction 
CSR presents a research area that exhibits differences among firms. It originated in 
stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) and addresses the wider social good. CSR connects to the 
socially responsible practices of firms that consider the interests, demands and concerns of 
various groups of stakeholders, both internal and external, as the recipients of firm practices and 
decisions (Peterson, 2004). Despite shareholders presenting the dominant – financial – 
stakeholder group emphasised by firm management, firms have many other relationships with a 
variety of stakeholders, including consumers, suppliers, employees, government bodies and 
environmental supporters.  
In comparison with shareholders, such firm stakeholders are likely to pursue different, 
non-financial goals, preferences and interests that managers are required to consider and serve, 
as firm stakeholders both affect and are affected by firm practices and behaviour (Font et al., 
2012). This highlights the significance of evaluating how firms perform concerning the social 
and environmental impacts of their practices and decisions. Resulting from the various 
stakeholder groups, managers confront multiple pressures and demands in relation to allocating 
managerial efforts and business resources to CSR, which holds firms accountable for the social 
and environmental consequences of firm practices and decisions. Accordingly, firms have 
growingly emphasised the importance of CSR and ensured addressing their attempts regarding 
CSR initiatives and activities (Borghesi et al., 2014).  
Devoting their efforts and resources to CSR, firms rely on the belief that doing good, in 
terms of undertaking social practices and decisions, basically leads to doing better for the best 
benefit of shareholders through accomplishing differentiation (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; 
Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Nelson, 2004; Borghesi et al., 2014). This effectively aligns with 
the key goal of managers concerning shareholders’ wealth maximisation as addressed by firm 
theory, given that the threat of takeover market is the primary control mechanism (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). However, despite the prominence and influence of CSR, firms normally 
demonstrate a difference in firm social performance, where some firms engage less in socially 
responsible practices relative to their counterparts given the common, underlying difference of 
ownership status (family or not) (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2016; 
Zientara, 2017).  
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Stressing firm behaviour, Friedland and Alford (1991) direct attention to the notion of ILs 
of which firm practices and decisions are basically tangible manifestation (Greenwood et al., 
2010). Underpinned by institutional theory, ILs are the core of the primary institutions, both 
market and non-market, comprising the society in which firms exist and operate. They provide 
the rules of the game in terms of defining appropriate behaviour and setting the means to 
achieve it (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011). In other words, ILs provide 
guidance and resilient prescriptions of social actions (Greenwood et al., 2010; Pache and Santos, 
2010). ILs thus present a proxy for firm behaviour as they implicitly embed in firm decision 
making, and in turn, shape firm practices and decisions, prompting the discrepancy in firm 
behaviour.  
This phenomenon calls attention to the role of ILs in the context of CSR. To the extent 
that ILs latently drive firm behaviour and that firms vary in making strategic choices and 
managerial decisions, the literature lacks a study of the association between ILs and CSR. While 
the extant literature has addressed the influence of ILs as covert drivers of firm behaviour on 
different firm aspects regarding economic and strategic behaviours, no attention has been paid 
to the influence of ILs on CSR. Emphasising the domains of ILs and CSR, a question arises 
regarding whether and how ILs affects firm engagement in CSR, given the difference in socially 
responsible practices between family and non-family firms.  
The scholars depict ILs as an intangible construct that justifies the difference in the 
culture and nature of firms in terms of the values, symbols and material practices (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Danisman et al., 2006). However, ILs have neither been measured directly nor 
applied to the context of CSR. Addressing this gap, in this study, I shed light on the perspective 
of ILs as hidden drivers of firm behaviour (Friedland and Alford, 1991), in light of CSR 
performance. Particularly, I seek to empirically investigate whether and how ILs – namely 
family and market logics – influence CSR performance. In doing this, I take a key step in terms 
of using an institutional-based approach to identify and classify firms beyond the ownership 
criteria.  
Building on the increasingly growing notion of SEW in the family business literature 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a; Berrone et al., 2012; Miller and Le 
Breton‐Miller, 2014), I establish the concept of firm logic orientation, specifically the familiness 
and marketness constructs, depicting and defining the firm type in terms of the logic-based 
group relating to the embeddedness of family and market logics by which a firm is driven. In 
doing this, I introduce different types of firms, such as FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs. This is 
manifested in real firm practices and decisions regarding a number of behavioural dimensions 
apart from family ownership status (or not).  
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Contrary to ownership-based studies, I posit that ownership status (family or not) alone is 
not an adequate indicator to determine whether or not a firm is family-oriented because it 
overlooks the importance of firm behaviour. Particularly, it disregards the firm culture and 
nature of running a business that actual practices and decisions reveal. That is, incorporating the 
role of ILs regarding the concept of distinction among firms, in this study, I rethink of family 
and non-family firms in terms of firm behaviour beyond the conventional understanding and 
classification of firms. 
Primarily, drawing on the SEW preservation perspective, in this study, I portray FLDFs 
and MLDFs as behaving similarly to family and non-family firms, respectively, in terms of their 
motives, objectives and essence. Particularly, I depict MLDFs as shareholder-oriented firms that 
prioritises the primary economic business objective of profitability and shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation, exhibiting an archetypal business setting. In contrast, FLDFs present a different 
business setting that exhibits a family-oriented attitude and preference in terms of prioritising 
the SEW preservation, overlapping the family and business systems. Moreover, I highlight the 
logic orientation of firms as an explanatory factor of CSR performance in terms of the rating of 
firm engagement in CSR. Therefore, in this study, I primarily investigate the difference in 
socially responsible practices among the logic-based groups of firms. The purpose of this study 
is to advance the knowledge of ILs and expand the understanding of CSR differences among 
firms, as well as the advantage and value of firm legitimacy for firm social performance. 
The central premises underlying the difference in CSR performance between FLDFs and 
MLDFs lie in the dark side of SEW (Kellermanns et al., 2012). Stressing the underlying family-
oriented facet that underlies the difference between and classification of FLDFs and MLDFs, 
the priority of SEW preservation presents a family-oriented attitude and preference as opposed 
to the priority of profitability and shareholders’ wealth maximisation. Given the 
multidimensional character of SEW, the scholars note that SEW dimensions can be both 
positively and negatively valanced as they associate with pleasant and unpleasant emotions and 
outcomes regarding firm stakeholders. Therefore, the stressed SEW dimensions are namely 
contradictory from the perspective of CSR. Such an ambivalent nature of SEW implies its 
detrimental effects on firm stakeholders in relation to responding to stakeholders’ demands and 
interests differently in a self-serving manner (Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012; 
Cruz et al., 2014; Zientara, 2017).  
This basically addresses the self-serving behaviour of FLDFs that fulfils narrowly defined 
firm’s self-interests related to SEW (Cruz et al., 2014), which results in their discriminatory 
behaviour towards firm stakeholders in terms of treating internal and external stakeholders 
unequally and unfairly. In other words, relative to MLDFs, FLDFs carry out social practices and 
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decisions that align with the concern for preserving the SEW of firm’s key actors irrespective of 
the detriments and disadvantages for firm stakeholders. This weakens the proactive stakeholder 
engagement of FLDFs and challenges their stakeholder management (Berrone et al., 2012; 
Cennamo et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014), undermining the CSR performance of FLDFs. 
Specifically, stemming from the perspective of SEW preservation, compared with MLDFs, 
FLDFs selectively and instrumentally implement socially responsible practices, adopting an 
instrumental (selective) rather than a strategic (normative) approach to CSR (Zientara, 2017).  
Moreover, in line with the response strategy of selective coupling perspective (Pache and 
Santos, 2013), FLDFs consider the interests and demands of firm stakeholders by selectively 
undertaking purposeful CSR initiatives and activities that primarily obtain (mitigate) gains 
(losses) of SEW. That is, given the negative valance of the SEW dimensions associated with 
discriminatory behaviour towards firm stakeholders, stakeholders’ concerns and interests are 
disregarded whenever SEW is exposed to risk (Cruz et al., 2014), purposefully implementing 
selected social practices and decisions that best fit the firm at the cost of some firm 
stakeholders. Therefore, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs view CSR as a marketing or public relations 
instrument, instead of a core business strategy, to fulfil SEW-related interests and concerns. As 
such, encountering the shadow of SEW’s dark side, FLDFs perform differently from MLDFs 
concerning CSR, namely suggesting a negative effect of the familiness of firms on CSR 
performance.  
Stemming from the discrepancy in CSR performance between FLDFs and MLDFs, in this 
study, I shed light on the role of firm legitimacy as an input of firm social performance. 
Particularly, stressing the firm isomorphism perspective, I emphasise the strategic conformity – 
a legitimacy-seeking activity – of firms (Deephouse, 1999; Deephouse and Carter, 2005), as an 
explanatory factor of CSR performance. In essence, apart from the understanding of CSR as a 
strategy for achieving firm legitimacy, in this study, I address CSR from a distinct perspective – 
not simply as a legitimacy-seeking activity.  
Specifically, I portray CSR as a kind of firm output related to firm social performance 
that follows social practices and decisions, which ultimately affect society and environment, 
given the ESG performance benchmarks. Irrespective of the underlying purpose behind firm 
engagement in CSR, here, the measure of CSR subjectively addresses and evaluates the way 
firms perform on a number of ESG categories that highlight the ESG strengths and concerns 
that the firm possesses and encounters, respectively. Accordingly, stressing the perspective of 
firm legitimacy, in this study, I emphasise the effect of strategic conformity on CSR 
performance.  
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Both CSR and firm legitimacy stress firm stakeholders as the recipients and social 
evaluators of firm practices and decisions, respectively. Firm legitimation is a social judgment 
that infers the social validation of firms conferred by firm stakeholders, who evaluate firm 
practices and behaviour. It conveys firm approval and acceptance regarding the appropriateness 
and properness of firm practices and behaviour, which protect the conduct of firms from being 
mistrusted in accordance with the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995). Thus, firm legitimacy predictably results in valued socially 
constructed outcomes, including favourable firm reputation and the support of stakeholders 
(Rao, 1994; Choi and Shepherd, 2005; Bitektine, 2011), which help firms overcome obstacles 
and difficulties by creating positive image, facilitating access to fundamental business 
resources, both financial and human capital, and granting a long-term relationship with firm 
stakeholders that ultimately improve the firm competitiveness and survival. 
Emphasising CSR performance, such predictable significant consequences of firm 
legitimacy indicate an upward implication for firms’ CSR concerning the evaluation of how 
firms perform in terms of the social and environmental effects of their practices and decisions. 
In other words, emphasising the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders, firm 
legitimacy prompts the social gains of firms in terms of improving the perception of firms’ 
CSR. Specifically, building on the assumption of institutional theory that isomorphism 
generates and improves firm legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983), seeking legitimacy through the adoption of isomorphic practices to those of industry 
peers, namely strategic conformity, has an incremental advantage for CSR performance. 
In this study, I also emphasise the logic orientation of firms as a moderator of the 
relationship between strategic conformity and CSR . Therefore, I stress the moderating role of 
firm logic orientation regarding the effect of strategic conformity on CSR performance as a 
more subtle and in-depth articulation of firm type – the logic-based group – in firm practices 
and decisions. That is, I extend the above argument on the strategic conformity-CSR 
relationship, examining whether such relationship varies according to the ILs embedded in firm 
decision making. Particularly, stressing the moderating role of ILs, I intend to empirically 
investigate whether and how ILs influences the effect of strategic conformity, as a legitimacy-
seeking activity, on CSR performance.  
Drawing on the aforementioned difference in CSR performance between FLDFs and 
MLDFs, they thereby differ in firm legitimacy in relation to firm acceptance and approval 
regarding the appropriateness and properness of social practices and decisions. Stemming from 
the SEW preservation perspective, FLDFs confront the shadow of SEW’s dark side involving 
self-serving and discriminatory behaviours that generate negative publicity, unfavourable image 
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and bad reputation for FLDFs concerning firm engagement in CSR, imposing their imprudence, 
guiltiness and suspiciousness in the eyes of firm stakeholders.  
Thus, stressing the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders, the firm legitimacy 
of FLDFs, in comparison with MLDFs, is lacking given the self-serving behaviour that SEW 
drives, as well as the resulting discriminatory behaviour towards firm stakeholders (Cennamo et 
al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014), in terms of the discrimination between 
internal and external stakeholders, and the unequal and unfair treatment of internal stakeholder 
themselves related to responding to the interests and concerns of firm stakeholders distinctly. 
Accordingly, emphasising the discrepancy in firm legitimation between FLDFs and MLDFs, the 
social gains of firms derived from firm legitimacy vary according to the logic orientation of 
firms, implying that seeking legitimacy through adopting isomorphic strategies has a substantial 
incremental value for the CSR performance of FLDFs relative to MLDFs. 
I use a sample of 3984 firm-year observations from 784 firms on the S&P 1500 index 
throughout the period of 2006–2013. Mandatory data are retrieved from the Compustat, MSCI, 
Execucomp and Centre for Research in Security Prices databases. Generally, the study reports 
that firm logic orientation explains an extra amount of variation in CSR performance in terms of 
the rating of firm engagement in CSR. Overall, it shows a discrepancy between FLDFs and 
MLDFs in terms of socially responsible practices, emphasising the evaluation of how firms 
perform on the ESG performance benchmarks. Specifically, the results suggest that FLDFs 
perform worse compared with MLDFs concerning CSR. Irrespective of family ownership status 
(or not), the study provides empirical evidence of the association between firm logic orientation 
and CSR. 
The study also finds a significant impact of strategic conformity – a legitimacy-seeking 
activity – on CSR performance. Namely, the results suggest a positive relationship between 
strategic conformity and CSR. Further, overall, the study shows that the firm logic orientations 
of familiness and marketness have different effects on this positive relationship. Generally, it 
reports that the strategic conformity-CSR relationship is a function of or conditional by firm 
logic orientation. Specifically, the results indicate that, relative to the marketness logic 
orientation, the familiness of firms amplifies the positive effect of strategic conformity on CSR 
performance. The study applies an interaction empirical setting to provide empirical evidence 
that, irrespective of ownership status (family or not), the logic orientation of firms moderates the 
effect of firm legitimacy on the impression of firms’ CSR, highlighting the moderating role of 
firm logic orientation.  
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Through the empirical window of CSR, the findings provide empirical evidence 
supporting the notion of ILs as being latent drivers of firm behaviour relating to the firm culture 
and nature of running a business. The importance of this study lies in suggesting a distinct view 
of the familiness and marketness of firms, identifying and classifying firms based on the 
embeddedness of family and market logics, which tangibly manifests in firm practices and 
decisions. In this study, I mainly show how family and market logics play an implicit role in 
affecting firm behaviour, and as such, differentiating among firms, emphasising the CSR 
context. Looking beyond firm strategies, I specifically shed light on a hidden logic-based root; 
that is, the culture and nature of firms, underlying how firms internally configure businesses 
regarding socially responsible practices, in terms of engaging in CSR, to deliver their strategies 
and goals.  
Given this study, I contribute to the literature of ILs, CSR, family business and firm 
legitimacy in several ways. First, I emphasise, define and operationalise family and market 
logics. Second, I develop and validate a quantitative measurement of and the embeddedness of 
family and market logics, and I establish an institutional-based classification of firms, 
identifying and grouping them as FLDFs, hybrid firms or MLDFs beyond the traditional 
understanding of firm types. Third, I introduce the concept of firm logic orientation, particularly 
the constructs of familiness and marketness, to define and depict the embeddedness of family 
and market logics by which a firm is driven. Therefore, I mainly develop an index of the logic 
orientation of firms based on real firm practices and behaviour. Fourth, relative to the extant 
ownership-based studies, I use a different approach to view and determine the familiness and 
marketness of firms, applying the perspective of ILs to identify and classify firms in terms of 
depicting and differentiating between family and non-family firm-like behaviours irrespective of 
family ownership status (or not). 
Fifth, from an empirical perspective, I address a difference between FLDFs and MLDFs 
regarding CSR performance, addressing the effect of firm logic orientation on firm engagement 
in CSR. Sixth, emphasising the isomorphism attempts of firms, I shed light on the social gains 
of firms derived from firm legitimation, and further, I highlight a contrast between FLDFs and 
MLDFs concerning the magnitude of strategic conformity-CSR relationship, pointing out the 
impact of the logic orientation of firms on CSR performance. Lastly, I empirically show and 
expand the understanding of the hidden role of ILs – family and market logics – as covert 
drivers of firm behaviour in terms of affecting CSR performance, differentiating firm 
engagement in socially responsible practices and the effect of firm legitimacy on the view of 
CSR among the logic-based groups of firms. Moreover, in applying the ILs perspective to the 
context of CSR, I thus provide scholars, policymakers and regulators with a distinct explanation 
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for and advance their understanding of the difference in CSR among firms, helping them better 
develop future CSR research, policies and regulations. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the literature review 
and hypothesis development. Descriptions of the data, sample and methodology design are 
included in Section 3. Section 4 discloses the findings from empirically testing the hypotheses, 
discusses the results of the multivariate analysis, and provides remarks on the robustness 
checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter.  
5.2 Literature Review & Hypothesis Development 
5.2.1 The Dark Side of Socioemotional Wealth 
Family and non-family firms differ in several aspects. The SEW preservation is a key 
distinguishing factor of family firm behaviour (Berrone et al., 2012), highlighting a family-
oriented attitude and preference. Emphasising the motives, objectives and essence of firms, it 
thereby underpins the distinction between and classification of FLDFs and MLDFs. Originating 
from behavioural agency theory, SEW is a popular model introduced by Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2007) that mainly encompasses the non-economic utilities of key firm actors derived from the 
firm, including authority and control, job security and protection, reputation and image and 
social ties. It presents a main reference point that family firms use to make their strategic 
choices and managerial decisions, considering mitigating the exposure of SEW to threat as 
opposed to the economic logic of firm decision making (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2011a; Berrone et al., 2012; Miller and Le Breton‐Miller, 2014).  
Given the multidimensional character of SEW (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2011a), the SEW dimensions are portrayed as inspiring care for and effective response to 
firm stakeholders from the perspective of CSR (Zientara, 2017). This is because the dimensions 
of SEW conceptually signify the non-economic benefits and moral values attached to the firm. 
Further, the concern for SEW preservation implies the avoidance of firm practices and decisions 
that incur negative publicity and unfavourable image for family firms as an identification and 
extension of firm members (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). SEW is thus generally depicted as a 
prosocial and positive stimulus, which supports the preliminary assumption that it is associated 
with more engagement of family firms in CSR (Kellermanns et al., 2012).  
However, whether family firms are more socially responsible relative to non-family firms 
remains a controversial discussion. Cruz et al. (2014) explain the contradictory views of family 
firms’ social practices and performance based on different reasons. First, most studies of the 
association between family ownership and CSR have stressed a single aspect of the socially 
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responsible practices and decisions of firms, namely the environment, overlooking the diversity 
of firm stakeholders. In consistency, second, given SEW is the most salient, distinguishing 
factor in characterising family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2012), the 
studies have also emphasised a single SEW dimension of firm reputation, prestige and image 
with which key firm actors are closely identified. This implies incorporating an incomplete view 
of the CSR of family firms, as SEW has a multidimensional character.  
As SEW preservation is a key reference point for framing the problems, issues and 
opportunities of family firms, it plays a key role in conceptualising and engaging in CSR. CSR 
is an influential managerial concept that relates to the role of firms in society at large; much 
attention has been given to CSR, resulting in extensive research on the intentions and 
consequences of the socially responsible practices of firms. CSR is theoretically grounded in 
stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984). In particular, CSR lies in the socially responsible practices 
of firms concerning the wider social good, where different internal and external stakeholders, 
whose interests, demands and concerns should be considered rather than shareholders only, are 
the recipients of firm practices and decisions (Peterson, 2004). As Font et al. (2012) state, firms 
have responsibilities towards society at large rather than only maximising shareholders’ wealth, 
where both internal and external, financial and non-financial stakeholders, such as customers, 
suppliers employees, environment and government bodies, affect and are affected by firm 
practices and decisions. Therefore, as CSR is theoretically based on stakeholder theory, the 
impact of SEW preservation on managing the various groups of stakeholders essentially matters 
(Zientara, 2017). Given the priority of preserving SEW, Cruz et al. (2014) assert that family 
firms respond to the demands and interests of firm stakeholders differently. Specifically, unlike 
non-family firm, family firms tend to behave more responsibly towards external rather than 
internal stakeholders, as the SEW dimensions are contradictory from the CSR perspective. 
Stressing different SEW dimensions, family firms disregard the demands and concerns of 
internal stakeholders, namely employees, while effectively considering the interests and 
demands of external stakeholders, avoiding the SEW of firm’s key actors from being 
jeopardised (Cruz et al., 2014).  
Therefore, they behave both good and bad at the same time in terms of treating internal 
and external stakeholders unequally and unfairly. In other words, underpinned by the 
multidimensional nature of SEW, family firms can be simultaneously socially responsible and 
irresponsible, responding to firm stakeholders distinctly. This reveals a self-serving behaviour 
of family firms compared with non-family firms, where family firms undertake social practices 
and decisions selectively and opportunistically to serve SEW-related interests and goals 
(Zientara, 2017). Accordingly, SEW is seen as a driver of family firms’ self-serving behaviour, 
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which yields a discriminatory behaviour towards firm stakeholders (Cruz et al., 2014), 
challenging the prosocial and positive stimulus claim.  
Drawing on the SEW preservation perspective, family firms are more likely to behave 
selectively and opportunistically relative to their counterparts due to namely the authority and 
power, social ties and business networks and reputation and image dimensions of SEW. Thus, in 
practice, social practices and decisions are more complicated in family firms in comparison with 
non-family firms. Cruz et al. (2014) state that, in the name of protecting SEW, family firms are 
more responsive to external stakeholders, adopting socially responsible practices that fulfil their 
demands and concerns to maintain firms’ favourable reputation and positive image with which 
key firm actors are closely identified, as well as social ties and business networks.  
Further, the concern for preserving authority, control and power of firm’s key actors leads 
to disregarding internal stakeholders, specifically employees. This involves overlooking their 
competencies and potentials, promotions and involvement in firm decision making, while 
sustaining such affective endowments in the hands of managers in compliance with the family-
oriented values and essence of nepotism and prejudice (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a). Together, 
this suggests unequal and unfair treatment not only of internal and external stakeholders but also 
discrimination among internal stakeholders themselves, that is, stakeholder differentiation.  
In accordance with this, stressing proactive stakeholder engagement, Kellermanns et al. 
(2012) point out the ‘dark side’ of SEW, which results in negative effects on the stakeholders of 
family firms. Extending the SEW perspective, they note that SEW can be negatively associated 
with proactive stakeholder engagement. They explain that the concern for preserving SEW 
triggers family firms’ self-serving behaviour, prioritising SEW-related interests and concerns at 
the cost of some firm stakeholders, which has adverse implications for stakeholder management. 
Specifically, emphasising the dark side of SEW, preserving the non-economic utilities of firm’s 
key actors linked to the firm has potential detrimental outcomes and disadvantages for some 
firm stakeholders, reducing proactive stakeholder engagement (Cennamo et al., 2012). To 
preserve the non-economic benefits linked to the firm, family firms operate with a mentality of 
‘us-against-them’ that expropriates or exploits specific firm stakeholders (Kellermanns et al., 
2012). This aligns with the expropriation hypothesis of family control and entrenchment 
addressed by El Ghoul et al. (2016).  
Further, Kellermanns et al. (2012) shed light on the double-valanced nature of SEW 
dimensions, where they can be positively and negatively valanced. This is at odds with the 
predominant view of SEW as prosocial and positive stimulus, where the SEW dimensions can 
be associated with pleasant (positive) and unpleasant (negative) emotions and consequences 
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concerning the various groups of stakeholders. Thus, the dimensions of SEW do not necessarily 
associate with good care for and effective response to firm stakeholders; instead, they can 
explain the low proactive stakeholder engagement. As Berrone et al. (2012) and Cennamo et al. 
(2012) assert, the SEW dimension that family firms emphasise affects their proactive 
stakeholder engagement.  
Given its multidimensional character, SEW encompasses different dimensions that refer 
to distinct concerns and present different reference points upon which firm practices and 
decisions are undertaken. Accordingly, the proactive stakeholder engagement of family firms is 
determined by the specific dimension of SEW that they stress. Specifically, emphasising the key 
SEW dimensions of reputation, image and prestige and social ties and business networks, family 
firms carry out socially responsible practices that burnish their social and environmental 
credentials, effectively fulfilling the interests and demands of external stakeholders as opposed 
to internal stakeholders.  
Moreover, stressing the authority, control and power dimension of SEW, family firms act 
unequally and unfairly towards internal stakeholders, namely abandoning employees’ interests 
and concerns while effectively responding to the demands and interests of firms’ key actors, 
such as top management. Although positively valanced in relation to the preservation of 
affective endowments, family firms’ discriminatory behaviour in terms of the unequal and 
unfair treatment of firm stakeholders suggests a negative valance of the SEW dimensions 
(Kellermanns et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014). This implies an ambiguous nature of SEW 
according to which family firms act contradictorily from the perspective of CSR, given the 
resulting CSR-related contradictions relating to stakeholder management. 
Relatedly, Zientara (2017) advances a debate on SEW regarding its influence on firm 
engagement in CSR, making a distinction between the instrumental (selective) and strategic 
(normative) approaches to CSR. Similarly, Cennamo et al. (2012) note that the proactive 
stakeholder engagement of family firms is determined by either instrumental or normative 
motives. Building on the work of Kellermanns et al. (2012) concerning SEW’s dark side, 
Zientara (2017) addresses the ambivalent nature of SEW and its adverse effects on the 
stakeholders of family firms, disputing the perception of SEW as a prosocial and positive 
stimulus. Given the ambiguous nature of SEW, Zientara (2017) asserts that the CSR initiatives 
and activities of family firms are more likely to reflect a selective rather than a normative 
motivation towards CSR.  
As such, given the concern for preserving SEW, family firms are more likely to undertake 
socially responsible practices selectively or instrumentally, adopting an instrumental approach 
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to CSR. That is, family firms engage in CSR not because it is fundamentally good or morally 
right, but because it serves SEW-related interests and concerns, behaving in a self-serving 
manner. Accordingly, drawing on the ambivalent nature of SEW, this gives rise to consequent 
CSR-related contradictions, where family firms can be socially responsible and irresponsible at 
the same time (Cruz et al., 2014). Given the self-serving SEW drives and the resulting 
discriminatory behaviour, family firms exhibit a case of ‘corporate schizophrenia’ that is not 
typical of firms genuinely committed to CSR (Zientara, 2017), reinforcing the shadow of 
SEW’s dark side that family firms confront. 
In contrast, adopting a strategic approach to CSR, non-family firms consider the interests 
and demands of all firm stakeholders, in line with the strategic ‘whole-business’ view of 
responsibility (Font et al., 2012; Zientara, 2017). Unlike family firms, CSR presents a core 
element of the business philosophy of non-family firms that reinforces CSR initiatives and 
activities and sets targets for the firm and society at large (Coles et al., 2013). In doing so, non-
family firms emphasise the wider social good, considering the strategic whole-business view of 
responsibility for the best interests of shareholders (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Nelson, 2004). 
That is, they reconcile the corporate good with the social good as doing good basically leads to 
doing better. Specifically, firm engagement in CSR eventually contributes to the best benefit of 
shareholders by triggering the loyalty of and attracting socially minded investors and other 
stakeholders (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Nelson, 2004; Carvalho et al., 2010; Wijesinghe, 
2014). 
Therefore, implementing an instrumental  approach to CSR, CSR is not a core business 
strategy for family firms as they simultaneously adopt socially responsible practices related to 
external stakeholders and behave irresponsibly towards internal stakeholders. Particularly, 
unlike non-family firms, family firms view CSR as a marketing or public relations instrument to 
obtain (avoid) gains (losses) of SEW from the publicised firm engagement in CSR irrespective 
of the potential detriments and disadvantages for internal stakeholders, specifically employees 
(Cennamo et al., 2012). In other words, given the priority of protecting the non-economic 
utilities of key firm actors derived from the firm, stakeholders’ interests and needs are 
disregarded whenever SEW is exposed to risk.  
This is at odds with the strategic whole-business view of responsibility that entails, 
regarding social practices and decisions, unselective CSR initiatives and activities in terms of 
behaving responsibly towards all firm stakeholders, considering their distinct demands and 
interests across the entire value chain of the firm (Coles et al., 2013). Unlike the genuine 
commitment and normative motivation towards CSR that underlies the strategic approach of 
non-family firms, the instrumental approach of family firms implies selectively or 
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instrumentally carrying out socially responsible practices that primarily fulfil firm’s narrowly 
defined SEW-related interests and concerns at the expense of specific firm stakeholders 
(Kellermanns et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014; Zientara, 2017).  
In other words, building on the perspective of SEW preservation, CSR presents the means 
to serve family firms’ self-interests of SEW rather than a core, authentic business strategy. The 
self-serving behaviour of family firms that SEW triggers, as well as the resulting discriminatory 
behaviour contradict the view of CSR as a force for the wider social good. These behaviours 
present using CSR instrumentally in protecting or expanding the affective endowments of key 
firm actors attached to the firm – given the multiple dimensions of SEW – rather than fulfilling 
the responsibilities of firms towards the society at large, generating poor publicity, negative 
image and unfavourable reputation for firms regarding firm engagement in CSR. Accordingly, 
as Zientara (2017) assert, SEW can be a negative stimulus, imposing the contradictions of social 
practices and decisions concerning stakeholder management that ultimately impact firm 
competitiveness and survival.   
In consistency, emphasising the expropriation hypothesis, El Ghoul et al. (2016) find that, 
compared with non-family firms, family firms exhibit lower CSR performance, diverting firm 
resources to fulfil firm’s self-interests in a self-serving manner. That is, stemming from the 
perspective of SEW preservation, family firms encounter the shadow of the dark side of SEW 
that weakens proactive stakeholder engagement and challenges stakeholder management, which 
imposes the firm negligence, guiltiness and suspiciousness in the eyes of firm stakeholders, 
undermining CSR performance in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR.  
Accordingly, building on the SEW preservation perspective, it is argued that FLDFs 
undertake CSR initiatives and activities selectively or instrumentally relative to MLDFs, 
adopting an instrumental approach to CSR that serves SEW-related interests and concerns. 
Particularly, given the ambivalent nature of SEW, it is contended that FLDFs behave socially 
responsibly and irresponsibly at the same, worsening proactive stakeholder engagement and 
challenging stakeholder management. Thus, drawing on such corporate schizophrenia of 
FLDFs, in this study, I suggest that the dark side of SEW negatively affects the socially 
responsible practices of FLDFs, implying a negative effect of familiness on CSR performance. 
5.2.2 Selective Coupling Response Strategy  
Stemming from the perspective of ILs, firms respond to the multiple, typically competing, 
demands and pressures of logics by adopting different response strategies to deal with 
institutional complexity. Firms need to find ways to deal with such demands and expectations to 
obtain legitimacy from key external institutional referents (Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
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Regarding firm response strategies, institutional research has recently pointed to selective 
coupling response strategy, among others, to institutional demands and pressures in the context 
of coexisting and contradictory ILs. Emphasising hybrid firms, Pache and Santos (2013) shed 
light on selective coupling as a response strategy to institutional plurality. Given the 
contradictory demands and pressures that firms confront, selective coupling entails the 
purposeful enactment of selected elements and practices prescribed by different logics that 
projects firm appropriateness, allowing firms to satisfy self-interest and concerns.  
Like other response strategies, selective coupling basically implies that firms undertake 
practices that best align with firm interests and goals, selectively combining or balancing 
practices and structures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Bromley and 
Powell, 2012; Pache and Santos, 2013). Accordingly, firms adopt a selective coupling response 
strategy particularly when the pressures and demands that they encounter conflict with their 
interests and undermine their priorities. Similarly, stressing social enterprises from an 
institutional perspective, Mair et al. (2015) point to the use of selective coupling mechanism, 
adopting practices that best fit the firm. The scholars shed light on the distinct types of hybrid 
firms, emphasising commercial and social welfare logics.  
Examining the setup of their governance structures in an institutional plurality context, 
Mair et al. (2015) identify two types of hybrids – conforming and dissenting – based on the 
response strategy adopted by firms to manage institutional complexity. Specifically, they assert 
that, in governing firms and achieving their strategic objectives, dissenting firms manage to 
combine and balance the demands and prescriptions of multiple logics, unlike conforming firms, 
by selective coupling or innovation mechanisms, where they operate under different, typically 
competing, logics. They note that as a result of selective coupling, firm arrangements are 
viewed as strategic tools to selectively run the business.  
Concerning firm engagement in CSR, this is in line with the instrumental (selective) 
approach to CSR (Zientara, 2017), where, as previously mentioned, CSR presents the means of 
family firms to serve SEW-related interests and goals. Specifically, selectively adopting socially 
responsible practices that best fit them, family firms use CSR as a marketing or public relations 
instrument to avoid the risk exposure of the SEW of key firm actors by the publicised firm 
engagement in CSR regarding the social and environmental credentials of firms. Thus, 
stakeholders’ interests and concerns are abandoned if SEW is threatened. Consistent with Pache 
and Santos (2013) and Mair et al. (2015) regarding selective coupling response strategy, this 
implies a purposeful enactment of selected social practices and decisions in relation to 
stakeholders’ needs and interests that signals firm appropriateness, allowing firms to satisfy 
their self-interests related to SEW. Thereby, applying the response strategy of selective coupling 
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to the CSR context, this suggests the adoption of selective coupling response strategy to the 
demands and concerns of the various groups of stakeholders of family firms. 
Drawing on the perspective of SEW preservation, SEW presents a key reference point 
around which FLDFs frame their social practices and decisions, given the interests and demands 
of firm stakeholders. Therefore, emphasising the response strategy of selective coupling, it is 
argued that FLDFs tend to implement (avoid) social practices and decisions that preserve or 
extend (threaten) SEW by selectively coupling CSR initiatives and activities. Particularly, 
stressing the concern for preserving the affective endowment of firm’s key actors, in this study, 
I suggest that FLDFs adopt selective coupling response strategy in relation to firm engagement 
in CSR, responding to the demands and concerns of firm stakeholders distinctly. 
Thus, stressing the perspective of SEW preservation that underlies the family logic in 
terms of a family-oriented attitude and preference and integrating the perspectives of SEW’s 
dark side and selective coupling response strategy, it is contended that FLDFs and MLDFs 
undertake the socially responsible practices differently; thereby, they vary in CSR performance 
concerning the rating of firm engagement in CSR. Particularly, emphasising the influence of 
firm logic orientation on CSR performance, in this study, I propose that FLDFs perform worse 
compared with MLDFs regarding CSR. Building on the literature above, the following 
hypothesis is suggested:  
H1: Relative to MLDFs, FLDFs are less socially responsible.  
5.2.3 Firm Legitimacy Role 
Founded in organisation theory, firm legitimacy is socially constructed as firm 
stakeholders – the members of society at large – evaluate firms based on certain explicit and 
implicit expectations, and in turn, accept and take for granted the legitimate firms (Suchman, 
1995). According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), firm legitimacy is a survival-enhancing aspect 
of firms resulting from being efficient and conformed to myths in an organisational 
environment. They assert that it isolates firms from external pressures as it keeps firms from 
having their conduct questioned, and as such, firms become legitimate. Firms are thereby 
protected from being sanctioned. Firms are the subjects of legitimation as they seek 
acceptability and approval, whereas the internal and external stakeholders are the sources of 
legitimation as they observe and assess firms in terms of their practices and behaviour 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008).  
Therefore, firm legitimacy represents the social judgment of firms by firm stakeholders to 
confer firms’ social validation (Bitektine, 2011). As such, protecting the conduct of firms from 
being mistrusted, firm legitimacy infers the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders 
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regarding firm practices and decisions. In other words, the legitimation of firms mainly conveys 
their acceptance and approval conferred by firm stakeholders, who are the key actors of the 
context in which firms exist and operate, as a result of the perception of firm adherence and 
commitment to shared norms, beliefs, rules and expectations (Deephouse and Carter, 2005). 
Suchman (1995, p.577) elaborates that firm legitimacy namely addresses the ‘generalised 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate’ 
within a social system, primarily triggering the social construction of favourable reputation for 
firms that plays a vital role in firm performance, competitiveness and survival (Aldrich and Fiol, 
1994). 
Drawing on resource-based theory, firm performance follows the resources, either 
tangible or intangible, and capabilities of firms (Acedo et al., 2006; Kunc and Morecroft, 2010). 
Organisational scholars widely agree that firm reputation is a private good that plays a key role 
in performance differences among firms, emphasising the significance of firms’ intangible 
assets (e.g., Rao, 1994; Bitektine, 2011). Firm reputation particularly infers the relative 
standing, quality, esteem and favourableness of firms as it relates to the image, prestige, 
goodwill and position of firms relative to their counterparts (Deephouse and Carter, 2005). 
Therefore, a favourable reputation of firms effectively creates a positive image facilitates access 
to the resources, both financial and human capital, essential to run the business, improving firm 
performance, and thereby, enhancing the firm competitiveness and survival.  
As an intangible resource, firm reputation is socially complex, unique and hard to trade or 
mimic. Accordingly, the social identity of firms, specifically firm reputation, significantly 
determines their fates because such a reputation is a key antecedent of firm performance. 
Emphasising the firm legitimacy perspective, the favourable firm reputation is the product of 
firms’ social validation in terms of the acceptable, appropriate and proper practices and 
behaviour of firms in the widely shared system of values and beliefs (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967). In other words, as firm legitimacy, firm reputation is socially constructed, where it is 
depicted as the outcome of the legitimation process that generates the status orderings of firms, 
and in turn, improves firms’ competitiveness and survival through creating desirable image and 
acquiring mandatory business resources that enhance firm life chances (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; 
Rao, 1994; Bitektine, 2011). Therefore, drawing on the social construction of firm reputation, 
there are predictable valued outcomes associated with firm legitimacy that help firms achieve 
their goals, enhancing firm’s competitive advantages and survival (Suchman, 1995).  
Such a strategic view of firm legitimacy consequences has prompted strategic 
management research to test how the legitimation of firms affects different firm dimensions. 
Among others, Choi and Shepherd (2005) investigate the effect of firm legitimacy on 
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stakeholders’ support granted to firms. Examining how both internal and external stakeholders, 
such as employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and government bodies, assess firms to 
determine their support, the scholars find that stakeholders support firms based on their 
perceptions of firm legitimacy. Primarily, stakeholders’ support, in terms of a long-term 
relationship with the firm that contributes to firm performance and serves the firm 
competitiveness and survival, is more likely for cognitively legitimate firms (Choi and 
Shepherd, 2005). Firm legitimacy thereby helps firms garner the support of firm stakeholders as 
another expected significant consequence of firm legitimation. 
Like firm legitimacy that conveys the acceptance and approval of firms conferred by firm 
stakeholder concerning firm practices and behaviour (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse and Carter, 
2005), CSR mainly concerns the consideration of the demands and interests of both internal and 
external stakeholders, who are the recipients of firm practices and decisions, for the wider social 
good (Freeman, 1984; Peterson, 2004). In other words, consistent with the firm legitimacy 
perspective, CSR stresses the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders regarding firm 
practices and behaviour that imply the social validation of firms (Bitektine, 2011), where firm 
stakeholders are the sources of firm legitimation. They specifically present the social evaluators 
of firms, which are the subjects seeking for firm legitimation in terms of the general perception 
or assumption of the appropriateness and properness of firm practices and decisions (Deephouse 
and Suchman, 2008). Therefore, both firm legitimacy and CSR address firm stakeholders as the 
social evaluators and recipients of firm practices and behaviour, respectively.  
As such, emphasising the social validation of firms conferred by firm stakeholders, it is 
argued that firm legitimacy helps keep firms from having their conduct mistrusted or questioned 
concerning firm engagement in CSR. Particularly, the expected valued outcomes of firm 
legitimacy in terms of favourable firm reputation and stakeholders’ support shed light on 
whether and how firm legitimacy affects CSR performance. This is because such socially 
constructed consequences of firm legitimation namely significantly contribute to firm 
performance, competitiveness and survival by creating positive image, facilitating access to 
essential business resources and granting a long-term relationship between firm stakeholders 
and the firm (Rao, 1994; Choi and Shepherd, 2005; Bitektine, 2011). Accordingly, stressing the 
benefit and value associated with firm legitimacy in terms of enhancing firm performance, and 
as such, improving firm’s competitive advantage and firm life chances (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; 
Bitektine, 2011), it is contended that firm legitimacy has an upward implication for CSR 
performance regarding the evaluation of how firms perform in terms of the social and 
environmental effects of their practices and decisions.  
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The scholars have widely addressed CSR as a strategy to strive for firm legitimacy (e.g., 
Yoon et al., 2006; Du and Vieira, 2012; Zheng et al., 2015). However, drawing on the 
predictable significant outcomes of firm legitimation, in this study, I emphasise firm legitimacy 
as an input of firm social performance, proposing that it improves the perception of firms’ CSR 
in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR in accordance with the inferred satisfaction 
and endorsement of firm stakeholders as the social evaluators and recipients of firm practices 
and decisions. Thus, it is argued that firm legitimacy helps firms obtain social gains in relation 
to enhancing the impression of the CSR of firms, where firm legitimacy is a survival-enhancing 
feature of firms. Particularly, building on the perspective of firm legitimacy, in this study, I 
purport that firms mitigate their bad publicity, unfavourable image and poor reputation 
regarding firm engagement in CSR given the expected valued consequences of firm 
legitimation, deriving social gains from firm legitimacy. 
Regarding legitimacy-seeking activities, Bitektine (2011) assert that there are different 
criteria to assess firm legitimacy. According to Suchman (1995), conformity to the environment 
is the best way to obtain firm legitimacy. In consistency, testing the relationship between 
conformity and legitimacy, Deephouse (1996) finds a positive effect of conformity on firm 
legitimacy in terms of the endorsement earned from the sources of legitimation. Therefore, firm 
legitimacy is achieved and – by extension – assessed by the isomorphism or conformity of firms 
relative to their peers (Deephouse, 1999), mainly via the degree of fit between firm and industry 
in terms of being isomorphic to industry peers.  
Firm legitimacy is thus broadly proxied in the literature by firm isomorphism, which is 
believed to facilitate firm stakeholders’ satisfaction and endorsement that infer firm acceptance 
and approval concerning firm practices and decisions (Deephouse and Carter, 2005). Relatedly, 
stressing the construction of firm legitimacy, Khoury et al. (2013) suggest a signalling 
framework where firms, the signal senders, influence the judgments of – firm stakeholders – 
social evaluators, the signal recipients, through signals that convey firm legitimacy, and in turn, 
improve firm competitiveness and survival. The scholars assert that such an influence entails 
firm isomorphism specifically through the implementation of isomorphic practices to those of 
industry peers, where this serves as signals that infer firm legitimacy. Particularly, the 
isomorphism of firms presents the means to burnish and control the uncertainty of firm 
acceptance and approval in terms of the appropriateness and properness of firm practices and 
behaviour.  
This is particularly relevant to the key assumption made by institutional theory that firm 
isomorphism generates and improves firm legitimacy. Firm isomorphism is a fundamental 
concept of institutional theory that indicates the extent of similarity among firms within a given 
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industry per particular firm attributes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Deephouse and Carter (2005) assert that as firm isomorphism generates and improves firm 
legitimacy, firm legitimacy drives firms to adopt isomorphic or similar practices. That is, 
seeking legitimacy gives rise to the awareness of peer firms about embracing a mimicking 
behaviour. According to Deephouse (1999), this results in a move towards namely mimetic 
isomorphism to meet the preferences or widely shared practices of market or industry.  
Similarly, stressing the institutional distance between home and host countries, Salomon 
and Wu (2012) point to the strategy of local isomorphism that foreign firms pursue to mitigate 
such a distance or difference. Specifically, foreign firms imitate the practices of domestic firms 
to achieve firm legitimacy. Given the expected significant socially constructed outcomes of firm 
legitimation (Rao, 1994; Choi and Shepherd, 2005; Bitektine, 2011), they thereby create a good 
image and obtain access to essential resources, both financial and human capital, for running the 
business, enhancing firm performance, competitiveness and survival. Therefore, by adopting 
such a mitigating strategy, firms overcome the disadvantages and difficulties that they encounter 
because of distance or idiosyncrasy that results in a lack of firm legitimacy.  
Emphasising mimetic isomorphism as a key antecedent of firm legitimacy, Deephouse 
(1996) states that firm isomorphism is manifested primarily as conformity or similarity 
regarding firm strategies, where firms seek legitimacy through ‘strategic conformity.’ 
Legitimate firms essentially appear to be rational social systems and are deemed acceptable by 
firm stakeholders as they conform to commonly adopted strategies within an industry, where 
strategic conformity has a positive effect on firm legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996; Westphal et al., 
1997). Accordingly, the legitimacy-seeking activity of strategic conformity, in terms of adopting 
isomorphic strategies, serves as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy. Specifically, as firm 
isomorphism generates and improves firm legitimacy, the greater the strategic conformity 
(idiosyncrasy), the higher (lower) the firm legitimacy.  
Accordingly, given the predictable valued consequences of firm legitimacy, it is 
contended that firms derive social gains from the adoption of isomorphic strategies – a 
legitimacy-seeking activity. Specifically, drawing on the firm isomorphism perspective, in this 
study, I propose that strategic conformity has an incremental advantage for CSR performance as 
it positively affects the perception of firms’ CSR in terms of the rating of firm engagement in 
CSR. Building on the above literature, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
H2: Strategic conformity has a positive impact on CSR performance. 
As outlined above, drawing on the perspectives of firm theory and market discipline, 
unlike FLDFs, MLDFs probably behave socially responsibly towards all firm stakeholders, 
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adopting a strategic approach to CSR (Zientara, 2017). They do so for the best interests of 
shareholders as doing good basically leads to doing better, reconciling the corporate good with 
the social good (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Nelson, 2004). Therefore, MLDFs may actively 
seek their acceptance and approval conferred by firm stakeholders concerning firm practices and 
decisions through effectively and unselectively responding to the demands and interests of both 
internal and external stakeholders. In other words, MLDFs are likely to effectively strive for 
achieving firm legitimacy in terms of firm’s social validation regarding the appropriateness and 
properness of firm practices and behaviour (Freeman, 1984; Suchman, 1995) in relation to CSR 
initiatives and activities. As such, relative to FLDFs, MLDFs may be more socially responsible, 
keenly counting the social and environmental impacts of their practices and decisions. 
Stressing the CSR and firm legitimacy perspectives, this supports the understanding of 
CSR as a strategic mechanism for obtaining firm legitimacy (Yoon et al., 2006; Du and Vieira, 
2012; Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014; Zheng et al., 2015). Accordingly, it is argued that firm 
stakeholders accept MLDFs as legitimate; this is in accordance with their fulfilment of the 
interests and concerns of all firm stakeholders, consistent with the strategic whole-business view 
of responsibility (Font et al., 2012; Zientara, 2017). That is, stressing the satisfaction and 
endorsement of firm stakeholders regarding firm practices and behaviour, the firm legitimacy of 
MLDFs may be taken for granted. Accordingly, MLDFs normally possess its benefit and 
advantage relating to the socially constructed outcomes of firm legitimation (Choi and 
Shepherd, 2005; Bitektine, 2011).  
In contrast, building on the SEW’s dark side perspective, FLDFs are likely to be less 
socially responsible compared with MLDFs, where they treat internal and external stakeholders 
unequally and unfairly, as well as discriminate among internal stakeholders themselves in 
alignment with SEW-related interests and goals, adopting an instrumental approach to SCR 
(Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014; Zientara, 2017). Specifically, 
given the priority of preserving the non-economic benefits of firm’s key actors attached to the 
firm, FLDFs act selectively and opportunistically, responding to the interests and demands of 
firm stakeholder differently in a self-serving manner. This addresses negative effects of SEW on 
the firm stakeholders of FLDFs relating to less proactive stakeholder engagement and 
detrimental stakeholder management (Kellermanns et al., 2012), undermining the CSR 
performance of FLDFs.  
Specifically, given the multidimensional character and ambivalent nature of SEW, the 
dimensions of SEW can be contradictory from a CSR perspective, where they can be associated 
with pleasant (positive) and unpleasant (negative) emotions and outcomes regarding firm 
stakeholders. Emphasising social practices and decisions, this results in CSR-related 
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contradictions in accordance with serving FLDFs’ self-interests related to SEW. Accordingly, 
FLDFs may behave both good and bad simultaneously, exhibiting a case of corporate 
schizophrenia (Zientara, 2017). Thus, stressing CSR initiatives and activities, it is contended 
that FLDFs lack firm legitimacy as a result of the discrimination between internal and external 
stakeholders and the unequal and unfair treatment of internal stakeholders. In other words, 
emphasising the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders concerning firm practices 
and decisions, the firm legitimacy of FLDFs may be deficient given the self-serving behaviour 
that SEW drives, as well as the resulting discriminatory behaviour towards firm stakeholders 
(Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014), which generate poor 
publicity, negative image and unfavourable reputation for FLDFs concerning firm engagement 
in CSR, imposing the imprudence, guiltiness and suspiciousness of FLDFs in the eyes of firm 
stakeholders.  
Accordingly, stressing the difference in CSR performance between FLDFs and MLDFs, 
in this study, I posit that FLDFs and MLDFs vary concerning firm legitimation in relation to the 
satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders regarding social practices and decisions. 
Further, drawing on the presumable discrepancy in firm legitimacy between FLDFs and MLDFs 
associated with the aforementioned difference in CSR performance, it is argued that the social 
gains derived from firm legitimacy, regarding improving the perception of firms’ CSR, are a 
function of firm logic orientation. Particularly, presuming the taken-for-granted firm legitimacy 
of MLDFs, in this study, I suggest that seeking legitimacy, in terms of adopting isomorphic 
strategies, has no substantial incremental value for MLDFs concerning CSR performance as 
they normally retain the advantages and values of firm legitimacy.  
In contrast, because of the lack of firm legitimacy, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs may be 
rewarded for seeking legitimacy in terms of enhancing the impression of their CSR regarding 
the evaluation of how firms perform in terms of the social and environmental consequences of 
their practices and decisions. This is in accordance with the perceived satisfaction and 
endorsement of firm stakeholders regarding firm practices and behaviour, and the expected 
valued outcomes of firm legitimation in terms of favourable firm reputation and stakeholders’ 
support. Therefore, in this study, I propose that seeking legitimacy has a substantial incremental 
advantage for FLDFs regarding CSR performance.   
Moreover, given that CSR presents a strategy for achieving firm legitimacy, the 
perception of firm legitimacy through legitimacy-seeking activities may infer the potential for 
firm engagement in CSR to maintain such firm legitimation (Yoon et al., 2006; Du and Vieira, 
2012; Zheng et al., 2015), improving the view of CSR in terms of the rating of firm engagement 
in CSR. Building on the firm theory and market discipline perspectives, MLDFs are likely to 
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use CSR as a core business strategy for the best interests of shareholders, where they adopt a 
strategic approach to CSR, and as such, actively seek and obtain firm legitimacy.  
Thus, such an inference from seeking legitimacy through adopting isomorphic strategies 
may be of less interest to MLDFs, strategic conformity having no substantial incremental value 
for the CSR performance of MLDFs. In contrast, it is perhaps of more interest to FLDFs, 
strategic conformity possessing a substantial incremental advantage for FLDFs’ CSR 
performance. This is because FLDFs are probably less socially responsible, and in turn, less 
legitimate relative to MLDFs. Unlike MLDFs, they are likely to undertake CSR initiatives and 
activities selectively and instrumentally to fulfil SEW-related goals and concerns, viewing CSR 
as a marketing or public relations tool, where FLDFs adopt an instrumental approach to CSR. 
That is, legitimacy-seeking activities, specifically strategic conformity, probably work best for 
FLDFs. Therefore, in this study, I propose that FLDFs and MLFDs differ regarding the effect of 
strategic conformity – a legitimacy-seeking activity – on CSR performance.  
Accordingly, in this study, I mainly extend the initial argument on the difference in CSR 
performance between FLDFs and MLDFs to further highlight the moderating role of firm logic 
orientation concerning the strategic conformity-CSR relationship, stressing the interplay of firm 
logic orientation, legitimacy seeking and CSR. Drawing on the firm legitimacy and 
isomorphism perspectives, it is argued that FLDFs manage to offset the otherwise negative 
impact of familiness on CSR performance through seeking legitimacy in terms of adopting 
isomorphic practices, namely strategic conformity, obtaining social gains from firm 
legitimation. Particularly, building on the discrepancy in firm legitimacy, in this study, I 
propose that strategic conformity has a substantial incremental value for the CSR performance 
of FLDFs compared with MLDFs, alleviating their imprudence, guiltiness and suspiciousness in 
the eyes of firm stakeholders in relation to SEW’s dark side. Drawing on the literature above, 
the following hypothesis is suggested: 
H3: The strategic conformity-CSR relationship is more pronounced in FLDFs relative 
to MLDFs.  
Figure 5.1 summarises the conceptual framework of the study.  
5.3 Data & Methodology Design 
5.3.1 Sample Selection & Data Description 
The sample is based on all firms listed on the S&P 1500 index throughout the period of 
2006–2016. To be included in the sample, firms must be identified and reported on Compustat 
(Fundamentals Annual) concerning a range of financial and business segment data. I start with 
an initial sample of 10591 firm-year observations for about 1400 firms. However, in this 
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chapter, I restrict firm-year observations to the period of 2006–2013 based on the available data 
of ESG performance. I retrieve ESG data from MSCI (MSCI ESG KLD Stats) regarding CSR, 
the main construct of study. In addition, firms must have data on Execucomp (Annual 
Compensation) and the Centre for Research in Security Prices (Monthly Stock Files) concerning 
executive compensation and ownership and outstanding shares, respectively. I include firms for 
which the complete data are available for a minimum of two years. Following literature, I also 
exclude firms operating in the public utilities and financial services sectors that are subject to 
distinct regulations (SIC code: 4900-4999 and 6000-6999, respectively). These criteria yield to a 
final sample comprised of 3984 firm-year observations from 784 firms in the period of 2006–
2013. Table 5.1 reports the time series and size of the sample.  
5.3.2 Variables Construction 
5.3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the CSR performance of firm (𝐶𝑆𝑅) in terms of the rating of 
firm engagement in CSR. Importantly, despite that CSR is a strategic tool for firms to achieve 
firm legitimacy, I employ CSR from a different perspective. In particular, rather than simply a 
legitimacy-seeking activity, here, CSR presents a sort of firm output – firm social performance – 
that results from firm strategic decisions on firm practices that potentially affect society and 
environment, given the ESG performance benchmarks. Therefore, building on the emphasis of 
stakeholder theory regarding the wider social good (Freeman, 1984), the construct of CSR aims 
at evaluating how firms perform in terms of the social and environmental consequences of firm 
practices and decisions, emphasising the ESG strengths and concerns that firm possesses and 
confronts, respectively, irrespective of the underlying reason of firm engagement in CSR. 
Accordingly, the measure of CSR subjectively addresses and ranks the way the firm performs 
on a number of ESG categories concerning the social and environmental effects of firm 
practices and decisions, that is, it is based on the standards of ESG performance.  
The data of CSR are retrieved from MSCI database, which provides positive and negative 
ESG performance indicators. Following Goss and Roberts (2011) and Lins et al. (2017), I 
measure CSR performance using the composite net CSR index, which is calculated as the sum 
of all net CSR indices across the ESG categories that present particularly the difference between 
strength and concern subcategories. Specifically, there are seven categories of ESG 
performance, including community, diversity, environment, human rights, employee relations, 
governance and product. Each category involves both ESG strength (+1) and concern (-1) 
subcategories, which represent the positive and negative CSR policies that, respectively, add to 
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and subtract from the net CSR index of the corresponding category, implying the way a firm 
performs regarding the ESG performance benchmarks.  
For a given firm-year, I compute the net CSR index for each category as the difference 
between the strength index and the concern index. For the strength (concern) index, firm’s 
number of strengths (concerns) of a category is scaled by the possible maximum number of 
strengths (concerns) of the category in a given year. Then, for each firm-year, I compute the 
composite net CSR index as the sum of all net CSR indices across all categories, representing 
the rating of firm engagement in CSR. Based on the approach of measuring CSR, it basically 
poses a subjective assessment of CSR initiatives and activities regarding how firms perform on 
a number of ESG categories, namely ESG performance indicators (+/-) that tackle the social and 
environmental consequences of firm practices and decisions in terms of the strengths and 
concerns addressed by each category.  
5.3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Emphasising the institutional-based classification of firms, one key explanatory variable 
is firm logic orientation (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛), a three-level categorical variable on the basis of 
the developed logic orientation index that suggests different types of firms in terms of the logic-
based group in accordance with the familiness, hybrid or marketness logic orientation of firms. 
According to the logic orientation index, firms are classified in the first, presenting the 
familiness logic orientation of firms; second, presenting the hybrid logic orientation of firms; or 
third, presenting the marketness logic orientation of firms, logic-based group of FLDFs, hybrid 
firms and MLDFs, respectively. Therefore, building on the logic orientation index, the firm 
logic orientation variable (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) takes a value of “1” for the familiness logic 
orientation of FLDFs, “2” for the hybrid logic orientation of hybrid firms, or “3” for the 
marketness logic orientation of MLDFs. Importantly, I allow firms to shift between the 
categories of the institutional-based classification across years to closely capture the 
discrepancy in firm behaviour from year to year.  
Another independent variable of interest is the interaction term of firm logic orientation – 
both familiness and marketness – and strategic conformity, emphasising the contrast particularly 
between FLDFs and MLDFs. Incorporating such interaction mainly addresses, apart from the 
main effect of the logic orientation of firms, the moderation effect of firm logic orientation on 
the relationship between strategic conformity and CSR. Stressing the firm legitimacy 
perspective, I focus on the legitimacy-seeking activities of firms in terms of adopting 
isomorphic practices to those of industry peers, namely mimetic isomorphism, to proxy for firm 
legitimacy as firm isomorphism generates and improves firm legitimation in terms of firm 
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acceptance and approval. Therefore, I use the strategic conformity of firms, namely the 
conformity of asset strategies, as the criterion by which firm legitimacy is assessed, presenting a 
proximal measure of firm legitimacy where, drawing on the firm isomorphism perspective, 
greater strategic conformity suggests higher firm legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996).  
Strategic conformity is a firm-level construct that represents the extent of similarity or 
isomorphism relating to the adopted firm strategies in a certain industry at a particular point in 
time, conforming to norms of a strategic behaviour. Strategies are inherently uncertain as they 
entail commitment to doing business in a certain way in the future. Drawing on uncertain 
strategies and business conditions, mimicking behaviour is likely regarding firm strategies. That 
is, to achieve future business success and enhance firm competitiveness and survival, firms 
imitate successful strategies in the face of uncertainty, implying a mimetic isomorphism where 
firms imitate others in the choice of strategies (Deephouse, 1999). Therefore, proxying for firm 
legitimacy, I measure strategic conformity (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦) as the extent of similarity 
of a focal firm’s asset strategies to those of other firms in its industry, following Deephouse 
(1996) and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990).  
The asset strategy reflects the allocation of firm’s resources in terms of the proportion of 
total assets committed to a certain asset. It is an operational strategic choice as firms have 
latitude in determining their assets mix. The asset strategies are the key strategy variables to be 
used to measure strategic conformity. Specifically, I first compute each asset strategy, including 
cash, receivables, inventory and fixed assets, as a proportion of firm’s total assets in a given 
year. Second, I compare each asset strategy variable to the industry-year mean, for all firms, of 
that variable and standardise the value by dividing by the industry-year standard deviation, for 
all firms, of that variable.  
This mainly measures how a focal firm’s asset strategy deviates from the industry 
average. Third, for each firm, I sum the absolute values of all asset strategy variables. Finally, I 
multiply the total value by (-1) to convert the deviation into the isomorphism or conformity of 
firm in a given year, absence of differences from counterparts in industry. Emphasising the firm 
isomorphism perspective, the greater the strategic conformity (idiosyncrasy), the higher (lower) 
the firm legitimacy as firm isomorphism generates and improves firm legitimation (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Deephouse and Carter, 2005). Therefore, this value represents firm’s overall 
isomorphism; larger (smaller) values – less (more) negative numbers – indicate greater 
conformity or isomorphism (idiosyncrasy), where the focal firm more (less) closely resembles 
industry peers in that year, and in turn, higher (lower) firm legitimacy. Data are obtained from 
Compustat (Fundamentals Annual).  
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To gain insight about the moderation effect of firm logic orientation on strategic 
conformity-CSR relationship, I use two dichotomous variables of firm type, in terms of the 
logic-based group, as moderators or conditioning variables, capturing the firm logic orientations 
of familiness and marketness against other logic orientations separately. Specifically, building 
on the logic orientation index, the first moderator (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 for the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise – hybrid firms and 
MLDFs, and the second moderator (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) is an indicator variable that equals 1 for the 
marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise – hybrid firms and FLDFs, to simplify 
the structure of data and results interpretation. As hybrid firms display an overlap between 
familiness and marketness regarding firm practices and decisions, they represent a grey area 
between FLDFs and MLDFs. In this case, they are basically thought neutral regarding firm logic 
orientation as they do not have strongly marked practices. In turn, I emphasise the contrast 
particularly between the extreme logic-based groups of FLDFs and MLDFs. 
5.3.3 Empirical Methodology & Model Specification 
I primarily investigate the role of ILs concerning firm logic orientation in the context of 
CSR by estimating the following baseline regression models using the pooled sample and 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) method in the preliminary analysis. In model (1), I first test the 
association between firm logic orientation and CSR. In model (2), I examine the effect of 
strategic conformity, as a legitimacy-seeking activity, on CSR performance. Further, in models 
(3) and (4), I address the association between firm legitimacy and CSR, given the logic 
orientation of firms – familiness and marketness – testing the presence of interaction regarding 
the moderation effect of firm logic orientation.  
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽9 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽11 𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽15 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽17 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽18 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽19 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽20 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
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𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽15 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽16 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽17 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽18 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽19 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽10 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽12 𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽14 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽16 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽18 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽19 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽20 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽21 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽7 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽10 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽12 𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽14 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽16 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽18 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽19 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽20 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽21 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
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In models (1) through (4), the dependent variable 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 is CSR performance in terms of 
the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index on the basis of 
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ESG performance indicators. In models (1), (3) and (4), I primarily emphasise the effect – both 
main and moderation – of firm logic orientation through the empirical window of CSR. In the 
existing finance and CSR literature, CSR performance has been widely used as an input in 
models explaining firm economic performance. However, here, I do not explain the firm aspects 
by means of CSR. Instead, stemming from the perspective of the dark side of SEW, I use CSR 
performance as an output of models emphasising the logic orientation of firms that depicts and 
defines the firm type in terms of the logic-based group concerning the embeddedness of family 
and market logics by which a firm is driven.  
In particular, stressing the ILs perspective, CSR presents a sort of firm output that results 
from firm strategic decisions on firm practices – potentially affecting society and environment – 
which are tangible manifestation of ILs as covert drivers of firm behaviour (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2010). Therefore, emphasising the endogeneity concerns, the 
models mainly address the influence of ILs on an outcome of CSR that alone would unlikely 
determine the logic orientation of firms as a reverse causality issue, presenting a more 
behavioural and descriptive institutional-based approach rather than a normative economic 
rationality. That is, considering the possibility of an endogenous relationship between firm logic 
orientation and CSR performance, I posit that this is not the case and, as such, does not affect 
the study. 
To incorporate the logic-based group of firms, I essentially build on the developed logic 
orientation index that suggests the firm type by identifying the extent of logics that firms embed 
in their decision making in terms of the familiness, hybrid or marketness logic orientation of 
firms. Testing H1, I am mainly interested in the effect of firm type in terms of the logic-based 
group on their socially responsible practices, emphasising the main effect of firm logic 
orientation. Therefore, to gain insight about how the embeddedness of family and market logics 
influences CSR, I particularly use the firm logic orientation variable (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡); a 
three-level categorical variable which is decomposed into three indicator or dummy variables of 
which, for multicollinearity-related issues, two are included in model (1) specification.  
Specifically, in model (1), I include both the logic-based group of FLDFs 
(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡), an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1, 
presenting the familiness logic orientation of firms, and 0 otherwise; and the logic-based group 
of MLDFs (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡), an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation 
value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of firms, and 0 otherwise. To avoid 
perfect collinearity, the middle logic-based group of hybrid firms (𝐻𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) serves as a 
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reference category for which the firm logic orientation value is 2 presenting the hybrid logic 
orientation of firms, an overlap between familiness and marketness.  
Emphasising the model intercept, model (1) is designed to allow for differences in the 
intercepts among the logic-based groups. In the baseline model, there are no interaction terms. 
In this case, I assume that the independent variables in the model have the same effect; slope, 
for all logic-based groups. However, looking at the intercept of the model, it is expected to be 
different for hybrid firms (𝐻𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) than for other logic-based groups, FLDFs 
(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) and MLDFs (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡). The coefficients’ estimates for FLDFs and 
MLDFs tell how much higher (or lower) their intercepts are relative to that for the reference 
category of hybrid firms. Hence, the reported intercept (constant) from regression is the 
intercept for those firms that are neither market logic-driven nor family logic-driven, and the 
intercept ± coefficient’s estimate is the intercept for the corresponding logic-based group other 
than hybrid firms, indicating the effect of firm type in terms of the logic-based group on CSR 
performance. 
Basically, H1 is a baseline hypothesis that emphasises the association between firm logic 
orientation and CSR, and, relatedly, H2 and H3 extend the argument to introduce firm 
legitimacy as an input of CSR performance. Particularly, H2 first stresses the relationship 
between strategic conformity –a legitimacy-seeking activity – and CSR. Therefore, model (2) 
aims to test the main effect of strategic conformity (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1), a proximal 
measure of firm legitimacy measured as the extent of similarity of a focal firm’s asset strategies 
to those of industry peers, on CSR performance. Further, while testing H1 addresses the main 
effect of firm logic orientation  in light of firm engagement in CSR, testing H3 emphasises the 
contrast particularly between FLDFs and MLDFs regarding the moderation effect of the logic 
orientations of firms – familiness and marketness – on, particularly the magnitude of, the 
relationship between strategic conformity and CSR.  
To simplify the data structure and results interpretation, I employ two different interaction 
models, separately capturing the firm logic orientations of familiness (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) and 
marketness (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) against other logic orientations in models (3) and (4), respectively. 
Therefore, unlike model (1), models (3) and (4) include interaction terms, addressing the 
moderation effect of firm logic orientations of familiness and marketness, respectively, in terms 
of assuming different relationship between strategic conformity and CSR as a function of the 
logic orientation of firms. Specifically, in models (3) and (4), the moderator variables of 
familiness and marketness; indicator variables that equal 1 for the corresponding firm logic 
orientation, and 0 otherwise, are separately interacted with the variable of strategic conformity 
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(𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) in an interaction term which is the main predictor of CSR 
performance.  
Specifically, the interaction term is the product of the marketness or familiness indicator 
and the continuous variable of strategic conformity, stressing the difference in strategic 
conformity-CSR relationship among the logic-based groups of firms. In an interaction empirical 
setting, strategic conformity variable is mean-centred putting the observations of a variable into 
deviation observation form by simply subtracting the industry-year mean from all firms’ 
observations of the variable (Holmbeck, 2002). According to the computation of interaction, the 
main effects are highly correlated with the interaction term, so mean-centring mitigates the 
potential problematic multicollinearity between the first-term predictors and any higher order 
interaction terms among them and facilitates testing the simple slopes (Aiken et al., 1991; 
Holmbeck, 1997; Holmbeck, 2002). Further, proxying for firm legitimacy, strategic conformity 
variable is lagged one year to mitigate the reverse effect of CSR as an issue of potential 
endogeneity, assuming weakly exogenous variables, where CSR presents a potential firm 
strategy for achieving firm legitimacy.  
Testing H3 goes in two steps, following Holmbeck (2002) as described in the previous 
chapter – Chapter 4. First, I examine the significance of the moderation effect of firm logic 
orientation – familiness and marketness – on the relationship between strategic conformity and 
CSR, testing the presence of an interaction. However, the statistically significant interaction 
provides no information about the significance of the individual simple slopes; singificant 
difference from zero. In other words, the initial significant moderation effect tells nothing about 
whether the strategic conformity-CSR relationship is significant for the first logic-based group 
of firms, the comprable logic-based group of firms, both or none of the opposing logic-based 
groups of firms of the moderator.  
Therefore, second, if an interaction term is statistically significant, a simple slope test is 
conducted applying a post-hoc regression, post-hoc probing the significant moderation effect to 
examine whether the relationship between strategic conformity and CSR is significant for one, 
both or none of the comparable logic-based groups of the moderator. The post-hoc probing 
analysis goes through a sequential process. First, for each original moderator – familiness 
(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) and marketness (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡) – I create two new conditional moderator 
variables – 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, and 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 
and 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, respectively – to run two separate post-hoc regressions. 
Specifically, as detailed below, stressing the logic orientation of firms, one logic-based group of 
firms is assigned a value of 0 in one regression and the other logic-based group of firms is 
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assigned a value of 0 in the other regression, upholding that one group is always higher than the 
other when running both regressions.  
For the familiness moderator (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡, 1 for FLDFs and 0 otherwise): 
▪ 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 (values are equivalent to the original 
moderator; 0 for other firms and 1 for FLDFs). 
▪ 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 – 1 (values are -1 for other firms and 0 
for FLDFs). 
For the marketness moderator (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡, 1 for MLDFs and 0 otherwise): 
▪ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 (values are equivalent to the original 
moderator; 0 for other firms and 1 for MLDFs). 
▪ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 – 1 (values are -1 for other firms and 
0 for MLDFs). 
Second, I compute new interactions incorporating each of the new variables above. Note 
that the continuous independent variables are mean-centred before conducting any regression 
analysis. 
For the familiness new conditional moderator variables, I compute below interactions: 
• 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
• 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
For the marketness new conditional moderator variables, I compute below interactions: 
• 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
• 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
Third, using the above new conditional moderator variables and interactions, I run two 
post-hoc regressions, one for each of the two new conditional moderator variables of familiness 
and marketness, to test the significance of the simple slope for each category of the original 
moderators. Specifically, running the post-hoc regressions, I generate the simple slopes, 
representing the relationship between strategic conformiry and CSR, for the (1) FLDFs 
category, (2) other firms category of hybrid firms and MLDFs, (3) MLDFs category and (4) 
other firms category of hybrid firms and FLDFs. Basically, stemming from models (3) and (4), 
in each post-hoc regression model, I enter simultaneously the main effect of the independent 
variable of strategic conformity, one new conditional moderator variable and the interaction 
among them, controlling for the year and industry fixed effects, as shown in models (3.1) 
through (4.2). 
 This, in turn, generates logic-based group-specific regression models. Holmbeck (2002) 
further explains that substitsuting a value of 0 for the new conditional moderator variable in 
each model, for both main effect and interaction term, keeps only the coeffiecient of the 
predictor variable of concern, namely strategic conformity, and the intercept of the model. 
Interestingly, plugging in a value of 0, the coefficient on the strategic conformity variable is the 
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simple slope of the regression line representing the relationship – I test for its significance – 
between stategic conformity and CSR for a signle category, which is a logic-based group(s) of 
firms, of the original moderatorfor which the value is 0 and is, as such, represented by an 
individual post-hoc regression model in the following form (Holmbeck, 2002). 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
(3.1) 
 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
(3.2) 
 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
(4.1) 
 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+  𝛽3 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
 
(4.2) 
 
Following the literature (e.g., Jo and Harjoto, 2012; Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2013; 
Borghesi et al., 2014; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Petrenko et al., 2016), I introduce into 
the models different control variables that are known to impact CSR. I control for the firm-
specific economic attributes including firm size (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡), the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; accounting-based performance (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡), firm profitability measured by the 
return on assets as the income before extraordinary items divided by firm’s total assets; dividend 
pay-out (𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡), the firm dividend policy of cash dividend pay-out as cash 
dividends divided by firm’s total assets; capital structure (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡), the debt financing of firm 
measured by the ratio of long-term debt to firm’s total assets; firm risk (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡), the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over the 12-month period preceding year end; advertising 
expenditure (𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡), the ratio of advertising expense to firm’s sales as a 
measure of growth options; capital expenditure (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡), the ratio of capital 
expense to firm’s sales as a measure of growth options; selling and administrative expenditure 
(𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡), the ratio of selling, general and administrative expense to firm’s total 
assets as a proxy for the agency conflict extent due to potential managerial discretion; and slack 
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resources (𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡), the available slack resources of firm measured by the current 
ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
 Controlling for the potential private benefits of managers, I use the free cashflow 
measure (𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡) as the cash holdings divided by firm’s total assets. I also control for 
the governance characteristics related to the effectiveness of the board structure using board 
composition (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡), the percentage of outside directors on the board as the 
number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on board; and board 
leadership (𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡), an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman 
positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise.  
Moreover, controlling for the managerial characteristics, I emphasise CEO structural 
power, influence and experience using CEO age (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡); gender 
(𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡), an indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise; and 
tenure (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡), the number the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s 
position. I also control for the managerial ownership and incentive-based compensation using 
CEO ownership (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡), the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares 
outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
short-term incentive pay (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡), the CEO incentive of short-term focus measured 
by the ratio of bonus earned by CEO to total compensation; and long-term incentive pay 
(𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡), the CEO incentive of long-term focus measured by the ratio of equity-
based compensation, granted restricted stock and option awards, to total compensation.  
I also use year and industry dummies, controlling respectively for the systematic time 
effects and trends and the industry fixed effects using Fama and French (1997) 30-industry 
classification, to control for endogeneity concerns. Throughout the analyses, I also estimate 
robust Huber-White standard errors where the observations are clustered at firm level by firm’s 
gvkey to control for the serial correlation. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles to reduce the effect of influential outliers.  
5.3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
5.3.4.1 Full Sample 
Table 5.2 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample of CSR analysis on the logic-
based groups, firm-specific characteristics, board structure, CEO-specific characteristics, 
managerial ownership and compensation variables. All data are as of the accounting reporting 
period end. Panel A summarises the logic-based groups of firms. Of the sample observations, 
43% is classified in the first group of the logic orientation index presenting FLDFs 
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(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚), 36% in the second group of hybrid firms (𝐻𝑦𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) and 21% in the third 
group of MLDFs (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚).   
Panel B reports summary statistics on key firm-specific characteristics. The mean 
(median) unlogged firm size (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) is $6.03 ($1.67) billion. The average accounting-based 
performance of firms in terms of return on assets (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) is 6%. On average, the 
dividend pay-out (𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡) is 1% and debt financing (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡) is 15% of firm’s total 
assets. The mean (median) firm risk (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) is 10% (9%). On average, the advertising 
expenditure (𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) and capital expenditure (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) is 1% 
and 6% of firm’s total sales, respectively, and the selling, general and administrative 
expenditure (𝑆𝐺𝐴𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) is 25% of firm’s total assets. The mean (median) slack 
resources of firms (𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠) is 2.63 (2.17) and free cashflow (𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤) is 
positive at 17% (13%) of firm’s total assets. On average, CSR performance  (𝐶𝑆𝑅) is negative at 
-0.18, representing more concerns than strengths in relation to firm engagement in CSR. The 
mean (median) strategic conformity (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦) is -3.03 (-2.67). 
Panel C reports summary statistics on the board structure. The mean (median) percentage 
of outside (independent) directors on the board (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) is 78% (80%) and 49% 
of observations report a CEO duality where the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
(𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦). Panels D and E summarise CEO-specific characteristics and managerial ownership 
and compensation, respectively. The mean CEO age (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝐴𝑔𝑒) is 56 years and the CEO 
has been in position for an average of 13 years (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒). 96% of observations report 
that the CEO is male (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟). On average, CEOs in the sample hold 2% of firm’s 
outstanding shares (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) and they receive a variable incentive pay of short-
term focus (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) and long-term focus (𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) of 23% and  48%, 
respectively, as a fraction of total compensation. 
5.3.4.2 Subsamples by Logic-based Group 
Table 5.3 reports summary statistics on CSR for the subsamples of the logic-based groups 
of FLDFs, hybrid firms, and MLDFs. As shown in Table 5.3, the logic-based groups of firms 
differ regarding the average firm engagement in CSR. On average, emphasising the ESG 
strengths (+) and concerns (-), FLDFs engage less in CSR (-0.25) relative to hybrid firms (-
0.16) and MLDFs (-0.08). Interestingly, this is consistent with prior studies that have addressed 
the dark side of SEW, suggesting a selective and less engagement of genuine family firms in 
CSR compared with non-family firms. In consistency, as Table 5.4 shows, the individual mean-
difference t-test suggests that the difference between each pair of the logic-based groups is 
statistically different from zero concerning CSR performance. 
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In Table 5.4, I compare the mean of CSR between each two logic-based groups of firms. I 
use independent t-tests to test the significance of difference in mean of CSR performance. 
According to the primary construction and definition of logic-based groups, I expect significant 
difference particularly between FLDFs and MLDFs in terms of their CSR. Overall, the results of 
individual t-test empirically prove that FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs are different to some 
extent in running their businesses regarding firm engagement in CSR. This confirms the 
argument regarding the role of ILs in shaping firm behaviour and practices, which primarily 
supports and validates the study’s suggested institutional-based classification of firms based on 
firm logic orientation in terms of the extent of embedded family and market logics.  
Table 5.5 reports summary statistics on strategic conformity for the subsamples of the 
logic-based groups of FLDFs, hybrid firms, and MLDFs. As reported in Table 5.5, the logic-
based groups of firms differ regarding the average strategic conformity, a proximal measure of 
firm legitimacy. On average, stressing the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset 
strategies and those of industry peers, FLDFs display less strategic conformity (-3.10) relative to 
hybrid firms (-3.03) and MLDFs (-2.97). Stemming from the SEW’s dark side perspective, 
FLDFs engage in self-serving and discriminatory behaviours, treating firm stakeholders 
differently. Therefore, emphasising the perspective of firm legitimacy, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs 
lack firm legitimation, stressing the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders.  
As Table 5.6 shows, the individual mean-difference t-test indicates that the difference 
between FLDFs and MLDFs and between hybrid firms and MLDFs is statistically different 
from zero concerning strategic conformity. In Table 5.6, I compare the mean of strategic 
conformity between each two logic-based groups of firms using independent t-tests. According 
to the primary construction and definition of logic-based groups, I expect significant difference 
particularly between FLDFs and MLDFs in terms of their strategic conformity,  a legitimacy-
seeking activity. Overall, the results of individual t-test empirically prove that FLDFs, hybrid 
firms and MLDFs are different to some extent in running their businesses, affecting firm 
legitimation. This, in turn, supports the argument concerning the role of ILs as latent drivers of 
firm behaviour, which manifest in firm practices and decisions that, indeed, affect and are 
affected by firm stakeholders. 
5.3.5 Correlation Matrix 
In Table 5.7, I provide the correlation matrix for all variables included in the CSR 
regression models. Overall, among the main independent and control variables, there is no 
strong cross-correlation (> 0.50), except between a few variables. A strong correlation among 
variables possibly indicates their redundancy which may give rise to multicollinearity concerns 
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and attenuation bias of regression results for estimating one structural variable with multiple 
proxies. Addressing the effect of multicollinearity, I also run the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
measure upon regressions to check for potential multicollinearity problem. It reports values 
between 1 and 10. The correlation between firm type, in terms of the logic-based group of firms, 
and CSR, regarding the rating of firm engagement in CSR, indicates a difference particularly 
between FLDFs and MLDFs.  
Interestingly, there is a significant negative (positive) correlation between the familiness 
(marketness) logic orientation of firms and CSR. That is, in line with the perspectives of the 
dark side of SEW and the selective approach to CSR, FLDFs have lower rating of firm 
engagement in CSR, whereas MLDFs have higher rating, relative to other firms. Further, 
strategic conformity and CSR are significantly positively correlated; therefore, firms with 
greater strategic conformity, as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy, seem to have higher 
rating of firm engagement in CSR.  
5.4 Empirical Results & Discussion 
5.4.1 Main Multivariate Analysis 
5.4.1.1 The Main Effect of Firm Logic Orientation 
Column (1) in Table 5.8 reports the results from estimating the CSR baseline regression 
model (1), emphasising the main effect of firm logic orientation on CSR performance. The 
coefficients on the indicator variables of FLDFs (FamilyFirm) and MLDFs (MarketFirm) are 
interpreted as the difference in CSR between both FLDFs and MLDFs and the reference 
category of hybrid firms driven by both family and market logics (HybridFirm), controlling for 
firm economic attributes, governance characteristics, and CEO-specific characteristics, as well 
as CEO ownership and incentive-based compensation in the model. 
The main coefficients are significant at the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Ceteris paribus, it is found that FLDFs (–0.0833) perform worse than hybrid firms, whereas 
MLDFs (0.0891) perform better than hybrid firms concerning CSR in terms of the rating of firm 
engagement in CSR. Note that the negative value of CSR generally indicates higher ESG 
concerns than ESG strengths, as the negative and positive CSR policies, respectively, across the 
seven ESG categories upon which firm engagement in CSR is assessed regarding how firms 
perform in terms of the social and environmental effects of their practices and decisions. In 
comparison with the reference category of hybrid firms, this is consistent with hypothesis H1, 
which predicts that FLDFs will be less socially responsible compared with MLDFs. 
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In the main regression analysis, I contrast between FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs 
regarding CSR performance. I emphasise the main effect of firm logic orientation, which may 
be familiness, hybrid or marketness. Generally, the results show differences among the logic-
based groups of firms in CSR performance in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR. 
Overall, the findings suggest that, relative to MLDFs, FLDFs are worse concerning proactive 
stakeholder engagement and stakeholder management in line with the SEW preservation 
perspective. 
The analysis of CSR suggests remarkable findings, emphasising the institutional-based 
classification of firms. The results provide empirical evidence of the association between the 
logic orientation of firms – familiness and marketness – and CSR. The findings show a 
significant difference between FLDFs and MLDFs in CSR performance. Consistent with the 
perspectives of SEW’s dark side and instrumental (selective) approach to CSR (Kellermanns et 
al., 2012; Zientara, 2017), the results show that FLDFs are less socially responsible compared 
with MLDFs. Depicting the family-oriented attitude and preference, the preservation of SEW 
presents a priority for FLDFs according to which they behave distinctly relative to MLDFs. 
SEW poses a key reference point for decision making that drives a self-serving behaviour of 
firms (Kellermanns et al., 2012), where FLDFs implement practices and decisions that align 
with and protect or expand the affective endowments of key firm actors linked to the firm. 
Emphasising firm engagement in CSR, the worse CSR performance of FLDFs indicates 
different social practices and decisions, compared with MLDFs, driven by the concern for 
preserving the non-economic benefits of firm’s key actors. SEW thereby imposes adverse 
implications for the firm stakeholders of FLDFs namely in terms of responding to the concerns 
and demands of firm stakeholders distinctly (Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012; 
Cruz et al., 2014). Extending the SEW perspective, this suggests a dark side of SEW in terms of 
driving a self-serving behaviour of FLDFs relating to fulfilling  SEW-related interests and goals 
at the cost of some firm stakeholders in the name of protecting the non-economic utilities 
attached to the firm. Therefore, it can be said that the self-serving behaviour of FLDFs 
negatively affects firm stakeholders because FLDFs undertake social practices and decisions 
that best align with the SEW preservation irrespective of the detrimental outcomes and 
disadvantages for firm stakeholders. According to Kellermanns et al. (2012), this implies less 
proactive stakeholder engagement and worsen stakeholder management of FLDFs relative to 
MLDFs. 
Specifically, given the multidimensional character of SEW, the dark side of SEW results 
in a discriminatory behaviour of FLDFs towards firm stakeholders in relation to treating internal 
and external stakeholders unequally and unfairly, suggesting a negative valance of SEW 
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dimensions (Kellermanns et al., 2012). That is, the preservation of SEW entails accentuating 
different dimensions of SEW that can be positively or negatively valanced. Particularly, in 
contrast to the predominant perception of SEW as a prosocial and positive stimulus, the 
dimensions of SEW are contradictory from the perspective of CSR as they can be associated 
with pleasant (positive) and unpleasant (negative) emotions and consequences regarding the 
various groups of stakeholders. Thus, emphasising the double-valance nature of SEW 
dimensions, FLDFs act contradictorily from a CSR perspective. Depending on the SEW 
dimension being stressed, stakeholders’ concerns and interests are either effectively considered 
or disregarded as FLDFs respond to the demands and interests of firm stakeholders differently 
(Cruz et al., 2014), highlighting an ambivalent nature of SEW (Zientara, 2017). 
In particular, given the self-serving behaviour that SEW triggers, as well as the resulting 
discriminatory behaviour towards firm stakeholders, it can be stated that FLDFs are more 
responsive to the interests and concerns of external rather than internal shareholders. Stressing 
the key authority, power and control dimension of SEW, FLDFs are likely to treat internal 
stakeholders unequally and unfairly. Retaining such non-economic benefits in the hands of 
managers in alignment with the family-oriented values and essence of nepotism and prejudice 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a), FLDFs abandon the interests and demands of internal 
stakeholders, specifically employees, including promotions, appreciation of their competencies 
and potentials and involvement in decision making. This indicates discrimination among 
FLDFs’ internal stakeholders themselves.  
Moreover, emphasising the crucial SEW dimensions of reputation and image and social 
ties and business networks, FLDFs effectively respond to the concerns and demands of external 
stakeholders, such as suppliers, creditors and customers, which implies unequal and unequal 
treatment of the internal and external stakeholders of FLDFs. Drawing on the SEW preservation 
perspective, FLDFs engage in socially responsible practices that effectively consider the 
demands and interests of external stakeholders to generate and maintain good publicity, positive 
image and favourable reputation with which firm’s key actors are closely identified. Thus, 
FLDFs obtain and sustain social ties and business networks given their social and environmental 
credentials, mitigating the risk exposure of SEW.  
When stressed, the above dimensions reveal a positive valance in relation to the 
preservation of SEW; however, they result in discrimination among the firm stakeholders of 
FLDFs. Drawing on the self-serving behaviour that SEW drives and the resulting discriminatory 
behaviour towards firm stakeholders, it can be stated that FLDFs demonstrate a case of 
corporate schizophrenia, where they behave socially responsibly and irresponsibly at the same 
time, treating firm stakeholder distinctly (Cruz et al., 2014; Zientara, 2017). According to 
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Cennamo et al. (2012) and Kellermanns et al. (2012), this reduces the proactive stakeholder 
engagement and challenges the stakeholder management of FLDFs. Particularly, this implies 
that FLDFs act selectively and opportunistically given the resulting CSR-related contradictions, 
regarding CSR initiatives and activities, in alignment with the priority of SEW preservation, 
mitigating the risk exposure of SEW.  
Accordingly, the dark side of SEW involving self-serving and discriminatory behaviours 
of FLDFs imposes the imprudence, guiltiness and suspiciousness of FLDFs in the eyes of firm 
stakeholders, undermining their CSR performance in terms of the rating of firm engagement in 
CSR. In other words, drawing on the perspective of SEW preservation, SEW has a downward 
effect on the CSR of FLDFs as CSR mainly addresses the consideration of demands and 
concerns of all firm stakeholders for the wider social good (Freeman, 1984; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001).  
In accordance with this, it can be said that FLDFs selectively implement socially 
responsible practices that serve firm’s self-interests related to the preservation of SEW at the 
cost of some firm stakeholders. Thus, following Cruz et al. (2014) and Zientara (2017), FLDFs 
are likely to adopt an instrumental approach to CSR, where they behave both good and bad 
simultaneously while preserving the affective endowments of firm’s key actors. Therefore, 
unlike MLDFs, FLDFs use CSR as a marketing or public relations instrument to fulfil SEW-
related concerns and goals rather than a core business strategy, selectively and instrumentally 
responding to the demands and interests of firm stakeholders. Specifically, FLDFs disregard 
stakeholders’ interests and demands whenever SEW is threatened. 
In contrast, drawing on the firm theory and market discipline perspectives, MLDFs act in 
the best interests of shareholders by undertaking social practices and decisions that consider the 
concerns and demands of all firm stakeholders, adopting a strategic  approach to CSR. MLDFs 
pursue CSR initiatives and activities in the sense that doing good basically leads to doing better, 
reconciling the corporate good with the social good for the best benefit of shareholders (Sen and 
Bhattacharya, 2001; Nelson, 2004). Therefore, they unselectively carryout socially responsible 
practices for the wider social good, actively counting the social and environmental of firm 
practices and decisions. Accordingly, prompting the loyalty of, as well as attracting socially 
conscious investors and other stakeholders, the social practices and decisions of MLDFs 
eventually contribute to the best interests of shareholders regarding shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation.  
Similarly, emphasising the selective coupling response strategy (Pache and Santos, 2013; 
Mair et al., 2015), it can be stated that FLDFs selectively couple social practices and decisions 
5 The Interplay of Institutional Logics, Legitimacy Seeking & 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
281 
 
in a way that best them in terms of serving SEW-related interests and goals, avoiding the 
potential loss of SEW. Drawing on the perspective of SEW’s dark side, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs 
respond to the demands and pressures of firm stakeholders distinctly, selectively adopting 
purposeful CSR initiatives and activities that primarily obtain (alleviate) gains (losses) of SEW 
in a self-serving manner. In other words, by selective coupling, FLDFs undertake socially 
responsible practices that are best aligned with the priority of SEW preservation at the cost of 
certain firm stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Bromley 
and Powell, 2012). Given the multidimensional nature of SEW, FLDFs adopt a selective 
coupling response strategy to the concerns and demands of firm stakeholders when these 
contradict their interests and undermine their priorities regarding the protection of the non-
economic utilities of key firm actors linked to the firm.   
As mentioned above, in the name of preserving SEW, FLDFs are effectively responsive 
to the interests and concerns of external stakeholders, publicising firm engagement in CSR in 
terms of their social and environmental advancements to burnish their reputation and image in 
the eyes of external stakeholders, which helps attain and maintain their social ties and business 
networks. Further, they overlook the interests and demands of internal stakeholders, specifically 
employees, regarding their competencies and potentials, promotions and involvement in firm 
decision making, maintaining authority, control and power in the hands of key firm actors. 
Therefore, as a result of the selective coupling response strategy concerning CSR initiatives and 
activities, FLDFs exhibit unfair treatment of internal stakeholders themselves, as well as 
discrimination between internal and external stakeholders (Cruz et al., 2014). 
Purposefully enacting selected social practices and decisions, it can be said that FLDFs 
fulfil their narrowly defined self-interests related to SEW preservation irrespective of the 
detriments and disadvantages for firm stakeholders. Specifically, given the negative valence of 
the SEW dimensions associated with discriminatory behaviour towards firm stakeholders, 
stakeholders’ interests and needs are abandoned whenever SEW is exposed to risk, implying the 
self-serving behaviour of FLDFs. In other words, FLDFs act selectively and opportunistically in 
terms of considering the demands and interests of internal and external stakeholders unequally 
and unfairly, where the affective endowments of key firm actors are protected from being 
jeopardised; otherwise, stakeholders’ demands and concerns, namely employees, are 
disregarded. This is consistent with the view of corporate schizophrenia (Zientara, 2017), where 
FLDFs behave socially responsibly and irresponsibly simultaneously, lessening proactive 
stakeholder engagement and challenging stakeholder management .  
Emphasising the institutional-based classification of firms, the results provide interesting 
empirical findings on the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs regarding CSR. The empirical 
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evidence of the distinct CSR performance among the logic-based groups of firms – FLDFs, 
hybrid firms and MLDFs – gives a new institutional-based explanation for the CSR differences 
observed among firms. Witnessed by CSR performance in terms of the rating of firm 
engagement in CSR, the findings demonstrate different types of firms regarding the firm logic 
orientations of familiness and marketness, which are associated with distinct socially 
responsible practices. Importantly, emphasising the logic orientation of firms, the difference 
between FLDFs and MLDFs in CSR performance provides empirical evidence of the role of ILs 
in shaping firm practices and behaviour (Greenwood et al., 2010). This supports the way in 
which this study operationalises both family and market logics concerning the embeddedness of 
ILs in firm decision making and the institutional-based classification of firms as a result. 
5.4.1.2 The Main Effect of Strategic Conformity 
Column (1) in Table 5.10 reports the findings from estimating the CSR baseline 
regression model (2), emphasising the association between firm legitimacy and CSR. Ceteris 
paribus, it is found that strategic conformity (0.0163) has a positive effect on CSR performance, 
at a significance level of 5%. This is consistent with hypothesis H2, which predicts a positive 
relationship between strategic conformity – a legitimacy-seeking activity – and CSR.  
In the main regression analysis, I emphasise the role of firm legitimacy as an input of firm 
social performance in terms of the strategic conformity-CSR relationship. The analysis of CSR 
suggests interesting results, stressing strategic conformity as a proximal measure of firm 
legitimacy. The findings provide empirical evidence of the association between firm legitimacy 
and CSR, where strategic conformity has an incremental value for CSR performance as it 
positively affects the perception of firms’ CSR, given that firm isomorphism, namely mimetic 
isomorphism, generates and improves firm legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Deephouse and Carter, 2005).  
Emphasising the firm legitimacy and isomorphism perspectives, it can be said that 
conforming to industry peers, specifically strategic conformity, helps firms derive social gains 
from firm legitimation in terms of improving the view of the CSR of firms. Particularly, seeking 
legitimacy through adopting isomorphic strategies enhances the view of firms’ CSR concerning 
the evaluation of how firms perform  in terms of the social and environmental consequences of 
their practices and decisions. This is due to the expected valued socially constructed outcomes 
of firm legitimacy regarding favourable firm reputation and stakeholders’ support that enhance 
firm performance, and in turn, improve firm’s competitive advantage and firm life chances 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Choi and Shepherd, 2005; Bitektine, 2011). That is, stressing the 
satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders as the social evaluators and recipients of firm 
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practices and decisions, firm legitimacy seems to explain an amount of variation in CSR 
performance, in terms of the rating firm engagement in CSR, relating to the social gains of firms 
derived from firm legitimation. 
CSR connects to the consideration of all firm stakeholders, both internal and external, in 
terms of fulfilling their interests and demands for the wider social good (Peterson, 2004). That 
is, CSR mainly stresses the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders as members of 
society at large, who affect and are affected by firm practices and decisions. Similarly, firm 
legitimacy infers the social validation of firms in terms of firm acceptance and approval 
regarding firm practices and decisions, which is conferred by firm stakeholders as a source of 
firm legitimation (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse and Carter, 2005). In other words, it conveys the 
satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders concerning firm practices and behaviour. 
Accordingly, both CSR and firm legitimacy address firm stakeholders as recipients and social 
evaluators of firm practices and decisions, respectively.  
Firm legitimacy is a survival-enhancing aspect of firms relating to the general perception 
or assumption of the appropriateness and properness of firm practices and behaviour in a widely 
shared system of values and beliefs (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Suchman, 1995). Accordingly, it particularly triggers the social construction of favourable 
reputation for firms, as well as garnering stakeholders’ support that significantly contribute to 
firm performance, competitiveness and survival (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Rao, 1994; Choi and 
Shepherd, 2005). Specifically, such socially constructed consequences of firm legitimacy play a 
vital role in creating desirable image, facilitating access to essential business resources – both 
financial and human capital – and granting long-term relationship between firms and firm 
stakeholders. Therefore, firm legitimation keeps firms from having their conduct questioned, 
and as such, firms become legitimate and protected from being penalised (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). 
Thus, regarding firm engagement in CSR, it can be stated that firm legitimacy keeps 
firms from having their social practices and decisions mistrusted; that is, it drives social gains 
regarding CSR performance. Particularly, firm legitimacy appears to have upward implication 
for the perception of firms’ CSR in accordance with the perceived satisfaction and endorsement 
of firm stakeholders and the predictable significant outcomes of firm legitimation. In other 
words, firms show to obtain social gains from the adoption of isomorphic strategies, as a 
legitimacy-seeking activity, in terms of improving the impression of the CSR of firms. Drawing 
on the benefit and advantage associated with firm legitimacy in terms of improving firm 
performance and enhancing firm’s competitive advantage and firm life chances, it can be said 
that firms alleviate their unfavourable publicity, negative image and poor reputation concerning 
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CSR performance, enhancing the view of firms’ CSR in terms of the rating of firm engagement 
in CSR. Thus, emphasising the social gains of firms that firm legitimacy prompts, seeking 
legitimacy, namely through strategic conformity, is a tool that helps firms improve the 
perception of their CSR performance. 
5.4.1.3 The Moderation Effect of Firm Logic Orientation 
Given the logic orientation of firms, the positive relationship between strategic 
conformity and CSR is emphasised. Stressing CSR performance, a statistically significant 
interaction is found between firm logic orientation – familiness and marketness – and strategic 
conformity, as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy, ceteris paribus. Column (1) in Tables 
5.11 and 5.12 report the results from estimating the CSR baseline regression models (3) and (4), 
emphasising the moderation effects of the firm logic orientations of familiness and marketness, 
respectively, on the relationship between strategic conformity and CSR in terms of the rating of 
firm engagement in CSR. The significant interaction implies that the positive strategic 
conformity-CSR relationship varies significantly as a function of the firm type in terms of the 
logic-based group, suggesting a moderation effect of firm logic orientation that partly supports 
hypothesis H3 in terms of the difference among firms.  
Further, Tables 5.13 and 5.14 show the results of the post-hoc probing of the significant 
moderation effects of familiness and marketness regarding the significance and magnitude of 
the individual simple slopes representing the relationship between strategic conformity and CSR 
given the firm type in terms of the logic-based group. The positive coefficient on strategic 
conformity indicates its positive effect on CSR performance, which is consistent with 
hypothesis H2. Supporting hypothesis H3, it is found that the positive relationship between 
strategic conformity and CSR is more pronounced in FLDFs (0.0729) relative to other firms 
(0.0254), significant at the 0.1% and 1% significance levels, respectively. In consistency, 
compared with other firms (0.0485), such a positive relationship is less pronounced in MLDFs 
(0.0203), at the significance levels of 0.1% and 5%, respectively. 
In the main regression analysis, I contrast FLDFs with MLDFs regarding the strategic 
conformity-CSR relationship. I emphasise the moderation effect of firm logic orientation, which 
may be familiness or marketness. Generally, the findings show differences among the logic-
based groups of firms regarding the positive effect of strategic conformity – a legitimacy-
seeking activity – on CSR performance. The results suggest that, relative to the marketness logic 
orientation, the familiness of firms amplifies such a positive relationship. Thus, highlighting the 
interplay between firm logic orientation, legitimacy seeking and CSR, they point to that FLDFs 
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can manage to offset the otherwise negative effect of familiness on CSR performance, relating 
to SEW’s dark side, in accordance with the firm legitimacy perspective. 
The analysis of CSR suggests interesting results, emphasising the institutional-based 
classification of firms. The findings provide empirical evidence of the effect of the logic 
orientation of firms – familiness and marketness – on the relationship between strategic 
conformity and CSR performance regarding the evaluation of how firms perform in terms of the 
social and environmental impacts of their practices and decisions; this is the moderating role of 
firm logic orientation. The results show a significant difference between FLDFs and MLDFs 
concerning the strategic conformity-CSR relationship. As previously mentioned, drawing on the 
dark side of SEW in terms of the self-serving and discriminatory behaviours (Kellermanns et al., 
2012; Zientara, 2017), FLDFs demonstrate worse CSR performance in terms of the rating of 
firm engagement in CSR, where they are less socially responsible compared with MLDFs.  
However, emphasising institutional theory’s assumption that isomorphism generates and 
improves firm legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Deephouse and Carter, 2005), strategic 
conformity, as a legitimacy-seeking activity, appears to help FLDFs mitigate their bad publicity, 
poor reputation and negative image associated with SEW’s dark side concerning firm 
engagement in CSR, given the social gains of firms that firm legitimacy drives. That is, it can be 
stated that the adoption of isomorphic strategies helps FLDFs offset the otherwise negative 
effect of familiness on CSR performance, alleviating their imprudence, guiltiness and 
suspiciousness in the eyes of firm stakeholders. Specifically, given the expected significant 
socially constructed outcomes of firm legitimation that significantly contribute to firm 
performance, and as such, improve firm’s competitive advantage and survival (Suchman, 1995; 
Choi and Shepherd, 2005; Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Bitektine, 2011), the incremental value 
of strategic conformity for CSR performance in terms of improving the perception of firms’ 
CSR is substantial for FLDFs relative to MLDFs.  
Given the aforementioned difference in CSR performance between FLDFs and MLDFs, it 
can be said that they differ concerning firm legitimacy. Particularly, emphasising the 
satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders regarding firm practices and behaviour, 
FLDFs lack firm legitimation in comparison with MLDFs. Stressing social practices and 
decisions, this is because of their discrimination between internal and external stakeholders, as 
well as unequal and unfair treatment of internal stakeholders themselves, where they respond to 
the concerns and demands of firm stakeholders distinctly. Emphasising the priority of SEW 
preservation, FLDFs act selectively and opportunistically in terms of considering stakeholders’ 
interests and demands in a self-serving manner.  
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In line with the multidimensional character and ambivalent nature of SEW (Zientara, 
2017), this imposes CSR-related contradictions as FLDFs act discriminatorily from the 
perspective of CSR, which weakens proactive stakeholder engagement and deteriorates 
stakeholder management. As discussed above, FLDFs view CSR as a marketing or public 
relations instrument to serve SEW-related interests and concerns, adopting an instrumental 
approach to CSR. Thus, stressing different dimensions of SEW, the concern for preserving the 
affective endowments of key firm actors linked to the firm has detrimental effects on the firm 
stakeholders of FLDFs, undermining the CSR performance of FLDFs.  
In contrast, drawing on the firm theory and market discipline perspectives, MLDFs 
actively seek firm legitimacy by effectively and unselectively responding to the interests and 
concerns of all firm stakeholders for the best benefit of shareholders regarding shareholders’ 
wealth maximisation, in line with the strategic whole-business view of responsibility. 
Particularly, unlike FLDFs, they use CSR as a core business strategy for achieving firm 
legitimacy, adopting a strategic approach to CSR. Accordingly, given stakeholders’ interests 
and concerns, MLDFs keenly consider the social and environmental effects of their practices 
and decisions, striving for firm acceptance and approval in terms of the appropriateness and 
properness of firm practices and behaviour. In doing so, they reconcile the corporate good with 
the social good in the sense that doing good leads to doing better in terms of sustaining the 
loyalty of and attracting socially conscious investors and other stakeholders (Sen and 
Bhattacharya, 2001; Nelson, 2004; Peterson, 2004; Carvalho et al., 2010; Wijesinghe, 2014). 
Therefore, stressing the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders concerning firm 
practices and behaviour, MLDFs possess a taken-for-granted legitimation relative to FLDFs.   
Accordingly, drawing on the discrepancy in firm legitimation between FLDFs and 
MLDFs, it can be stated that strategic conformity – a legitimacy-seeking activity – works best 
for FLDFs compared with MLDFs concerning CSR performance. Specifically, seeking 
legitimacy through the adoption of isomorphic strategies appears to have no substantial 
incremental value for the CSR performance of MLDFs relative to FLDFs. Because their 
legitimation is taken for granted, MLDFs do not appear to further benefit from strategic 
conformity regarding the impression of their CSR as they normally possess the benefit and 
value of firm legitimacy in relation to the socially constructed consequences. 
Whereas, due to their lack of firm legitimation, strategic conformity seems to more likely 
help FLDFs enhance the view of firms’ CSR in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR, 
obtaining considerable social gains from firm legitimacy . Further, drawing on the lack of firm 
legitimation, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs are rewarded for seeking legitimacy in terms of improving 
the impression of their CSR. This due to the perceived satisfaction and endorsement of firm 
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stakeholder concerning firm practices and decisions, and the expected significant consequences 
of firm legitimation in terms of favourable firm reputation and stakeholders’ support(Choi and 
Shepherd, 2005; Bitektine, 2011). Particularly, seeking legitimacy through adopting isomorphic 
strategies shows to have substantial incremental advantage for the CSR performance of FLDFs 
compared with MLDFs.  
Moreover, as CSR serves as a strategic tool for obtaining firm legitimacy (Du and Vieira, 
2012; Zheng et al., 2015), the perception of firm legitimacy through strategic conformity 
indicates the potential of firm engagement in CSR to sustain such firm legitimation, enhancing 
the impression of firms’ CSR in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR. However, such 
an indication from seeking legitimacy through the adoption of isomorphic strategies appears to 
be of less interest to MLDFs, strategic conformity possessing no substantial incremental 
advantage for their CSR performance. This is because, unlike FLDFs, MLDFs adopt CSR as a 
core business strategy for the best interests of shareholders, where they adopt a strategic 
approach to CSR, and as such, actively seek and obtain firm legitimacy, building on the 
perspectives of firm theory and market discipline..  
Whereas, it shows to be of more interest to FLDFs, strategic conformity having a 
substantial incremental value for their CSR performance. This is due to that they are less 
socially responsible, and in turn, less legitimate compared with MLDFs, where, as mentioned 
earlier, they carry out CSR initiatives and activities selectively and instrumentally to fulfil 
firms’ self-interests related to SEW, adopting an instrumental approach to CSR as CSR presents 
a marketing or public relations tool. As such, stressing the substantial incremental advantage of 
strategic conformity for their CSR, FLDFs can effectively manage to mitigate the otherwise 
negative effect of familiness on CSR performance imposed by the dark side of SEW 
(Kellermanns et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, it can be said that, by pursuing isomorphism attempts, namely strategic 
conformity, FLDFs can move away from the shadow of SEW’s dark side concerning the 
negative publicity, bad image and unfavourable reputation associated with their self-serving and 
discriminatory behaviours that undermine CSR performance, improving the perception of firms’ 
CSR. Emphasising the social gains of firms that firm legitimacy drives, this implies that FLDFs 
may deliberately do things better by simply conforming to industry peers as a legitimacy-
seeking activity. As such, FLDFs can achieve firm legitimacy that, conveying the satisfaction 
and endorsement of firm stakeholders regarding firm practices and behaviour, they expect to 
have an incremental benefit and value in terms of offsetting the negative effect of familiness on 
CSR performance. This is because firm legitimacy presents a survival-enhancing feature (Meyer 
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and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995), which helps protect the conduct of FLDFs, specifically firm 
engagement in CSR, from being questioned or mistrusted.  
Therefore, it can be stated that, as a legitimacy-seeking activity, strategic conformity 
essentially represents a channel through which FLDFs namely alleviate their negligence, 
guiltiness and suspiciousness related to the dark side of SEW in the eyes of stakeholders. This 
aligns with the local isomorphism strategy addressed by Salomon and Wu (2012) regarding 
imitating firm practices to obtain firm legitimation, and in turn, conquer obstacles that firms 
encounter. Thus, emphasising isomorphism attempts, FLDFs overcome difficulties and 
disadvantages that they confront because of the dark side of SEW.  
This further aligns with the perspective of SEW preservation, where FLDF key actors are 
more likely to avoid the bad publicity, unfavourable reputation and negative image the firm with 
which they are closely identified, in the name of protecting or expanding the non-economic 
utilities attached to the firm. Therefore, building on the signalling framework (Khoury et al., 
2013), FLDFs may deliberately conform to industry peers, in terms of adopting isomorphic 
practices, to signal isomorphism that helps achieve firm legitimacy, garnering stakeholders’ 
support, creating favourable firm reputation, and as such, enhancing the firm competitiveness 
and survival (Rao, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). 
Emphasising the institutional-based classification of firms, the results provide interesting 
empirical findings on the difference between FLDFs and MLDFs regarding the strategic 
conformity-CSR relationship. The empirical evidence of the moderating role of firm logic 
orientation – familiness and marketness – gives a new institutional-based explanation for the 
difference in CSR observed among firms. Moreover, witnessed by the moderation effect of firm 
logic orientation, the findings show different types of firms in terms of the logic-based groups, 
which are associated with distinct CSR performance in terms of the rating of firm engagement 
in CSR. Importantly, emphasising the logic orientation of firms, the discrepancy between 
FLDFs and MLDFs in the relationship between strategic conformity – a legitimacy-seeking 
activity – and CSR presents empirical evidence of the role of ILs in shaping firm practices and 
behaviour (Greenwood et al., 2010). This supports the operationalisation of both family and 
market logics regarding the embeddedness of ILs in firm decision making, as well as the 
institutional-based classification of firms in this study. 
5.4.2 Robustness Checks 
In this study, I use additional techniques to account for econometric and endogeneity 
concerns. In the analysis of the main effect of firm logic orientation on CSR performance, I 
include the lagged value of some control variables as a robustness check. This follows the 
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literature and controls for potential endogeneity caused by reverse causality. As Column (2) in 
Table 5.8 shows, the results do not change the conclusions about the difference in CSR between 
FLDFs and MLDFs. As an additional robustness check, the model is estimated with the firm 
random effects, controlling for firms’ idiosyncratic tendencies that could randomly influence 
firm engagement in CSR. This aligns with the fact that, based on the observed behavioural 
dimensions, firms are allowed to shift between the logic-based groups of the institutional-based 
classification across years to closely capture the discrepancy in firm behaviour from year to year 
by not restricting firms to a fixed firm type across years. Using random-effects estimation, the 
main regression analysis results are robust regarding the CSR performance of FLDFs and 
MLDFs as reported in Column (3) in Table 5.8. 
To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, both the year and industry fixed effects are 
included in all the models, controlling for the time and industry trends of CSR. As a robustness 
check accounting for endogeneity, the model is estimated using a dynamic panel-data estimation 
procedure that only assumes weak exogeneity, which allows CSR performance to be affected by 
the previous trends of CSR idiosyncratic to the firm regarding the rating of firm engagement in 
CSR. As shown in Column (4) in Table 5.8, the results do not alter the conclusions about the 
worse performance of FLDFs relative to MLDFs concerning CSR. However, some power of the 
main independent variables is lost.  
Running another robustness check, I go a step further. Apart from the institutional-based 
classification of firms, the family ownership status of firms is used to group the sample firms 
under the same empirical setting. Instead of using the indicators of firm logic orientation, the 
ownership-based classification of firms is applied using a conventional indicator to flag family 
(= 1) and non-family (= 0) firms based on family ownership. The data of family ownership are 
retrieved from the professional website of Ron Anderson.  
As Table 5.9 reports, the findings of the preliminary regression analysis are robust 
regarding the difference in CSR performance, paralleling the sample of family and non-family 
firms with FLDFs and MLDFs, respectively. The robustness of the main regression analysis 
results supports the argument that, stressing the ILs perspective, FLDFs and MLDFs behave like 
family and non-family firms, respectively, in terms of their motives, objectives and essence, 
emphasising firm behaviour irrespective of ownership status (family or not). That is, some 
commonalities and similarities between FLDFs (MLDFs) and family (non-family) firms are 
expected.  
Comparing family and non-family firms with FLDFs and MLDFs, respectively, it is 
found that family firms are less socially responsible relative to non-family firms, which is 
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consistent with hypothesis H1. Thus, FLDFs and MLDFs exhibit family and non-family firm-
like behaviour, respectively, regarding firm engagement in CSR. Therefore, relative to the 
conventional split of family and non-family firms, in this study, I put forward an institutional-
based classification of firms that depends on real firm behaviour irrespective of ownership 
status (family or not), building on the idea that ILs provide the guidance and prescriptions of 
firm practices and decisions. 
Emphasising family ownership status, the alignment of findings supports the underlying 
concept concerning the role of ILs, namely family and market logics, in driving firm behaviour 
and shaping firm practices and decisions relating to CSR. Further, the robustness of results 
empowers the institutional-based classification of firms that draws on a number of observed 
behavioural dimensions, supporting the established logic orientation index that essentially 
identifies and classifies firms based on the differences in actual firm practices and decisions. 
Therefore, the findings empirically underpin the different view of the familiness and marketness 
of firms, specifically the concept of firm logic orientation that depicts and defines the firm type 
in terms of the logic-based group in relation to the embeddedness of family and market logics 
by which a firm is driven. That is, interestingly, such a robustness strongly reinforces and 
validates the proposed institutional-based approach of categorising firms compared with the 
traditional ownership-based classification. The emphasis on ILs as hidden drivers of firm 
behaviour particularly sheds light on a covert explanatory institutional factor, namely the logic 
orientation of firms; this presents the culture and nature of firms, and in turn, flags firms in a 
different manner beyond the ownership criteria.  
In the analysis of the main effect of strategic conformity on CSR performance regarding 
the association between firm legitimacy and CSR, I follow the literature and include the lagged 
value of some control variables as a robustness check, controlling for potential endogeneity 
caused by reverse causality. As Column (2) in Table 5.10 shows, the results do not alter the 
conclusions about the positive relationship between strategic conformity – a legitimacy-seeking 
activity – and CSR. However, some power of the main independent variable is lost.  
As an additional robustness check, the model is estimated with the firm random effects to 
capture the idiosyncratic trends of firms that could randomly affect their CSR initiatives and 
activities. Using a random-effects estimation, the main regression analysis results are robust 
regarding the positive strategic conformity-CSR relationship, as reported in Column (3) in Table 
5.10. To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, both the year and industry fixed effects are included 
in all the models, controlling for the time and industry tendencies in relation to CSR. As a 
robustness check accounting for endogeneity, the model is estimated with a dynamic panel-data 
estimation procedure that only assumes weak exogeneity; this allows the CSR performance of 
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firms to be affected by their prior idiosyncratic trends concerning CSR in terms of the rating of 
firm engagement in CSR. As Column (4) in Table 5.10 reports, the results do not change the 
conclusions about the positive effect of strategic conformity on CSR performance.  
Concerning the analysis of the moderation effect of firm logic orientation regarding the 
positive relationship between strategic conformity and CSR, different robustness checks are run 
to test the presence of interaction between firm logic orientation and strategic conformity. The 
results of the preliminary regression analyses of CSR are robust regarding the significant 
interaction terms using random-effects estimation and dynamic estimation – accounting for 
endogeneity12 – robustness checks. As mentioned above, these checks stress the impact of firm 
random effects and the prior idiosyncratic trends of firms relating to CSR that could normally 
affect CSR performance. However, the significance of some interaction terms’ coefficients 
alters slightly downward. Columns (2) and (3) in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, report these results, 
respectively. 
As a further robustness check, a reduced sample that limits the comparison to FLDFs and 
MLDFs is used, excluding hybrid firms as a neutral logic-based group that overlaps familiness 
and marketness regarding the observed firm practices. Unlike in the main regression analysis, a 
single moderator is applied to directly contrast FLDFs (=1) with MLDFs (= 0) concerning the 
moderation effect of firm logic orientation on the strategic conformity-CSR relationship. As 
reported in Table 5.15, the findings of the main regression analyses are robust regarding the 
presence of interaction between firm logic orientation and strategic conformity, where the 
positive relationship between strategic conformity and CSR varies significantly as a function of 
or conditional by the logic orientation of firms. The results of the post-hoc analysis, shown in 
Table 5.16, do not change the conclusions about the significance and magnitude of the strategic 
conformity-CSR relationship, given the firm type. However, some power of the main 
independent variables is lost.  
 As an additional robustness check, I go a step further. Under the same empirical setting, 
the ownership-based classification of firms is applied to categorise the sample firms using the 
family ownership status indicator instead of the institutional-based classification that 
emphasises firm logic orientation. Using family ownership data from Ron Anderson’s sample 
available online, a single moderator is used to flag the sample firms as family (=1) and non-
family (=0) firms. As reported in Table 5.17, the results of the preliminary regression analyses 
 
12 To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, both the year and industry fixed effects are also included in all 
the models, controlling for the time and industry trends of CSR. 
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do not change regarding the presence of interaction between firm type, in terms of family 
ownership status, and strategic conformity, comparing the sample of family and non-family 
firms with FLDFs and MLDFs, respectively. As previously discussed, the robustness of the 
main regression analyses results supports the argument that, stressing the ILs perspective, 
FLDFs and MLDFs behave like family and non-family firms, respectively, in terms of their 
motives, objectives and essence, emphasising firm behaviour irrespective of ownership status 
(family or not). That is, some commonalities and similarities between FLDFs (MLDFs) and 
family (non-family) firms are expected. 
 The significant interaction term indicates that the positive relationship between strategic 
conformity and CSR differs significantly according to the firm type in terms of the family 
ownership status of firms. Further, as Table 5.18 shows, the results of the post-hoc analysis do 
not change the conclusions about the significance and magnitude of the effect of strategic 
conformity on CSR performance, given the firm type. Paralleling family and non-family firms 
with FLDFs and MLDFs, respectively, it is found that strategic conformity positively affects 
CSR performance in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR, which confirms hypothesis 
H2.  
Further, it is also found that such a positive relationship is more pronounced in family 
firms compared with non-family firms, which is consistent with hypothesis H3. Therefore, 
emphasising the social gains of firms derived from firm legitimacy, FLDFs and MLDFs show to 
be isomorphic to family and non-family firms, respectively. Thus, as discussed above, relative 
to the traditional split of family and non-family firms, in this study, I present an institutional-
based classification of firms that relies on real firm behaviour irrespective of ownership status 
(family or not), drawing on the idea that ILs provide the guidance and prescriptions of firm 
practices and decisions.  
Stressing family ownership status, the robustness of findings underpins the underlying 
concept concerning the role of ILs, namely family and market logics, in driving firm behaviour 
and shaping firm practices and decisions relating to CSR. Moreover, the alignment of results 
reinforces the institutional-based classification of firms that draws on a number of observed 
behavioural dimensions, supporting the developed logic orientation index that essentially 
identifies and classifies firms based on the differences in actual firm practices and decisions. 
Therefore, the results empirically support the different view of the familiness and 
marketness of firms, specifically the concept of firm logic orientation that depicts and defines 
the firm type in terms of the logic-based group in relation to the embeddedness of family and 
market logics by which a firm is driven. That is, interestingly, such a robustness strongly 
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supports and validates the proposed institutional-based approach of identifying and categorising 
firms compared with the conventional ownership-based classification, given the distinct view of 
their familiness and marketness, where; instead of family ownership status (or not), firm 
practices and behaviour characterise and define firms in terms of their distinctive culture and 
nature. The emphasis on ILs as covert drivers of firm behaviour particularly sheds light on a 
latent explanatory institutional factor, namely the logic orientation of firms; this presents the 
culture and nature of firms, and in turn, groups firms in a different manner beyond the 
ownership criteria.  
Moreover, in addition to its success regarding capturing both the main and moderation 
effects of firm type – firm logic orientation – in the context of CSR, grouping firms as FLDFs 
and MLDFs has the advantage over the traditional split of family and non-family firms in terms 
of being a faster, simpler and smarter approach. The conventional ownership-based 
classification of firms entails time and effort spent browsing the proxy statements and annual 
reports of firms to find out about ownership status (family or not). In contrast, the institutional-
based classification of firms is an accounting-based process that emphasises actual firm 
practices and decisions. Specifically, it incorporates multiple behavioural dimensions measured 
using financial data easily accessible via various databases, drawing primarily on the existing 
family business research.  
5.5 Conclusion 
CSR reveals a remarkable discrepancy among firms that has been largely addressed and 
examined. However, little attention has been paid to the role of ILs, as hidden drivers of firm 
behaviour (Friedland and Alford, 1991), in shaping the socially responsible practices of firms. 
The basis of this study lies in the application of ILs perspective to the concept of distinction 
among firms, stressing the CSR context. In this study, I stressed the institutional-based 
classification of firms – FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs –  apart from ownership status 
(family or not), addressing the logic orientation of firms  that depicts and defines the firm type 
in terms of the logic-based group relating to the embeddedness of family and market logics by 
which a firm is driven. 
Building on the SEW preservation perspective, in this study, I portrayed FLDFs and 
MLDFs as behaving similarly to family and non-family firms, respectively, in terms of their 
motives, objectives and essence. Primarily, I depicted MLDFs as shareholder-oriented firms that 
prioritise the primary economic business objective of profitability and shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation, exhibiting an archetypal business setting. In contrast, presenting a different 
business setting, FLDFs display a family-oriented attitude and preference in terms of prioritising 
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the preservation of SEW attached to the firm, overlapping the family and business systems. 
Moreover, hybrid firms exhibit an intersection between FLDFs and MLDFs concerning firm 
practices and decisions, overlapping family and market logics. In doing so, this study 
distinguishes itself from the the existing family-oriented studies that have commonly stressed 
the ownership criteria in terms of ownership status (family or not), which is believed to 
overlook the importance of firm behaviour. 
In this study, I provided empirical evidence that ILs give a viable explanation for the 
discrepancy among firms concerning CSR performance, as well as the strategic conformity-CSR 
relationship. This study has an important implication for detecting the contrast between FLDFs 
and MLDFs regarding firm engagement in CSR. It examined the effect of firm logic orientation 
on CSR performance in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR. Further, it emphasised 
the association between firm legitimacy and CSR, highlighting the role of firm legitimation as 
an input of firm social performance. Specifically, it investigated the effect of adopting 
isomorphic practices, specifically isomorphic strategies, to those of industry peers, as a 
legitimacy-seeking activity, on CSR performance. Moreover, given the firm type in terms of the 
logic-based group, it examined the impact of firm legitimacy, namely strategic conformity, on 
the impression of firms’ CSR, emphasising the moderating role of firm logic orientation.  
Emphasising the association between firm logic orientation and CSR regarding the 
evaluation of how firms perform in terms of the social and environmental consequences of their 
practices and decisions addressed by the ESG performance benchmarks, CSR performance 
appeared to vary according to the logic orientation of firms, consistent with the perspective of 
ILs. Generally, I found that the socially responsible practices of firms are associated with firm 
logic orientation, where family and market logics drive firm practices and decisions differently. 
Specifically, relative to MLDFs, FLDFs showed to be less socially responsible, where FLDFs 
perform worse concerning CSR as the familiness of firms has a negative effect on CSR 
performance.  
Further, emphasising the firm legitimacy and isomorphism perspectives, strategic 
conformity – a legitimacy-seeking activity – showed to affect CSR performance. Also, this 
relationship appeared to differ between FLDFs and MLDFs, highlighting the moderation effect 
of firm logic orientation. Particularly, I found that strategic conformity positively affects CSR 
performance in terms of improving the perception of the CSR of firms, shedding light on the 
social gains that firm derive from firm legitimation. Stressing the incremental value of strategic 
conformity for CSR performance, I also found that the positive strategic conformity-CSR 
relationship varies as a function of or conditional by firm logic orientation. In other words, this 
positive relationship appeared to operate differently among firms that vary conceptually in terms 
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of the embeddedness of family and market logics. Overall, I found that the familiness and 
marketness of firms have different effects on such a relationship. Specifically, compared with 
the marketness logic orientation, the familiness of firms amplifies this positive relationship, 
where the effect of strategic conformity on CSR performance is more pronounced in FLDFs 
relative to MLDFs.  
Drawing on the SEW perspective, FLDFs were characterised by the priority of SEW 
preservation as opposed to shareholder-oriented MLDFs. Given the multidimensional character 
of SEW, the SEW dimensions can be both positively and negatively valanced as they associate 
with pleasant (positive) and unpleasant (negative) emotions and consequences concerning firm 
stakeholders. The double-valanced nature of SEW dimensions thereby suggests an ambiguous 
nature of SEW (Kellermanns et al., 2012; Zientara, 2017). Stressing the essential SEW 
dimensions of firm reputation and prestige and social ties, FLDFs are effectively responsive to 
the interests and demands of external rather than internal stakeholders. As such, they burnish the 
image and reputation of firms with which firm’s key actors are closely identified, as well as 
sustain business networks by broadcasting their social and environmental contributions.  
Moreover, considering another key SEW dimension of authority, power and control, 
FLDFs maintain such non-economic benefits in the hands of managers at the cost of internal 
stakeholders, namely employees. Thus, they abandon employees’ needs and concerns regarding 
promotions, appreciation of their competencies and potentials and involvement in decision 
making, while protecting the affective endowments of key firm actors in alignment with the 
family-oriented values and essence of nepotism and prejudice. Thus, given the concern for 
preserving the non-economic utilities derived from the firm, FLDFs treat the internal and 
external stakeholders unequally and unfairly, as well as discriminate among internal 
stakeholders themselves, implying the dark side of SEW (Kellermanns et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, this indicates that the SEW dimensions are contradictory from the perspective of 
CSR. 
Particularly, stressing different dimensions of SEW, FLDFs overlook the demands and 
interests of some internal stakeholders, while effectively considering the concerns and interests 
of external stakeholders, avoiding the non-economic benefits of key firm actors from being 
jeopardised (Cruz et al., 2014). Therefore, given the concern for SEW preservation, FLDFs can 
be both good and bad simultaneously, enforcing their self-serving and discriminatory 
behaviours as FLDFs respond to the interests and demands of firm stakeholders distinctly (Cruz 
et al., 2014). In other words, fulfilling SEW-related interests and goals, FLDFs behave both 
socially responsibly and irresponsibly at the same time, suggesting the corporate schizophrenia 
of FLDFs (Zientara, 2017).  
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In consistency, given the priority of SEW preservation, FLDFs selectively and 
instrumentally undertake socially responsible practices, adopting an instrumental (selective) 
approach to CSR (Zientara, 2017). Specifically, FLDFs use CSR as a marketing or public 
relations tool to serve SEW-related interests and concerns. Consistent with this, FLDFs adopt a 
selective coupling response strategy to the demands and interests of firm stakeholders in terms 
of undertaking purposeful CSR initiatives and activities (Pache and Santos, 2013). By selective 
coupling, FLDFs implement socially responsible practices that best fit them in terms of aligning 
with firm’s self-interests related to SEW regarding obtaining or extending (alleviating) gains 
(losses) of SEW. That is, irrespective of the detriments and disadvantages for firm stakeholders, 
they disregard stakeholders’ interests and concerns whenever SEW is exposed to threat. In 
doing so, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs exhibit self-serving and discriminatory behaviours, where they 
carry out social practices and decisions at the expense of some firm stakeholders in a self-
serving manner.  
In contrast, drawing on the firm theory and market discipline perspectives, MLDFs adopt 
a strategic (normative) approach to CSR for the wider social good. Unlike FLDFs, MLDFs view 
CSR as a core business strategy in terms of effectively and unselectively responding to the 
demands and concerns of firm stakeholders. In particular, they reconcile the corporate good 
with the social good in the sense that doing good, in terms of actively considering the social and 
environmental effects of firm practices and decisions, leads to doing better. MLDFs do so for 
the best interests of shareholders regarding shareholders’ wealth maximisation as they prompt 
the loyalty of, as well as attract socially minded investors and other stakeholders (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2001; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Nelson, 2004; Borghesi et al., 2014).  
As FLDFs act selectively and opportunistically, SEW has negative implications for the 
firm stakeholders of FLDFs. Particularly, this is in relation to less proactive stakeholder 
engagement and weak stakeholder management , where FLDFs act discriminatorily from the 
CSR perspective. Thus, drawing on the SEW’s dark side perspective (Kellermanns et al., 2012), 
FLDFs are less socially responsible compared with MLDFs, where they perform worse 
concerning CSR in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR. That is, FLDFs confront the 
shadow of the dark side of SEW involving the self-serving behaviour that SEW triggers, as well 
as the resulting discriminatory behaviour towards firm stakeholders, which undermines the CSR 
performance of FLDFs relative to MLDFs. 
Emphasising the perspective of firm legitimacy, favourable firm reputation and 
stakeholders’ support are predictable valued consequences of firm legitimation that conveys the 
satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders regarding firm practices and behaviour. These 
socially constructed outcomes thereby improve firm competitiveness and survival by creating 
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positive image and granting access to fundamental business resources – both financial and 
human capital – which contribute significantly to firm performance (Rao, 1994; Choi and 
Shepherd, 2005; Bitektine, 2011). Accordingly, drawing on the benefit and value of firm 
legitimacy, strategic conformity – a legitimacy-seeking activity – positively affects CSR 
performance regarding the evaluation of how firms perform in terms of the social and 
environmental impacts of their practices and decisions, given that both CSR and firm legitimacy 
connect to firm stakeholders as the recipients and social evaluators of firm practices and 
behaviour, respectively.  
Emphasising firm acceptance and approval concerning firm practices and decisions, firm 
legitimacy, as a survival-enhancing aspect, helps protect the conduct of firms from being 
mistrusted (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995). Thus, stressing the assumption that 
isomorphism – namely mimetic isomorphism – generates and improves firm legitimacy (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Deephouse and Carter, 2005), the adoption of isomorphic strategies helps 
firms enhance the perception of their CSR in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR. 
This reveals the social gains of firms obtained from firm legitimacy, where strategic conformity 
has incremental value for CSR performance. 
Stemming from the difference in CSR performance between FLDFs and MLDFs, they are 
likely to vary in firm legitimation in relation to the satisfaction and endorsement of firm 
stakeholders concerning social practices and decisions. On the one hand, the firm legitimacy of 
MLDFs is taken for granted as they effectively strive for firm’s social validation. As outlined 
above, drawing on the firm theory and market discipline perspectives, they actively seek the 
firm acceptance and approval conferred by firm stakeholders regarding the appropriateness and 
properness of firm practices and decisions. Therefore, stressing CSR initiatives and activities, 
MLDFs effectively consider the interests and concerns of all firm stakeholders, consistent with 
the strategic whole-business view of responsibility. Specifically, they keenly count the social 
and environmental consequences of their practices and decisions. In doing so, MLDFs adopt the 
strategic approach to CSR, reconciling the corporate good with the social good for the best 
benefit of shareholders in terms of maximising shareholders’ wealth.  
On the other hand, adopting an instrumental approach to CSR, FLDFs lack firm 
legitimacy in accordance with the dark side of SEW involving their self-serving and 
discriminatory behaviours, which prompts the imprudence, guiltiness and suspiciousness of 
FLDFs in the eyes of firm stakeholders. Particularly, emphasising social practices and decisions, 
the discrimination among internal stakeholders themselves, as well as the unequal and unfair 
treatment of internal and external stakeholders impose the firm stakeholders’ view of the poor 
publicity, negative image and unfavourable reputation of FLDFs regarding firm engagement in 
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CSR. As such, stressing the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders, the legitimation 
of FLDFs is deficient.  
Building on the discrepancy in firm legitimacy associated with the aforesaid difference in 
CSR performance, the social gains of firms that firm legitimation triggers differ between FLDFs 
and MLDFs. In particular, given their taken-for-granted legitimation, MLDFs do not further 
benefit from strategic conformity regarding CSR performance as they normally possess the 
benefit and advantage of firm legitimacy in relation to the socially constructed outcomes. 
Whereas, given their lack of firm legitimation, strategic conformity has a substantial 
incremental value for the CSR performance of FLDFs relative to MLDFs. Moreover, lacking 
firm legitimacy, FLDFs are seemingly rewarded for seeking legitimacy in terms of enhancing 
the view of their CSR. This is in accordance with perceived firm legitimacy and its predictable 
significant outcomes, in terms of favourable firm reputation and stakeholders’ support, that infer 
the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders regarding firm practices and behaviour.  
Further, as CSR serves as a strategy for achieving firm legitimacy (Du and Vieira, 2012; 
Zheng et al., 2015), the perception of firm legitimacy through strategic conformity infers the 
potential of firm engagement in CSR to maintain such firm legitimation, enhancing the view of 
firms’ CSR in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR. Unlike MLDFs, FLDFs view 
CSR as marketing or public relations instrument rather than a core business strategy. Thus, such 
an inference from seeking legitimacy through the adoption of isomorphic strategies is of more 
interest to FLDFs compared with MLDFs. This is because FLDFs are less socially responsible, 
and in turn, less legitimate relative to MLDFs, where, as mentioned earlier, they undertake CSR 
initiatives and activities selectively and instrumentally to serve SEW-related interests and goals, 
adopting an instrumental rather than strategic approach to CSR.  
As such, strategic legitimacy, as a legitimacy-seeking activity, has a substantial 
incremental advantage for the CSR performance of FLDFs. In other words, seeking legitimacy 
through adopting isomorphic strategies more likely helps enhance the impression of the CSR of 
FLDFs compared with MLDFs. That is, legitimacy-seeking activities, specifically strategic 
conformity, work best for FLDFs. Thus, the impact of firm legitimacy on the perception of 
firms’ CSR varies according to firm logic orientation. Particularly, relative to the marketness 
logic orientation, the familiness of firms amplifies the positive effect of strategic conformity on 
CSR performance. 
Following Salomon and Wu (2012), FLDFs perhaps implement an isomorphism strategy 
in terms of mimicking firm practices to mitigate the distance to, or discrepancy from, other 
firms – industry peers – striving for firm legitimacy. Thus, adopting such a mitigating strategy, 
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they effectively can overcome the difficulties and disadvantages resulting from SEW’s dark 
side, where firm legitimacy helps them create desirable image and obtain access to essential 
business resources, as well as a long-term relationship with firm stakeholders that significantly 
contribute to firm performance ,and as such, enhance the firm competitiveness and survival.  
Therefore, conforming to industry peers, FLDFs perhaps attempt to deliberately do things 
simply better to obtain firm legitimacy of which they expect a vital benefit and value related to 
the predictable valued socially constructed outcomes of favourable firm reputation and 
stakeholders’ support. This, in turn, has an incremental advantage of improving the perception 
of firms’ CSR, given that firm legitimacy presents a survival-enhancing feature (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995), which helps keep FLDFs from having their conduct, 
specifically firm engagement in CSR, questioned or mistrusted.   
Stressing the isomorphism attempts, strategic conformity helps offset the otherwise 
negative effect of the familiness of firms on CSR performance imposed by the dark side of 
SEW. Therefore, stressing the firm legitimacy perspective, this provides an insight into a 
channel through which FLDFs can manage to mitigate their negative publicity, negative image 
and poor reputation concerning firm engagement in CSR, given the shadow of the dark side of 
SEW deteriorating proactive stakeholder engagement and challenging stakeholder management. 
Building on the discrepancy in CSR performance among the logic-based groups of firms, 
in this study, I provided ILs, CSR and family business scholars, as well as policymakers and 
regulators, with a new institutional-based explanation for the difference in socially responsible 
practices among firms that develop the understanding of ILs and CSR. Specifically, stressing 
the ILs perspective, I applied a distinct view of the familiness and marketness of firms to the 
CSR context. I further addressed the influence of firm logic orientation on CSR regarding the 
evaluation of how firms perform on the ESG performance benchmarks relating to the social and 
environmental impacts of firm practices and decisions. Drawing on the difference in CSR 
performance among firms, the study has important implications and feedback for scholars, 
policymakers and regulators regarding the understanding and conceptualisation of the familiness 
and marketness of firms.  
Driving firm behaviour, the familiness logic orientation apparently distinguishes firms 
from the standard, shareholder-oriented view of firms – the marketness logic orientation – 
which manifests a different CSR performance. This study can extend the knowledge of scholars, 
policymakers and regulators on ILs and CSR. Primarily, they need to consider that, apart from 
family ownership status (or not), FLDFs prioritise SEW-related interests and goals, which 
outweigh the demands and concerns of firm stakeholders, and as such, overlook the prominence 
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of CSR. In this study, I mainly directed attention to the shadow of the dark side of SEW and its 
detrimental outcomes for firm stakeholders.  
Stemming from the SEW preservation perspective, FLDFs engage in CSR in a way that 
best fits them, highlighting FLDFs as a distinct business form or approach relative to 
shareholder-oriented MLDFs (Greenwood et al., 2010). Specifically, the study indicates that the 
familiness logic orientation of firms displays a family-oriented attitude and preference that 
trigger FLDFs’ tendency to depart from the typical shareholder-oriented business setting of 
MLDFs where a marketness logic orientation, primarily underlying the difference in CSR. This 
affects the understanding and evaluation of firm strategies and practices, where the difference 
among firms may be justified against market and government regulations and policies.  
Fundamentally, this study can expand the understanding of firm engagement in CSR 
among CSR scholars, policymakers and regulators , giving them an insight that firms can be 
selective in terms of CSR initiatives and activities. Mainly, the firm logic orientation of firms 
implicitly plays a key role in undertaking social practices and decisions, highlighting the effect 
of the logic orientation of firms on the socially responsible practices given the difference in 
CSR performance among the logic-based groups of firms. Providing a distinct, institutional-
based explanation for the discrepancy in CSR among firms, this can help CSR scholars, 
policymakers and regulators understand the role of ILs in prompting the discrepancies in firm 
behaviour related to firm engagement in CSR and develop CSR research, regulations and 
policies. This indicates the importance to take into account the latent institutional factor of firm 
logic orientation to achieve a better understanding of firms and by extension firm practices and 
behaviour. 
Emphasising the firm legitimacy and isomorphism perspectives, in this study, I also 
provided important feedback for firm legitimacy scholars in terms of the social gains that firms 
obtain from firm legitimacy. Given the expected significant socially constructed consequences 
of firm legitimacy, FLDFs show to improve the view of their CSR, stressing their isomorphism 
attempts relating to the adoption of isomorphic strategies. Accordingly, this study can give them 
insight and advance their understanding of firm legitimacy as an explanatory factor of CSR 
performance, emphasising CSR from a different perspective that stresses a subjective 
assessment of CSR initiatives and activities, which represents the evaluation of how firms 
perform on a number of ESG categories addressed by ESG performance indicators. Specifically, 
given the ESG performance benchmarks, these indicators encompass the social and 
environmental effects of firm practices and decisions in relation to ESG strengths and concerns 
addressed by each category.  
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Given the worse CSR performance of FLDFs, the familiness logic orientation has a 
different, amplifying effect relative to the marketness of firms on the positive strategic 
conformity-CSR relationship, alleviating the otherwise negative effect of familiness on CSR 
performance. Therefore, stressing the SEW’s dark side perspective, the study can expand the 
understanding of scholars, policymakers and regulators of the underlying goal of, perhaps, the 
purposeful isomorphism attempts of FLDFs regarding the adoption of isomorphic strategies, 
namely asset strategies, to those of industry peers.  
Given the social gains of firms that firm legitimation triggers in terms of improving the 
perception of firms’ CSR, seeking legitimacy regarding the adoption of isomorphic practices 
represents a channel that helps FLDFs alleviate their negligence, guiltiness and suspiciousness 
in the eyes of firm stakeholders in relation to the dark side of SEW. This gives an insight that 
FLDFs effectively manage the shadow of SEW’s dark side. In other words, emphasising the 
isomorphism attempts, FLDFs overcome the shadow of the dark side of SEW, in terms of their 
negative publicity, detrimental image and unfavourable reputation regarding firm engagement in 
CSR, by adopting isomorphic strategies, specifically strategic conformity, that improves the 
impression of their CSR. 
Irrespective of family ownership status (or not), FLDFs and MLDFs exhibited CSR 
performance like that of genuine family and non-family firms, respectively. Highlighting a 
different view of the familiness and marketness of firms, FLDFs and MLDFs, as such, 
respectively match family-owned or managed and non-family firms in terms of firm practices 
and decisions, displaying family and non-family firm-like behaviours, respectively. Regarding 
the underlying concept of family logic, it suggests a family-oriented flavour and essence in 
terms of the priority of SEW preservation as opposed to the core of market logic, which lies in 
the priority of profitability and shareholders’ wealth maximisation. Accordingly, drawing on the 
popular SEW model, in this study, I explained that FLDFs undertake CSR initiatives and 
activities in a way that best aligns with and protects or expands the non-economic benefits of 
key firm actors attached to the firm, avoiding the potential loss of SEW. 
Given the logic orientation of firms, in this study, I provided empirical evidence that 
firms vary in internally configuring the firm business in terms of firm engagement in CSR; this 
was found in the CSR performance of firms and the interplay of firm logic orientation, firm 
legitimacy and CSR. This confirms the role of ILs as being latent drivers of firm behaviour. 
Importantly, such evidence draws attention to and supports the introduced notion of firm logic 
orientation and approves the functionality of familiness and marketness constructs, 
differentiating among firms in terms of firm social performance. In this way, in this study, I 
suggested a different classification of firms and a distinct view of their familiness and 
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marketness. The key idea is that, stressing the embeddedness of family and market logics, firms 
differ in the culture and nature of running a business that latently embed in their decision 
making, and in turn, shape and explain the differences in firm practices and decisions; this is 
primarily a covert logic-based root. Thus, this study emphasises that it is not family ownership 
status (or not), but the firm practices and behaviour that characterise and define firms in terms 
of their distinctive culture and nature.   
Importantly, in this study, I addressed the advantage of the institutional-based 
classification of firms as a simpler, faster and smarter approach relative to the conventional 
ownership-based classification. The traditional, widely used classification of family and non-
family firms requires time and effort spent browsing the proxy statements and annual reports of 
firms to find out about ownership status (family or not). In contrast, the new, institutional-based 
classification of firms is basically an accounting-based process that emphasises actual firm 
practices and decisions. Particularly, it incorporates several behavioural dimensions measured 
using financial data easily accessible through various databases, drawing mainly on the extant 
family business research. 
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Tables & Figures 
Table 5.1 - Sample distribution by year. 
This table reports the time series and size of sample used in analysis. I start with all S&P 1500 index constituents 
from 2006 through 2016. I restrict the sample to years 2006-2013 for which firms have complete financial, ESG, 
ownership and monthly stock data on Compustat, MSCI, Execucomp and CRSP. I include firms with a minimum of 
two-year observations and exclude regulated firms with the first two-digit SIC codes being 49 and 60-69.  
Year Number of observations/Year Percent 
2006 196 4.92 
2007 385 9.66 
2008 521 13.08 
2009 574 14.41 
2010 594 14.91 
2011 606 15.21 
2012 583 14.63 
2013 525 13.18 
Total firm-year observations 3984 100.00 
Total unique firms 784  
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Table 5.2 - Descriptive statistics. 
This table reports the full sample summary statistics on all variables used in analysis. FamilyFirm is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 
0 otherwise; HybridFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 2 presenting the 
hybrid logic orientation of hybrid firms, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm 
logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the 
natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Performance is the firm accounting-based performance measured by return on 
assets as income before extraordinary items divided by firm’s total assets; DivedendPayout is the cash dividend pay-
out as cash dividends divided by firm’s total assets; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total 
assets; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; 
AdvertisingExpenditure is the ratio of advertising expense to firm’s sales; CapitalExpenditure is the ratio of capital 
expense to firm’s sales; SGAExpenditure is the ratio of selling, general and administrative expense to firm’s total 
assets; SlackResources is the current ratio as current assets divided by current liabilities; FreeCashFlow is the cash 
holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; CSR is the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured by the composite net 
CSR index; StrategicConformity is the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies and these of other 
firms in its industry as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside 
(independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the 
board; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the 
CEO, and 0 otherwise; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveGender is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
CEO is male, and 0 otherwise; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; 
ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO 
shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; ShortIncentive is the CEO incentive of short-term focus 
measured by the ratio of bonus earned by CEO to total compensation; LongIncentive the CEO incentive of long-term 
focus measured by the ratio of equity-based pay, granted restricted stock and option awards, to total compensation. 
Full sample 
Variable Mean Median St Dev. 
Panel A – Logic-based groups 
FamilyFirm 0.43 0.00 0.50 
HybridFirm 0.36 0.00 0.48 
MarketFirm 0.21 0.00 0.41 
Panel B – Firm-specific characteristics 
FirmSize (Unlogged, ‘000$) 6029.62 1674.80 12907.53 
Performance  0.06 0.06 0.08 
DividendPayout  0.01 0.00 0.02 
Debt 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Risk 0.10 0.09 0.05 
AdvertisingExpenditure 0.01 0.00 0.02 
CapitalExpenditure 0.06 0.03 0.12 
SGAExpenditure 0.25 0.21 0.17 
SlackResources 2.63 2.17 1.67 
FreeCashFlow 0.17 0.13 0.16 
CSR -0.18 -0.30 0.82 
StrategicConformity -3.03 -2.67 2.49 
Panel C – Board structure 
BoardIndependence  0.78 0.80 0.11 
Duality 0.49 0.00 0.50 
Panel D – CEO-specific characteristics 
ExecutiveAge 56.07 56.00 6.74 
ExecutiveGender 0.96 1.00 0.19 
ExecutiveTenure  12.92 11.00 8.03 
Panel E – Managerial ownership & compensation 
ExecutiveOwnership  0.02 0.01 0.05 
ShortIncentive  0.23 0.21 0.17 
LongIncentive 0.48 0.53 0.25 
Observations 3984 
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Table 5.3 - Descriptive statistics: CSR by logic-based group. 
CSR is the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index; FamilyFirm is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 
0 otherwise; HybridFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 2 presenting the 
hybrid logic orientation of hybrid firms, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm 
logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsamples by logic-based group 
 
Variable 
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. 
Group of FLDFs 
 (FamilyFirm =1) 
Group of hybrid  firms  
(HybridFirm =1) 
Group of MLDFs  
(MarketFirm =1) 
CSR -0.25 0.74 -0.16 0.82 -0.08 0.94 
Observations = 3984 1719 1435 830 
 
Table 5.4 - Difference-in-mean t-test: CSR. 
CSR is the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index; FamilyFirm is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 
0 otherwise; HybridFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 2 presenting the 
hybrid logic orientation of hybrid firms, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm 
logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise. 
t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Variable FamilyFirm & 
HybridFirm 
FamilyFirm & 
MarketFirm 
HybridFrim & 
MarketFirm 
CSR 0.0959*** 
(3.43) 
0.167*** 
(4.86) 
0.0711+ 
(1.88) 
Observations 3154 2549 2265 
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Table 5.5 - Descriptive statistics: Strategic conformity by logic-based group. 
StrategicConformity is the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies and these of other firms in its 
industry as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy; FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic 
orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; HybridFirm is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 2 presenting the hybrid logic orientation of hybrid 
firms, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 
presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise. 
Subsamples by logic-based group 
 
Variable 
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. 
Group of FLDFs 
 (FamilyFirm =1) 
Group of hybrid  firms  
(HybridFirm =1) 
Group of MLDFs  
(MarketFirm =1) 
StrategicConformity -3.10 2.61 -3.03 2.53 -2.97 2.41 
Observations = 3984 1719 1435 830 
 
Table 5.6 - Difference-in-mean t-test: Strategic conformity. 
StrategicConformity is the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies and these of other firms in its 
industry as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy; FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic 
orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; HybridFirm is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 2 presenting the hybrid logic orientation of hybrid 
firms, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 
presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise. 
t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Variable FamilyFirm & 
HybridFirm 
FamilyFirm & 
MarketFirm 
HybridFrim & 
MarketFirm 
StrategicConformity 0.0770 
(0.69) 
-0.0531* 
(-2.11) 
-0.130+ 
(-1.95) 
Observations 3154 2549 2265 
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Table 5.7 - Correlation matrix. 
This table reports the correlation between all variables used in analysis. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation 
of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; HybridFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 2 presenting the hybrid logic orientation of hybrid firms, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm 
is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; 
Performance is the firm accounting-based performance measured by return on assets as income before extraordinary items divided by firm’s total assets; DivedendPayout is the cash dividend pay-out as 
cash dividends divided by firm’s total assets; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period 
preceding year end; AdvertisingExpenditure is the ratio of advertising expense to firm’s sales; CapitalExpenditure is the ratio of capital expense to firm’s sales; SGAExpenditure is the ratio of selling, 
general and administrative expense to firm’s total assets; SlackResources is the current ratio as current assets divided by current liabilities; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total 
assets; CSR is the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index; StrategicConformity is the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies and these of other 
firms in its industry as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the 
total number of directors on the board; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; ExecutiveAge is the age of 
CEO; ExecutiveGender is an indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveOwnership is the 
shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; ShortIncentive is the CEO incentive of short-term focus 
measured by the ratio of bonus earned by CEO to total compensation; LongIncentive the CEO incentive of long-term focus measured by the ratio of equity-based pay, granted restricted stock and option 
awards, to total compensation.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0 
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FamilyFirm 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
HybridFirm -0.65*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . 
MarketFirm -0.45*** -0.38*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . 
FirmSize (Unlogged) -0.06*** -0.03* 0.11*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . 
Performance  0.14*** 0.03* -0.20*** 0.05*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . 
DividendPayout  0.03* 0.03** -0.08*** 0.12*** 0.31*** 1.00 . . . . . . . 
Debt 0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.08*** -0.17*** -0.02 1.00 . . . . . . 
Risk -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.21*** -0.34*** -0.21*** 0.00 1.00 . . . . . 
AdvertisingExpenditure 0.02 0.00 -0.03* 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.02 0.04** 1.00 . . . . 
CapitalExpenditure 0.10*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.08*** 0.11*** 0.03 -0.07*** 1.00 . . . 
SGAExpenditure 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.13*** 0.06*** 0.14*** -0.29*** 0.13*** 0.35*** -0.27*** 1.00 . . 
SlackResources -0.04** 0.03** 0.01 -0.23*** 0.07*** 0.02 -0.28*** 0.05*** -0.07*** -0.13*** 0.02 1.00 . 
FreeCashFlow -0.13*** 0.03** 0.11*** -0.13*** 0.09*** 0.01 -0.40*** 0.05*** 0.08*** -0.15*** 0.19*** 0.60*** 1.00 
CSR -0.07*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.23*** 0.10*** 0.18*** 0.04** -0.22*** 0.12*** -0.01 0.05*** -0.05*** 0.06*** 
StrategicConformity 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.08*** 0.00 -0.02 0.19*** -0.13*** 0.03* 0.07*** -0.11*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
BoardIndependence  -0.08*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.15*** -0.03* -0.01 0.15*** -0.08*** -0.03* 0.02 -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.05*** 
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Duality -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.10*** 0.02 0.02 0.03* -0.04** -0.05*** 0.04** -0.06*** -0.03* -0.05*** 
ExecutiveAge -0.02 -0.01 0.03* 0.07*** -0.02 0.05*** 0.03* -0.04*** -0.09*** 0.02 -0.06*** 0.00 -0.08*** 
ExecutiveGender -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.04** -0.06*** 0.02 -0.08*** 0.04*** -0.02 
ExecutiveTenure  0.04*** -0.02 -0.03* -0.08*** 0.04** -0.02 -0.12*** 0.05*** -0.05*** -0.01 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 
ExecutiveOwnership  0.02 0.01 -0.04** -0.12*** 0.02 0.03** -0.17*** 0.07*** 0.04** -0.05*** 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 
ShortIncentive  0.06*** -0.04** -0.03* 0.07*** 0.23*** 0.04** 0.04** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.03** -0.07*** -0.11*** -0.09*** 
LongIncentive -0.10*** 0.04** 0.08*** 0.14*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.08*** -0.10*** -0.02 0.10*** -0.07*** -0.06*** 0.03** 
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CSR 1.00             
StrategicConformity 0.10*** 1.00            
BoardIndependence  0.14*** 0.13*** 1.00           
Duality 0.02 -0.00 0.20*** 1.00          
ExecutiveAge -0.04** -0.05*** -0.02 0.26*** 1.00         
ExecutiveGender -0.06*** 0.03* 0.02 0.05*** 0.08*** 1.00        
ExecutiveTenure  -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.15*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.06*** 1.00       
ExecutiveOwnership  -0.09*** -0.16*** -0.21*** 0.23*** 0.18*** -0.02 0.53*** 1.00      
ShortIncentive  0.00 -0.01 -0.04*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.04** -0.00 -0.03* 1.00     
LongIncentive 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.26*** -0.02 -0.12*** 0.00 -0.18*** -0.25*** -0.56*** 1.00    
Observations 3984             
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Table 5.8 - Preliminary multivariate analysis: Main effect of firm logic orientation. 
The results of (1) preliminary OLS multivariate analysis, and robustness tests (2) including lagged control variables 
in OLS multivariate analysis, (3) random-effects estimation and (4) dynamic estimation. The dependent variable is 
CSR representing is the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index. FamilyFirm is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of 
FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm is indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 
presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s 
sales; Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; 
DivedendPayout is the cash dividend pay-out as cash dividends divided by firm’s total assets; Debt is the debt ratio 
as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; Performance is the firm accounting-based performance measured by 
return on assets as income before extraordinary items divided by firm’s total assets; SlackResources is the current 
ratio as current assets divided by current liabilities; AdvertisingExpenditure is the ratio of advertising expense to 
firm’s sales; CapitalExpenditure is the ratio of capital expense to firm’s sales; SGAExpenditure is the ratio of 
selling, general and administrative expense to firm’s total assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s 
total assets; ShortIncentive is the CEO incentive of short-term focus measured by the ratio of bonus earned by CEO 
to total compensation; LongIncentive the CEO incentive of long-term focus measured by the ratio of equity-based 
pay, granted restricted stock and option awards, to total compensation; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by 
CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding 
shares; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; 
ExecutiveGender is an indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise; Duality is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; 
BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
Variables CSR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FamilyFirm  -0.0833* -0.0916* -0.0574* -0.0208+ 
 (0.0339) (0.0367) (0.0235) (0.0114) 
MarketFirm  0.0891+ 0.0867+ 0.0577+ 0.0262+ 
 (0.0473) (0.0518) (0.0311) (0.0148) 
FirmSize  0.179***  0.157*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0210)  (0.0171) (0.0130) 
Risk -1.448*** -1.466*** -0.366 -0.707*** 
 (0.409) (0.435) (0.292) (0.211) 
DividendPayout  4.892***  1.504+ 1.557*** 
 (1.077)  (0.791) (0.462) 
Debt 0.155  0.176 0.0933 
 (0.164)  (0.135) (0.0785) 
Performance 0.394+  0.215 -0.0154 
 (0.235)  (0.163) (0.132) 
SlackResources -0.0413** -0.0358** -0.0249* -0.0238*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0136) (0.0112) (0.00602) 
AdvertisingExpenditure 2.746* 3.714** 1.115 1.322* 
 (1.167) (1.268) (1.083) (0.524) 
CapitalExpenditure 0.796*** 0.702** 0.433* -0.00671 
 (0.216) (0.249) (0.181) (0.130) 
SGAExpenditure  0.0247 0.0136 0.109 -0.0353 
 (0.145) (0.161) (0.142) (0.0686) 
FreeCashFlow 0.361*  0.366** 0.193* 
 (0.171)  (0.139) (0.0793) 
ShortIncentive  0.251* 0.392** 0.0837 0.142+ 
 (0.118) (0.129) (0.0845) (0.0733) 
LongIncentive  0.204* 0.321** 0.0700 0.179*** 
 (0.0871) (0.103) (0.0584) (0.0493) 
ExecutiveOwnership  -0.755 -0.841 -0.555 -0.564* 
 (0.512) (0.611) (0.420) (0.285) 
ExecutiveAge  -0.00185 -0.00112 -0.000946 0.000379 
 (0.00318) (0.00352) (0.00281) (0.00140) 
ExecutiveTenure  -0.00434 -0.00585+ -0.00375 -0.00234+ 
 (0.00281) (0.00314) (0.00264) (0.00136) 
ExecutiveGender  -0.279* -0.248* -0.244* -0.0486 
 (0.112) (0.120) (0.101) (0.0517) 
Duality  0.0679 0.0979* 0.0284 0.0496* 
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 (0.0436) (0.0480) (0.0320) (0.0208) 
BoardIndependence  0.629*** 0.650** 0.605*** 0.233** 
 (0.180) (0.203) (0.149) (0.0851) 
(lag) FirmSize   0.198***   
  (0.0210)   
(lag) DividendPayout   5.956***   
  (1.175)   
(lag) Debt  0.223   
  (0.181)   
(lag) Performance  0.296   
  (0.235)   
(lag) FreeCashFlow  0.232   
  (0.163)   
(lag) CSR    0.723*** 
    (0.0154) 
Constant -0.637* -0.697* -0.588* -0.232+ 
 (0.297) (0.329) (0.253) (0.132) 
Observations 3984 3200 3984 3200 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE - - Yes - 
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.220 - 0.612 
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Table 5.9 - Robustness test (Family status of ownership). 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using the family ownership status indicator. The dependent variable is CSR 
representing is the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index. FamilyFirm is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 for family firm, and 0 otherwise; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; 
Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; DivedendPayout 
is the cash dividend pay-out as cash dividends divided by firm’s total assets; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt 
scaled by firm’s total assets; Performance is the firm accounting-based performance measured by return on assets as 
income before extraordinary items divided by firm’s total assets; SlackResources is the current ratio as current assets 
divided by current liabilities; AdvertisingExpenditure is the ratio of advertising expense to firm’s sales; 
CapitalExpenditure is the ratio of capital expense to firm’s sales; SGAExpenditure is the ratio of selling, general and 
administrative expense to firm’s total assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ShortIncentive is the CEO incentive of short-term focus measured by the ratio of bonus earned by CEO to total 
compensation; LongIncentive the CEO incentive of long-term focus measured by the ratio of equity-based pay, 
granted restricted stock and option awards, to total compensation; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as 
a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares;  
ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; 
ExecutiveGender is an indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise; Duality is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; 
BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables CSR  
FamilyFirm  -0.0401* 
 (0.0177) 
FirmSize 0.174*** 
 (0.0310) 
Risk -0.603 
 (0.487) 
DividendPayout  6.528*** 
 (1.431) 
Debt 0.0522 
 (0.226) 
Performance 0.482+ 
 (0.283) 
SlackResources  -0.0455* 
 (0.0200) 
AdvertisingExpenditure 7.245*** 
 (1.884) 
CapitalExpenditure 0.936*** 
 (0.270) 
SGAExpenditure  0.0682 
 (0.186) 
FreeCashFlow 0.630* 
 (0.265) 
ShortIncentive  0.168 
 (0.149) 
LongIncentive  0.109 
 (0.116) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.524 
 (0.794) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00195 
 (0.00434) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.00463 
 (0.00378) 
ExecutiveGender -0.222 
 (0.149) 
Duality 0.0729 
 (0.0556) 
BoardIndependence  0.645** 
 (0.244) 
Constant -0.815* 
 (0.379) 
Observations 2844 
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Industry Effect Yes 
Year Effect Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.247 
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Table 5.10 - Preliminary multivariate analysis: Main effect of strategic conformity. 
The results of (1) preliminary OLS multivariate analysis, and robustness tests (2) including lagged control variables 
in OLS multivariate analysis, (3) random-effects estimation and (4) dynamic estimation. The dependent variable is 
CSR representing is the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index. 
StrategicConformity is the lagged value of the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies and these of 
other firms in its industry as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; 
Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; DivedendPayout 
is the cash dividend pay-out as cash dividends divided by firm’s total assets; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt 
scaled by firm’s total assets; Performance is the firm accounting-based performance measured by return on assets as 
income before extraordinary items divided by firm’s total assets; SlackResources is the current ratio as current assets 
divided by current liabilities; AdvertisingExpenditure is the ratio of advertising expense to firm’s sales; 
CapitalExpenditure is the ratio of capital expense to firm’s sales; SGAExpenditure is the ratio of selling, general and 
administrative expense to firm’s total assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ShortIncentive is the CEO incentive of short-term focus measured by the ratio of bonus earned by CEO to total 
compensation; LongIncentive the CEO incentive of long-term focus measured by the ratio of equity-based pay, 
granted restricted stock and option awards, to total compensation; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as 
a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; 
ExecutiveGender is an indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise; Duality is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; 
BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables CSR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
StrategicConformity 0.0163* 0.0152+ 0.0159* 0.0137* 
 (0.00740) (0.00879) (0.00641) (0.00552) 
FirmSize  0.204***  0.183*** 0.136*** 
 (0.0210)  (0.0177) (0.0141) 
Risk -1.451** -1.336** -0.461 -0.676** 
 (0.454) (0.435) (0.330) (0.212) 
DividendPayout  5.080***  2.202* 1.546*** 
 (1.198)  (0.907) (0.462) 
Debt 0.230  0.155 0.0814 
 (0.187)  (0.148) (0.0790) 
Performance 0.119  0.0528 -0.0405 
 (0.252)  (0.193) (0.125) 
SlackResources  -0.0530*** -0.0380** -0.0369** -0.0239*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0138) (0.0123) (0.00603) 
AdvertisingExpenditure 3.443** 3.674** 1.660 1.292* 
 (1.310) (1.293) (1.167) (0.525) 
CapitalExpenditure 0.564* 0.568* 0.429* -0.0326 
 (0.251) (0.249) (0.192) (0.130) 
SGAExpenditure 0.0280 0.0304 0.0569 -0.0291 
 (0.163) (0.160) (0.145) (0.0681) 
FreeCashFlow 0.604**  0.470** 0.213** 
 (0.196)  (0.161) (0.0807) 
ShortIncentive  0.306* 0.377** 0.119 0.139+ 
 (0.134) (0.131) (0.0968) (0.0737) 
LongIncentive  0.281** 0.319** 0.100 0.175*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.0710) (0.0494) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.970 -0.809 -1.026* -0.547+ 
 (0.636) (0.621) (0.518) (0.286) 
ExecutiveAge -0.000297 -0.000436 -0.00130 0.000466 
 (0.00360) (0.00359) (0.00317) (0.00141) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.00582+ -0.00624* -0.00429 -0.00235+ 
 (0.00318) (0.00317) (0.00281) (0.00136) 
ExecutiveGender -0.252* -0.250* -0.228* -0.0497 
 (0.117) (0.115) (0.109) (0.0513) 
Duality  0.103* 0.0988* 0.0684+ 0.0494* 
 (0.0487) (0.0487) (0.0369) (0.0208) 
BoardIndependence  0.606** 0.653** 0.628*** 0.229** 
 (0.207) (0.205) (0.173) (0.0854) 
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(lag) FirmSize   0.207***   
  (0.0211)   
(lag) DividendPayout   5.918***   
  (1.192)   
(lag) Debt  0.170   
  (0.186)   
(lag) Performance  0.179   
  (0.229)   
(lag) FreeCashFlow  0.333*   
  (0.168)   
(lag) CSR    0.724*** 
    (0.0156) 
Constant -0.723* -0.819* -0.560* -0.242+ 
 (0.329) (0.329) (0.281) (0.131) 
Observations 3200 3200 3200 3200 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE - - Yes - 
Adjusted R2 0.214 0.216 - 0.612 
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Table 5.11 - Preliminary multivariate analysis: Moderation effect of firm logic orientation of 
familiness. 
The results of (1) preliminary OLS multivariate analysis, and robustness tests (2) random-effects estimation and (3) 
dynamic estimation. The dependent variable is CSR representing is the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured 
by the composite net CSR index. FamilyFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value 
is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of FLDFs, and 0 otherwise; StrategicConformity is the lagged value of 
the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies and these of other firms in its industry as a proximal 
measure of firm legitimacy; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; DivedendPayout is the cash dividend pay-out as 
cash dividends divided by firm’s total assets; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; 
Performance is the firm accounting-based performance measured by return on assets as income before extraordinary 
items divided by firm’s total assets; SlackResources is the current ratio as current assets divided by current liabilities; 
AdvertisingExpenditure is the ratio of advertising expense to firm’s sales; CapitalExpenditure is the ratio of capital 
expense to firm’s sales; SGAExpenditure is the ratio of selling, general and administrative expense to firm’s total 
assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; ShortIncentive is the CEO incentive of 
short-term focus measured by the ratio of bonus earned by CEO to total compensation; LongIncentive the CEO 
incentive of long-term focus measured by the ratio of equity-based pay, granted restricted stock and option awards, to 
total compensation; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number 
of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; 
ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveGender is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board 
chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside 
(independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the 
board. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables CSR 
(1) (2) (3) 
FamilyFirm  0.129* 0.0597* 0.0409+ 
 (0.0512) (0.0354) (0.0251) 
StrategicConformity 0.00612* 0.00495* 0.00295+ 
 (0.00254) (0.00208) (0.00155) 
FamilyFirm × StrategicConformity 0.0429* 0.0300+ 0.0164+ 
 (0.0176) (0.0161) (0.00916) 
FirmSize  0.202*** 0.189*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0164) (0.0103) 
Risk -1.432** 0.455** 0.204* 
 (0.451) (0.159) (0.0801) 
DividendPayout  5.015*** 2.153* 1.534*** 
 (1.183) (0.906) (0.461) 
Debt 0.248 0.155 0.0863 
 (0.185) (0.148) (0.0792) 
Performance 0.289 0.102 -0.0118 
 (0.267) (0.199) (0.132) 
SlackResources  -0.0483** -0.0357** -0.0228*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0123) (0.00600) 
AdvertisingExpenditure 3.388** 1.680 1.289* 
 (1.275) (1.153) (0.520) 
CapitalExpenditure 0.600* 0.433* -0.0303 
 (0.254) (0.193) (0.133) 
SGAExpenditure  0.0135 0.0494 -0.0321 
 (0.163) (0.145) (0.0683) 
FreeCashFlow 0.547** -0.460 -0.674** 
 (0.193) (0.330) (0.212) 
ShortIncentive  0.294* 0.119 0.139+ 
 (0.133) (0.0972) (0.0739) 
LongIncentive  0.269** 0.0988 0.174*** 
 (0.104) (0.0710) (0.0494) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.993 -0.228* -0.0521 
 (0.623) (0.108) (0.0512) 
ExecutiveAge  -0.000912 -0.00152 0.000332 
 (0.00354) (0.00316) (0.00140) 
ExecutiveTenure  -0.00541+ -0.00415 -0.00225+ 
 (0.00315) (0.00282) (0.00136) 
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ExecutiveGender  -0.259* -1.061* -0.560* 
 (0.114) (0.515) (0.284) 
Duality  0.108* 0.0697+ 0.0510* 
 (0.0479) (0.0368) (0.0206) 
BoardIndependence  0.594** 0.633*** 0.230** 
 (0.206) (0.173) (0.0854) 
(lag) StrategicConformity   0.722*** 
   (0.0156) 
Constant -0.734* -0.562* -0.245+ 
 (0.325) (0.280) (0.131) 
Observations 3200 3200 3200 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE - Yes - 
Adjusted R2 0.220 - 0.612 
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Table 5.12 - Preliminary multivariate analysis: Moderation effect of firm logic orientation of 
marketness. 
The results of (1) preliminary OLS multivariate analysis, and robustness tests (2) random-effects estimation and (3) 
dynamic estimation. The dependent variable is CSR representing is the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured 
by the composite net CSR index. MarketFirm is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value 
is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs, and 0 otherwise; StrategicConformity is the lagged value 
of the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies and these of other firms in its industry as a proximal 
measure of firm legitimacy; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; DivedendPayout is the cash dividend pay-out as 
cash dividends divided by firm’s total assets; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; 
Performance is the firm accounting-based performance measured by return on assets as income before extraordinary 
items divided by firm’s total assets; SlackResources is the current ratio as current assets divided by current liabilities; 
AdvertisingExpenditure is the ratio of advertising expense to firm’s sales; CapitalExpenditure is the ratio of capital 
expense to firm’s sales; SGAExpenditure is the ratio of selling, general and administrative expense to firm’s total 
assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; ShortIncentive is the CEO incentive of 
short-term focus measured by the ratio of bonus earned by CEO to total compensation; LongIncentive the CEO 
incentive of long-term focus measured by the ratio of equity-based pay, granted restricted stock and option awards, to 
total compensation; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number 
of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; 
ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveGender is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board 
chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside 
(independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the 
board. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables CSR 
(1) (2) (3) 
MarketFirm  -0.119** -0.0496+ -0.0370* 
 (0.0369) (0.0259) (0.0163) 
StrategicConformity 0.0258* 0.0210* 0.0110* 
 (0.0112) (0.00852) (0.00486) 
MarketFirm × StrategicConformity -0.0198+ -0.0119+ -0.0102* 
 (0.0117) (0.00625) (0.00435) 
FirmSize  0.211*** 0.178*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0132) (0.0111) 
Risk -1.460** 0.467** 0.210** 
 (0.453) (0.160) (0.0808) 
DividendPayout  5.035*** 2.220* 1.525*** 
 (1.183) (0.907) (0.462) 
Debt 0.247 0.162 0.0906 
 (0.185) (0.148) (0.0785) 
Performance 0.240 0.0862 -0.0251 
 (0.257) (0.195) (0.127) 
SlackResources  -0.0505*** -0.0367** -0.0234*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0123) (0.00599) 
AdvertisingExpenditure 3.357** 1.641 1.276* 
 (1.292) (1.159) (0.522) 
CapitalExpenditure 0.636* 0.445* -0.0209 
 (0.249) (0.192) (0.131) 
SGAExpenditure  0.0260 0.0531 -0.0302 
 (0.163) (0.145) (0.0686) 
FreeCashFlow 0.557** -0.470 -0.678** 
 (0.193) (0.331) (0.213) 
ShortIncentive  0.296* 0.121 0.138+ 
 (0.134) (0.0970) (0.0739) 
LongIncentive  0.258* 0.0982 0.171*** 
 (0.104) (0.0709) (0.0495) 
ExecutiveOwnership -0.974 -0.228* -0.0526 
 (0.631) (0.109) (0.0517) 
ExecutiveAge  -0.000631 -0.00137 0.000415 
 (0.00356) (0.00316) (0.00140) 
ExecutiveTenure  -0.00526+ -0.00418 -0.00217 
 (0.00319) (0.00282) (0.00137) 
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ExecutiveGender  -0.257* -1.035* -0.553+ 
 (0.116) (0.520) (0.286) 
Duality  0.103* 0.0694+ 0.0502* 
 (0.0480) (0.0368) (0.0207) 
BoardIndependence  0.598** 0.625*** 0.230** 
 (0.207) (0.173) (0.0858) 
(lag) StrategicConformity   0.722*** 
   (0.0155) 
Constant -0.674* -0.550+ -0.238+ 
 (0.328) (0.281) (0.131) 
Observations 3200 3200 3200 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm RE - Yes - 
Adjusted R2 0.219 - 0.613 
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Table 5.13 - Post-hoc regressions for other firms category (Hybrid firms and MLDFs) and 
FLDFs category. 
The results of preliminary post-hoc analysis of the relationship between strategic conformity and CSR in firms other 
than FLDFs -Panel A- and FLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is CSR representing is the rating of firm 
engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index. FamilyFirm_Other is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 for FLDF, and 0 otherwise; FamilyFirm_Family is an indicator variable that equals 0 for FLDF, and -1 
otherwise; StrategicConformity is the lagged value of the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies 
and these of other firms in its industry as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables CSR 
Panel A- Other firms category (Hybrid firms and MLDFs) 
FamilyFirm_Other 0.128* 
 (0.0530) 
StrategicConformity 0.0254** 
 (0.00963) 
FamilyFirm_Other × StrategicConformity  0.0475** 
 (0.0182) 
Constant -0.303* 
 (0.148) 
Panel B- FLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Family 0.128* 
 (0.0530) 
StrategicConformity 0.0729*** 
 (0.0166) 
FamilyFirm_Family × StrategicConformity  0.0475** 
 (0.0182) 
Constant -0.275* 
 (0.114) 
Observations 3200 
Industry Effect Yes 
Year Effect Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.135 
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Table 5.14 - Post-hoc regressions for other firms category (Hybrid firms and FLDFs) and 
MLDFs category. 
The results of preliminary post-hoc analysis of the relationship between strategic conformity and CSR in firms other 
than MLDFs -Panel A- and MLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is CSR representing is the rating of firm 
engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index. MarketFirm_Other is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 for MLDF, and 0 otherwise; MarketFirm_Market is an indicator variable that equals 0 for MLDF, and -1 
otherwise; StrategicConformity is the lagged value of the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies 
and these of other firms in its industry as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables CSR 
Panel A- Other firms category (Hybrid firms and FLDFs) 
MarketFirm_Other -0.130*** 
 (0.0392) 
StrategicConformity 0.0485*** 
 (0.0111) 
MarketFirm_Other × StrategicConformity -0.0282* 
 (0.0133) 
Constant -0.290* 
 (0.146) 
Panel B- MLDFs category 
MarketFirm_Market -0.130*** 
 (0.0392) 
StrategicConformity 0.0203* 
 (0.0109) 
MarketFirm_Market × StrategicConformity -0.0282* 
 (0.0133) 
Constant -0.359* 
 (0.145) 
Observations 3200 
Industry Effect Yes 
Year Effect Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.135 
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Table 5.15 - Robustness test (Reduced sample). 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis using a reduced sample, excluding hybrid firms. The dependent variable is 
CSR representing is the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index. FamilyFirm is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm logic orientation value is 1 presenting the familiness logic orientation of 
FLDFs, and 0 if the firm logic orientation value is 3 presenting the marketness logic orientation of MLDFs; 
StrategicConformity is the lagged value of the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies and these of 
other firms in its industry as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; 
Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; DivedendPayout 
is the cash dividend pay-out as cash dividends divided by firm’s total assets; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt 
scaled by firm’s total assets; Performance is the firm accounting-based performance measured by return on assets as 
income before extraordinary items divided by firm’s total assets; SlackResources is the current ratio as current assets 
divided by current liabilities; AdvertisingExpenditure is the ratio of advertising expense to firm’s sales; 
CapitalExpenditure is the ratio of capital expense to firm’s sales; SGAExpenditure is the ratio of selling, general and 
administrative expense to firm’s total assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; 
ShortIncentive is the CEO incentive of short-term focus measured by the ratio of bonus earned by CEO to total 
compensation; LongIncentive the CEO incentive of long-term focus measured by the ratio of equity-based pay, 
granted restricted stock and option awards, to total compensation; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as 
a fraction of shares outstanding as the number of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; 
ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; 
ExecutiveGender is an indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise; Duality is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; 
BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside (independent) directors on the board as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables CSR 
FamilyFirm 0.197** 
 (0.0745) 
StrategicConformity 0.0510* 
 (0.0227) 
FamilyFirm × StrategicConformity 0.0454+ 
 (0.0247) 
FirmSize  0.223*** 
 (0.0193) 
Risk -1.142+ 
 (0.597) 
DividendPayout  4.903** 
 (1.535) 
Debt 0.319 
 (0.251) 
Performance 0.324 
 (0.398) 
SlackResources  -0.0202 
 (0.0201) 
AdvertisingExpenditure 3.930* 
 (1.783) 
CapitalExpenditure 0.378 
 (0.337) 
SGAExpenditure -0.109 
 (0.217) 
FreeCashFlow 0.485+ 
 (0.257) 
ShortIncentive  0.398* 
 (0.197) 
LongIncentive  0.123 
 (0.161) 
ExecutiveOwnership -1.218 
 (0.840) 
ExecutiveAge 0.00160 
 (0.00463) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.00572 
 (0.00457) 
ExecutiveGender -0.345+ 
 (0.192) 
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Duality  0.0702 
 (0.0667) 
BoardIndependence  0.929*** 
 (0.278) 
Constant -1.073* 
 (0.483) 
Observations 1374 
Industry Effect Yes 
Year Effect Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.239 
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Table 5.16 - Post-hoc regression for MLDFs category and FLDFs category. 
The results of robustness post-hoc analysis of the relationship between strategic conformity and CSR in MLDFs -
Panel A- and FLDFs -Panel B. The dependent variable is CSR representing is the rating of firm engagement in CSR 
measured by the composite net CSR index. FamilyFirm_Market is an indicator variable that equals 1 for FLDF, and 
0 for MLDF; FamilyFirm_Family is an indicator variable that equals 0 for FLDF, and -1 for MLDF; 
StrategicConformity is the lagged value of the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies and these of 
other firms in its industry as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables CSR 
Panel A- MLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Market 0.224** 
 (0.0775) 
StrategicConformity 0.0251+ 
 (0.0141) 
FamilyFirm_Market × StrategicConformity 0.0492+ 
 (0.0253) 
Constant -0.602** 
 (0.222) 
Panel B- FLDFs category 
FamilyFirm_Family 0.224** 
 (0.0775) 
StrategicConformity  0.0723** 
 (0.0223) 
FamilyFirm_Family × StrategicConformity 0.0492+ 
 (0.0253) 
Constant -0.379+ 
 (0.222) 
Observations 1374 
Industry Effect Yes 
Year Effect Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.163 
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Table 5.17 - Robustness test (Family status of ownership). 
The results of OLS multivariate analysis the family ownership status indicator. The dependent variable is CSR 
representing is the rating of firm engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index. FamilyFirm is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 for family firm, and 0 otherwise; StrategicConformity is the lagged value of the 
extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset strategies and these of other firms in its industry as a proximal 
measure of firm legitimacy; FirmSize is the natural logarithm of firm’s sales; Risk is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over a 12-month period preceding year end; DivedendPayout is the cash dividend pay-out as 
cash dividends divided by firm’s total assets; Debt is the debt ratio as long-term debt scaled by firm’s total assets; 
Performance is the firm accounting-based performance measured by return on assets as income before extraordinary 
items divided by firm’s total assets; SlackResources is the current ratio as current assets divided by current liabilities; 
AdvertisingExpenditure is the ratio of advertising expense to firm’s sales; CapitalExpenditure is the ratio of capital 
expense to firm’s sales; SGAExpenditure is the ratio of selling, general and administrative expense to firm’s total 
assets; FreeCashFlow is the cash holdings scaled by firm’s total assets; ShortIncentive is the CEO incentive of 
short-term focus measured by the ratio of bonus earned by CEO to total compensation; LongIncentive the CEO 
incentive of long-term focus measured by the ratio of equity-based pay, granted restricted stock and option awards, to 
total compensation; ExecutiveOwnership is the shares held by CEO as a fraction of shares outstanding as the number 
of CEO shareholdings divided by total number of outstanding shares; ExecutiveAge is the age of CEO; 
ExecutiveTenure is the number of years a CEO has been in firm’s position; ExecutiveGender is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if CEO is male, and 0 otherwise; Duality is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm’s CEO and board 
chairman positions are occupied by the CEO, and 0 otherwise; BoardIndependence is the percentage of outside 
(independent) directors on the board as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the 
board. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables CSR 
FamilyFirm 0.0497 
 (0.0710) 
StrategicConformity  0.0308* 
 (0.0139) 
FamilyFirm × StrategicConformity 0.0512* 
 (0.0249) 
FirmSize  0.193*** 
 (0.021) 
Risk -0.489 
 (0.531) 
DividendPayout  6.592*** 
 (1.505) 
Debt 0.163 
 (0.242) 
Performance 0.485 
 (0.315) 
SlackResources  -0.0592** 
 (0.0216) 
AdvertisingExpenditure 7.928*** 
 (1.985) 
CapitalExpenditure 0.734* 
 (0.318) 
SGAExpenditure 0.0656 
 (0.200) 
FreeCashFlow 0.880** 
 (0.283) 
ShortIncentive  0.184 
 (0.164) 
LongIncentive  0.183 
 (0.137) 
ExecutiveOwnership -1.044 
 (1.008) 
ExecutiveAge -0.00164 
 (0.00481) 
ExecutiveTenure -0.00476 
 (0.00414) 
ExecutiveGender -0.259+ 
 (0.149) 
Duality  0.110+ 
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 (0.0608) 
BoardIndependence  0.624* 
 (0.273) 
Constant -0.812+ 
 (0.417) 
Observations 2347 
Industry Effect Yes 
Year Effect Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.259 
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Table 5.18 - Post-hoc regressions for non-family firms category and family firms category. 
The results of robustness post-hoc analysis of the relationship between strategic conformity and CSR in non-family 
firms -Panel A- and family firms -Panel B. The dependent variable is CSR representing is the rating of firm 
engagement in CSR measured by the composite net CSR index. FamilyFirm_Non-family is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 for family firm, and 0 otherwise; FamilyFirm_Family is an indicator variable that equals 0 for family firm, 
and -1 otherwise; StrategicConformity is the lagged value of the extent of similarity between a focal firm’s asset 
strategies and these of other firms in its industry as a proximal measure of firm legitimacy.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for clustering by firm. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Variables CSR 
Panel A- Non-family firms category 
FamilyFirm_Non-family 0.143* 
 (0.0719) 
StrategicConformity 0.0386+ 
 (0.0208) 
FamilyFirm_Non-family × StrategicConformity 0.0374 
 (0.0249) 
Constant -0.396* 
 (0.179) 
Panel B- Family firms category 
FamilyFirm_Family 0.143* 
 (0.0719) 
StrategicConformity 0.0459** 
 (0.0139) 
FamilyFirm_Family × StrategicConformity 0.0374 
 (0.0249) 
Constant -0.353* 
 (0.175) 
Observations 2347 
Industry Effect Yes 
Year Effect Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.161 
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6 Conclusion 
The extant literature has extensively investigated the difference in practices and decisions 
among firms. This differentiation has been commonly linked to the family ownership status (or 
not) of firms. Friedland and Alford (1991) explain such a discrepancy by introducing the notion 
of ILs as a proxy for firm behaviour, where they covertly embed in firm decision making, and in 
turn, drive firm behaviour. ILs underpin the culture and nature of firms as they provide the 
prescriptions and means of appropriate behaviour, shaping firm practices and decisions (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Danisman et al., 2006; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2011).  
Emphasising the role of ILs as latent drivers of firm behaviour, in this thesis, I 
emphasised and operationalised both family and market logics. To differentiate among and 
classify firms, I relied on the SEW perspective concerning the non-economic utilities of key 
firm actors attached to the firm that present a key reference point of firm practices and 
decisions. SEW is a main distinguishing factor that captures the uniqueness of family firm 
behaviour, which has grabbed a growing attention in the family business literature. Specifically, 
drawing on the concern for SEW preservation, I identified and classified firms according to real 
firm practices and decisions. In doing so, this thesis differentiates itself from the the extant 
family-oriented studies that have widely emphsised the ownership criteria in terms of ownership 
status (family or not), which is believed to overlook the importance of firm behaviour.  
Investigating the discrepancy in firm behaviour among firms, in this thesis, I introduced 
the concept of firm logic orientation, which depicts and defines the firm type in terms of the 
logic-based group regarding the embeddedness of family and market logics by which a firm is 
driven. Particularly, I presented the constructs of familiness and non-familiness, or marketness. 
In doing so, I developed an index of the logic orientation of firms and came up with an 
institutional-based classification of FLDFs, hybrid firms and MLDFs based on several 
behavioural dimensions.  
Building on the SEW preservation perspective, in this thesis, I portrayed FLDFs and 
MLDFs as behaving similarly to family and non-family firms, respectively, in terms of their 
motives, objectives and essence. Primarily, I depicted MLDFs as shareholder-oriented firms that 
prioritise the primary economic business objective of profitability and shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation, demonstrating an archetypal business setting. In contrast, presenting a different 
business setting, FLDFs display a family-oriented attitude and preference in terms of prioritising 
the preservation of SEW derived from the firm, overlapping the family and business systems. 
Moreover, hybrid firms display an intersection between FLDFs and MLDFs regarding firm 
practices and decisions, overlapping family and market logics.  
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In this thesis, I shed light on the difference in firm practices and behaviour via several 
empirical windows, incorporating the role of ILs regarding the concept of distinction among 
firms. Particularly, emphasising the contexts of CG and CSR, I provided empirical evidence that 
ILs give a viable explanation for the discrepancy among firms concerning firm governance and 
social performance. Examining the association between firm logic orientation and CG, the first 
empirical chapter – Chapter 3 – has an important implication for discovering the difference 
between FLDFs and MLDFs regarding CG configurations.  
This study emphasised whether and how firm logic orientation influences the firm choice 
of internal CG configurations. In line with the ILs perspective, the structure of the board of 
directors and executive compensation plan showed to differ according to the logic orientation of 
firms, where family and market logics drive firm practices and decisions differently. Generally, 
I found that, compared with MLDFs, FLDFs exhibit a distinct choice of board size, board 
independence and executive compensation. Particularly, the boards of FLDFs are smaller and 
less independent relative to MLDFs. Moreover, compared with MLDFs, FLDFs pay lower total 
and equity-based compensation.  
Consistent with the CG deviance perspective (Aguilera et al., 2018), these findings 
implied a unique, potent identity of FLDFs stemming from the concern for SEW preservation, 
which yields their CG latitude. SEW represents the most prominent feature of family-oriented 
identity (Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014), which characterises FLDFs relative to MLDFs 
concerning SEW-related interest and goals. Accordingly, FLDFs appeared to undertake deviant, 
idiosyncratic CG practices relative to the dominant shareholder-oriented governance system in 
the name of preserving the non-economic benefits of firm’s key actors, including authority, 
control and power, job security and protection, reputation and prestige and social ties, closely 
attached to the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011a).  
As Ravasi and Schultz (2006) assert, firm identity is a sensemaking tool that interprets 
and gives meaning to firm behaviour. It defines what a firm is and how it wishes to be, 
determining firm interests and priorities (Glynn, 2008; Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014). Thus, the 
priority of SEW preservation primarily reflects a distinct identity of FLDFs in terms of SEW-
related concerns and goals. Therefore, according to Greenwood et al. (2011), FLDFs’ identity 
enacts conditions against, and in turn, resistance to the demands, standards and expectations of 
CG imposed by the prevailing governance practices, that is, the CG discretion of FLDFs.  
Stemming from the perspective of SEW preservation, the executives of FLDFs actively 
strive for maintaining or extending the non-economic benefits linked to the firm and mitigating 
the risk exposure of SEW. Accordingly, regarding CG configurations, they prefer and advocate 
configuring the board of directors and executive compensation in a way that facilitates or at 
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least does not hinder preserving their affective endowments. Specifically, this is related to 
limiting the monitoring and advising functions of the board in terms of smaller and less 
independent boards of FLDFs, as well as forgoing managerial remuneration and decoupling 
managerial performance and pay in terms of lower total and equity-based compensation, 
respectively.  
Similarly, for the controlling shareholders of FLDFs, the board of directors is a tool 
through which they fulfil their goals and preferences including both economic and non-
economic benefits, favouring smaller and less independent boards for more attainable 
negotiation, communication and control over management appointment and decisions. In 
addition, the dominant shareholders enforce their ownership and/or voting rights to support and 
protect managers, who in return advocate and carry out their interests and objectives, in the 
sense of a lax linkage between managerial performance and pay. As such, FLDFs showed to 
implement distinct CG practices relative to MLDFs, avoiding CG configurations that expose 
their non-economic utilities, such as authority and power, reputation and prestige, job security 
and protection and business networks, attached to the firm to risk. 
Further, building on the perspective of SEW preservation, the affective endowments 
derived from the firm pose a substantial incentive for both the managers and controlling 
shareholders of FLDFs to voluntarily serve as self-monitored stewards of the business. 
Particularly, FLDF managers effectively safeguard the firm financially, and as such, protect or 
expand their SEW, given the interdependence of firm’s financial status and SEW, as well as the 
dual financial and SEW-related risks borne by managers because of their undiversified financial 
wealth. Thus, preserving their both financial wealth and SEW, the managers of FLDFs are self-
incentivised to act efficiently and not opportunistically, given the managerial labour market 
competitiveness and the threat of takeover market.  
Likewise, given their large shareholdings that also endorse the SEW of authority and 
control, prestige and social ties, the dominant shareholders of FLDFs are self-motivated to 
closely and effectively monitor, assess and discipline top management, protecting their both 
economic and non-economic benefits linked to the firm. Concerning their respective controlling 
roles, this diminishes the need for large and independent boards and limits the necessity of high 
total compensation and equity-based compensation, justifying the discrepancy in CG 
configurations between FLDFs and MLDFs.  
Drawing on the difference in CG configurations between FLDFs and MLDFs, in this 
study, I provided the ILs, CG and family business scholars, as well as policymakers and 
regulators with a new institutional-based explanation for the difference in firm governance 
practices that expands the understanding of ILs and CG. The study has important implications 
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and feedback regarding the understanding and conceptualisation of the familiness and 
marketness of firms, applying the ILs perspective to identify and classify firms in terms of 
depicting and differentiating between family and non-family firm-like behaviours. Emphasising 
the SEW perspective, in this study, I incorporated ILs to primarily detect family-oriented firms 
and – by extension – their counterparts as a different manner for the distinction among firms; in 
doing so, I stressed family and market logics irrespective of ownership status (family or not).  
Moreover, building on the SEW preservation perspective, I established a quantitative 
approach to identify and assess the embeddedness of family and market logics. I incorporated 
several behavioural dimensions that capture variations among the logic-based groups of firms, 
generating an institutional-based classification of firms beyond the traditional understanding of 
the firm types relating to the ownership criteria. Further, I applied a distinct view of the 
familiness and marketness of firms to the CG context, revealing an impact of firm logic 
orientation on firm governance practices, namely the firm choice of internal CG configurations.  
Extending the argument on firm logic orientation as a latent explanatory institutional 
factor of CG configurations, the second empirical chapter – Chapter 4 – has an important 
implication for detecting the moderating role of firm logic orientation in relation to the CG 
determinant-configuration relationships. Given the association between firm logic orientation 
and CG configurations highlighted in the first empirical chapter – Chapter 3, this study 
addressed whether the effect of well-known CG determinants, including firm-specific, 
managerial and governance characteristics, on CG configurations is a function of or conditional 
by the firm type in terms of the logic-based group.  
It stressed the CG determinant-configuration relationships as a more subtle and in-depth 
manifestation of firm character – the logic orientation of firms – in firm behaviour. In other 
words, relative to the main effect of firm logic orientation addressed in the previous chapter, it 
emphasised the moderation effect of the logic orientation of firms – both familiness and 
marketness – on the relationship between CG determinants and configurations in terms of the 
board of directors structure and executive compensation design. In line with the perspective of 
ILs, the positive – as well as negative – effect of CG determinants on CG configurations showed 
to be a function of the logic orientation of firms, where family and market logics drive firm 
practices and decisions differently.  
To the extent that the CG determinant-configuration relationships are generally well-
established in the literature, they appeared to operate differently among firms that vary 
conceptually in terms of the embeddedness of family and market logics. Overall, I found that 
the familiness and marketness of firms have different effects on this relationship, where the 
familiness of firms lessens the positive relationship between CG determinants and 
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configurations compared with the marketness logic orientation. Specifically, emphasising the 
complexity of firm operations and monitoring and advising benefits, the positive effect on both 
board size and independence is less pronounced in FLDFs relative to MLDFs. This is also true 
for the negative effect of certain CG determinants on board size and independence. Similarly, 
for executive total and equity-based compensation, the positive effect of the scope of firm 
business, the effectiveness of the board structure and managerial entrenchment is mitigated in 
FLDF compared with MLDFs.  
As discussed earlier, in contrast to shareholder-oriented MLDFs, FLDFs exhibit a family-
oriented attitude and preference regarding prioritising the protection of the non-economic 
benefits of key firm actors, drawing on the perspective of SEW preservation. Given that SEW is 
the leading aspect of family-oriented identity (Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2014), the 
priority of SEW preservation posits a unique, influential identity of FLDFs. FLDFs’ identity 
enforces conditions against, and in turn, resistance to external demands and pressures 
(Greenwood et al., 2011) concerning CG in accordance with SEW-related interests and 
concerns.  
Thus, as mentioned above, these results indicated that such an identity drives the 
discretion of FLDFs over firm governance in the name of preserving SEW, yielding different, 
idiosyncratic governance practices relative to the dominant shareholder-oriented governance 
system, in line with the perspective of CG deviance (Aguilera et al., 2018). Stemming from the 
ILs perspective, the identity of FLDFs thereby serves as an organisational filter (Greenwood et 
al., 2011), which frames how firms fulfil and respond to the demands, standards and 
expectations of CG imposed by the prevailing governance system in compliance with the 
concern for SEW preservation.  
Particularly, emphasising the firm identity perspective, FLDFs apply an organisational 
filter between CG determinants and configurations, filtering the CG demands and pressures 
enforced by the dominant governance practices that contradict SEW-related interests and goals. 
Therefore, relative to MLDFs, FLDFs respond differently to CG determinants concerning CG 
configurations, where the CG practices of FLDFs are aligned with their priorities and interests 
regarding the SEW preservation, which reflects the characterisation and distinction of their 
identity, irrespective of the prevailing governance practices. Accordingly, limiting the 
relationship between CG determinants and configurations, FLDFs avoid undertaking CG 
practices that threaten SEW. In contrast, prioritising the profitability and shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation, MLDFs appear to obey the external demands and pressures imposed by the 
dominant shareholder-oriented governance system, given the overriding objective of CG 
regarding the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth. Thus, drawing on the firm theory and 
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market discipline perspectives, they undertake the dominant governance practices to avoid being 
disciplined by the market. 
Further, as FLDFs tend to implement CG practices that support their SEW-related goals, 
interests and concerns, which collectively demonstrate firm identity, FLDFs seem to adopt the 
response strategy of decoupling to the pressures, standards, and expectations of CG, responding 
distinctly to CG determinants regarding CG configurations. Specifically, FLDFs decouple CG 
configurations from their determinants, isolating themselves from the CG pressures and 
demands enforced by the prevailing governance practices if these conflict with their interest and 
undermine their priority of SEW preservation. That is, restraining the CG determinant-
configuration relationships, FLDFs refrain implementing CG practices that expose SEW to risk.  
Accordingly, by decoupling, FLDFs separate between the implemented and standard or 
normative structures (Tilcsik, 2010; Bromley and Powell, 2012) concerning CG. In other words, 
adopting decoupling response strategy, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs do not undertake the dominant 
governance practices at their operational level; instead, according to Mair et al. (2015), they 
conform to the minimum standards for legitimacy-seeking purposes. Thus, they depart from the 
prevailing governance system in the name of preserving SEW; consistent with the CG deviance 
perspective (Aguilera et al., 2018), this results in different, idiosyncratic governance practices.  
Moreover, as mentioned above, given the dual threat that FLDFs managers cope with and 
the interdependence of the financial standing of firms and SEW (Berrone et al., 2012; Miller 
and Le Breton‐Miller, 2014), the affective endowments linked to the firm self-motivate the 
managers of FLDFs to voluntarily serve as self-monitored stewards of the business. The 
economic and non-economic objectives can be fulfilled simultaneously, where preserving the 
SEW of key firm actors benefits the financial performance, and as such, financial status of the 
firm and vice versa. Preserving and extending the non-economic utilities derived from the firm 
– including authority and power, social ties, reputation and prestige and job security – entail, on 
the part of FLDF managers, making an extensive effort to run the business, effectively engaging 
with firm stakeholders and improving firm competitiveness and survival (Miller and Le Breton-
Miller, 2005; Cennamo et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012). Therefore, such interdependence 
of firm’s financial status and SEW provides FLDF managers with a substantial incentive to 
actively protect the firm business financially, and in turn, maintain the non-economic benefits 
attached to the firm for a win-win objective of shareholders and managers.  
Relatedly, unlike shareholders, managers are undiversified in their financial wealth. Their 
financial welfare is closely linked to their careers, which also grant reputation and prestige, 
authority and control, job security and protection and social ties. Accordingly, given the 
competitiveness of managerial labour market and the threat of takeover market, poor financial 
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performance has the potential of a dual threat that FLDF managers confront in terms of financial 
hardship and SEW loss (Berrone et al., 2012). Likewise, bearing both financial and SEW-
related risks poses a substantial incentive for FLDF managers to actively safeguard the firm 
financial, and consequently, protect their both economic and non-economic utilities derived 
from the firms. That is, emphasising the concern for preserving their SEW, the managers of 
FLDFs are self-incentivised to act efficiently and not opportunistically.  
This constrains the potential opportunistic behaviour of FLDF managers because the loss 
aversion of current SEW offsets the chase of future gains. Therefore, stemming from the SEW 
preservation perspective, the self-motivation of FLDF managers triggers their stewardship and, 
as van Aaken et al. (2017) assert, self-governance. This thereby underlies the substitution effect 
of SEW for the respective controlling roles of the board of directors and executive 
compensation (Williamson, 1983). In other words, the importance of the board of directors and 
executive compensation as internal CG configurations, regarding the roles of monitoring and 
advising, and managerial motivation and the alignment of interests, respectively, is alleviated in 
FLDFs where the preservation of SEW is a priority. Specifically, SEW plays a disciplinary role 
for the managers of FLDFs given the concern for protecting their affective endowments linked 
to the firm, leaving little room for internal CG configurations in terms of restricting the 
relationship between CG determinants and configurations. 
Irrespective of ownership status (family or not), the response of CG configurations to 
their determinants showed to differ as a function of or conditional by firm logic orientation. 
Given the empirical evidence of the difference in the choices of CG configurations between 
FLDFs and MLDFs addressed in the previous chapter, in this study, I directed attention to a 
further underlying explanation, highlighting the moderation effect of the logic orientation of 
firms on the CG determinant-configuration relationships. Drawing on the difference in CG 
determinant-configuration relationships between FLDFs and MLDFs, in this study, I provided 
ILs, CG and family business scholars, as well as policymakers and regulators with a new 
institutional-based explanation for the difference in firm governance practices, expanding the 
understanding of ILs and CG.   
Driving firm behaviour, the familiness logic orientation evidently differentiates firms 
from the standard, shareholder-oriented view of firms – the marketness logic orientation – 
which exhibits in, first, a different choice of internal CG configurations, and second, a different 
relationship between CG determinants and configurations. This can extend the knowledge of 
scholars, policymakers and regulators on ILs and CG. Primarily, they need to consider that, 
apart from family ownership status (or not), FLDFs prioritise the preservation of SEW, which 
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characterises a unique, potent firm identity, and in turn, interferes in the adoption of dominant 
shareholder-oriented governance practices, namely CG deviance.  
Stemming from the perspective of SEW preservation, FLDFs configure firm governance 
in a way that best fits them, highlighting FLDFs as a distinct business form or approach 
compared with shareholder-oriented MLDFs (Greenwood et al., 2010). Specifically, the above 
studies imply that the familiness logic orientation of firms portrays a family-oriented attitude 
and preference that prompt FLDFs’ tendency to depart from the archetypal shareholder-oriented 
business setting of MLDFs where a marketness logic orientation, underpinning the discrepancy 
in CG. This impacts the understanding and evaluation of firm strategies and practices, where the 
discrepancy among firms may be explained against market and government regulations and 
policies.  
Fundamentally, these studies can expand the understanding of firm governance among 
CG scholars, policymakers and regulators, giving them an insight that a single governance 
system does not fit all firms. However, the logic orientation of firms covertly plays a key role in 
configuring the CG of firms, shedding light on the influence of firm logic orientation on the 
firm choice of internal CG configurations, as well as CG determinant-configuration 
relationships given the variations among the logic-based groups of firms. Providing a different, 
institutional-based explanation for the discrepancy in CG among firms, this can help CG 
scholars, policymakers and regulators understand the role of ILs in triggering the differences in 
firm behaviour related to firm governance and develop CG research, regulations and policies. 
This indicates the importance to take into account the latent institutional factor of firm logic 
orientation to achieve a better understanding of firms and by extension firm practices and 
behaviour. 
Examining the association between firm logic orientation and CSR, the third empirical 
chapter – Chapter 5 – has a key implication for detecting the difference between FLDFs and 
MLDFs concerning CSR performance, as well as the moderating role of firm logic orientation 
regarding the strategic conformity-CSR relationship. This study emphasised whether and how 
firm logic orientation affects CSR performance in terms of the rating of firm engagement in 
CSR. Consistent with the perspective of ILs, CSR performance showed to vary according to the 
logic orientation of firms, where family and market logics shape firm practices and decisions 
distinctly. Overall, I found that the socially responsible practices of firms are associated with 
firm logic orientation. Specifically, relative to MLDFs, FLDFs showed to be less socially 
responsible, where FLDFs perform worse concerning CSR as the familiness of firms has a 
negative effect on CSR performance.  
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Moreover, this study also addressed the role of firm legitimacy as an input of firm social 
performance in terms of the impact of firm legitimacy on the impression of firms’ CSR. Further, 
extending the argument on the association between firm legitimacy and CSR, it emphasised 
whether the effect of strategic conformity – a legitimacy-seeking activity – on CSR performance 
is a function of or conditional by the firm type in terms of the logic-based group. It stressed the 
strategic conformity-CSR relationship as a more perceptive and in-depth articulation of firm 
character – the logic orientation of firms – in firm practices and decisions. In other words, 
relative to the main effect of firm logic orientation on CSR performance, it addressed the 
moderation effect of the logic orientation of firms – both familiness and marketness – on the 
relationship between strategic conformity and CSR performance regarding the evaluation of 
how firms perform in terms of the social and environmental impacts of their practices and 
decisions. 
Emphasising the firm legitimacy and isomorphism perspectives, the adoption of 
isomorphic practices, namely isomorphic strategies, to those of industry peers, as a legitimacy-
seeking activity, appeared to influence CSR performance. Further, this relationship showed to 
differ according to firm logic orientation. Particularly, I found that strategic conformity 
positively affects CSR performance in terms of improving the view of the CSR of firms, 
shedding light on the social gains that firms obtain from firm legitimation. Generally, stressing 
the incremental advantage of strategic conformity for CSR performance, I also found that the 
familiness and marketness of firms have different effects on such a relationship. In other words, 
the strategic conformity-CSR relationship appeared to operate differently among firms that vary 
conceptually in terms of the embeddedness of family and market logics. Specifically, compared 
with the marketness logic orientation, the familiness of firms amplifies this positive 
relationship, where the effect of strategic conformity on CSR performance is more pronounced 
in FLDFs relative to MLDFs.  
As mentioned above, building on the SEW perspective, FLDFs were characterised by the 
priority of SEW preservation as opposed to shareholder-oriented MLDFs. Given the 
multidimensional character of SEW, the SEW dimensions can be both positively and negatively 
valanced as they associate with pleasant (positive) and unpleasant (negative) emotions and 
consequences concerning firm stakeholders. The double-valanced nature of SEW dimensions 
thereby suggests an ambiguous nature of SEW (Kellermanns et al., 2012; Zientara, 2017). 
Stressing the essential SEW dimensions of firm reputation and prestige and social ties, FLDFs 
are effectively responsive to the interests and demands of external rather than internal 
stakeholders. As such, they burnish the image and reputation of firms with which firm’s key 
actors are closely identified, as well as sustain business networks by broadcasting their social 
and environmental contributions.  
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Moreover, considering another key SEW dimension of authority, power and control, 
FLDFs maintain such non-economic benefits in the hands of managers at the cost of internal 
stakeholders, namely employees. Thus, they abandon employees’ needs and concerns regarding 
promotions, appreciation of their competencies and potentials and involvement in decision 
making, while protecting the affective endowments of key firm actors in compliance with the 
family-oriented values and essence of nepotism and prejudice. Thus, given the concern for 
preserving the non-economic utilities derived from the firm, FLDFs treat the internal and 
external stakeholders unequally and unfairly, as well as discriminate among internal 
stakeholders themselves, implying the dark side of SEW (Kellermanns et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, this indicates that the SEW dimensions are contradictory from the perspective of 
CSR. 
Particularly, stressing different dimensions of SEW, FLDFs overlook the demands and 
interests of some internal stakeholders, while effectively considering the concerns and interests 
of external stakeholders, avoiding the non-economic benefits of key firm actors from being 
jeopardised (Cruz et al., 2014). Therefore, given the concern for SEW preservation, FLDFs can 
be both good and bad simultaneously, enforcing their self-serving and discriminatory 
behaviours as FLDFs respond to the interests and demands of firm stakeholders distinctly (Cruz 
et al., 2014). In other words, fulfilling SEW-related interests and goals, FLDFs behave both 
socially responsibly and irresponsibly at the same time, suggesting the corporate schizophrenia 
of FLDFs (Zientara, 2017).  
In consistency, given the priority of SEW preservation, FLDFs selectively and 
instrumentally undertake socially responsible practices, adopting an instrumental (selective) 
approach to CSR (Zientara, 2017). Specifically, FLDFs use CSR as a marketing or public 
relations tool to serve SEW-related interests and concerns. Consistent with this, FLDFs adopt a 
selective coupling response strategy to the demands and interests of firm stakeholders in terms 
of undertaking purposeful CSR initiatives and activities (Pache and Santos, 2013). By selective 
coupling, FLDFs implement socially responsible practices that best fit them in terms of aligning 
with firm’s self-interests related to SEW regarding obtaining or extending (alleviating) gains 
(losses) of SEW. That is, irrespective of the detriments and disadvantages for firm stakeholders, 
they disregard stakeholders’ interests and concerns whenever SEW is exposed to threat. In 
doing so, unlike MLDFs, FLDFs exhibit self-serving and discriminatory behaviours, where they 
carry out social practices and decisions at the expense of some firm stakeholders in a self-
serving manner.  
In contrast, drawing on the firm theory and market discipline perspectives, MLDFs adopt 
a strategic (normative) approach to CSR for the wider social good. Unlike FLDFs, MLDFs view 
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CSR as a core business strategy in terms of effectively and unselectively responding to the 
demands and concerns of firm stakeholders. In particular, MLDFs reconcile the corporate good 
with the social good in the sense that doing good, in terms of actively counting the social and 
environmental effects of firm practices and decisions, leads to doing better. They do so for the 
best interests of shareholders regarding shareholders’ wealth maximisation as they trigger the 
loyalty of and attract socially conscious investors and other stakeholders (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Nelson, 2004; Borghesi et al., 2014).  
As FLDFs act selectively and opportunistically, SEW has negative implications for the 
firm stakeholders of FLDFs. Particularly, this is in relation to less proactive stakeholder 
engagement and weak stakeholder management, where FLDFs act discriminatorily from the 
CSR perspective . Thus, drawing on the SEW’s dark side perspective (Kellermanns et al., 
2012), FLDFs are less socially responsible compared with MLDFs, where they perform worse 
concerning CSR in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR. That is, FLDFs confront the 
shadow of the dark side of SEW involving the self-serving behaviour that SEW triggers, as well 
as the resulting discriminatory behaviour towards firm stakeholders, which undermines the CSR 
performance of FLDFs relative to MLDFs. 
Emphasising the perspective of firm legitimacy, favourable firm reputation and 
stakeholders’ support are predictable valued consequences of firm legitimation that conveys the 
satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders regarding firm practices and behaviour. These 
socially constructed outcomes thereby improve firm competitiveness and survival by creating 
positive image and granting access to fundamental business resources – both financial and 
human capital – which contribute significantly to firm performance (Rao, 1994; Choi and 
Shepherd, 2005; Bitektine, 2011). Accordingly, drawing on the benefit and advantage of firm 
legitimacy, strategic conformity – a legitimacy-seeking activity – positively affects CSR 
performance regarding the evaluation of how firms perform in terms of the social and 
environmental impacts of their practices and decisions, given that both CSR and firm legitimacy 
connect to firm stakeholders as the recipients and social evaluators of firm practices and 
behaviour, respectively.  
Emphasising firm acceptance and approval concerning firm practices and decisions, firm 
legitimacy, as a survival-enhancing aspect, helps protect the conduct of firms from being 
mistrusted (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995). Thus, stressing the assumption that 
isomorphism – namely mimetic isomorphism – generates and improves firm legitimacy (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Deephouse and Carter, 2005), the adoption of isomorphic strategies helps 
firms enhance the perception of their CSR in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR. 
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This reveals the social gains of firms obtained from firm legitimacy, where strategic conformity 
has incremental value for CSR performance. 
Stemming from the difference in CSR performance between FLDFs and MLDFs, they are 
likely to vary in firm legitimation in relation to the satisfaction and endorsement of firm 
stakeholders concerning social practices and decisions. On the one hand, the firm legitimacy of 
MLDFs is taken for granted as they effectively strive for firm’s social validation. As outlined 
above, drawing on the firm theory and market discipline perspectives, they actively seek the 
firm acceptance and approval conferred by firm stakeholders regarding the appropriateness and 
properness of firm practices and decisions. Therefore, stressing CSR initiatives and activities, 
MLDFs effectively consider the interests and concerns of all firm stakeholders, consistent with 
the strategic whole-business view of responsibility. Specifically, they keenly count the social 
and environmental consequences of their practices and decisions. In doing so, MLDFs adopt the 
strategic approach to CSR, reconciling the corporate good with the social good for the best 
benefit of shareholders in terms of maximising shareholders’ wealth.  
On the other hand, adopting an instrumental approach to CSR, FLDFs lack firm 
legitimacy in accordance with the dark side of SEW involving their self-serving and 
discriminatory behaviours, which prompts the imprudence, guiltiness and suspiciousness of 
FLDFs in the eyes of firm stakeholders. Particularly, emphasising social practices and decisions, 
the discrimination among internal stakeholders themselves, as well as the unequal and unfair 
treatment of internal and external stakeholders impose the firm stakeholders’ view of the poor 
publicity, negative image and unfavourable reputation of FLDFs regarding firm engagement in 
CSR. As such, stressing the satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders, the legitimation 
of FLDFs is deficient.  
Drawing on the discrepancy in firm legitimacy associated with the aforesaid difference in 
CSR performance, the social gains of firms that firm legitimation triggers differ between FLDFs 
and MLDFs. In particular, given their taken-for-granted legitimation, MLDFs do not further 
benefit from strategic conformity regarding CSR performance as they normally possess the 
benefit and value of firm legitimacy in relation to the socially constructed outcomes. Whereas, 
given their lack of firm legitimation, strategic conformity has a substantial incremental value for 
the CSR performance of FLDFs relative to MLDFs. Moreover, lacking firm legitimacy, FLDFs 
are seemingly rewarded for seeking legitimacy in terms of enhancing the view of their CSR. 
This is in accordance with the perceived firm legitimacy and its predictable significant 
outcomes, in terms of favourable firm reputation and stakeholders’ support, that convey the 
satisfaction and endorsement of firm stakeholders regarding firm practices and behaviour.  
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Further, as CSR serves as a strategy for achieving firm legitimacy (Du and Vieira, 2012; 
Zheng et al., 2015), the perception of firm legitimacy through strategic conformity infers the 
potential of firm engagement in CSR to maintain such firm legitimation, enhancing the view of 
firms’ CSR in terms of the rating of firm engagement in CSR. Unlike MLDFs, FLDFs view 
CSR as marketing or public relations instrument rather than a core business strategy. Thus, such 
an inference from seeking legitimacy through the adoption of isomorphic strategies is of more 
interest to FLDFs compared with MLDFs. This is because FLDFs are less socially responsible, 
and in turn, less legitimate relative to MLDFs, where, as mentioned earlier, they undertake CSR 
initiatives and activities selectively and instrumentally to serve SEW-related interests and goals, 
adopting an instrumental rather than strategic approach to CSR.  
Accordingly, strategic conformity, as a legitimacy-seeking activity, has a substantial 
incremental advantage for the CSR performance of FLDFs. In other words, seeking legitimacy 
through adopting isomorphic strategies more likely helps enhance the impression of the CSR of 
FLDFs compared with MLDFs. That is, legitimacy-seeking activities, specifically strategic 
conformity, work best for FLDFs. Thus, the impact of firm legitimacy on the perception of 
firms’ CSR varies according to firm logic orientation. Particularly, relative to the marketness 
logic orientation, the familiness of firms amplifies the positive effect of strategic conformity on 
CSR performance. 
Following Salomon and Wu (2012), FLDFs perhaps implement an isomorphism strategy 
in terms of mimicking firm practices to mitigate the distance to, or discrepancy from, other 
firms – industry peers – striving for firm legitimacy. Thus, adopting such a mitigating strategy, 
they effectively can overcome the difficulties and disadvantages resulting from SEW’s dark 
side, where firm legitimacy helps them create desirable image and obtain access to essential 
business resources, as well as a long-term relationship with firm stakeholders that significantly 
contribute to firm performance ,and as such, enhance the firm competitiveness and survival.  
Therefore, conforming to industry peers, FLDFs perhaps attempt to deliberately do things 
simply better to obtain firm legitimacy of which they expect a vital benefit and advantage 
related to the predictable valued socially constructed outcomes of favourable firm reputation 
and stakeholders’ support. This, in turn, has an incremental advantage of improving the 
perception of firms’ CSR, given that firm legitimacy presents a survival-enhancing feature 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995), which helps keep FLDFs from having their 
conduct, specifically firm engagement in CSR, questioned or mistrusted.  
Stressing the isomorphism attempts, strategic conformity helps offset the otherwise 
negative effect of the familiness of firms on CSR performance imposed by the dark side of 
SEW. Therefore, stressing the firm legitimacy perspective, this provides an insight into a 
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channel through which FLDFs can manage to mitigate their negative publicity, negative image 
and poor reputation concerning firm engagement in CSR, given the shadow of the dark side of 
SEW deteriorating proactive stakeholder engagement and challenging stakeholder management 
. 
Building on the discrepancy in CSR performance among the logic-based groups of firms, 
in this study, I provided ILs, CSR and family business scholars, as well as policymakers and 
regulators, with a new institutional-based explanation for the difference in socially responsible 
practices among firms that develop the understanding of ILs and CSR. Specifically, stressing 
the ILs perspective, I applied a distinct view of the familiness and marketness of firms to the 
CSR context. I further addressed the influence of firm logic orientation on CSR regarding the 
evaluation of how firms perform on the ESG performance benchmarks relating to the social and 
environmental impacts of firm practices and decisions. Drawing on the difference in CSR 
performance among firms, the study has important implications and feedback for scholars, 
policymakers and regulators regarding the understanding and conceptualisation of the familiness 
and marketness of firms.  
Driving firm behaviour, the familiness logic orientation apparently distinguishes firms 
from the standard, shareholder-oriented view of firms – the marketness logic orientation – 
which reveals a different CSR performance. This study can extend the knowledge of scholars, 
policymakers and regulators on ILs and CSR. Primarily, they need to consider that, apart from 
family ownership status (or not), FLDFs prioritise SEW-related interests and goals, which 
outweigh the demands and concerns of firm stakeholders, and as such, overlook the prominence 
of CSR. In this study, I mainly directed attention to the shadow of the dark side of SEW and its 
detrimental outcomes for firm stakeholders.  
Stemming from the SEW preservation perspective, FLDFs engage in CSR in a way that 
best fits them, highlighting FLDFs as a distinct business form or approach relative to 
shareholder-oriented MLDFs (Greenwood et al., 2010). Specifically, the study indicates that the 
familiness logic orientation of firms displays a family-oriented attitude and preference that 
trigger FLDFs’ propensity to depart from the typical shareholder-oriented business setting of 
MLDFs where a marketness logic orientation, primarily underlying the difference in CSR. This 
affects the understanding and evaluation of firm strategies and practices, where the difference 
among firms may be justified against market and government regulations and policies.  
Fundamentally, this study can expand the understanding of firm engagement in CSR 
among CSR scholars, policymakers and regulators, providing them with an insight that firms 
can be selective in terms of CSR initiatives and activities. Mainly, the firm logic orientation of 
firms implicitly plays a key role in undertaking social practices and decisions, highlighting the 
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effect of the logic orientation of firms on the socially responsible practices given the difference 
in CSR performance among the logic-based groups of firms. Providing a distinct, institutional-
based explanation for the discrepancy in CSR among firms, this can help CSR scholars, 
policymakers and regulators understand the role of ILs in prompting the discrepancies in firm 
behaviour related to firm engagement in CSR and develop CSR research, regulations and 
policies. This implies the importance to deliberate the latent institutional factor of firm logic 
orientation to achieve a better understanding of firms and by extension firm practices and 
behaviour. 
Emphasising the firm legitimacy and isomorphism perspectives, in this study, I also 
provided important feedback for firm legitimacy scholars in terms of the social gains that firms 
obtain from firm legitimacy. Given the expected significant socially constructed consequences 
of firm legitimacy, FLDFs show to improve the view of their CSR, stressing their isomorphism 
attempts relating to the adoption of isomorphic strategies. Accordingly, this study can give them 
insight and advance their understanding of firm legitimacy as an explanatory factor of CSR 
performance, emphasising CSR from a different perspective that stresses a subjective 
assessment of CSR initiatives and activities, which represents the evaluation of how firms 
perform on a number of ESG categories addressed by ESG performance indicators. Specifically, 
given the ESG performance benchmarks, these indicators encompass the social and 
environmental effects of firm practices and decisions in relation to ESG strengths and concerns 
addressed by each category.  
Given the worse CSR performance of FLDFs, the familiness logic orientation has a 
different, amplifying effect relative to the marketness of firms on the positive strategic 
conformity-CSR relationship, alleviating the otherwise negative effect of familiness on CSR 
performance. Therefore, stressing the SEW’s dark side perspective, the study can expand the 
understanding of scholars, policymakers and regulators of the underlying goal of, perhaps, the 
purposeful isomorphism attempts of FLDFs regarding the adoption of isomorphic strategies, 
namely asset strategies, to those of industry peers.  
Given the social gains of firms that firm legitimation triggers in terms of improving the 
perception of firms’ CSR, seeking legitimacy regarding the adoption of isomorphic practices 
represents a channel that helps FLDFs alleviate their negligence, guiltiness and suspiciousness 
in the eyes of firm stakeholders in relation to the dark side of SEW. This gives an insight that 
FLDFs effectively manage the shadow of SEW’s dark side. In other words, emphasising the 
isomorphism attempts, FLDFs overcome the shadow of the dark side of SEW, in terms of their 
bad publicity, negative image and unfavourable reputation regarding firm engagement in CSR, 
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by adopting isomorphic strategies, specifically strategic conformity, that improves the 
impression of their CSR. 
Irrespective of family ownership status (or not), FLDFs and MLDFs appeared to adopt 
CG practices resembling those implemented by archetypal family and non-family firms, 
respectively. Moreover, FLDFs and MLDFs displayed CSR performance similar to that of 
genuine family and non-family firms, respectively. Highlighting a different view of the 
familiness and marketness of firms, FLDFs and MLDFs, as such, respectively match family-
owned or managed and non-family firms in terms of firm practices and decisions, displaying 
family and non-family firm-like behaviours, respectively. Regarding the underlying concept of 
family logic, it suggests a family-oriented flavour and essence in terms of the priority of SEW 
preservation as opposed to the core of market logic, which lies in the priority of profitability and 
shareholders’ wealth maximisation. Accordingly, drawing on the popular SEW model, in this 
thesis, I explained that FLDFs structure the boards and plan executive compensation in a way 
that complies with and preserves or extends the non-economic benefits of firms’ key actors 
derived from the firm, mitigating the risk exposure of SEW. Likewise, I explained that FLDFs 
undertake CSR initiatives and activities in a way that best aligns with and protects or expands 
the non-economic utilities of key firm actors attached to the firm, avoiding the potential loss of 
SEW. 
Given the logic orientation of firms, in this thesis, I provided empirical evidence that 
firms vary in internally configuring the firm business in terms of firm governance; this was 
found in the firm choice of internal CG configurations and the relationship between established 
CG determinants and configurations, as well as firm engagement in CSR; this was found in the 
CSR performance of firms and the interplay of firm logic orientation, firm legitimacy and CSR. 
This approves the role of ILs as being latent drivers of firm behaviour. Importantly, such 
evidence draws attention to and supports the introduced notion of firm logic orientation and 
approves the functionality of familiness and marketness constructs, differentiating among firms 
in terms of firm governance and social performance. In this way, in this thesis, I suggested a 
different classification of firms and a distinct view of their familiness and marketness. The key 
idea is that, stressing the embeddedness of family and market logics, firms differ in the culture 
and nature of running a business that implicitly embed in their decision making, and as such, 
shape and explain the differences in firm practices and decisions; this is primarily a hidden 
logic-based root. Thus, this thesis emphasises that it is not family ownership status (or not), but 
the firm practices and behaviour that characterise and define firms in terms of their distinctive 
culture and nature.   
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Consistent with the institutional theory assumption on the isomorphism or similarity of 
firms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1987), firms behave similarly given 
the case of CG and CSR, where – at the firm level – they can be grouped as FLDFs, hybrid 
firms or MLDFs considering the embeddedness of family and market logics. Building on the 
ILs perspective, in this thesis, I pointed out that the embeddedness of such logics defines and 
determines the firm type, whether or not a firm is family-oriented. This emphasises that there is 
a distinction among firms in terms of actual firm practices and decisions beyond the traditional 
ownership criteria. Presenting the core of the main institutions of society that guide social 
actions (Thornton, 2004), ILs proxy for firm behaviour as they tacitly embed in firm decision 
making, and in turn, shape firm practices and decisions that tangibly demonstrate the latent 
institutional factor – the logic orientation of firms (Friedland and Alford, 1991). ILs provide 
taken-for-granted, resilient prescriptions and guidance that help make sense of social actors’ 
practices, defining and setting the means of appropriate behaviour (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; 
Greenwood et al., 2011).  
Thus, emphasising the contexts of CG and CSR, the firm practices and decisions of 
FLDFs and MLDFs are basically tangible manifestation of embedded family and market logics, 
respectively, that trigger the discrepancy in firm behaviour. Drawing on the increasingly 
growing concept of SEW in the family business literature (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et 
al., 2012), in this thesis, I introduced and empirically proved the functionality of the 
institutional-based classification that identifies and classifies firms irrespective of ownership 
status (family or not), emphasising the display of family and non-family firm-like behaviours 
and incorporating the firm practices of corporate diversification, earnings management, tax 
aggressiveness and R&D investment.  
Accordingly, I suggested a distinct view of the familiness and marketness of firms, 
identifying and classifying them in a different manner from the conventional understanding and 
classification of firms widely emphasised in ownership-based studies. Drawing on the 
perspectives of ILs and SEW, in this thesis, I mainly asserted commonalities and similarities 
between FLDFs (MLDFs) and family (non-family) firms in terms of their motives, objectives 
and essence. Thus, I showed that family and non-family firm-like behaviours respectively 
represent demonstrations of family and market logics embedded in firm decision making apart 
from family ownership status (or not). 
Importantly, in this thesis, I addressed the advantage of the institutional-based 
classification of firms as a simpler, faster and smarter approach relative to the conventional 
ownership-based classification. The traditional, widely used classification of family and non-
family firms requires time and effort spent browsing the proxy statements and annual reports of 
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firms to find out about ownership status (family or not). In contrast, the new, institutional-based 
classification of firms is basically an accounting-based process that emphasises real firm 
practices and decisions. Particularly, it incorporates several behavioural dimensions measured 
using financial data easily accessible through various databases, drawing mainly on the extant 
family business research. 
The thesis provides a conceptual and analytical framework to guide future research 
concerning firm behaviour and performance, advancing the understanding and conceptualisation 
of firm type. Unlike ownership-based studies, it sheds light on the role of ILs as covert drivers 
of firm behaviour to identify and differentiate among the logic-based groups of firms, 
highlighting a distinct view of the familiness and marketness of firms. It empirically showed 
that the embeddedness of ILs, namely family and market logics, or so-called firm logic 
orientation matters at least as much as ownership status (family or not) for firm practices and 
decisions. 
 Thus, future research should accommodate ILs in empirical models. One direction for 
further research is to revisit the key empirical questions, commonly referring to family or 
professional ownership, under the newly proposed lens of ILs as a latent explanatory – 
institutional – factor. Thus, it would be possible to discover and explain the areas of difference 
among firms from an institutional perspective. Applying the notion of firm logic orientation, a 
forthcoming study can investigate firm financial performance among the logic-based groups of 
firms, given the difference in CG configurations and CSR performance between FLDFs and 
MLDFs. Further research can also examine other firm aspects, such as agency costs, 
productivity, CSR reporting and marketing practices, as areas of focus in the extant literature. 
Moreover, it would be interesting to study whether the logic orientation of firms explains 
strategic conduct or strategic management choices, such as dividend policy, capital structure and 
mergers and acquisitions strategies.  
Stemming from the quantitative measurement of the embeddedness of family and market 
logics, future research can emphasise the discrepancy within FLDFs and MLDFs themselves in 
relation to the behavioural dimensions, considering the differences in the incorporated firm 
practices that underlie the view and determination of the familiness and marketness of firms. 
The thesis can also give scholars insight to conduct future research stressing other nonmarket 
logics of the main institutions or societal sectors of society, such as state or religion, in which 
firms exist and operate. This can aid in providing quantitative measurement and empirical 
examination of the relative effects on firm behaviour. 
One of the key points that could limit the precision of the work of this thesis is that the 
analysis was US-based. The cultural element in business research is crucial, and it is 
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increasingly accepted as a significant point of reference for global research. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that the data and analysis would be influenced by using a sample 
comprising US firms. Particularly, the US context presents a highly capitalistic, market-driven 
business environment where the distinction between family and business (non-family) systems 
concerning firm practices and decisions could be more subtle relative to, for instance, the Italian 
context, calling into question the institutional-based classification of sample firms.  
This, as a matter of fact, makes it more difficult and challenging to run the analysis and 
obtain promising results. However, in applying the institutional-based approach to identify and 
classify firms in a different global context, for instance, that of Italy or Kuwait, the difference 
among firms, family and non-family, would be more remarkable. As a result, the distinction can 
become easier in terms of characterising and defining firms in relation to firm behaviour, and as 
such, defining and determining the firm type regarding firm logic orientation. This is a 
limitation that highlights an opportunity for future research to conduct a global study examining 
the phenomenon in different countries.
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